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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation focuses on the animated, charcoal, hand-drawn films of William 
Kentridge‟s Drawings for Projection series (1989—2003).  At the beginning of this study, 
Kentridge‟s films are positioned as a dialectic of self and memory as embodied in a 
post-colonial South African setting.  The series itself was selected as being 
representative of his artistic oeuvre. They are a closed-ended narrative, using a ground-
breaking animation technique, created by the artist himself (Christov-Bakargiev 1998; 
Godby 1982). They were made by Kentridge during a specific South African cultural and 
historical period: beginning with Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, made in 
1989 at the height of apartheid; through to Tide Table, made in 2003 at the beginning of 
post post-apartheid South Africa. The hypothesis presented is that Kentridge‟s films 
have memory as their main theme. Memory itself takes different forms, and the 
discourse of memory deals with, for instance: memorialisation; repressed memories; 
traumatic memories; the unconscious and memories; and “postmemory”.  How he 
depicts memories of his own and those of others is at the centre of this research.  Using 
qualitative research methodology, with contextualisation (socio-historical and cultural) 
and comparative studies (apartheid and the Holocaust; different artistic representations 
of memory, for example Pascal Croci and William Kentridge; and Anselm Kiefer and 
William Kentridge) being part of the research design, this thesis has sought to 
substantiate this hypothesis.  Further substantiation and clarification has been 
expounded by referencing seminal works in the field, such as those of Sigmund Freud 
(1899: “screen memories”; 1917: trauerarbeit); Roland Barthes (1981: the punctum / 
spacio-temporal continuum); Pierre Nora (1989: “lieux de mémoiré” / “sites of memory”); 
Henri Raczymow (1994: “memoire trouée” / “memory shot through with holes”); Richard 
Terdiman (1993: poesis); Marianne Hirsch (1997: “postmemory”); and Hayden White 
(1996: historical metafiction); among others. There have already been numerous 
references to how William Kentridge has depicted the ephemeral nature of memory / 
memories (Boris 2001; Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee, 1999; Christov-
Bakargiev 1998; Sitas 2001).  However an in-depth, hermeneutic, comparative analysis 
has not yet been undertaken. This study is therefore significant in that it explicates 
William Kentridge‟s works, making the following contributions: to the scholarship on 
Kentridge‟s work; to a South African perspective to the growing field of trauma studies; 
and to the apartheid and post-apartheid reflections on re-remembering and forgetting, 
memorialisation, forgiveness and guilt. Through socio-cultural and historical 
comparisons as well as artistic contrasts, the films themselves are acknowledged as an 
important source of reference of South African society. They are a documentation of life 
lived during apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. 
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TERMINOLOGICAL SYNOPSES OF CONCEPTS  
As this study of William Kentridge’s animated films is so eclectic, a brief summation 
of the most important terms / concepts has been provided up front here. 
absent memory (Sicher 2004) 
Efraim Sicher coined this term to describe memories that are “transferred” to those 
that were not present first-hand (2004).  This term is used to describe how 
Kentridge has adopted memories not of his own, and, through his identification with 
them, how he has portrayed them in his art works.  He has appropriated the 
documented / recounted traumatic memories of others and attempted to portray 
them in his artistic endeavours. 
anamnesis 
William Kentridge defines this concept as a healing through remembering (cf. Boris 
2001:33).  His character Soho/Felix remembers both his own memories and those 
of others.  However, although it is assumed, it remains an unanswered question as 
to whether these “memories” have actually resulted in Kentridge’s protagonist, 
Soho/Felix, being healed. 
“anti-narrative non-stories” (White 1996) 
Hayden White suggests that “anti-narrative non-stories” as found in filmic and 
literary forms are non-linear stories that do not represent historical events as fixed 
narratives (1996). Rather they are open-ended, mixed narratives, somewhat 
chaotic and even surreal at times.  White argues that these anti-narratives are 
William Kentridge: Terminological synopses of concepts 
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more realistic in the portrayal of remembered events because memories are also 
recalled in such a manner.   This is appropriate for describing William Kentridge’s 
animated films as he tries to draw or present memory and history as it is thought 
and remembered. 
chronotope (Bakhtin 1981) 
It has been posited by many authors that memories are structured through the 
means of certain cultural conventions (Antze and Lambek 1996; Kirmayer 1996; 
Lambek 1996).  Mikhail Bahktin identified what he termed the “chronotope” as one 
of these cultural conventions (1981).  He specifically used it in language analysis 
and defined it as a space-time continuum / narrative, explaining that they are 
interdependent.  Michael Lambek has used it to explain how memories are linked 
to their recounting.  (See Chapter Five: Memory of this dissertation.) 
disremembering (Kentridge 2001; Rollet 2007) 
William Kentridge refers to “forgetting” as “disremembering”.  He uses the word to 
emphasise that “forgetting” is a conscious act; one chooses what to remember and 
what to forget.  Author Sylvie Rollet has used the word (2007) in a similar way (see 
Chapter Eight: Memory, History, Identity, Time and Space). 
fortuna (Kentridge 2001) 
William Kentridge has described his artistic creative process as “fortuna”. He has 
defined this process as a combination of both rationality and chance (cited in Boris 
2001:35).  Essentially it is Kentridge’s way of stating that while his work is not 
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completely planned and structured, it is also not completely a form of word / 
drawing association or rather, not completely an unconscious act.  He has given 
numerous examples of instances where he has drawn an image for his films, or 
included words or word plays, where he has only retrospectively realised that these 
words, and even drawings are specifically based on his past experiences or on his 
memories of these past experiences.  It is often only retrospectively that this 
merging of ideas, emotions, words and images has made sense to him and he has 
been able to make an association between them and previous experiences. 
generational transference of traumatic memory / second-generation 
witnessing 
This is a concept of memory that serves to explain how some second generation 
individuals have inherited the traumas endured by their parents or siblings (Bar-On 
1995; Bauman 1998; Berger 1998; Brodzki 2004; Fox 1999; Hass 1996; Sicher 
2004; Zeitlin 1998 / 2004).  It is a concept that helps one to understand the desire 
for the re-enactment or re-presentation of trauma that has been passed down 
generationally. This concept serves to help understand Kentridge’s and other 
artists’ obsessions with the depiction of past traumas that they have “inherited” 
from their family members.  William Kentridge’s historical background as a South 
African Jew could be used to explain his desire to portray Holocaust images as 
part of his inheritance.  He is only too well aware that had his grandfather Morris 
Kantorowicz not immigrated from Zhager (Lithuania) to South Africa in 1903, he 
and his family members would have been decimated along with all the other 
Lithuanian Jews. 
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historicising process (Bathrick 2004) 
David Bathrick uses this term to explain how artists and others rework or re-
present historical events that they have not experienced personally (2004).  
Through this process of re-presentation the emphasis is not on the events 
themselves but on how individuals recover these past events.  In this process of 
recovering them, and re-presenting them, the individual makes sense of what they 
do not understand.  In this way the individual also comes to experience a form of 
closure.  This term is especially important for explaining how second generation 
survivors come to terms with their families’ tortured pasts.  It is not only applicable 
to understanding William Kentridge’s animated films and other art works, but also 
to understanding other artists and their works.  These artists include art 
spiegelman (sic) and Pascal Croci (see Chapter Seven for more details). 
intertextuality (Kristeva 1996) 
Julia Kristeva coined the term “intertextuality” to describe how texts are not stand-
alone texts (1996).  Rather texts are made up of other texts, they are interrelated 
and various and diverse texts assimilate one another.  It emphasises that texts are 
not made in a vacuum, but are ideological, cultural, political, and religious. It is also 
used to explain texts as having a multiplicity of meanings and interpretations.  This 
study refers to Kentridge’s works as intertextual as they are created within his and 
South Africa’s history; they relate to South Africa’s social and cultural past and 
present, as well as those of other countries.  His films are not bound to only one 
interpretation, but to a proliferation of different meanings. 
William Kentridge: Terminological synopses of concepts 
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landscapes (Cosgrove 1998; cf. Osborne 2001) 
Dennis Cosgrove refers to the concept as a word that implies a historical 
discourse, through which various peoples have situated themselves (1998).  This is 
appropriate to the interpretation of Kentridge’s films, especially that of Felix in Exile 
where he marks the land, using red pastels.  It is this author’s opinion that he does 
so in an attempt to show how the indigenous peoples of South Africa have their 
histories and identities bound to the land.  This is particularly tragic in light of forced 
removals that took place during the apartheid era, such as that of District Six. 
“lieux de mémoire” / sites of memory (Nora 1989) 
Pierre Nora, a French social historian, claims that “lieux de mémoire” / sites of 
memory are monuments, museums, festivals, and even archives that document 
history (1989).  He claims that these historical artefacts are essential to 
remembering histories that have been abandoned.  This concept is prevalent in the 
animated film of William Kentridge, Monument, which initially positions the 
monument as a testament to the mine workers who had perished, as a site of 
memory. 
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“memoire trouée” / “memory shot through with holes” (Raczymow 1994)  
Henri Raczymow defines this memory as a void, or an absence, a memory of not 
“remembering and not being there” (1994:101-102).  It is memory at a distance: 
geographical, historical and spatial. These “memories” are not of first hand events 
and experiences, but through historical and personal accounts, appropriated and 
represented and “remembered” by others; they are “perspectival”, constantly 
moving through time.  This concept describes how Kentridge is able to represent 
and “remember” others’ memories and portray them through his imagination, in 
some cases as though they are his very own memories. 
memory envy (Hartman 2004) 
Geoffrey Hartman has postulated that there is a form of memory which he has 
termed “memory envy” that defines an individual who has not experienced 
traumatic experiences first hand, but has adopted them through completely 
identifying with them (2004:230; cf. Hartman 1996; Hirsch 1997). This is almost 
identical to Marion Hirsch’s concept of “postmemory” (1997).  Both concepts are 
useful in explaining and understanding Kentridge’s depictions of traumatic 
experiences. He has not experienced these traumas personally, but through 
identifying and empathising with them he has chosen to portray them in his films 
and other artistic works. 
narrated memory: poesis (Terdiman 1993) 
Richard Terdiman considers narrated memory to be a “poesis”, or rather a creation 
and an alteration or an adaptation of remembered experiences; an individual’s own 
William Kentridge: Terminological synopses of concepts 
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memory as well as their adoption of others’ memories (1993).  This is a concept 
that is vital in understanding William Kentridge’s animated films.  Not only are the 
films themselves told / re-told in a narrative form, they are the re/creation of 
memories, that of his memories as well as that of others’ memories.   
politics of memory (Antze and Lambeck 1996) 
Paul Antze and Michael Lambeck believe that memory, while inherently connected 
to identity, has become “politicised”. Memories are interpretive reconstructions 
made up of cultural and social conventions. This interpretation of memory is 
important to understand Kentridge’s portrayals of a traumatic historical past which 
he attempts to situate politically, socially and culturally.  Memory is centred on an 
essential subject, but that subject could either be an individuated “I” or a collective 
“we”. 
memoro politics (Hacking 1996) 
Ian Hacking, while studying the science of memory, introduced this new term to the 
discourse of memory. Memory is intrinsically bound to the concept of identity. He 
defines memory as being constituted through politics.  This thesis links this concept 
of memory to Sigmund Freud’s idea that individuals’ identities are created / formed 
predominantly by what they have forgotten.  This thesis then positions Soho/Felix’s 
identity as having been formed through politics.  
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postmemory (Hirsch 1997)   
This concept was coined by Marianne Hirsch, who uses it to describe a form of 
memory that is connected to an object or source as mediated not through 
recollection but through imagination (1997:22).  This is used to describe 
Kentridge’s “memories” of others’ past trauma (individual / collective / historical) 
through empathy and identification and through his imagination.  
post post-apartheid 
“Post post-apartheid”, has not, as far as can be determined, been defined or 
specifically delineated.  For purposes of this dissertation, the concept is 
amalgamated out of a few very observations concerning South Africa, fourteen 
years after the establishment of the TRC. The year 1994 in South Africa serves as 
marker for the beginning of the era and state termed “post-apartheid”.  In April of 
that year, Nelson Mandela was elected as President of South Africa in the first 
democratic elections.  Obviously cultural, social and political change, rarely, if ever, 
coheres instantaneously and around a particular event, however, this era is one of 
them.  Apartheid was defined by its racial inequality, human rights abuses, 
segregation, by-laws, and censorship.  It was also defined by a State of 
Emergency and by the civil war between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the United 
Democratic Front in Natal (now Kwa-Zulu Natal).  Post-apartheid, after 1994, was 
an era seen to encapsulate the ethos of reconciliation, mourning and forgiveness.  
This was part of the aim in establishing The Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
William Kentridge: Terminological synopses of concepts 
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Post post-apartheid can be viewed as the era, circa 2003 onwards, where many 
individuals experience existential anxiety. There are persistently racialised fears, 
and a constant uncertainty about the future political and social directions of South 
Africa.  It also encapsulates an era that does not concern itself with the 
repercussions of apartheid, but rather with the here and now and problems 
pervading South Africans in the present (Buys 2010; Goldstuck 2006).  These 
concerns include xenophobia; government corruption and nepotism; the ever-
growing divide between the classes, to mention a few. 
screen memories (Freud 1899a and 1899b) 
This phrase was introduced by Sigmund Freud to explain his view that individuals 
do not remember actual instances or events (1899a and 1899b).  Rather, they 
remember memories: or memories of memories; or remembered fantasies. Freud 
also postulated that the act of remembering is one of narrative. This idea is used to 
explain Kentridge’s propensity to remember memories of memories, both his own 
and those of others.  (Freud’s concept of screen memories is much more 
complicated than this brief encapsulation suggests.  It is, however, explained, 
discussed and applied in more detail throughout this study.) 
self-identity 
This concept, as defined and explained by Victor Burgin (1996), links the self, the 
“I” to: place; time; space; history; and geography.  Therefore any identity, whether it 
is the subject / individuated “I”, or the collective “we”, is related to both a time and a 
place.  This idea, as expounded by Burgin, is used within this study to reference 
William Kentridge: Terminological synopses of concepts 
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William Kentridge’s films as being partly autobiographical.trauerarbeit (Freud 1917 
/ 1957; Freud 2005)  
Sigmund Freud coined the term “trauerarbeit”, which basically means “psychic 
trauma”.  William Kentridge has placed it on the cover of his book that deals with 
his miniature theatre production Black Box / Chambre Noir (2006), as well as using 
it within the theatre production itself. This thesis refers to this concept to explain the 
difference between physical and psychical traumas and their resultant memories.  
It is also a reference as to how William Kentridge tries to depict “psychic traumas” 
by drawing the insides of brains which contain red lines — evidence of traumas 
experienced by individuals, either as individuals or part of a nation’s trauma.  It is 
linked to the concept of “traumatic memory”. 
traumatic memory (Young 1996) 
Allan Young stresses two meanings of traumatic memory (1996).  The first 
meaning of traumatic memory is psychical.  This memory is made up of imagery of 
past torments / tortures, and disturbing psychical sensations.  The second meaning 
of traumatic memory that Young emphasises is that of a neurological or physical 
trauma (cf. Stone 2003).  The latter meaning of traumatic memory is a physical or 
body trauma which continues to remember pain, both physical and mental.  
Underlying this concept of “traumatic memory” is Sigmund Freud’s belief that the 
unconscious mind is filled with memories that are too awful to acknowledge 
consciously (1899a).  Kentridge attempts to portray both types of traumatic 
memory in his films and other artistic works.  Not only does he draw images of 
William Kentridge: Terminological synopses of concepts 
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physiological brains and what their innards “consist” of, in an attempt to draw / 
represent / portray psychical trauma; he also draws images of physical trauma, for 
instance, images of individuals who suffered torture at the hands of the supporters 
and enforcers of apartheid. For example, in his film History of the Main Complaint 
he draws images of individuals having electrodes attached to their bodies and 
being shocked continuously.  He uses his artist’s imagination to depict what he 
perceives these traumatic memories to look like.   
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 William Kentridge: A study in memory 
This dissertation critically analyses William Kentridge’s animated, charcoal, 
hand-drawn Drawings for Projection film series (1989 - 2003) in order to argue 
that Kentridge’s works represent memory — both personal and collective, within 
a specifically South African context.   There have already been numerous 
references to how William Kentridge has depicted the ephemeral nature of 
memory / memories (Boris 2001; Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee, 
1999; Godby 1992; Sitas 2001). However, this thesis explicates Kentridge’s 
works further by linking memory and trauma and his representation of the horror 
of apartheid. Several seminal works have been referenced, such as those of 
Sigmund Freud (1899: “screen memories”; 1917: “trauerarbeit”); Henri 
Raczymow (1994: “memoire trouée” / “memory shot through with holes”); 
Richard Terdiman (1993: “poesis” / narrated memory); Marianne Hirsch (1997: 
“postmemory”). By connecting memory and trauma this paper articulates how 
and why Kentridge portrays apartheid’s atrocities and their traumatic aftermath 
surrealistically and in a unique manner. This thesis will further argue that 
Kentridge uses the concept of memory to bring together identity, being, time, 
space, history and place.  Through his artistic technique of incomplete erasure 
he reveals the continuing effect that the past has on the present: Kentridge 
draws an image or scene, which he photographs and then “erases”.  These 
“erasures” leave behind imprints, or smudges, which he then draws over, which 
morph into different images, and different meanings. His work physically depicts 
layers of reality, a reference to his drawings and erasures — the supposedly 
dominant and “official” present and the unsuccessfully erased past.  In other 
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words, he depicts memory itself.  That Kentridge’s animated films represent 
memory is a well-documented interpretation of Kentridge’s work1.   However, 
while this is a well-established interpretation of Kentridge’s films, it must be 
noted that the majority of authors who contend this, including the artist himself, 
are writing for art books, art reviews, art journals, newspapers, and lectures, 
with only the very occasional academic article amongst them (for instance see 
Dubow and Rosengarten 2004; and Taylor 2008; see Chapters Two and Three 
for the relevant literature reviews).   There are also several post-graduate 
studies on Kentridge, but none of these studies deal with the filmic series in its 
entirety and many focus on his other art works, such as his tapestries, prints or 
still lifes2.   The majority of these writings are descriptive and not analytical, as 
Chapter Two, a literature review, will make apparent. This chapter reviews the 
substantive writings on Kentridge’s art works.  While many art books that are 
dedicated to the work of Kentridge include essays by esteemed academics 
such as Michael Godby (1992), Dan Cameron (1999) and Ari Sitas (2001), no 
academic book has been written on Kentridge and his animated filmic series. 
Also, to date (2011), and as far as can be determined, no doctoral study has 
focused entirely on Kentridge’s filmic series and his representation of memory 
(see Chapter Two for review of post-graduate studies on Kentridge’s works).  In 
                                                          
1
 Cf. Alemani 2006; Benezra 2001; Boris 2001; Cameron 2001; Christov-Bakargiev 1998 and 
1999; Coetzee 1999; Coetzee 2001; Cooke 2001; Dubrow and Rosengarten 2004; Enwezor 
1998; Enwezor 2007; Godby 1992; Kentridge 1999b, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 
2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Krut 2006; Law-Viljoen 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Oppelt 1999; Sitas 2001; 
Stewart 2006; Stone 2003; Taylor 2008; Wilson 2006. 
  
2
 Cf.  Belluigi 2001; Bergman, 2010; Chen, 2004; Collier, 2004; Garza 2011; Hennlich, 2010; 
Kapitza-Meyer 1994; Kucharski, 2005; Maltz, 2008; McIlleron 2003; Oliver-Smith 1999; 
Opperman 1999; Pai, 2003; Sasson (no date); Schoeman, 2007; and Thompson 2005. 
 
William Kentridge: Introduction: A study in memory 
 
3 | P a g e  
 
addition to this, it should be noted that in the five3 international, seminal works 
by renowned scholars focusing on South African cinema, published in the last 
five years, only one and a half pages of text is dedicated to Kentridge — 
arguably South Africa’s most pre-eminent artist.  This not only highlights from 
the outset just how significant this study is, but also points out the clear gap in 
past research that it fills. 
 
1.2 The aim of the study 
The aim of this research is to investigate how and why William Kentridge’s films 
depict and engage with memory and memories (his own and others’), within a 
specific South African, apartheid, post-apartheid, and post post-apartheid 
context.4  When Kentridge completed his first two films in the series, that is 
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest city after Paris, made in 1989, and Monument, 
made in 1990, films, documentaries, articles, newspaper reports and television 
programmes that were in any way anti-apartheid in nature were banned.  If 
found guilty of either producing or disseminating such material you could face 
prison, or at the very least, be threatened with prison.  Kentridge’s films 
however, were one of the first documented depictions of apartheid and its 
atrocities to reach the public.  At the height of the State of Emergency (circa 
                                                          
3
 These five seminal works are:  
 
Martin Botha’s Marginalised Lives and Painful Pasts: South African Cinema after Apartheid 
(2007); and South African Cinema 1896 — 2010 (2011); 
 
Jacqueline Maingard’s South Africa’s National Cinema (2008); 
 
Keyan Tomaselli’s Cultural Icons (2009); and lastly, 
 
Lucia Sak’s Cinema in a Democratic South Africa: The Race for Representation (2010).  
 
4
 Please see: Terminological Synopses of Concepts for a definition of this latter term. 
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1989), government secrecy was at its strictest, police and army control was at 
its most enforced.  South African society was still at its most naïve and very little 
was known about the inner machinations of the South African Nationalist Party.  
William Kentridge was an exception to this, having had first-hand experience of 
the Nationalist Party and its rule as he grew up in an anti-apartheid 
environment. His father, Sir Sydney Kentridge, was involved in defending anti-
apartheid activists in a number of landmark trials, including the Steve Biko 
inquest, the Treason trials and the Nelson Mandela trials (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:13).   Kentridge himself, while a student at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, took part in protests against the militant White Nationalist Party 
(Christov-Bakargiev 1998 and 1999).  Even during his school years Kentridge 
was aware of the “outrageous things” that were happening in an “abnormal 
society”: torture; detention without trial; police brutality (Kentridge cited in 
Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13).  His films provided evidence of this “abnormal 
society”: the inhumane treatment and capitalist exploitation of workers in mines; 
the extreme disparity between the “haves” and the “have-nots”; evidence of a 
split society kept separate by razor wire and inhumane laws.  For instance, the 
elite suburb of Houghton (Kentridge’s family home) is separated by razor wire 
from the township Alexandria (cf. depicted in his film Johannesburg, 2nd 
Greatest City after Paris; Mine).  As an anti-apartheid activist and executive 
member of the Black Sash (from 1987 — 1990), this researcher was able to 
relate to the depictions of an apartheid society as represented by Kentridge, 
having experienced them first-hand, with for instance, the researcher having 
been arrested at peaceful protests; being constantly intimidated by the police; 
and learning of the torture, rape and death of close associates and community 
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members who were involved in the anti-apartheid movement.  Also, while living 
in Imbali5 as a peace monitor, this researcher was exposed to the inhumane 
living conditions of the community:  abject poverty; no amenities; a lack of 
infrastructure; police curfew; constant police and army harassment and 
presence; and constant civil unrest.6 Personal experience of these two different 
worlds — the “haves” and the “have-nots” — was indeed “split” or 
“schizophrenic”. This personal identification with Kentridge’s works was the 
inspiration for this study.  However, this over-identification led to one of the 
limitations of the study: a naturally biased and subjective interpretation of 
Kentridge’s works.  Had the researcher not experienced these conditions and 
events first-hand, the interpretation might have well been different.  A severe 
hindrance of this study was the almost complete unobtainability of his films7 or 
direct access to his installations and other art works.8  Another hindrance was 
the fact that Kentridge himself writes and speaks prolifically on his own works, 
thereby leaving little room for elaboration or outside insight.  Because Kentridge 
has largely driven the debate around his works through his own erudite 
commentary, and, given the assumption that he cannot be conversant with all of 
                                                          
5
 A township found outside of Pietermaritizburg, KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
6
 The Inkatha Freedom Party was led by Zulu Chief, Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi. He was 
elected head of the non-independent black state of KwaZulu-Natal (previously Natal) in 1972 
and revived the Inkatha Freedom Party in 1975 after breaking with the African National 
Congress (ANC). Rejecting full independence for KwaZulu-Natal, he worked within the white 
Afrikaans establishment to end apartheid. In the late 1980s and early 1990s he engaged in a 
fierce struggle for leadership with the ANC. Thousands were killed and left homeless in the 
violent Inkatha-ANC clashes. Following the 1994 democratic national elections, he was 
appointed Minister of Home Affairs by Nelson Mandela (SA history online … 2012).  
 
7
 The films’ price ranges went from R110.00 in 1994 to 100s of thousands in the early 21
st
 
century. 
 
8
 This was somewhat overcome with the assistance of the artist himself who was kind enough to 
provide copies of his films and other artworks to the researcher. 
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the manifold academic discourses dealing with, for instance, trauma and 
memory, his own interpretations of his work are often limited.  One of the 
reasons for the lack of scholarship and theoretical framework on Kentridge’s 
works is undoubtedly in part because Kentridge himself has articulated his own 
works in terms of his artistic technique and motive.  His own, often erudite, 
contributions and participations in the debate surrounding his work, through 
books (cf. Breidbach 2006b and Stone 2003), lectures (cf. Christov-Bakargiev 
1998 and 1999) and interviews (cf. Oppelt 1996) have in turn led to the debate, 
scholarship and commentaries being somewhat defined and influenced by 
Kentridge’s own commentaries.  This has resulted in the terms of debate 
inevitably concentrating on the relationship of Kentridge’s works and memory 
but only to a very superficial level.  The assumption here is that as Kentridge 
himself is not conversant with different academic discourses on theory dealing 
with, for instance, trauma and memory, his interpretations and commentaries 
are limited.  As an authorial voice it is assumed that he has the final say on his 
work, although Kentridge himself is adverse to there being any authoritative, 
final interpretation of his works (Kentridge cited in Cameron; Christov-Bakargiev 
1998; and Godby 1992).  However, this limitation was overcome with the 
introduction (1994) of new discourses on memory and trauma.  These new 
discourses provided this study with the tools to explicate how and why 
Kentridge portrayed / portrays what he did / does. Through these discourses, 
associations and interpretations never made before are now made clear, such 
as that of postmemory (Hirsch 1997).  The extremely well-documented research 
that stated that Kentridge’s works depicted memory could now be expounded 
upon, foregrounded in the theoretical discourse on memory.   
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The aim of this study is primarily to describe and critically analyse the 
representation of memory / memories within Kentridge’s animated series.  
Therefore, the objectives of the research are: hermeneutic; exploratory; 
explanatory; and descriptive.  The objective is hermeneutic because it interprets 
and analyses the textual-visual material being studied.  The objective is also 
both exploratory and explanatory because it explains new knowledge, such as 
the different theories dealing with historical trauma, memory trauma, memory, 
and identity.  This new knowledge is then used to explicate the latent meanings 
of Kentridge’s visual texts.  Lastly, the objective of this study is descriptive in 
that it seeks to identify themes and motifs within Kentridge’s Drawings for 
Projection series. 
 
1.3 Need and motivation for the research 
The need for the study is founded on the fact that there is undoubtedly a lack of 
a theoretical framework from which to analyse and critique the themes found 
within Kentridge’s films.  Numerous journal articles, art books, art reviews and 
several post-graduate studies have analysed Kentridge’s works.  However, the 
majority of these works have focused on his artistic representations and are 
primarily found in visual arts studies.  In addition to that, when the films are the 
focus of a study, the focus is on one or two of the films, but not on the series in 
its entirety9.  
                                                          
9
 Cf. Alemani 2006; Belluigi, 2001; Benezra 2001; Bergman, 2010; Boris 2001; Cameron 2001; 
Chen, 2004; Christov-Bakargiev 1998 and 1999; Coetzee 1999; Coetzee 2001; Collier, 2004; 
Cooke 2001; Dubrow and Rosengarten 2004; Enwezor 1998; Enwezor 2007; Garza, 2011; 
Godby 1992; Hennlich 2010; Kentridge 1999b, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2007a, 
2007b, 2007c; Krut 2006; Kucharski 2005; Law-Viljoen 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Maltz, 2008; 
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1.4 Introduction and demarcation of subject area 
The subject area of this study is described and demarcated in the title of the 
thesis: Landscapes of the unconscious mind: a dialectic of self and memory on 
a post-colonial, South African landscape in the hand-animated, charcoal-
medium films of William Kentridge.  “Landscapes” here is both a metaphorical 
reference and a literal one.  Kentridge depicts the physical landscapes of South 
Africa — which are the most visible reminders of history as well as constituting 
the actualities of place, such as the Johannesburg Highveld; the Johannesburg 
rand mines; and the Johannesburg city landscape. He also depicts the fluid and 
ever-changing landscapes of the human mind (being, identity, the unconscious, 
and memory) through the ephemeral nature and process of his work.  This is in 
turn a representation of memory and being, or memory and identity. Kentridge 
situates himself at the centre of these representations as both his characters 
Soho Eckstein and Felix Teitlebaum are drawn in his exact likeness. Kentridge 
also looks at the role of memory and history and the effects of history on the 
physical landscape (place), where artefacts are created, and landscapes are 
reshaped through architecture and engineering. In other words, Kentridge looks 
at the effect of apartheid on South Africa: its peoples; their land; their psyches; 
their communities; their cultures; and their way of life.  By situating himself at 
the centre of his films and through his depiction of history, place and politics the 
viewer is presented with a subjective perspective of South Africa through a 
period time which extends from the height of apartheid and an enforced State of 
Emergency (1989) to the era of post post-apartheid (2003).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
McIlleron 2003; Oliver-Smith, 1999; Oppelt 1999; Pai, 2003; Sasson (no date); Schoeman, 
2007; Sitas 2001; Stewart 2006; Stone 2003; Taylor 2008; Thompson 2005; and Wilson 2006. 
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The thesis therefore analyses the following animated works of William 
Kentridge:  
 Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris (1989);  
 Monument (1990);  
 Mine (1991);  
 Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old (1991);  
 Felix in Exile (1994);  
 History of the Main Complaint (1996);  
 WEIGHING ... and WANTING (1998);  
 Stereoscope (1999); and 
 Tide Table (2003).    
These films comprise the Drawings for Projection series in its entirety (as of 
2011). 
 
It must be noted that this study in no way attempts to give a detailed analysis of 
every film produced in the Drawings for Projection series, nor does it study his 
films in a strictly linear or chronological manner.  Also, it does not critique the 
aesthetics or focus on the specific visuals of his films.  However, it does argue 
for how and why he engages with memory within a very specific South African 
context to represent themes of trauma, re-remembering, apartheid, guilt, 
responsibility and memorialisation.   
 
Kentridge’s art includes a wide range of aesthetic techniques and different 
mediums: lithographs; tapestries; still lifes; animated films; drawing; 
photography; stereography; etching; watermarking; bronze sculpture; artist’s 
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books; flipbooks; set design; installations; performance in plays; writing, 
directing and producing plays; acting in, writing and directing films (such as the 
film I & T10); prints; and operas.  
 
The discussion of these films is informed by Kentridge’s other works in various 
mediums: his other animated works — both stand-alone films, and those made 
for multi-medium theatre productions which he has directed (including an opera, 
The Magic Flute (2007a),  and several plays — for example,  Ubu and the Truth 
Commission (1997)); other conventional plays in which he has been involved as 
director, actor, set designer, and contributor to collective scriptwriting initiatives 
(e.g. Will of a Rebel, 1979); a number of live-action or mixed live-action and 
animated films (e.g. Salestalk, 1984); documentaries (e.g. David Goldblatt, 
1985); and his still artworks. However, these serve as secondary sources and 
are not the focus units of analysis. 
  
1.5 Theoretical and conceptual foundations of the study 
This study, through theoretical and analytical sampling, as well as comparative 
analysis, has provided the means to interpret Kentridge’s films in a new and 
meaningful way, affording inimitable insight into the artist’s works, for instance 
through relating the relatively “new” discourse on memory, circa 1994, to 
Kentridge’s works. In addition to that, by explaining how Kentridge has depicted 
various themes such as identity and memory, trauma, and guilt, this study has 
highlighted the importance of Kentridge’s works in the way that he has 
represented historical and cultural phenomena, such as those of apartheid and 
the decimation of the Herero peoples. Through this research, the way in which 
                                                          
10
 Based on the myth of Tristan and Isolde. 
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Kentridge has provided astonishing and creative insight and understanding to 
culturally and historically specific contexts has been brought to the fore. This 
study has also contributed to the understanding and meaning of Kentridge’s 
emergent themes and idiographic depictions of trauma, guilt, history, memory 
and identity in his Drawings for Projection animated film series. 
 
Although there is an extensive body of critical work that already exists on 
Kentridge, this study has explicated new meanings and interpretations of his 
animated film series that add new knowledge and understanding to the field of 
scholarship of Kentridge’s works.  Different theories (for example theories that 
dealt with historical trauma, memory trauma, memory, identity) were used to 
elucidate the latent meanings of Kentridge’s visual texts.  Artistic sources of a 
comparable and similar nature were also selected (artists whose works dealt 
with the representation of the Holocaust, for example Joe Kubert and art 
spiegelman (sic)). These different comparative analyses investigated topics 
such as traumatic memory and their depiction in artistic works. This is an 
important, but hitherto unexamined perspective on Kentridge’s films. This study 
also provides information to the ever-growing discourse on memory and trauma.   
 
Different meanings and interpretations were elicited through the application of 
complex conceptual and theoretical sources, with specific reference to seminal 
works, such as those mentioned as primary sources (for instance, Sigmund 
Freud, Marianne Hirsch, Laura Mulvey and Roland Barthes) and supporting 
sources such as art reviews; newspaper reports; documentaries; journal 
articles; and book chapters. 
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1.6  Methodological research strategy 
The research design itself is qualitative, with an emphasis on a descriptive 
analysis of the textual-visual material (i.e.  William Kentridge’s animated film 
series). This study explores the portrayal of memory and identity in William 
Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection series by means of a qualitative content 
analysis, and since this is an exploratory study, this thesis attempts to answer 
the following main research problem:   
Does William Kentridge’s animated film series represent memory / memories?   
 
The main research problem can be subdivided into the following sub-problems:  
How does William Kentridge’s animated series represent memories (his own 
and others)?11 Whose memories does he represent?  Why, if at all, does he 
depict memories in his films?   Do Kentridge’s animated films represent a 
specific South African political socio-historical period of time?  Can Kentridge’s 
films be considered an “authentic” form of documenting South African history? 
 
The collection of data in this study is selective / purposive, and includes a 
multitude of both primary and secondary sources.  The primary sources include: 
DVD’s of William Kentridge’s animated films Drawings for projection; the DVD of 
Ubu Tells the Truth; video of his Drawing the Passing, which filmed him making 
and drawing his film Stereoscope; screenplays of Kentridge’s plays such as Will 
of a Rebel; home videos provided by the artist for the purposes of this study; 
attending his multi-media play productions such as Woyzeck on the Highveld; 
                                                          
11
  The “how” in this instance refers to the metaphorical representations, and not to the “how” in 
terms of Kentridge’s drawing techniques. 
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attending art exhibitions of William Kentridge’s still lifes, his installations, 
drawings, sculptures and photographs exhibited from his Drawings for 
Projection series and other works; attending his opera, The Magic Flute; 
attending his Black Box / Chambre Noir miniature, mechanical,  theatre 
production; a book-length interview with Angela Breidbach. Primary sources 
also include reading and viewing comparative examples for study, such as: the 
DVD Shoah (Claude Lantzmann); memoirs of apartheid and the Holocaust (for 
example Elie Wiesel and Ruth Kluger); plays (for example Georg Tabori’s plays; 
Jane Taylor’s play Ubu and the Truth Commission); testimonies (the Holocaust 
and apartheid); fine art works (for example Anselm Kiefer); graphic novels (for 
example art spiegelman (sic): Maus I and Maus II; and Pascal Croci: 
Auschwitz); photographical and documentary material (such as: the Soweto 
uprising in South Africa; the Sharpeville massacre; armed forces during the 
occupation of townships in South Africa during apartheid; the Holocaust; and 
World War II); case studies; and art exhibitions. Seminal theoretical works used 
as primary data, and presented cogently in a literature review, include a 
selection of sources from authors: Sigmund Freud; Hayden White; Theodor 
Adorno; Walter Benjamin; Roland Barthes; Jean Baudrillard; Jacques Derrida; 
Julia Kristeva; Marianne Hirsch; Victor Burgin; and James E. Young.   
 
Secondary sources of data selection include: news and newspaper articles (for 
example, news reports on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission12); 
                                                          
12
 South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was formed in 1996, was 
established to hear testimony from both perpetrators and victims for the purpose of retrieving 
lost stories and histories, bearing witness to atrocities, to make reparation for those who had 
suffered and to provide amnesty for the perpetrators of the atrocities of apartheid and South 
Africa’s civil war. The emphasis was on reconciliation and to provide a new context of 
forgiveness in a post-apartheid and post-colonial era. Archbishop Desmond Tutu wrote in his 
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historical documentaries (covering diverse subjects such as the Holocaust; 
apartheid atrocities; civil wars); news footage; interviews; journal articles; 
reviews; books on William Kentridge’s art works; numerous academic sources; 
and films.  The review of both primary and secondary sources established that 
this is not a “replication study” but is a work of original research.    In addition to 
these sources, the dissertation relies heavily on this author’s personal 
observations. 
 
Data collection occurred along the following lines: after first viewing Kentridge’s 
two films at the Durban Film Festival in 1994, the researcher bought these films 
through the Film Resource Unit.  Whenever the artist produced / created a new 
project, the researcher attended the installation, art exhibition or film viewing, 
such as his play Woyzeck on the Highveld; and Ubu tells the Truth.  In addition 
to this, any art book or review was immediately bought or obtained for possible 
future research, such as Drawings for Projection by Michael Godby (1992); 
William Kentridge (Christov-Bakargiev 1998) and William Kentridge (Cameron, 
Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999).  Having followed his career closely and 
considering that an in-depth study of his work might be worth undertaking, the 
researcher contacted the artist at his Houghton studio (and family home) and 
spoke to him of a possible doctoral research project (2000).  He invited the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
book No Future without Forgiveness that “True forgiveness deals with the past, all of the past, 
to make the future possible” (1999:279).  Kadar Asmal, in the same vein, quotes Alexander 
Solzhenistsyn:  
 
By not dealing with past human rights violations, we are not simply protecting the 
perpetrators’ trivial old age; we are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from 
beneath new generations (cited in Krog 1998:37). 
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researcher to meet with him immediately at his studio.  Kentridge was very 
enthusiastic about the project and in preparation provided extensive video 
material, (personal and copies of all his films); copies of his plays (extending 
back to his university days); videos of his outdoor work which featured the 
making of the art work for example, the making of Memory and Geography  
(with artist Doris Bloom, 1995).  He also gave a detailed tour of his studio which 
included images from his films in the series as well as his current work in 
progress (at that time, early 2000, they were images from the film Stereoscope).  
Although it was not a formal interview, Kentridge explained his film-making 
process and many unknown details of his artistic technique were elaborated on, 
such as how he “paints” with loose charcoal powder.  His insight into his own 
works was apparent, and it was very clear to the researcher why his own 
commentaries are highly valued and sought after.  From then onwards, the 
artist and his curator Ms. Anne McIIleron, met any requests for information or 
copies of films.  Also, and most importantly, Kentridge provided this author 
copyright to use his work in any future research, such as the (then) proposed 
doctoral study and articles and seminars.   
 
The sampling criteria:  any installations, still lifes, or art works relating to the 
Drawings for Projection series.  The preliminary data consisted of all nine films: 
this was based on the accessibility and availability of Kentridge’s works.  
Obviously not every one of Kentridge’s works are now available, for instance 
the play Ubu and the Truth Commission only performed for a short period in the 
late 1990s and there have been no repeat performances since then.  Many of 
the plays Kentridge wrote, directed and performed in, such as Will of a Rebel 
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and Faustus in Africa!, were performed in the late 1980s and were therefore 
completely inaccessible except in their written form.  As Kentridge’s series of 
nine films had come to an end in 2003 with the creation of Tide Table and all 
were accessible, it was decided that this would be the actual sample for 
analysis.  However, in addition to these nine films for analysis, any 
accompanying works, such as drawings, etchings, tapestries, prints or still lifes 
relating directly to any of the nine films in the series would also be analysed as 
they form an extension of the films themselves13. 
 
1.7 Definitions of key terms 
A Terminological Synopses of Concepts was included to avoid any 
misconceptions of the several significant terms that are used throughout this 
thesis, such as postmemory, fortuna, and intertextuality.  These terms are 
included as a prelude to the thesis and are presented prior to Chapter One.   
 
1.8 Layout of the thesis 
The thesis comprises ten chapters.  Chapter One, the introduction, details the 
research design and limitations of the study as well as the contributions it 
makes and outlines the different chapters briefly. Chapters Two and Three are 
Literature Reviews.  The former deals specifically with the substantive works on 
William Kentridge and it also includes a brief summary of each of the nine films 
that make up the Drawings for Projection series.  The latter chapter introduces 
the reader to the seminal works that are used throughout this study.  This 
Chapter Three will also provide the motivation for utilising certain concepts 
                                                          
13
  An example of this is the drawing series Sleeping on Glass, which were drawn as part of the 
Stereoscope film installation. 
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within this dissertation.  Chapter Four explains how and why this study makes 
use of qualitative research methods.  Chapter Five focuses on theoretical 
conceptualisations of memory and how they are to be applied in the 
understanding of William Kentridge’s works.  It also examines the way in which 
one can take on the traumatic memories of others (a process known as 
postmemory), such that they have the same impact on oneself as one’s own 
“real” memories.  Chapter Six examines the effects of traumatic (i.e. tormenting) 
memory on the individual; the relationship between traumatic memory and 
postmemory; memory and dreams; and screen memories. Chapter Seven 
focuses on how traumatic events have been depicted artistically, and questions 
whether such representations are ethically justifiable.  It specifically looks at the 
different artistic mediums of the graphic novel and film.  The concepts that are 
raised within this field are applied to Kentridge’s films.  The concepts of history, 
time, space and identity and their relationship to memory are the specific focus 
of Chapter Eight.  Lastly, the different concepts of landscapes, cities and 
monuments are all prevalent within Kentridge’s films.  How they are depicted 
and their relationship to memory are discussed within Chapter Nine.  The 
dissertation concludes with Chapter Ten, which provides an overview of some 
of the artistic projects William Kentridge has produced since his last film in the 
Drawings for Projection series was made (Tide Table — 2003).  This chapter 
also mentions Kentridge’s very latest artistic endeavours and then provides a 
very brief summation of the thesis itself.  Lastly, it provides suggestions for 
further research.   
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1.9  Contributions and limitations of  this study 
It is the “manner” in which Kentridge depicts the unconscious, memory and 
identity that is the very basis of this thesis.  It is from that basis that it makes the 
following contributions: to the scholarship on Kentridge’s work; to a South 
African perspective to the growing field of trauma studies; and to the apartheid 
and post-apartheid reflections on re-remembering and forgetting, 
memorialisation, forgiveness and guilt.   
 
The challenge and limitation of this research design methodology as applied in 
this dissertation is mostly one of over-generalisation. The other limitation is that 
the sampling method was purposive. William Kentridge is a prolific artist 
working in artistic mediums of sculpture (bronze, paper, iron), plays, operas, still 
lifes,  prints, tapestries, and etchings.  However, it is the animated film Drawings 
for Projection series that was selected as the primary sample to be studied 
because it is highly representative of his oeuvre. Even though Kentridge’s other 
works have been referred to, the series is clearly demarcated and only allows 
for brief comparisons and references to his other artistic works, and this is 
primarily due to time constraints. 
 
1.10 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the focus of the study, discusses the objectives and 
demarcations and research design of the study.    
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The next chapter, Chapter Two, is a literature review on Kentridge’s works.   
 
(Godby 1992: the front cover of the book). 
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CHAPTER TWO: WILLIAM KENTRIDGE: LITERATURE REVIEW (PART I) 
The extensive writings on Kentridge are divided into two very different kinds of 
works.  The one caters for an art audience, is mostly descriptive and deals with very 
specific subjects and very detailed descriptions of the artist’s oeuvre.  The emphasis 
is on colour reproductions and photographs of the artist and his artistic creations.  
The second kind of writings caters for an academic or scholarly audience and is a 
discourse that has emerged mainly from journal articles and post-graduate studies.  
These are pre-dominantly analytical in nature and their critiques of Kentridge’s works 
are elucidated on in this chapter.  Both writings proffer insight and analysis of 
Kentridge’s work and both are invaluable. This chapter therefore deals with both 
approaches and writings on and about Kentridge’s films.  The first section assesses 
the literature from art books, art critiques, art reviews, and interviews.1 The second 
section reviews the academic and scholastic writings about Kentridge’s works. 
 
2.1  Part I: Art books 
These books also have several foci in common: they detail Kentridge’s background, 
both personal and artistic; they emphasise his artistic influences; they focus on the 
most recent work of Kentridge’s; and they almost always include a retrospective of 
his oeuvre.  These retrospectives are significant of, and by, themselves.  They offer 
an overview of Kentridge’s development as an artist.  Some of the most noteworthy 
inclusions in these books focus on the themes inherent in his works; in addition to 
this, they almost always include an interview or foreword by the artist himself.  While 
                                                          
1
 Newspaper reports, which range from Die Beeld to the Mail & Guardian to the New York Times, are 
simply too numerous to include in this study.  Anyone who has a particular interest in these reviews 
and reports can access them through the Goodman Gallery’s online archive. 
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they are extremely important, they are limited by what they accentuate.  And while 
several academics have contributed by writing essays that are included in these 
books, the nature and style of the essays remain essentially descriptive with some 
interpretation or “reading” of Kentridge’s works.  One of the exceptions that falls 
within this collective literature on Kentridge is his interview with Angela Breidbach.  It 
is a book-long interview that is appositely titled Thinking Aloud: Conversations with 
Angela Breidbach (2006), and contains many small doodles and several black and 
white reproductions from Kentridge’s works, including of course, his animated films. 
 
These art books are not only descriptive in writing style but are also considered to 
be, colloquially put, “coffee-table books”.  In other words, their (perceived) worth is 
predominantly in the reproductions of Kentridge’s art works, accompanied by 
detailed descriptions.  However, many of these art books have made an extremely 
significant contribution to the understanding and interpretation of Kentridge’s 
artworks, and it would be completely remiss of this study to ignore them.  In fact, this 
thesis argues that they are the foundational works that make up the extensive 
literatures on Kentridge, including the scholastic writings on Kentridge’s oeuvre.   
 
For instance, one of the most notable contributions that these art books make to the 
on-going critical enquiry into Kentridge’s works are the inclusion of screenshots from 
his films as well as photographs of the installations that often accompany a 
screening of his films at a museum.  This allows access to his compilations when 
they are inaccessible by either time or geography.  These screenshots and other 
objets d'art attached to the films, such as his still lifes, can therefore be analysed in 
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detail and a sense of their temporal-spatial mise-en-scène can be appreciated in the 
way that it was meant to be — in context; but at a distance and often retrospectively.  
For example, in Chapter Six: Memory and Trauma of this thesis, an analysis of six 
etchings is proffered.  These etchings, collectively entitled Sleeping on Glass, as well 
as an installation, showing discarded mining and industrial machinery, were 
exhibited as an extension of Kentridge’s film Stereoscope.  The film was also 
screened, projected onto a sculpture that doubled up as a screen.  This particular 
installation was only exhibited at the Villa Medici in Rome in 1999.  Without their 
inclusion in these foundational art books, the detailed critique of the exhibit would not 
have been afforded to this researcher (cf:  Chapter Six: Memory and Trauma; 
Alemani 2006; Christov-Bakargiev 1999: 81; Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and 
Cameron 2001:134-135).  
Thus, Part I of this chapter provides a review of these foundational literatures which 
includes: Kentridge’s personal background; his artistic endeavours prior to his 
animated film series2; his artistic influences; discussion of his artistic animated 
technique; a brief overview of the nine films in the series; and, the themes found in 
his films.   
2.1.1 Kentridge’s personal background  
William Kentridge is a secular Jew whose father is the renowned anti-apartheid 
activist lawyer, Sir Sydney Kentridge, who was involved in most of the key political 
cases in South Africa in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (Alemani 2006:10; Cameron 
1999:40; Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13; Christov-Bakargiev 1999:35).  These cases 
                                                          
2
 William Kentridge: Five Themes, edited by Mark Rosenthal, incorporates a complete chronology of 
Kentridge’s artworks up to the year 2009 (2009). 
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included the Steve Biko3 inquest in 1977, the Treason trial and Nelson Mandela4 
trial.  His mother, Felicia Kentridge, is also an attorney, who instituted the Legal 
Resources Centre which provides legal assistance for individuals who are unable to 
pay for any (Alemani 2006:10; Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13-15; Cameron 1999:40).  
His maternal great-grandfather fled to South Africa just before the South African War 
at the end of the nineteenth century, escaping the incessant Pogroms of Eastern 
Europe.  His paternal great-grandfather also immigrated to South Africa at the outset 
of the 20th century and changed his ethnic family name “Kantorowitz” to that of 
Kentridge (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13).  Interestingly, his maternal grandmother, 
Irene Newmark, was the first female barrister in South Africa.  His grandfather, 
Morris Kentridge, was also a lawyer and a parliamentarian for the Labour Party and 
he was incarcerated for being a socialist in the 1920s (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13).  
Kentridge was brought up in Johannesburg and has lived in his childhood Houghton 
home for most of his life as he and his family (his wife Anne and their three children) 
moved back into his family home after his parents divorced and his father emigrated 
to England (Alemani 2006:10). 
                                                          
3
 Stephen Bantu Biko (1946-1977) originated the Black Conscious Movement in South Africa in the 
late 1960s.  He was incarcerated and brutally tortured and beaten to death.  As a result of local and 
international pressure there were several inquests held to determine the cause of death.  This 
inquest, however, had the police claiming that Biko died after embarking on a hunger strike.  
Independent sources, however, stated that he was murdered by the police. The inquest attributed his 
death to a “prison accident”; although evidence presented at the inquest revealed that he had been 
viciously tortured and murdered.  The outcome of the inquest was not accepted.  Despite this, Biko's 
death caused an international outcry, which increased the pressure on the South African government 
to abolish its detention policies and called for an international probe on the cause of his death. It took 
another eight years and intense pressure before the SAMDC took disciplinary action against two 
doctors who treated Steve Biko during the five days before he died (SA history online … 2012).   
 
4
 The Nelson Mandela Trial is also known as the “Rivonia Trial”.  It took place in Johannesburg in 
1963 when Mandela and 10 other anti-apartheid activists went on trial for sabotage, treason, terrorism 
and conspiracy.  They were all found guilty (SA history online … 2012). 
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William Kentridge’s personal background is repeated in almost every book or review 
about him.  Hence, while it might might seem unnecessarily repetitive to include 
here, this study argues that it is absolutely imperative that Kentridge’s personal 
heritage and background is known as it not only informs his own works, as this 
research will show, but by extension it therefore also informs this study.  For 
instance, Kentridge’s ancestry includes both a Lithuanian-Jewish and German-
Jewish lineage (Alemani 2006:10; Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13-15; Cameron 
1999:40).  Had his paternal great-grandfather not immigrated to South Africa before 
World War II, there would no William Kentridge or Kentridge lineage to speak of, as 
Jews living in Lithuania were all slaughtered by the Nazis.  In addition, Kentridge 
himself makes many revealing remarks about the Holocaust and genocide and this 
also allows for a strong comparative study with Kentridge’s works and those art 
works that are representative of the Holocaust, which is expounded on in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis: Memory, Landscapes, Cities and Monuments.  Even the fact that 
Kentridge grew up in an anti-apartheid environment is significant to know as it sheds 
light on his knowledge of apartheid atrocities and the abnormal situations and 
abhorrent conditions of this highly dichotic society.  He was aware of these atrocities 
long before South African society at large was aware of them; he also had first-hand 
information of these atrocities from the cases that his father took up as a trial lawyer.  
He was exposed to them long before they became general knowledge or were 
exposed at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996 (Kentridge cited in 
Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13; Kentridge cited in Cameron 1999:40). One of the most 
meaningful, and certainly harrowing, experiences for Kentridge was an incident that 
occurred when he was still a child, Kentridge relates it thus: 
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At the time, I was six years old and my father was one of the lawyers for the 
families of the people who had been killed [in the Sharpeville5 massacre in 
1960]. I remember coming once into his study and seeing on his desk a large, 
flat, yellow Kodak box, and lifting the lid off of it — it looked like a chocolate 
box. Inside were images of a woman with her back blown off, someone with 
only half her head visible. The impact of seeing these images for the first time 
— when I was six years old — the shock — was extraordinary (cited in 
Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13). 
 
 
Another disturbing childhood experience for Kentridge was when he was driving with 
his grandfather and they saw four or five men kicking a third man who was lying in a 
gutter at the edge of a road6. These experiences made Kentridge realise, at a very 
young age (five years), that the world was not as he conceived it. Having knowledge 
of these early, troubling childhood experiences is important because these 
experiences have been referenced in his work, most especially in Felix in Exile 
(1994) and History of the Main Complaint (1996).  This then allows for deeper insight 
into his works.  Firstly, it shows undoubtedly that these are indeed very personal 
works of art; secondly Kentridge has again placed himself at the very centre of this 
narrative by including these incidences in his films; and thirdly, his films are a form of 
bearing witness, years later, to apartheid atrocities that he had witnessed first-hand. 
 
Even the somewhat innocuous fact that Kentridge lives in Houghton is important, 
simply because of its geography.  The upper-class suburb is directly adjacent to the 
township of Alexandra.  Many homes in the opulent suburb often protect their houses 
and perfectly landscaped gardens with high walls topped with razor wire.  The 
                                                          
5
 Kentridge’s father, Sir Sidney Kentridge, served as counsel for the victims’ families. His father was 
knighted in 1999 by the Queen for his immense contribution to human rights (SA history online … 
2012). 
 
6
 This incident occurred in Valley Road, which is a road that turns off a main road, Jan Smuts Avenue 
in Johannesburg (Goldberg and Kentridge 2001:96). 
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significance of this to this study is that it shows that not only has Kentridge observed 
the difference in living environments, vis-à-vis the “haves” and the “have-nots” but he 
has chosen to represent them in his films.  For instance, in Johannesburg, 2nd 
Greatest City after Paris, he depicts these schizophrenic living conditions.  Also, it 
reveals that he chooses to tell his own stories and the untold stories of the 
marginalised: for instance he represents his own very comfortable suburban life in 
WEIGHING … and WANTING, even including images of his own wife, Anne 
Stanwix; while in the films Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, Mine, 
Monument, and Felix in Exile he depicts the stories of the working-class, the 
oppressed, the subalterns.  He often juxtaposes the two extreme living conditions 
with one another, as found in the film Mine; and the apposition of luxury and poverty, 
residing next to one another, just as the upper-classes of Houghton live next door to 
the poverty-stricken township dwellers of Alexandra (this is discussed in further detail 
in Chapter Nine: Memory, Landscapes, Cities and Monuments). 
 
Also, with regard to one of the main characters portrayed in his Drawings for 
Projection series, Soho Eckstein, Kentridge has stated that he is a “model” for this 
character (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13).  He has elaborated on this by 
stating that this character is a “displaced self-portrait: that there is a strong male 
family resemblance down the generations” (Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:13; cf. Alemani 2006:13, 47 and 81; Benezra 2001:15; Cameron 1999:45; 
Coetzee 1999:86).  He has also stated that in some images in his first film 
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris the character Soho Eckstein looks very 
similar to his maternal grandfather (Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13).  
This is noteworthy as this study positions both the central characters Soho Eckstein 
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and Felix Teitlebaum as being facets of the artist himself.  It is therefore fundamental 
to this thesis’ argument that Kentridge represents not only collective cultural and 
political memories, but personal ones as well, in his animated series.  It positions 
Kentridge, his self, his identity, in constant dialogue and dialectic with his own 
unconscious as well as the collective unconscious.  In a rather perspicacious 
statement cited in Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev’s book in 1998, Kentridge comments 
on how his main character Soho Eckstein resembles his paternal grandfather Morris 
and early on in his career he did a linocut based on an old photograph of his 
grandfather sitting on the beach in Muizenberg, in Cape Town, in a pinstriped suit.  
The pinstriped suit is the character Soho Eckstein’s constant dress.  Many years 
later, Kentridge completed the last film in this series, entitled Tide Table (2003).  In it 
he includes a drawing of Soho/Felix on the beach, all alone, in a deck chair and 
wearing a pinstriped suit.  In an interview with Claire Wegener, Kentridge stated that 
his character Soho/Felix was on holiday in Muizenburg, Cape Town (2006:271).  
This provides further evidence that Kentridge’s character / s is / are a facet of 
himself.  Here you also have a statement made in 1998 coming full circle with his 
proclamation made in 2006, with reference to the last film made in his filmic series 
(Tide Table 2003).  Please see Chapter Eight: Memory, History, Identity, Time and 
Space for further elucidation on this argument.  
Knowing that Johannesburg has been his home for all of his life, barring a year in 
France while studying at the l’École Jacques Lecoc (Alemani 2006:10; Cameron, 
Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999; Christov-Bakargiev 1998:15), is also 
extremely relevant.  In interviews Kentridge speaks very fondly of his family home 
and of Johannesburg.  His love of the rather desparate province is apparent in his 
films.  This is another example of the importance of noting Kentridge’s personal 
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background. His very first film of the series pays tribute to the city in its very title.  All 
his films in the series feature some aspect of the city, from the dry, sandy Highveld, 
to the Rand mines to the cityscapes, suburbia-scapes and the landscapes.   This 
affection that Kentridge has for Johannesburg and how he situates himself within it 
and how it features within his films is analysed predominantly in Chapter Nine:  
Memory, Landscapes, Cities and Monuments. Another piece of autobiographical 
information that sheds light on his drawing process is revealed. His mother’s name, 
Felicia, became the name for one of the central characters in his cinematic series, 
Felix Teitlebaum7.  However, he was only aware of the unconscious association 
sometime after naming his alter ego.  This is yet another example that reveals how 
his biographical details, his early socialisation, childhood experiences and lived 
environment, both social and geographical, are intrinsic to his films. Kentridge 
experimented with many different artistic mediums prior to his cinematic series.  It is 
to this that the chapter now turns. 
 
2.1.2  Kentridge’s artistic endeavours prior to his animated film series 
The art books always include some information on Kentridge’s artistic undertakings 
prior to his commencement of the Drawings for Projection series.  In 1975, while 
studying a Bachelor of Arts (majoring in Politics and African Studies) at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, he co-founded the Junction Avenue Theatre 
Company — a non-racial theatre company based in Johannesburg and the township 
of Soweto.  His previous work leading up to his animated films includes writing, 
directing and acting in several plays: he performed in the play Ubu Rex (1975), an 
                                                          
7
 Kentridge, Rinder, Rosenthal and Silverman (2009), podcast, Round Table discussion at the 
University of California Berkeley, on 16 March 2009. (Accessed 2010/June/22.) 
William Kentridge: Chapter Two: Literature Review (Part I) 
 
29 | P a g e  
 
adaption of Alfred Jarry’s Ubu Roi; co-authored, designed and acted in the play The 
Fantastical History of a Useless Man (1976); co-authored and performed in the play 
Randlords and Rotgut; acted as Tristan Tzara in Travesties (1978); collaborated and 
performed in Security (1979); directed Will of a Rebel (1979) written by Ari Sitas; 
Dikhitsheneng: “The Kitchens”: a farcical play (1980); he co-directed the video fiction 
Howl at the Moon with Hugo Cassirer and Malcolm Purkey (1981); he made the film 
Salestalk (1984); he directed the play Catastrophe written by Samuel Becket (1984).  
From 1976 to 1978 he studied fine art with Bill Ainslie.  He completed his first 
animated film Title / Tale in collaboration with Stephen Sack and Jemima Hunt in 
1978.  He took part in exhibitions from 1978. His first group exhibition, and his first 
solo exhibition were in 1979 at the Market Gallery in Johannesburg.  Kentridge also 
studied mime at the l’École Jacques Lecoc (1981-1982). 
At first glance this summary of Kentridge’s endeavours prior to the creation of his 
animated series might seem peripheral or superfluous.  However this is not 
necessarily the case.  There are many themes and motifs that have their roots in 
Kentridge’s early works.  For instance, the play Randlords and Rotgut (1978), which 
is based on the essay written by Charles van Onselen, concerns the plight of the 
mine workers on the Rand goldmines found in the Witwatersrand area. The mine 
workers endured extreme hardships working underground in very dangerous 
conditions. They were paid poorly and they lived in hostels away from their wives 
and children.  A culture of alcoholism and prostitution became a way of life.  These 
themes are resurrected in the Drawings for Projection series, most notably in the film 
Mine.  This film has several disturbing images depicting the horrors of life in the 
subterranean world of gold mining.  For example, the hostels are portrayed as rows 
upon rows of shelves containing decapitated heads — disembodied, hideous.  A 
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scene where the protagonist of the series, Soho Eckstein, the owner and exploiter of 
the miners, lies in his bed where a coffee plunger moves through the bed, through 
the mines and into a slave ship, makes a very emphatic statement — the miners are 
no different to those slaves held captive on the slave ship.  
 
Another example of the relevance of this information to the understanding and 
contextualisation of Kentridge’s films is that of the Beckett play Catastrophe.  
Kentridge’s entire film Monument (1990), the second film in the series, is based on 
this play. Very simply, the play is about a man, the protagonist, standing completely 
still on a theatre stage as an autocratic director and his female assistant put the final 
touches to the scene he is directing.  Author Sportelli defines the play as “an action 
bringing ruin and pain on stage, where corpses are seen and wounds and other 
similar sufferings are performed” (1988:126).  This description of the play is useful in 
critiquing Kentridge’s film Monument which is dealt with in Chapter Nine of this 
dissertation.  
 
2.1.3 Kentridge’s artistic influences 
William Kentridge’s influences and artistic references include: German 
Expressionism8; Goya9 10; the post-Cubism of Max Beckmann11 12; William Hogarth13 
                                                          
8
 Cf. Cameron 1999; Christov-Bakargiev 1998; Christov-Bakargiev 1999; Coetzee 1999; Kentridge 
1998 and 1999; Kentridge cited in Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999. 
 
9
 Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes (1747-1828). 
 
10
 Cf. Alemani 2006:9-11 and 21; Kentridge cited in Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999; 
Christov-Bakargiev 1998; Godby 1990. 
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14; Berlin Dada15 16; Russian Futurism17 18; Constructivism19 20; and Russian 
Formalism21 (these latter three movements are also referenced in the fact that theirs 
were considered a socially involved art)22.  German Expressionism is referenced not 
only with regard to the artists’ works but also to that of film makers of the movement, 
who used techniques such as surrealistic drawings and the discarding of distinct 
outlines (Kuhn and Knight 1999:67). In fact, this thesis argues that his work is mostly 
referenced by German Expressionistic filmmaking23 (Kentridge cited in Christov-
Bakargiev 1998:14-15), certainly more so than German Expressionism artwork / 
paintings, as the latter of course espouses bright, surreal colours, while Kentridge 
does not.  Furthermore, this thesis also argues that Russian Formalist filmmaking is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11
 Born 1884, died 1950. 
 
12
 Cf. Alemani 2006:10-11; Benezra 2001: 14,15; Christov-Bakargiev 1998 and 1999; Kentridge cited 
in Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:103-105. 
 
13
 Born 1697, died 1764. 
 
14
 Cf. Alemani 2006:11 and 21; Cameron 1999; Christov-Bakargiev 1998; Christov-Bakargiev 1999; 
Godby 1990. 
 
15
 Art movement circa 1918-1922. 
 
16
 Cf. Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1999:14; cf. Alemani 2006:11; Christov-Bakargiev 1998. 
 
17
 Cf. Christov-Bakargiev 1998 and 1999; Coetzee 1999; Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 
1999:15 and 105. 
 
18
 Art movement circa 1910-1920. 
 
19
 Art movement circa 1919-1929. 
 
20
 Cf. Alemani 2006:12 and 52-53; Christov-Bakargiev 1998 and 1999; Coetzee 1999; Kentridge cited 
in Christov-Bakargiev 1999:15 and 105. 
 
21
 Russian Formalism is sometimes referred to as Soviet Montagism. 
 
22
 Cf. Christov-Bakargiev 1998 and 1999; Coetzee 1999; Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 
1999:15 and 105. 
 
23
 German Expressionist filmmakers include: Paul Wegener, The Golem (1914); Robert Wiene, The 
Cabinet of Dr Caligari (1919); Fritz Lang, Metropolis (1925); and Friedrich Murnau, Nosferatu (1922). 
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an influence in Kentridge’s works, both in terms of stylistic filmic techniques 
(predominantly with the use of montage) and in terms of their socially engaged art24.  
Please see Chapter Eight for a brief exposition on this.   It is the Russian Formalist 
documentary filmmaker Dziga Vertov who coined the term “Kino-Eye” or cinematic 
eye — referring to what the eye does not see, or rather to the X-Ray eye (discovered 
after watching films in slow motion and realising that in the process of film making, 
there is much that is on celluloid that the eye does not consciously see) (1973:79). 
The Russian Formalists, most especially Sergei Eisenstein, used the philosopher 
Georg Hegel’s (1770-1831) revolutionary formula that antithesis plus thesis equals 
synthesis25 with the aim of exciting their audience (Feaster 1993:24).  Their rapidly, 
multiple-imaged films create a never-ending discourse.  How this is relevant to 
Kentridge’s films is explained below, where his artistic technique is discussed.  
Although both German Expressionism and Russian Formalism are influences on 
Kentridge’s work, it must be noted that these two film movements are diametrically 
opposed to one another.  For instance, the German Expressionists placed great 
emphasis on an individual’s experience rather than a national collective experience.  
German Expressionists focussed on the character’s psychology — on terror, pathos 
and agony.  This is antithetical to the Russian Formalists, who focussed their 
filmmaking on social / radical events.  German Expressionist film making also 
completely and totally rejects realism. Kentridge’s films, however, do both: they focus 
on an individual, Soho Eckstein and Felix Teitlebaum, but they also focus on South 
                                                          
24
 Russian Formalist filmmakers include: Lev Kuleshov, Vsevolod  Pudovkin, Alexander Dovzhenko, 
and Sergei Eisenstein (as well as documentary film makers Dziga Vertov and Esther Shub).  Sergei 
Eisenstein is most famous for his film Battleship Potemkim (1925) and Vsevolod Pudovkin is most 
famous for his film: Mother (1926). 
 
25
 In filmic terms this refers to the juxtaposing of two different cinematic images (antithesis plus thesis) 
to produce a new idea or image (synthesis). 
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Africa’s social events of a specific culturally defined time, that is, for example, 
apartheid’s State of Emergency.  Kentridge himself has stated that the themes of 
German Expressionist filmmakers and the Russian Formalists which used their own 
emotive feelings of anger to raise social consciousness paralleled his own feelings of 
anger and social responsibility (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1999:15; cf. Coetzee 
1999:92). Of course, the social awareness and anger towards the inhumanity and 
atrocities that Kentridge refers to speaks directly to the socio-political and cultural 
period of his time: apartheid. In terms of being influenced technically, both these 
filmic movements can be referenced; for instance, Kentridge makes use of the 
Russian Formalist’s cinematic styles, for example in Stereoscope.  He uses 
montage; split screens; isolated close-ups; disjointed continuities; jump-cuts; 
vertiginous camera vantage points.  He juxtaposes a violent dystopian society with 
that of a homebound melancholy protagonist.  However, using the same filmic 
example he also makes use of German Expressionist filmic styles: close-ups of 
Soho/Felix’s pathos; surrealistic imagery, such as the static or electric blue cat, 
which continuously morphs and brings with it the extremes of both comfort and 
annihilation. There are also the portrayals of a nightmarish and hallucinatory society 
whose dark, shadowy elements are perpetrators of violence, terrorism and thuggery.  
Kentridge also incorporates the use of chiaroscuro lighting26.  All these are stylistic 
rudiments of German Expressionist filmmaking.  The fact that both film movements, 
and many different artists, can be referenced as influences on his work, both in 
terms of artistic style and themes is a testament to the “uniqueness”27 of Kentridge’s 
                                                          
26
 This refers to Kentridge’s drawing technique and not as lighting set up for a mis-en-scène. 
 
27
 Cf.  Rosalind Krauss in her article entitled The Rock: William Kentridge’s “Drawings for Projection” 
discusses his animated technique and argues for “the uniqueness of Kentridge’s medium”, and that 
his innovative animated process “invents a medium” (2000:8).  Carolyn Christov-Bakagiev suggests 
rather that although Kentridge’s technique of drawing and erasure are not unique to Kentridge, it is 
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work and the fact that it is actually quite difficult to try and categorise his work neatly 
and definitively. 
With regard to his collaborations with the Handspring Puppet  Company, specifically 
with director Basil Jones and Adrian Kohler for their works Faustus in Africa!, Ubu 
and the Truth Commission, and Woyzeck on the Highveld, artistic inferences can be 
made directly with Japanese Bunraku28; pre-colonial African puppet theatre and 
English puppetry (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:18-19).  Also in terms of themes, such as 
the inclusion of recurring motifs, for example, dreams, mirrors and labyrinths, 
Kentridge has referenced magic realist writer Jorge Luis Borges (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:19). 
 
Kentridge himself has expressly stated that the most significant local artist to 
influence him was Dumile Feni29.  While studying at artist Bill Ainslie’s art studio 
Kentridge encountered Feni working there.  According to Kentridge, it was Feni’s 
large scale “demonic” charcoal drawings that made him understand the power and 
expression of charcoal (Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:27; cf. Alemani 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the manner in which he employs it to express “a metaphor for the loss of historical memory — the 
amnesia to which injustice, racism and brutality are subjected in society” that is of significance 
(2004:32).  See also Tom Gunning: Stereoscope: Doubled Vision peering through Kentridge’s 
“Stereoscope” (2001). 
 
28
 Created in Osaka in 1684, the theatre production includes three performers on stage, including the 
puppeteers (Brazell 1998:115-124).  This is similar in style to the Kentridge collaborations which have 
both the puppets and the puppeteers appearing on stage as an integrated part of the production.  
More typical puppet shows have only the puppets on stage, with the puppeteers coordinating the 
strings from behind the scenes and hidden away. 
 
29
 His full name is Zwelidumile Geelboi Mgxaji Mslaba Feni (1942-1991). He was known as the 
“Township Goya” (cf. Campbell-Smith 2004; Dumile Foundation; Sack 1988). 
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2006:10; Benezra 2001:12)30.  Feni’s portrayals included scenes of everyday 
township life, poverty and the brutality found in townships (cf. Christov-Bakargiev 
1998; Dumile Foundation; and Johans Boorman’s on-line Museum of South African 
Art).  Another artist who is referenced is German artist Anselm Kiefer, albeit 
extremely briefly (cf. Alemani 2006:14-15; Christov-Bakargiev 1998).  It is important 
to note this brief reference as Chapter Nine: Memory, Landscapes, Cities and 
Monuments of this thesis elaborates on this influence and does a comparative 
analysis between the two artists. 
In terms of Landscape Art, this too has been referenced as a source of incentive for 
Kentridge’s works, although in a rather adverse manner.  Rather than emulate the 
Romanticist, colonial depictions of South Africa, such as those of Jan Ernest 
Abraham Volschenk31  and J. H. Peerneef32, which depicted the South African and 
African landscapes with exotic lushness and verdure, Kentridge chose to depict the 
landscapes as he saw them (Cameron 1999:47-50; Christov-Bakargiev 1998:26; 
Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1999:22; 109-110).  That is, he chooses to 
depict the landscapes that are embedded with the human condition, with humanity.  
From his contributions to his conversations with Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev 
(1998:26; cf. Alemani 2006:45; Coetzee 1999:84-85) he seems to be challenging 
that version of landscape history.  He contests the perfectly portrayed Romantic 
ideal.  He therefore renders the landscape as he sees it: scarred and pitted with 
                                                          
30
 Dan Cameron in his book, William Kentridge, published in 1999, incorrectly states that Kentridge’s 
work can be directly tied to Dumile Feni’s Expressionistic work and “with whom he studied” (1999:41).  
Kentridge was a teenager taking night time art classes at his art teacher Bill Ainslie’s home when Feni 
often visited, but Feni left South Africa in 1968.  Kentridge’s works are certainly influenced by his work 
as he himself has clearly stated (Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:26), but it is remiss to 
dismiss the other German Expressionistic influences on Kentridge. 
 
31
 Born 1853, died 1936. 
 
32
 Born 1886, died 1957. 
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mines; traumatised and raped through constant exploitation from the rand mines; 
littered with old mining debris and old electrical pyres; dry; stripped of its fertility and 
bereft of life, absolutely desolate.  Most importantly, he sees the landscapes as a 
text to be deconstructed. These depictions are central to his films, most specifically 
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, Mine, Felix in Exile, and WEIGHING … 
and WANTING.  These ideas are explicated on in Chapter Nine, where Kentridge’s 
depictions of landscapes are linked to the concept of geography and memory.  He 
also challenges the artistic notion of “Landscape Art” by using the land as a drawing 
board, in collaboration with artist Doris Bloom.  In a series of artistic creations they 
first drew an anatomically correct heart in the Rome landscape and then they drew a 
huge gate with an emblematic heart, in Newtown Johannesburg, which they set 
alight.  As such, they challenged both the Land Art of the 1960s and Landscape Art.  
The former is a movement whereby artists changed the actual, physical landscape 
for artistic purposes.  The latter deals with any recording — photographs, paintings, 
filming, drawings — of landscapes in their natural formations, recorded in situ 
(Büttner 2006).  Kentridge does neither, rather he and Bloom create images on top 
of barren land and then record those images (cf. Chapter Nine). 
 
2.1.4  A discussion of Kentridge’s artistic animated technique 
All these books have another theme in common.  They include a discussion and a 
description of the drawing technique used by Kentridge.  He usually works on a large 
sheet of paper — which sometimes covers an entire wall of his studio.  Working 
between drawing and a still camera which he uses to film the drawings, he moves 
painstakingly between the two.  An image drawn, using charcoal (the residue of fire), 
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is changed, erased; all the time he steps back from the process to photograph the 
changes, the erasures and the metamorphosis of the images in question. Kentridge’s 
filmmaking technique consists of making a series of charcoal drawings, using 
charcoal sticks as well as charcoal dust, with which he literally paints33.  Sometimes 
he uses blue pastel — usually to identify and separate the images from one another 
— to illustrate water, which symbolises cleanliness, anxiety34, innocence, and 
femaleness / sexuality (cf. Alemani 2006:22, 33 and 93; Cameron 1999:66; Godby 
1992: unpaginated)35.   He occasionally uses red pastel as well — these red strokes 
tend to symbolise anger, geography and even death.36  He makes a series of 
drawings which he then films two or three times, by himself, and then he alters the 
drawings in question, filming each alteration as he goes along.  He alters the 
drawings, erases the images, but charcoal can never be entirely erased. He literally 
makes hundreds of modifications.  A trace of soot is always left behind. Some of the 
remaining traces are incorporated into new images, others simply leave behind a 
ghostly trace or imprint. The drawings therefore, are layered and are sedimental or 
akin to a palimpsest. These drawings are reminiscent of memories, which are often 
mere traces of forgotten events, and are fragmentary and layered upon one another. 
Kentridge has himself said of memory:  
                                                          
33
 The artist was kind enough to explain his artistic process, as well as provide a tour of his Houghton 
studio, to this researcher. 
 
34
 This evidenced in two of Kentridge’s films Felix in Exile and WEIGHING … and WANTING. For 
instance, while Felix Teitlebaum sits mournfully and desolate in his hotel room, filled with anxiety, 
depression, melancholia and frustration.  His hotel room is flooded with bright blue water and is 
named “ANXIETY”.  
 
35
 Cf. the following films Johannesburg, 2
nd
 Greatest City after Paris; Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old; 
Felix in Exile and Stereoscope for examples of such representation. 
 
36
 Cf. the following films Felix in Exile; WEIGHING … and WANTING and History of the Main 
Complaint as evidence of this observation.  For instance, dead bodies are outlined in red pastel; bullet 
wounds are emphasised with a cross in red pastel. 
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The difficulty in holding onto passions, impressions, ways of seeing things, the 
way that things that seem so indelibly imprinted on our memories still fade 
and become elusive (cited in Boris 2001:31; cf: Kentridge in Christov-
Bakargiev 1998:96). 
 
It is this very ephemeral nature of memory that inspired Kentridge to an art form that 
is persistently and relentlessly in motion — moving art (cf.  Boris 2001:31).  Thus 
Kentridge’s artistic technique of drawing in charcoal has inherent tensions within it — 
between drawing and erasure; memory and amnesia; remembering and forgetting.  
Art curator Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev pontificates that Kentridge’s  
process of re-drawing and erasure means that each drawing is poised in a 
state of uncertainty.  Each stage of the drawing carries with it the visual 
memory of its recent past…. This suggests a view of knowledge as constantly 
negotiated between present and memory, as if forgetting and remembering 
were not distinct moments, but overlapping (1999:34). 
 
Through these erasures which leave elusive traces of absence, Kentridge ratifies the 
processes of forgetting, by effacing, and remembering, by drawing and redrawing.  
The traces that are left are, according to Kentridge, “evidence of some disturbance” 
— every stage of the drawing conveys with it the visual memory of its recent past.  
This is akin to Sigmund Freud’s conceptualisations of memory which he explicates in 
his A Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad (1899a / 1984) which Chapter Eight deals 
with in great depth.  Interestingly, Kentridge did not at first accept his inability to 
completely erase his charcoal strokes.  He has often described his initial frustrations 
at not being able to eradicate the charcoal traces, describing it thus: 
When I started doing animation, it was a real problem that I couldn’t erase 
images perfectly.  I tried every kind of eraser to make the charcoal drawing 
disappear completely … it was only ages later that I understood they were 
vital (cited in Enright and Kentridge 2002:27). 
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The making of a film could involve a drawing of a particular  scene which would be 
filmed up to 500 times, prompting Kentridge to describe the process as “stone-age 
filmmaking” (cited in Boris 2001:32)37. If a scene changes, he starts with a new 
drawing and the process begins all over again.  However, only twenty still lifes38 
might be left over from a film that is about eight minutes long, and he can take up to 
two years to complete the process.  When his film is complete he works with an 
editor, such as Angus Gibson, or Cathy Myberg, to produce the final cut.  During this 
process he will, for example, add accompanying music, normally the evocative and 
haunting music of Philip Miller.   
The importance of noting Kentridge’s artistic animation style is unequivocally critical 
to understanding the films themselves as it reveals how his work is said to represent 
memory or memories, metaphorically speaking of course39:  
From the material process of animation — producing a moving image through 
a succession of drawings — Kentridge derives a metaphor, simultaneously 
slippery and incisive, for the processes of memory, insight and evasion 
(Gunning 2001:65). 
 
However, not only do his works represent memories, but with their cultural, historical 
and political themes they are also a testament against forgetting one’s past.  
Kentridge stated in 1992: 
                                                          
37 The documentary video Drawing the Passing (1999b), records this entire process as the artist 
works on his film Stereoscope.   
38
 This differs from cell animation, whereby thousands of cells remain at the end of the celluloid, or 
traditional cell animation process (Preston 1994). 
 
39
 Cf. Alemani 2006; Benezra 2001; Boris 2001; Cameron 2001; Christov-Bakargiev 1998 and 1999; 
Coetzee 1999; Coetzee 2001; Cooke 2001; Dubrow and Rosengarten 2004; Enwezor 1998; Enwezor 
2007; Godby 1992; Kentridge 1999b, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Krut 
2006; Law-Viljoen 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Oppelt 1999; Sitas 2001; Stewart 2006; Stone 2003; Taylor 
2008; Wegener 2006; Wilson 2006. 
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I have never tried to make illustrations of apartheid, but the drawings and films 
are certainly spawned by and feed off the brutalized society left in its wake.  I 
am interested in a political art, that is to say an art of ambiguity, contradiction, 
uncompleted gestures and uncertain endings.  An art (and a politics) in which 
optimism is kept in check and nihilism at bay (cited in Godby 1992: 
unpaginated). 
 
Kentridge wants to erect “a beacon against the process of forgetting the routes of our 
recent past” (cited in Boris 2001:33; Christov-Bakargiev 1998:97).  He also 
advocates what Staci Boris defines as “healing through remembering” (Boris 
2001:33).  Kentridge further stated that his metaphor of drawing is “a multi-layered 
highway of consciousness, where one lane has one thought but driving up behind 
and overtaking it is a completely different thought” (1999:415).  He has also 
philosophised that “the activity of drawing is a way of trying to understand who we 
are or how we operate in the world” (1999:419).  Having discussed his artistic 
technique the focus now turns to the narrative and stories of the nine films at the 
centre of this study. 
 
2.1.5  The nine films in the Drawings for Projection40 series 
The art books also include detailed descriptions of the films in question.  The 
descriptions usually differ in length, depending on the size and length of the books, 
as well as the time of printing.  So for example, author Michael Godby in his book 
Drawings for Projection provides a very detailed description of Kentridge’s works, but 
as the book was written and printed in 1992, Godby only focused on the films that 
had been released up until that time: the first four films in the series.  However, 
                                                          
40
 To reiterate, all the films, and copyright, are provided by very kind courtesy of the artist, William 
Kentridge (PhD). 
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rather than rely on the different authors and their descriptions of the films, what 
follows is a transcription of the films based on several viewings by this researcher, 
summarised as part of the methodological process. 
 
There are initially two central characters in this filmic series — Soho Eckstein and 
Felix Teitlebaum — then they merge into one (referred to as Soho/Felix in this 
thesis).  Soho Eckstein is identifiable by his pin-striped suit and cigar, whilst Felix 
Teitlebaum is always represented naked.  Soho Eckstein is at first represented as an 
un-empathetic character, an industrialist, a negligent husband, a mining magnate 
and exploiter of his workers.  Felix Teitlebaum on the other hand has an innocent 
aura about him, a dreamer, who constantly fantasises about Mrs. Eckstein.   His 
nakedness implies vulnerability, and in Felix in Exile he is depicted as desolate and 
melancholic.  Finally the two characters merge into one in the film History of the Main 
Complaint.  The individual that is the result of this collusion has the more distinct 
appearance and likeness of Kentridge himself.  The character retains the capitalist, 
or executive-type pin-stripe suit, which is particularly ironic in the poignant scenes of 
Soho/Felix on the beach in the film Tide Table — this also references Kentridge’s 
earlier statement made in 1998 about how his character is a “displaced self-portrait” 
(Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13).  Eckstein’s suit and resemblance to 
Kentridge make him easily identifiable, and he retains some of the innocence of Felix 
Teitlebaum, and a sense of responsibility and guilt that come into play in the 
conscious and unconscious being that is Soho/Felix (themes most prevalent in the 
film, History of the Main Complaint).  The merging of the two characters sees a more 
self-reflexive individual, who as time passes confronts his past choices and 
decisions, and his responsibilities, and deals with feelings of guilt and remorse. 
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A brief synopsis of each film follows:  
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris (1990): Kentridge introduces the 
audience to three central characters: Soho Eckstein, Felix Teitlebaum and Mrs. 
Eckstein. Soho Eckstein is represented as a capitalist, a mining magnate, dressed in 
a pin-stripe suit and an ever-present cigar. He is also depicted as gluttonous and un-
empathetic and exploitative of his workers. His wife, Mrs. Eckstein, is a neglected 
wife, and coveted by Felix Teitlebaum, who is always represented as naked. He 
seems to represent the proletariat, the subaltern, or the innocent; although he is at 
first elusive and enigmatic it is very apparent that he is the exact opposite of Soho 
Eckstein. The film focuses on Soho Eckstein and his grand empire, which includes 
him buying up half of Johannesburg, the setting of all nine films. While Soho 
Eckstein focuses on his capitalist exploits, Felix Teitlebaum initially fantasises about 
having an affair with Mrs. Eckstein. The film includes a fight between Soho Eckstein 
and Felix Teitlebaum, with a victorious Felix Teitlebaum. The film also includes 
scenes of Soho Eckstein feeding the poor, presumably his mine workers, but the 
food that he literally throws at them also obliterates them from the scene, erasing 
their existence.  Soho Eckstein is drawn with an obese face, which is in sharp 
contrast to the lined, painfully thin faces of the poor. 
In Monument (1990), Soho Eckstein is depicted as a great philanthropist. He unveils 
a monument, supposedly erected to his workers, with great fanfare, and much 
grandeur. The monument, which is formed from the words of Soho’s presentation at 
the unveiling, is unexpectedly a sculpture of a character named “Harry”, based on a 
hobo that the artist had encountered many times living on the streets. “Harry the 
Hobo” is pinioned to the base of the monument, and he is overly burdened by a huge 
mass of rock on his back. A close-up focuses on the face of Harry, only to have him 
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open his eyes — the “statue” is alive, the close-up fades to the sound of his 
extremely laboured and painful breathing.   
Mine (1991): this film follows on from Monument and is a horrifying view of the 
miners working underground in the goldmines, owned and excavated by Soho 
Eckstein. Soho Eckstein, still wearing his pin-stripe suit is shown to be seated behind 
his office desk, which then turns into a bed.  His bed serves as his desk, which is 
littered with office machinery including a ticker-tape machine that spews out ticker-
tape and a Nigerian head. Soho Eckstein presses his coffee plunger, which turns 
into a lift shaft that then continues to tunnel into a dormitory filled with bunks and 
bodiless heads.  This is intercut with shots of miners working in the mines drilling in 
the rockface; the plunger continues until it turns into a transatlantic slave ship. The 
association is clear – the miners are no more than badly paid slaves living and 
working in abominable conditions. The lift returns, but with a gift, a tiny rhinoceros. 
Soho Eckstein, with one sweep of an arm, clears his desk or bed, of all his office 
machinery and men that have been spewed out of the ticker-tape machine, so that 
he can play with his new acquisition, a tiny rhinoceros. The scene ends with the desk 
becoming a big luxurious bed again where he plays leisurely with his new pet.   
Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old (1991) reintroduces both Mrs. Eckstein and Felix 
Teitlebaum, who is now her lover. There are opening scenes of (a still naked) Felix 
Teitlebaum sitting in a vast, empty landscape. In opposition, Soho Eckstein, whose 
building empire keeps growing and expanding is featured sitting at his desk 
surveying his empire. He is then shown alone in his bed, with a caption ‘Soho 
Abandoned’, a reference to his wife’s affair with Felix Teitlebaum. A street protest is 
portrayed, watched by the lovers, and graphic love-making scenes are depicted, 
rather surrealistically in a photograph frame which sits on Soho Eckstein’s office 
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desk. The love-making scenes emit a flood of water which in turn floods Soho 
Eckstein’s office and building empire, destroying the office blocks, including Soho 
Eckstein’s headquarters. Soho Eckstein is left alone with his cat in an empty 
landscape, with the inscription “Her Absence filled the World”; he picks up his cat, 
which transforms into a bullhorn that booms out “Come Home”. The message 
continues, as days turn into nights; through the vast landscape and into Felix 
Teitlebaum’s territory. Felix Teitlebaum retreats to his forlorn landscape while Mrs. 
Eckstein and Soho Eckstein are shown together, with a halo of water growing around 
them while marchers move along the horizon.    
Felix in Exile (1994), the fifth film in the series, chronicles the story of Felix 
Teitlebaum, and Soho Eckstein and Mrs. Eckstein are erased temporarily. This film 
also begins with a forsaken landscape, littered with mining and industrial debris.  It 
then cuts to a scene of a woman, “Nandi”, who, with the aid of a theodolite, is 
surveying the landscape.  She is drawing, or documenting, the landscape where a 
brutal atrocity has occurred; she tries to draw what she sees before the bodies are 
reabsorbed into the land. Felix Teitlebaum is depicted in a rather depressing hotel 
room, which contains a suitcase of Nandi’s drawings that he is looking at. As Nandi 
draws, dead, dying and wounded bodies emerge. Their wounds bleed into the 
ground. While Felix Teitlebaum is not there to personally witness what Nandi is 
witnessing, through her eyes, her drawings, her testimony, he “sees” the protesters, 
the dead, the wounded, the bleeding, suppurating bodies, which are then absorbed 
into the landscape, completely disappearing.  Nandi’s drawings fly out of the suitcase 
and cover the hotel walls, creating an interior landscape in the room. Newspapers 
cover the bodies and they then too turn into drawings, and also plaster the hotel 
walls. There is a close-up of Felix Teitlebaum shaving, the mirror dissolves and he 
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finds not his own reflection in the mirror but Nandi’s. The mirror fills up with water 
which then floods his room.  Nandi then looks at Felix through a double-ended 
telescope; they then embrace in a pool of water; as she bathes she is shot and 
becomes yet another body appropriated by the landscape, just as the earlier bodies 
she had drawn became embedded in the landscape. In the meanwhile, Felix 
Teitlebaum is left alone and melancholic in his hotel room, watching, both impotent 
and seemingly imprisoned.  As the room fills with water the drawings continue to 
peel off the walls into the water and Felix Teitlebaum is left alone and despondent. 
The film fades with Felix Teitlebaum looking towards the barren landscape bereft of 
any bodies, and all traces of a massacre have been completely erased.  
History of the Main Complaint (1996) sees the morphing of the characters Soho 
Eckstein and Felix Teitlebaum (henceforth referred to as Soho/Felix so as to 
distinguish from the previous versions of the formally disparate personae). Soho 
Eckstein’s characteristic pin-stripe suit is still apparent, but prior to this morphing of 
the two characters; Soho Eckstein had been drawn in a very indistinct manner, with 
a rather messy technique and ill-defined and rough facial features. Felix Teitlebaum 
was depicted more distinctly and definitely more clearly so as to resemble the artist 
himself, who has clearly stated that both characters are alter-egos for himself.41 
Soho/Felix clearly keeps the outer appearance of Soho Eckstein, but his facial 
features are in the exact likeness of Felix Teitlebaum and of course, the artist 
himself. The film begins with a shot of an empty city street, in stark comparison to 
previously portrayed streets filled with protesters. It has the tense atmosphere of a 
significant aftermath. The film then cuts to a hospital ward where Soho/Felix is lying 
in a coma behind a hospital curtain. He is wearing a respiratory mask and 
                                                          
41
 Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:13; cf. point 2.1.1 above. 
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surrounded by medical machinery. A doctor uses a stethoscope to check 
Soho/Felix’s body and drawings of X-Rays appear as the sensor penetrates deep 
into his body; X-Rays not only of his bones but also office equipment that forms a 
montage with his physical innards.  Many more doctors surround Soho/Felix and all 
are identical versions of himself (and of the artist). On the screen of a sonar machine 
a scene of the outside world appears, with Soho/Felix looking through the 
windscreen of a moving car.  Other images appear — telephones and typewriters — 
emblems of his previous corporate life. His past is appearing in his present. The 
scenes then form a montage, with the use of jump-cuts from one scene to another 
from his hospital bed to his driving outside. He keeps looking into his rear view 
mirror. His bodily tests run parallel to his memories of brutal attacks on black South 
Africans — horrific images of men beating another man feature. Soho/Felix then 
remembers an accident where he hit a man on the road while driving. His 
remembering awakens him from his coma and he can no longer lie there as an 
unengaged, unresponsive witness of events. The white curtain opens and we then 
see him at his desk. The question that is raised is whether or not Soho/Felix has 
made any moral progress. Does he feel any guilt at the past apartheid atrocities? 
The audience is left wondering whether or not his memory and recognition of things 
past has changed anything or whether it is simply business as usual?42 
                                                          
42
 This film coincided with the establishment of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
which was formed to hear testimony from both perpetrators and victims for the purposes of retrieving 
lost stories and histories, bearing witness to atrocities, making reparation for those who had suffered 
and providing amnesty for the perpetrators of the atrocities of apartheid and South Africa’s civil war. 
The emphasis was on reconciliation and to provide a new context of forgiveness in a post-apartheid 
and post-colonial era.  Please see Terminological Synopsis of Concepts for more details. 
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With WEIGHING … and WANTING (1998),43 the film’s narrative begins with a close-
up of a white, blue-rimmed tea cup and matching saucer. A scene then emerges to 
reveal a living room, complete with a fire-place and a vase full of fresh flowers. 
Although the room is empty, pieces of random papers are found on the table, while a 
word, “WEIGHING”, is spelt out on the wall, followed by the words “and WANTING”. 
A large rock appears on the landscape, which resembles a brain; and a CAT scan, 
an image which is from the last film and is included here. The CAT scan resembles a 
crematorium oven from one of the death camps, which is possibly an indirect 
reference to the Holocaust. Soho/Felix enters the CAT scan and his brain is 
“excavated”, revealing layers of his brain, some with images of a mine, a reference 
to his previous life as an exploitative capitalist. The scene ends abruptly, reverting to 
another landscape; this time however, instead of being a barren wasteland there are 
tall trees and they protect a house. Soho/Felix is seen walking towards the house; he 
stops and picks up a stone. A jump-cut takes us inside the house where Soho/Felix 
is sitting inspecting the stone. There are scales and loose papers on the table where 
he sits. The film then shows different views of the world and fragments of the past 
inside the stone. Soho/Felix then tenderly embraces a naked, thin woman wearing 
glasses.44 Afterwards, the film reverts to its focus on the large rock in the landscape. 
Soho/Felix is also seen listening to the teacup, holding it close to his ear, as if it were 
a sea shell.  The image of the naked woman is erased and the remnants from her 
body morph into a steel framework.  Soho/Felix places his head in her lap, but she 
                                                          
43
 This film continues chronicling the life of Soho/Felix, but it is a film that is clearly made post-
apartheid and is clearly separate from the depiction of the incidents of protesting, rioting, and violence 
experienced during apartheid. Following on from History of the Main Complaint, this film is centred on 
reconciliation and memory, a mirror reflection of South Africa during that era. 
 
44
 This woman is drawn in the likeness of William Kentridge’s wife, Anne Stanwix, whom this 
researcher has had the opportunity to meet briefly. 
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morphs into a telephone. Several brief scenes of domestic conflict appear. She is 
shown beating him, and the tea cup shatters. The ensuing chaos and violence is 
represented by black charcoal marks and red pastel slashes as well as torn pieces of 
paper. Soho/Felix is then shown completely alone in his home. The woman emerges 
from the rock on the landscape. He is shown listening to her, they meet again and 
the torn fragments of paper are united. The camera then reveals the rock, complete 
again. There is a room with a basin of water on the table and the re-joined pieces of 
paper are seen to completely disappear. Soho/Felix’s head rests on the rock outside. 
The audience is left with a question — was this a dream, was he just sleeping?  
Stereoscope (1999) sees the continuation of the central character Soho/Felix; this 
time the screen and images are split into two. They are seemingly identical to each 
other, but of course are not. The central story however is on the city in chaos — 
uprisings, violence, beatings, destruction of shops and the city centre. The city is 
presented as bustling and alive, with telephone wires and poles, power stations and 
a telephone switchboard. These images of a city in chaos are juxtaposed with 
domestic or work scenarios where Soho/Felix is shown in his office or home, often 
looking pensive and melancholic. There are images that he incorporates from 
previous films, such as a room filling with water as with Felix in Exile, and the 
character “Nandi” reappears. There is also the ever-present cat, which as with earlier 
films, turns into different objects, such as a toaster, a telephone and a bomb.  The 
film ends with the flashing words ‘GIVE’ and then ‘FORGIVE’.45 
                                                          
45
 In his Round Table discussion Kentridge states that he attended Jacques Derrida’s lecture on 
forgiveness, in Johannesburg in 2002: 
Derrida who came and gave a lecture at that time which I could not understand but he said 
that the word give has an interesting etymology, that the word comes from the Germanic root 
gif and knowing from Afrikaans, I don’t know German but from Afrikaans the word gif means 
poison … there is a poison in the giving.  And that acts of giving are acts of aggression and 
William Kentridge: Chapter Two: Literature Review (Part I) 
 
49 | P a g e  
 
Tide Table (2003) is the last film to be made by Kentridge for this series. It opens 
with Soho/Felix, in pin-stripe suit, sitting on a beach in an old-fashioned deck chair46. 
Waves swell in the sea, then retreat; a shore line advances, then retreats. It is an 
almost utopian image. He watches a boy playing on the sand. It is not clear if the 
child is his own, or a grandchild, or possibly, it might be a recollection from his own 
childhood. The child throws stones into the waves, climbs over rocks, builds sand 
castles in the likeness of hotels and bathes in a pool of sea water. Soho/Felix 
watches a religious baptism take place in the waves; he reads a newspaper which 
shows stocks rise and fall; there are cows present, fat and lean, some stray into the 
sea; there is a bathing booth filled with deck chairs that morphs into a 
slaughterhouse, then a death camp, and lastly, a hospital filled with sick ailing 
bodies. Simultaneously, three military generals watch Soho/Felix from a hotel 
balcony with binoculars. All the while a black South African woman watches both the 
boy as well as the sometimes dozing Soho/Felix.  The film ends with the boy on the 
beach and Soho/Felix having exchanged places at the shoreline, with Soho/Felix 
throwing stones into the waves. 
The descriptions of these films are significant as they chronicle the narrative and the 
main events of the characters. The descriptions are also important to include here as 
Kentridge’s films are not that accessible for general viewing, and while they cannot in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that the idea of forgiveness becomes very complicated (Kentridge, Rinder, Rosenthal and 
Silverman 2009). 
Kentridge therefore uses these words in his film as a reference to Derrida’s lecture and his 
understanding that to give can poison one.  This is a possible questioning of the call for forgiveness 
by the TRC.   
 
46
 In an interview with Claire Wegener William  Kentridge states that his character Soho/Felix is on 
holiday in Muizenburg, Cape Town (2006:271). 
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any way substitute for watching the films themselves, they do at least provide an 
overview of their content and stories.  
2.1.6  A discussion of the themes and motifs found in Kentridge’s films 
Kentridge’s films are not just about historical events that occurred during apartheid, 
they are about themes and concerns that relate to apartheid and other atrocities and 
wars, such as identity, guilt, memory, forgiveness and reconciliation.  The latter films 
specifically focus on Soho/Felix’s constant struggle for forgiveness and his remorse.  
Other themes however, deal with the more intimate experiences of his characters.  
For example, Felix Teitlebaum’s personal interaction with the character Nandi, the 
sexual relationship that Felix Teitlebaum has with Mrs. Eckstein; the inclusion of his 
own wife, Anne Stanwix; domestic scenes in a home with a fireplace and having tea; 
walking up his garden pathway to his home.  Kentridge expressed it succinctly and 
insightfully when he stated in an interview with Claire Wegener in 2006: 
All the films I’ve made I’d say are not documentary.  They are not 
documenting what happened here, but they’re trying to make some kind of 
map of how what happened here impacts in one’s head, which is not the 
same thing.  … my other long-term project is to consider how we become who 
we are, what agency we have in the construction of ourselves, what things 
have an effect, how strong those effects are, how long memories are retained, 
how long strong compassion can be maintained.  All of those things are 
questions that interest me (2006:272). 
 
There are also many diverse, but recurring motifs found in his filmic series.  These 
include: cats and rhinoceroses; landscapes — urban and rural; water; disused 
machinery and industrial waste; pollution of land and water; old fashioned 
telephones (known as “bakelites”) and typewriters; eyes; mirrors; tea-cups and other 
household items such as beds, and fireplaces; medical equipment such as X-Rays 
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and CAT scans.  Two stylistic motifs include the use of red and / or blue pastel.  This 
is mentioned above in point 2.1.4 which details Kentridge’s artistic oeuvre. Thus, 
many of the motifs found in his films relate to the individual, such as domestic 
scenes, as well as the collective, such as rioters, miners and protesters.  
To conclude this section of Chapter Two it is imperative to note that this thesis is 
greatly indebted to these foundational works and to Kentridge’s own elucidations of 
his works. 
2.2 Part II: Scholarly works on Kentridge 
Part II of this chapter focuses on the scholarly research about Kentridge’s works, 
which includes post-graduate studies as well as other academic literature. A brief 
overview of these studies and articles is proffered here. Broken Vessels: The 
Impossibility of the Art of Remembrance and Re-collection in the work of Anselm 
Kiefer, Christian Boltanski, William Kentridge and Santu Mofokeng (2001), is an MA 
thesis written by Dina Zoe Belluigi.  This study focuses on two of Kentridge’s films 
from the Drawings for Projection series, namely Felix in Exile (1994) and History of 
the Main Complaint (1996).  Her theoretical framework centres on the works of 
Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-Francois Lyotard and the role of the 
historian and the artist in representing history.  She also expressly focuses on the 
concept of melancholia in all four artists.  Although she analyses these four artists 
she does not do a comparative analysis between them and they are analysed as 
separate entries / entities.  Her analysis of Anselm Keifer therefore is not duplicated 
in this dissertation.  (Please see Chapter Nine for more details.)  A PhD dissertation 
entitled Melancholy Constellations: Walter Benjamin, Anselm Kiefer, William 
Kentridge and the Imaging of History as Catastrophe is written by Gerhard Theodore 
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Schoeman.  As with the previously mentioned MA thesis, he similarly focuses on 
melancholia and the representation of history and uses a theoretical framework 
based predominantly on Walter Benjamin and to a lesser degree Theodor Adorno.  
His analysis only focuses on one of the films from Kentridge’s series:  Felix in Exile.  
His study does overlap to some degree with the MA thesis written by Dina Zoe 
Belluigi.  Another doctoral study that emphasises melancholy and mourning is 
Kristina Maria Ottolina Hagstrom’s Melancholy Traces: Performing the Art of 
Mourning. Hagstrom presents three case studies: the testimonial writings of 
Auschwitz survivor Charlotte Delbo; William Kentridge’s play and opera; and the 
public discourse surrounding the “honour killing” of Fadime Sahindel that took place 
in Sweden. With regard to Kentridge her chapter centres on his theatrical production 
Black Box / Chambre Noir and the accompanying opera The Magic Flute.  Only 
passing references are made to his Drawings for Projection series, most specifically 
History of the Main Complaint.  She focuses on the relationship between 
performance and mourning, or performance of melancholia.  Her theoretical 
framework includes Judith Butler (peformative art); Walter Benjamin, Theodor 
Adorno and Michel Foucault.  While Hagstrom’s chapter on Kentridge provides an 
absorbing and thorough historical overview and detailed analysis of The Magic Flute 
and colonial Enlightment and colonialism her thesis is not pertinent to this study.  A 
book by Jennifer Arlene Stone entitled Freud’s Body Ego or Memorabilia of Grief.  
Lucien Freud and William Kentridge, was published in 2003.  Stone is a practising 
psychoanalyst in New York and her work was a comparative analysis of the artists 
Lucien Freud and William Kentridge.  The focus is also on melancholia and mourning 
as thematics inherent in both artists’ works.  Her theoretical framework is entirely 
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based upon that of Sigmund Freud and his work on melancholia and the body ego47.  
Stone’s work is referenced in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
 
Healing Violence in South Africa: A Textual Reading of Kentridge’s “Drawings for 
projection” (2005) is another PhD study on Kentridge by Vanessa Thompson.  Her 
methodology is comprised of three main sections.  The first is a humanist reading of 
Kentridge’s films up to his eighth film in the series, Stereoscope (1999), based on the 
works of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow.  The second part of her methodology is 
a semiotic reading based solely on the work of Hugh J. Silverman’s Textualities: 
Between Hermeneutics & Deconstruction (1994).  This is an extremely brief chapter 
that does not really contribute to the elucidation of Kentridge’s films at all.  The last 
part of her study is comprised of a frame-by-frame transcription of all eight films in 
Kentridge’s series.  Her research is not at all relevant to this thesis. 
 
A very interesting doctoral study was completed by Sara Matthews (2008) titled: A 
Pedagogy of Implication: Witnessing Historical Trauma as a Question of Learning.  
Her study focuses on the teacher’s testimony to the pedagogy or teaching of trauma.  
In other words, how does one teach traumatic events, especially those relating to 
civil war(s)?  What effect does it have on the teacher and their learners? Matthews 
flew to South Africa and conducted interviews with teachers.  She suggests that one 
way to teach and engage with the pedagogy of traumatic events is to convey or 
teach them through creativity or artists’ work.  It is in this capacity that she refers to 
                                                          
47
 Please see Freud’s: Mourning and Melancholia (1917 / 1957); Sigmund Freud: on Murder, 
Mourning and Melancholia (2005); and The Ego and the Id (1923 / 1961). 
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Kentridge’s work as an example of teaching trauma through art (she also uses John 
Keats as an example).  She references Kentridge’s still lifes and film Ubu Tells the 
Truth; as well as his films Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, Sobriety, 
Obesity & Growing Old and Stereoscope.  Her theoretical foundation is based on the 
theories of pedagogy such as those of Deborah Britzman and Donald Meltzer.  The 
former academic’s field of expertise is psychology and education and teaching what 
she terms as “studies in difficult knowledge” and “studies of the emotional world” 
(cited in Matthews 2008:4-8).  The latter academic, Donald Meltzer’s field of 
expertise is Kleinian psychoanalysis, based on the work of Melanie Klein.  While 
Matthews’ thesis is not germane to this study, the results from her interviews and her 
unusual stance on how to teach the traumata of history were most thought-provoking 
and very well argued. 
 
Arlene Murphy completed an MA report as part of a coursework MA that was entitled 
the Use of Medical Imagery in Hand Drawn Animation Artworks: William Kentridge’s 
“History of the Main Complaint” and Other Works (2008).  Her focus is on Kentridge’s 
animated films History of the Main Complaint and WEIGHING … and WANTING as 
well as her own artistic work in the mediums of stop-frame animation, painting and 
printmaking.  Her report examines how Kentridge, as well as herself, use medical 
imagery in their works as a means to narrate the self.  Her theoretical focus is on 
Lisa Cartwright’s book Screening the Body: Tracing Medicine’s Visual Culture 
(1995); Barry Saunder’s CT Suite: The work of Diagnosis in the Age of Non Invasive 
Cutting (2008); and, Kathleen Adler and Marcia Pointon’s The Body Imaged: the 
Human Form and Visual Culture since the Renaissance (1993).  Andrew Joseph 
Hennlich completed his doctoral research, (un)Fixing the eye: William Kentridge and 
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the Optics of Witness in 2010.  He clearly states that his central line of inquiry into 
Kentridge’s works is comprised of how the artist uses “optical toys” as metaphors in 
his artworks (2011:12).  He has selected the following artworks for his analysis: Ubu 
Tells the Truth (camera); Felix in Exile (theodolite); History of the Main Complaint 
(medical imaging devices); and lastly Black Box / Chamber Noir (camera). His 
literature review for a reading of the complex narratives of history and apartheid 
consists of a central key text, Antjie Krog’s Country of my Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and 
the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa, published in 1998 (2011:27). 
Other texts include the works of Melanie Klein and Jonathan Carey respectively.  
The latter author deals with the problematics of visual modernism and social 
modernity and looks at the significance of physiological optics. The film Felix in Exile 
is the focus of chapter two which interestingly includes a comparative analysis 
between Kentridge’s work and the South African artist J. H. Pierneef. In Chapter 
Three of his thesis, which in his introduction he states deals predominantly with 
Kentridge’s film History of the Main Complaint, Hennlich makes constant reference to 
another of Kentridge’s films in the Drawings for projection series: WEIGHING … and 
WANTING.  He also references two main sources: Lisa Cartwright’s book Screening 
the Body: Tracing Medicine’s Visual Culture (1995); and Barry Saunder’s CT Suite: 
The work of Diagnosis in the Age of Non Invasive Cutting (2008).  The reason for 
highlighting his two central sources is that this chapter is very similar to Arlene 
Murphey’s MA study, which preceded Hennlich’s dissertation by two years.  The 
overlap is quite considerable in places. 
 
Leora Ruth Maltz completed her doctoral dissertation for the discipline of art and 
architecture in 2008.  Her dissertation is titled: William Kentridge: Process as 
William Kentridge: Chapter Two: Literature Review (Part I) 
 
56 | P a g e  
 
Metaphor and Other Doubtful Enterprises.  This is another fascinating analysis of 
Kentridge’s oeuvre.  It is entirely focused on Kentridge’s artistic or stylistic aesthetic 
process: the act of drawing.  It is based on the theories surrounding the concept of 
metaphysics and change founded on the philosophical works of Alfred North 
Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, Nicholas Rescher and Henri Bergson.  This 
metaphysical philosophy is termed “process philosophy” and defines reality as a 
process.  Her argument is that through his act of drawing Kentridge links it to the real 
world beyond the drawing.  She also includes film maker George Meliès48, 
dramaturge Samuel Beckett and artist George Brecht49 as part of her methodology.  
Other theories that form part of her methodology are John Dewy’s aesthetics of 
action; Hannah Arendt’s ethics of action; Harold Rosenberg’s writings on process; 
and Marxist theories of history.  Much of her dissertation focuses on Kentridge’s very 
early works, such as his performance, direction and artworks in the Junction Avenue 
Theatre production of plays.  Her work is ultimately indebted to an article on 
Kentridge by academic Rosalind Krauss published in 2001 (this article is mentioned 
further on in this thesis).  However, her emphasis is on Kentridge’s process as it fits 
into post-war discourses of American art. 
Several scholars have also written articles on Kentridge’s cinematic project.  
Rosalind Krauss in her article: The Rock: William Kentridge’s “Drawings for 
Projection” (2001) was the first to emphasise the significance of Kentridge’s 
aesthetic act or process in drawing his art.  As already mentioned, Leora Ruth Maltz 
has used that article as the basis for her doctoral research (2008).  Tom Gunning, a 
professor in the Department of Art History at the University of Chicago, wrote an 
                                                          
48
 A French illusionist, born 1861, died 1938. 
49
 A conceptual artist, born 1926, died 2008; he was also a composer and chemist, and a creator of 
participatory art. 
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article on the film Stereoscope: Doubled Vision peering through Kentridge’s 
“Stereoscope” (2001).  He too focusses on the process of the medium of animation 
as “invented”50 by Kentridge (2001:66).  He attempts to decipher the erasures and 
the spaces between the drawings.  He suggests that Kentridge’s films raise more 
questions than answers and concludes that “the animation of this world [the violent 
city of Johannesburg as depicted in Stereoscope] seems demonic, with the only 
solution (perhaps) being that of complete erasure” (2001:73; parenthesis — author of 
this dissertation).  Susan Stewart, a poet and critic, wrote an intriguing article on 
Kentridge’s works, with reference to many of the different mediums he employs, 
simply titled A Messenger.  In this article, Stewart argues that Kentridge, through his 
use of animation and fantasy-inspired content, suggests that there is a place for 
“fantasy in an art of public conscience” (2001:87).  This is very similar to what 
academic and historian Hayden White (1996) argues, that is, that surrealism and 
fantasy can be used to re-represent historical events.  Chapter Eight of this thesis, 
which deals with this line of enquiry, therefore sources Susan Stewart as support for 
Hayden White’s discourse on historical re-representation as it applies to Kentridge’s 
films.  Susan Stewart also contributed an article to the book William Kentridge: Prints 
(2006), entitled Resistance and Ground: the Prints of William Kentridge.  While the 
book does not deal with his filmic series, Stewart’s insights on Kentridge’s prints 
have been extrapolated from and linked to his films in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
 
In “History of the Main Complaint”: William Kentridge and the Making of Post-
apartheid South Africa (2004), academics Jessica Dubow and Ruth Rosengarten 
                                                          
50
 As with Krauss (2001), Gunning clearly states that while this process of animation as used by 
Kentridge is not entirely new, the way that Kentridge explores it and develops it is (2001:66). 
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situate Soho Eckstein’s body as the locus and backdrop to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.  Several of their interpretative readings of Kentridge’s 
film History of the Main Complaint are similar as those proffered in this dissertation 
and as such are mentioned and sourced in Chapter Eight:  Memory, History, Identity, 
Time and Space.  Jane Taylor, writer of the play, Ubu and the Truth Commission 
(1997), which was directed by Kentridge, has written two articles on Kentridge.  The 
first article, Spherical and without Exits: thoughts on William Kentridge’s anamorphic 
film “What Will Come (Has already Come)” (2008) only cursorily references 
Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection series.  The second article Tide Tables Turned: 
Fathers and Sons in William Kentridge (2009), concerns itself with the last film in 
Kentridge’s series: Tide Table. Taylor gives a particularly intriguing textual reading of 
the film: she proffers that this film of Kentridge’s deals with a sub-text: the post-
apartheid problem of Aids in South Africa.  While this is most fascinating her 
interpretation is not at all relevant to this dissertation.  
 
In summation of this section, there are many other articles and scholastic studies on 
Kentridge’s work, but they do not concern themselves with his Drawings for 
Projection series.  With regard to the studies and academic articles discussed here, 
they generally fall outside the purview of this dissertation. 
 
2.3  Conclusion 
To conclude then, while many of these analyses, including both the foundational and 
the scholastic works on Kentridge, have become virtual truisms, the fundamental 
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questions subtending these critiques and observations, that is, why and how 
Kentridge engages with and depicts memory /memories) remain unasked and 
unanswered, until now.  This thesis therefore opens up a new avenue of 
interpretation, focusing on the series that inaugurated Kentridge’s double-enacted 
aesthetic operation of inscription and erasure and provides a theoretical framework 
never before considered.  
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORETICAL (PART II) 
 
The chapter provides an overview, critique and substantiation of the relevant seminal 
works required for the analysis of the topic.  Furthermore, it contextualises the 
investigation within previous, related research and therefore also provides supporting 
theory (i.e. secondary sources).  As with all literature reviews, the seminal and 
ancillary theoretical works designated also clearly demarcate the boundaries of 
knowledge relating to this study, as obviously not all research can be included.  As 
mentioned in Chapter One (and Chapter Four: A Methodology of Memory, which 
explains the qualitative process that resulted in this choice) the literature selected is 
extremely eclectic, as dictated by the themes and the sensitised concepts initially 
identified in Kentridge‘s films.  Also, as elucidated on in Chapter Four, the 
perspectives selected in order to explicate Kentridge‘s films started with a very 
simple premise, the researcher‘s own world-view: a repudiation of grand narratives; 
an abjuration of any absolute / one ―truth‖; and an incredulity of ―objectivity‖. The five 
broad themes covered in this chapter are: psychoanalysis; post-structuralism; 
postmodernism; memory studies; and, trauma studies. 
 
3.1  Psychoanalysis and Sigmund Freud 
Sigmund Freud is the founding father of psychoanalysis. While Sigmund Freud‘s 
works have been celebrated or denigrated, refuted or practised, he has undeniably 
had an influential impact as a major historical figure in the Western world.  His works 
have introduced such concepts as ―the Unconscious‖; ―penis envy‖; the ―Oedipus 
Complex‖; ―psychoanalysis‖; ―psychic trauma‖; and the ―talking cure‖, to mention a 
few.  Countless books, articles, theories, and curricula have been generated 
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discussing his works, either disparagingly or positively.  Ultimately though, Freud 
generated a unique form of discourse which is either used as a psychotherapeutic 
practice or as a critical method of analysis / critique for analysing history; narratives; 
media and literary texts; culture; and politics (Forrester 1990; Payne 2005).   
 
Sigmund Freud created psychoanalysis as ―a procedure for the medical treatment of 
neurotic patients‖ (1915 / 1991a:39).  At the basis, or creation of every self, lies 
psychical trauma, usually traced to some infantile experience. Freud‘s theory was at 
first known as a theory of ―hysteria‖ simply because the psychiatric work that he was 
doing involved his female patients whose symptomology he diagnosed as ―hysteria‖.  
He then concluded that these symptoms could be traced back to some form of 
childhood abuse that had been forgotten and repressed in their unconscious minds.  
They then resurfaced and presented themselves as ―hysteria‖. He published his 
findings in 1896, entitled: The Aetiology of Hysteria.  He also argued that women 
were in some way responsible for their own sexual abuse.  As his work progressed, 
he dismissed that argument and instead introduced the Oedipus Complex, based 
entirely on the myth of Oedipus Rex1.  Freud only returned to his concept of 
psychical trauma (―trauerarbeit” 2 3) after he began treating shell-shocked soldiers 
                                                          
1
 Oedipus Rex is a tragedy by the Greek playwright Sophocles.  Due to an oracle, Oedipus fled the 
house of his (adoptive) parents and thus encountered his biological parents, unwittingly murdering his 
father, King Laius, and committing incest with his mother, Jocasta.  The prophecy foretold by the 
oracle was fulfilled. When Oedipus realised his sin, he punished himself by gouging out his eyes.  
Although Sigmund Freud, who first analysed the myth, recognised that the story of Oedipus Rex was 
a Greek myth, he also saw this tragedy as a symbolic description of man's greatest psychological 
conflicts (this myth is the basis for Freud‘s concept of men‘s ―Oedipal Complex‖ first introduced in his 
work The Interpretation of Dreams (1900 / 1991a); the corresponding complex in women is called the 
―Electra Complex‖).  In effect, the myth represents every child's unconscious desire to possess the 
opposite-sexed parent and simultaneously dispose of the same-sexed parent (Freud 1991a). 
 
2
 Freud coined this term ―trauerarbeit‖ or ―psychic trauma‖. 
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returning from the First World War.  Ultimately, in the psychoanalytic account the 
individual subject is formed in the face of trauma or as a result of trauma.  In order to 
understand how such trauma is initially repressed or denied Freud introduced 
several seminal concepts to further his, and our, understanding of trauma.  He 
argued that emotions, thoughts and desires are mental, and are known consciously.  
However, the self has unconscious components too, which he said included 
―instinctual impulses … [which] can only be described as sexual‖ (1982:47).  He saw 
psychoanalysis as a means of delving into the unconscious in order to trace desire, 
wish fulfilment and the residues of trauma.  He defined the process thus: ―to make 
mysteries and fish in troubled waters,‖ where the psychoanalyst finds the self in a 
constant struggle between ―the pressure of the exigencies of life‖ and ―the 
satisfaction of the instincts‖ (1982:46-47).  For Freud this meant an intensive reading 
of the hidden strata of the stories told by his patients.  He employed several methods 
as techniques to achieve this underside or the buried layers, which included ―the 
talking cure‖ or ―free association‖: the patient talks at will in consultation with the 
psychoanalyst about intimate subjects, subjects so sensitive that the patient normally 
conceals them from the outside world.  He used a form of free association as well as 
analysing the contents of a patient‘s dreams, which he felt contained the residues of 
the unconscious mind.  He argued that ―chance and symptomatic actions‖ had to be 
understood as ―valid psychical acts‖.  One such act would be that of ―forgetting‖ 
which uses absent-mindedness as a device for secreting data.  For Freud 
―forgetting‖ was the ―intention to avoid unpleasure‖ (1982:52, 88, 87, 100-103).  This 
notion of avoidance became the purpose of looking for structured absences that are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3
 Cathy Caruth defined trauma in her book, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History, as 
―an overwhelming experience of sudden or catastrophic events in which the response to the event [is] 
… often delayed, uncontrolled [and] repetitive‖ (1996:11).  It is overwhelming because it is 
unprecedented.   
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founded on displacement, denial and over-determination.  The central idea behind 
this is that an individual‘s psyche denies stress and displaces it onto something else, 
which gives credence to the psychoanalytic premise as a theory of conflict.  Freud 
writes: ―the ideas which people try to suppress in this way turn out invariably to be 
the most important ones‖ (1982:52).  Freud also introduced the concept of 
―scopophilia‖ or simply ―the pleasure in looking‖ (1982:65).  Freud argued that sexual 
life is characterised by the ―desire to look at the other person or to feel him or to 
watch him in the performance of his intimate actions‖ (1982:258, 347, 371, and 364).  
This concept was later adopted and expounded on by Laura Mulvey and Jean-Paul 
Sartre. (These ideas are central to studying Kentridge‘s films and are elucidated on 
in Chapter Seven.)  Psychoanalysis as a therapeutic theory is simply an individual‘s 
psychic struggle to overcome trauma and form an integrated self.  These psychic 
struggles are fought in the realm of the unconscious, which means that they cannot 
be known or thought of in the conscious realm or neurons of individuals.   
 
Freud used archaeology4 as a recurrent analogy for exhuming psychical processes 
and buried impulses, wishes, desires and trauma. Understanding the unconscious as 
a (metaphoric) archaeological excavation site uncovering the unconscious and 
repressed impulses and memories is fundamental to comprehending repressed 
trauma as related to Kentridge‘s works.  Freud considered the psychoanalyst‘s role 
to be the excavation of the analysand‘s unconscious.  And many theorists have 
                                                          
4
  Imagine that an explorer arrives in a little-known region where his interest is aroused by an  
expanse of ruins, with remains of walls, fragments of columns, and tablets with half effaced 
and unreadable inscriptions. … he may start upon the ruins, clear away the rubbish, and, 
beginning from the visible remains, uncover what is buried.  If his work is crowned with 
success, the discoveries are self-explanatory … the fragments of columns can be filled out 
into a temple; the numerous inscriptions, which, by good luck, may be bilingual, reveal an 
alphabet and a language, and when they have been deciphered and translated, yield 
undreamed-of information about the events of the remote past, to commemorate which the 
monuments were built (Freud 2001 / 1896:192).  
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argued that this archaeological exhuming of an unconscious is not limited to the 
excavation of an individual‘s psyche but that of history‘s psyche too (Harvey 2007; 
Irigaray 1985 / 1977). French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray, while accusing 
Freud of disregarding and neglecting history, took it upon herself to appropriate 
Freud‘s idea and protract his concept of the unconscious beyond the constraints of 
the individual‘s psyche to comprehend a culture that is as resounding with memory 
as childhood is for the subject (1985 / 1977).  Freud often referred to this trope as an 
analogy for the sedimentation of the psychic unconscious, his metaphors even 
extended to referring to ―unearthing‖ and ―recovery‖ of memories or latent desires 
(2001 / 1896).  His idea of exhuming or excavating an individuals‘ unconscious 
psyche as well as excavating history and culture are absolutely essential to the 
methodology of this thesis. That is, this thesis has endeavoured to excavate not only 
the artist‘s unconscious, but also the historical psyche of a traumatised and often-
times repressed unconscious of South African culture.  With regards to 
―psychoanalysing‖ the artist himself: his intentions, motivations and desires, it has 
been used to understand his motivation behind what he chooses to depict and why.  
It also makes a direct link to Kentridge‘s own traumata experienced as a child which 
has informed his later decisions of what to draw.  For instance, both the traumatic 
events from his early child hood years are referenced in films, the one where he 
finds the photographs of the dead bodies in his father‘s study and the one where he 
witnesses the beating of a man in the street (please see Chapter Two for a detailed 
description of both instances, as recounted by Kentridge himself, as well as a 
depiction of the films in which they resurface).  The archaeology metaphor has also 
been used to draw an analogy of how Kentridge‘s films themselves are sedimented 
with history, culture, politics and trauma, buried deep beneath their charcoal images 
William Kentridge: Chapter Three: Theoretical Literature Review (Part II) 
 
65 | P a g e  
 
(please see Chapter Nine for a comprehensive analysis).  It has even gone so far as 
to explain how Kentridge‘s artistic technique is also a process of sedimentation and 
recovery: his charcoal drawings are layered one upon another and erasures reveal 
different images with different meanings.  In addition, it has used Freud‘s 
understanding of sedimentation and recovery to assist with understanding and 
recovering South Africa‘s collective trauma and repressed memories of the apartheid 
years. Please see Chapter Eight of this thesis for the sections on history and 
Sigmund Freud‘s A Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad (1899a).  Both sections make 
use of Freud‘s ideas to construe and disinter Kentridge‘s films. Also see Chapter Six: 
Memory and Trauma, which details Freud‘s concept of ―trauerarbeit”; and Chapter 
Nine, which applies these theories to the use of landscapes in Kentridge‘s filmic 
series.  
 
Some of the foremost difficulties with Freud‘s theories include: his central positioning 
of the role of the father in the family set-up; the lack or absence of the mother figure; 
his emphasis, or rather over-emphasis on the Oedipal myth5; his biological 
determinism; the belief of feminist scholars who argued that Freud reinforced cultural 
and societal disadvantages that women experience in the Western world (Burnham 
                                                          
5
 The general scholarly view is that while the Oedipal myth is given credence, it is criticised for its 
absolutism, totalisation and reductionism.  For instance, Catherine Kearns in her book entitled 
Psychoanalysis, Historiography and Feminist Theory, uses Freud‘s theory of Oedipal myth in order to 
analyse history‘s phallocentric centre.  However, she still distances herself completely from Freud‘s 
subscription to the Oedipus myth as a ―developmental absolute‖ (1997:6; [emphasis, this researcher]).  
 
Similarly, authors Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in their work Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia state:  
 
We do not deny that there is an Oedipal sexuality, an Oedipal heterosexuality and 
homosexuality, an Oedipal castration, as well as complete objects, global images, and 
specific egos.  We deny that these are productions of the unconscious (1972:74). 
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20066; Elliot 1994; Green 2004; Harvey 2007; Irigaray 1985 / 1977; Mitchell 2000).  
His works have been critiqued as sexist and dismissed as ―pseudo-science‖ (Mitchell 
2000, and Webster 2005 respectively); and he has often been accused of eliding 
history (Harvey 2007; Irigaray 1977). Although it is not the purview of this thesis to 
delve into the problematics of all of Freud‘s theories, one such example of such a 
critique would concern the deficient definition of the ―Unconscious‖.  Very simply the 
―Unconscious‖ refers to a mental process of which the individual is unaware.  The 
―Unconscious‖ or the ―System of the Unconscious‖ as defined by Freud is the 
opposite of the conscious and is an ―entity‖ that influences oneself unbeknown to 
oneself.  Its specific structure as characterised by Freud is defined thus: ―exemption 
from mutual contradiction, primary process, timelessness, and replacement of 
external by psychical reality‖ (1915 / 1999a:40).  It is also, according to Freud, the 
ultimate motivational source.  However, Ann E. Berthoff pertinently asks: how does 
this ―unconscious‖ differ from ―motivation and determination?‖ (2008:148). She also 
refers to Susanne K. Langer‘s astute observation that: 
ideas, intentions, images and fantasies … are rooted in the fabric of totally 
unfelt activities which Freud reified with the substantive term, ‗the 
unconscious‘‖, which further leads to the critique of Freud‘s ―single system‖ as 
―overassumptive‖ (cited in Berthoff 2008:148).   
 
Catherine Kearns adds to the argument by stating that the ―Unconscious‖ should not 
be accepted as a deified absence ―unknowable, and (omni)present)‖ (1997:7).  
However, while acknowledging its limitations, this concept is significant in its 
explanatory value in understanding the concept of trauma and excavating the 
―unconscious‖ in Kentridge‘s films. It is also absolutely essential in understanding 
                                                          
6
 See Freud‟s Women, written by Lisa Appignanesi and John Forrester, who discuss this debate, that 
is, whether a women is born or made, in great detail (1992).  
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concepts such as ―free association‖, ―screen memories‖, ―repression‖, and the 
interpretation of latent content in an individual‘s psyche, all of which, in turn, are 
highly pertinent to this study.  Please see Chapter Five for an elucidation and 
application of Freud‘s ―screen memories‖; and Chapter Eight for Freud‘s A Note 
upon the Mystic Writing Pad, which looks at the metaphor of the unconscious as a 
palimpsest, and is thus compared to that of a stylus writing on parchment, which 
when erased, leaves a residue or trace.  This is then likened to Kentridge‘s charcoal 
drawing process, which has already been explained in Chapter One and Chapter 
Two.  Briefly, however, it is a process of multiple layering of charcoal drawings upon 
one another, which when erased leave behind ghostly traces or residues.  Patrick H. 
Hutton in his book, History as an Art of Memory, has postulated psychoanalysis as 
the ―art of memory‖ (1993:66).  It is in this very vein that Freud‘s psychoanalytic 
method of inquiry has been applied to William Kentridge, as this thesis focuses on 
how and why Kentridge‘s filmic series depicts memory.  
 
Contemporary psychoanalysis is less a therapeutically practiced form of 
psychotherapy and tends to take its form as ―psychoanalytic critique‖, used by film 
and media theorists; in literary theory; in feminism and gender studies; in cultural 
studies; and even within political and social theories (Elliot 1994:2; Cohen 2007)7.  
                                                          
7
 John Forrester posits this ardently: 
Freud‘s writings are an extraordinary resource, they are so and continue to be so only as long 
as the practice of analysis preserves and develops the form of discourse that Freud invented.  
And this form of discourse has become even more vital and fundamental insofar as other 
disciplines, from the theory of cinema to the philosophy and sociology of science, have looked 
to a general theory of discourse.  The specific theory of the psychoanalytic discourse pre-
exists all the other post-modern general theories of discourse; it challenges them to justify the 
very project of their generality, it offers them an example, maybe even a template, and it 
incites the question that is antecedent to any possible treatment of discourse.  Freud did 
invent a new form of discourse whose extraordinary laws and possibilities are still being 
investigated (1990:3). 
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Textual criticism has been equated to that of psychoanalysis in its goal to uncover 
secrets and explain them, or as Toby Miller clearly sates: ―surfacing the sedimented 
to satisfy the analyst‘s professional duty‖ (2000:475).  This involves examining ―the 
dregs, one might say, of the world of phenomena‖ (1982:52).  For example, referring 
specifically to the use of psychoanalysis as a critical method of inquiry in film, Dudley 
Andrew posits that  
psychoanalysis has been deployed to account for the unconscious of 
filmmakers and spectators, the nature of film as fantasy, the inevitability of 
identification for fantasy to come into play, and how the unconscious in film 
may intersect with wider connections of psychoanalysis and culture 
(1984:135).   
 
This encapsulates what forms a part of the principal undertaking of this research: 
trying to account for Kentridge‘s unconscious (predominantly in Chapter 6: Memory 
and Trauma); as well as the spectators of his films (evidenced in Chapter 7: 
Questions of (Post)memory, Representation and Aesthetics); and how the 
―unconscious‖ in Kentridge‘s films mirrors or portrays the wider connections of a 
South African psyche and culture (a theme found throughout this inquiry). 
 
However, it must again be stated that despite the importance of Freud‘s 
psychoanalytic ―template‖ or method of discourse, this thesis distinguishes itself 
somewhat from this treatise in that it does not appropriate it as is.  In other words, 
this is a dissertation that cannot be categorised as a purely psychoanalytic study.  It 
in no way adopts this methodological framework in toto.  This is despite that fact that 
many of the theorists8 who have been referenced in this thesis themselves have 
been influenced by, or use psychoanalytic concepts.  In keeping with the overall 
                                                          
8
 His works have influenced the following authors, all of whom are pertinent to this study, in some 
manner: Roland Barthes; Victor Burgin; Jacques Derrida; Michel Foucault; Michael Halbwachs; Julia 
Kristeva; Laura Mulvey; and Hayden White.  
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approach used within this research, this study has adopted a deconstructive or 
sceptical approach to any one ―grand narrative‖ or ―master narrative / theory‖ of 
which psychoanalysis is one such an example.  One such scholar who also makes 
use of Freud‘s (and Jacques Lacan‘s) theories is feminist filmmaker, Laura Mulvey, 
who this section now discusses. 
 
3.2 Psychoanalysis and Laura Mulvey 
Laura Mulvey wrote the seminal article Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema in 
19759 (reprinted 1989).  It is almost canonical in its stature, and has in the past thirty-
something years been interrogated, refuted, revised and reiterated.  It is even 
considered by some academic scholars as the ―most influential publication in 
contemporary film studies‖ (Merck 2007:2).  For those uninitiated in film or cultural 
studies, feminist or gender or even media studies, very simply put, Mulvey‘s article 
argues that mainstream Hollywood cinema represents women as passive objects of 
male desire.  She uses Freudian psychoanalysis and structuralism to support her 
argument.  Her essay is often referred to as the theory of the ―male gaze‖, and her 
theory is so eminent that oft times little more is proffered by way of theory or 
explication. However, her theory is not without criticism and this study does not wish 
to make any assumptions on the part of the reader.  Therefore, without transcribing 
her article in its entirety, a few important points need to be elaborated on.  Mulvey 
                                                          
9
 Reprinted in 1989, which is the edition that this thesis uses, but also in many anthologies, for 
example:  
 
Robert Stam and Toby Miller‘s (eds) Film and Theory: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); and  
 
Bill Nichols‘ (ed.) Movies and Methods.  Volume II (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of 
California Press, 1985); and  
 
Philip Rosen‘s (ed.) Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
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writes that ―the determining male gaze projects its fantasy on the female figure‖ 
(1989:19).  In doing so, the male characters are ―bearers of the look‖ which is aimed 
at physically attractive, but sexually submissive female characters.  Furthermore, the 
audience watching these films does so through the eyes of the dominant male 
protagonists, thereby positioning all of them as though they are heterosexual men 
desiring heterosexual women.  In addition to that, she theorises that the camera 
(read here cameraman) that records the film is male.  In other words she is referring 
to phallocentric Hollywood — the predominantly male directors and producers who 
make the decisions as to what a film records — who devise a voyeuristic position for 
the assumed heterosexual male spectator.  As already stated, Mulvey‘s article has 
been critiqued almost ad nauseum, and revisited repeatedly, including constant re-
examination from Mulvey herself10.  A few of the central criticisms are discussed 
here briefly.  Linda Kauffman criticises the essay for its lack of objectivity (1998:72); 
and Mandy Merck argues that the essay is lacking in academic rigour (2007:11).  Not 
only because it is so descriptive in style, but because the foundational (that is, 
psychoanalytical) concepts are neither defined in the text nor footnoted, which as 
Merck rightly argues, would make the terminology and constant reference to 
psychoanalytic discourse impossible to understand if the reader was not already 
familiar with these terms (2007:11).  Noël Carroll contests Mulvey‘s article on 
empirical grounds: he suggests that male erotic display in mainstream Hollywood 
film is not that rare (1996:260-274).  He also argues that the genres of comedy and 
biopics do not eroticise the female form.  Bill Nichols criticises Mulvey‘s over-reliance 
                                                          
10
 For instance, please see Visual and Other Pleasures (1989) and Fetishism and Curiosity (1996) 
where Mulvey discusses contemporary political, economic, social and cultural changes that have 
impacted on her article. 
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on psychoanalysis and its perceived ―indifference to social specificity‖ (2000:47)11.  
Another criticism of the psychoanalytic tenets she uses is articulated by Dan 
Laughey, that of her presumed audience responses (2007:105).  In other words, she 
assumes that because visual pleasure is constructed by unconscious psychical 
processes and fashioned by invisible patriarchal ideologies, female cinema 
spectators are repressed without being conscious of this.  This also pre-empts an 
argument as postulated by academic Annette E. Kuhn of Mulvey‘s lack of empirical 
research, which if carried out would deliver conflicting results (2000:442-447).  These 
criticisms, while valid, are not relevant to this thesis.  Neither is her theory of the 
―male gaze‖.  What is relevant is her general idea of the visual pleasures, or 
scopophilic / voyeuristic pleasures, which are experienced when viewing a film.  It is 
also the embodiment of the diegetic look and the identification of the spectator with 
the character in a film that is of consequence to this study.  This therefore relates 
directly to the pleasure enjoyed by viewing the aesthetics of Kentridge‘s films, 
despite their often gory depictions. It is also academic support of the idea of the 
spectator‘s identification with the central characters, Soho Eckstein and Felix 
Teitlebaum.  The spectator‘s identification with these characters means empathising 
with the issues that these characters grapple with, such as, guilt, responsibility, 
mourning and accountability, within the context of apartheid and post-apartheid.  Her 
work is therefore referenced in Chapter Seven of this study, albeit very briefly.  As 
Miriam Hansen reiterates, cinema is about the spectator‘s ―perceptual identification 
with seeing and being seen‖ (1994:2).  The processes of identification are significant: 
                                                          
11
 This is actually predicated on an inaccurate premise, Freud was aware of the cultural and historical 
positioning of the self: 
 
I must endeavour to construct a narrative in which subjective and objective attitudes, 
biographical and historical interests, are combined in a new proportion (1925:7). 
 
See also: Freud: Moses and Monotheism (1939). 
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the audience views the images, and then identifies with parts of them, complete with 
all the characters and their own psychic conflicts. This exposition discusses post-
structuralism and postmodernism next. 
 
3.3  Post-structuralist and postmodernist concepts 
The theoretical approach of post-structuralism, which synthesises psychoanalysis, 
feminism and deconstruction, was developed out of a profound scepticism of total 
theory (Stam 2000).  Its central tenet argues for a double articulation of discourses 
and non-discourses (said or unsaid) of all texts (Stam 2000). It looks specifically at 
the significant discourses surrounding the text as well as those found within the text. 
This thesis has only selectively focused on three main post-structuralist tenets (cf. 
Irigaray 1985 / 1977; Kristeva 1996; Mulvey 1975; Stam 2000).  Firstly, that of 
spectator identification which is expounded on in Chapter Seven: Questions of 
(Post)memory, Representation and Aesthetics.  The second tenet deals with the 
importance of the context of a text: the social, cultural, and historical contexts.  The 
texts, in this instance, are the nine films that comprise the Drawings for Projection 
series, and the context is that of South Africa (apartheid and post-apartheid). South 
Africa‘s political, historical and social milieu not only contextualised Kentridge‘s 
works, he was highly critical of the events that were being practiced in South Africa 
at the time of making these films.  Thirdly, there is the post-structuralist tenet that a 
text is never transparent, innocent, or natural.  Therefore it has to be deconstructed 
or unpicked in order to understand its modes of representation.  Deconstructive films 
are therefore counter-cinematic, both aesthetically and politically (Stam 2000).  This 
is exemplified in Kentridge‘s films aesthetically, as they are surrealist and flout 
Classical Hollywood cinema, and politically, because they were anti-apartheid and 
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blatantly challenged the apartheid status-quo.  This is pivotal to the films 
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, Mine, and Monument.  All these films 
were made during the apartheid years and were a damning testament to the ruling 
Nationalist Party at the time.  These films not only defied the apartheid regime but 
also testified to the state-sanctioned atrocities committed under this regime. 
  
Postmodernism12 as a discourse is self-reflexive in that it provides its own texts with 
criticism.  As a term it is polysemic and has many contributing theorists. It is also 
considered to be difficult to define13 (Klages 201014; Livingstone 2010).  There are 
three broad areas of ―postmodernism‖: as an epoch, beginning ―after‖ modernism; as 
an aesthetic style; and thirdly, as a discourse.  Dick Hebdige in his book, Hiding the 
Light, identifies three pivotal concepts that make up postmodernist discourse: firstly, 
there is the negation of totalisation, such as a defining essential human nature; 
secondly, there is the negation of utopia.  This stems from Jean-François Lyotard‘s 
disbelief in what he terms the ―grand ecrits‖ of the West: scepticism of, for example, 
science.  The third concept identified by Hebdige is the negation of teleology (the 
negation of a grand design of purpose) (1988).  Essentially, it is an emphasis on 
                                                          
12
 Even though scholar Mary Klages claims that postmodernism is difficult to define she has 
attempted what is, arguably, an excellent encapsulation: 
 
rejecting boundaries between high and low forms of art, rejecting rigid genre distinctions, 
empahsizing pastiche, parody, bricolage, irony, and playfulness.  Postmodern art (and 
thought) favors reflexivity and self-consciousness, fragmentation and discontinuity (especially 
in narrative structures), ambiguity, simultaneity, and an emphasis on the destructured, 
decentered, dehumanized subject (2010). 
 
13
 Which is presumably why Jean-François Lyotard wrote an essay attempting to do just that: 
Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism? (1982). 
 
14
 Mary Klages writes of postmodernism: 
 
Postmodernism is a complicated term, or set of ideas, one that … is hard to define, because it 
… appears in a wide variety of disciplines or areas of study, including art, architecture, music, 
film, literature, sociology, communications, fashion and technology (2010). 
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decentring; displacement; openness; heterodoxy; contingency; multiplicity; plurality; 
intertextuality; hybridity; and multidimensionality.  It proposes a rejection of meta-
narratives and totalising ―truth‖ claims.  Theorists that have contributed to this 
discourse include, amongst others, Jean Baudrillard; Jean-François Lyotard; 
Frederic Jameson; Hayden White; Keith Jenkins; Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari; 
Jacques Lacan; and Julia Kristeva. Critics have dismissed postmodernism as 
―frivolous‖ and ―intellectually irresponsible‖ (Anchor 2001:112). This relates directly to 
how postmodernism posits an ―anything goes‖ approach, which, in the discipline of 
history for example, could be used to advocate historical denialism, such as that of 
fascism or genocide. Postmodernism is dismissed for its novel-jargon and its 
―vertiginous quality of the postmodern thought-world‖ (Anchor 2001:112).  Jürgen 
Habermas, as a vocal opponent of postmodernism refers to it as ―destructive‖ and 
―rampant‖ (cited in Livingstone 2010:31).  Harold Bloom in his book, The Anxiety of 
Influence: A theory of Poetry, writes contemptuously: 
They are postmodernists.  Their peculiar, rather desperate view only purports 
to be revolutionary.  Instead it is empty.  It is postmodernism collapsing in 
upon itself, crushed to dust under the weight of its own catatonic 
meaninglessness (1997:xxv). 
 
Other criticisms include scathing remarks, such as describing academics who still 
teach postmodernism as existing as ―islands of outdated trendiness, archipelagos of 
discarded academic chic‖, and ―postmodernism is dead‖ (Pontuso 2008:215; cf. 
Huyssen 2006). 
 
Post-structuralism and postmodernism as discourses are also not the theoretical 
framework within which Kentridge‘s films are critiqued.  However, this framework 
uses the postmodern techniques of discourse analysis and post-structuralist 
technique of deconstruction to interrogate Kentridge‘s films in order to further 
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articulate and explicate them.  As described in Chapter Four, dealing with the 
methodology, there are several relevant principal tenets, from which this study 
emanates, which are quintessentially postmodern.  Firstly, there is the refusal of a 
grand or authoritative truth, or a master narrative. There is no one authoritative, 
overriding narrative describing the past: ―A complete, final and definitive account or 
interpretation of any historical matter is, therefore, an intrinsic impossibility‖ (Macfie 
2010:223).  William Kentridge has also stated:  
I believe that in the indeterminancy of drawing, the contingent way that 
images arrive in the work … Trains of thought that seem to be going 
somewhere but can‘t quite be brought to a conclusion.  If there were to be a 
very clear, ethical or moral summing-up in my work, it would have a false 
authority‖ (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998: 35). 
 
Secondly, there is the challenge of the chronological, historical, linear construction of 
time because it makes it teleological in nature (for instance, either Marxist, Christian 
or liberal).  This study rather opts for ―anti-narrative non-stories‖ as expounded by 
postmodernist Hayden White.  Kentridge‘s films challenge a chronological, linear 
construction of time, this concept is central to the film History of the Main Complaint 
(please also see Chapter Eight: Memory, History, Identity, Time and Space).   
 
Thirdly, the postmodernist aesthetic as defined by both experimentation and the 
surreal. His films are indeed surreal and hallucinatory (see Chapter Seven: 
Questions of (Post)memory, Representation and Aesthetics).  Fourthly, a text 
contains no fixed meaning and is open to a multiplicity of interpretations. Art historian 
and academic, Michael Godby, writes: 
Kentridge in fact rejoices both in the suggestive openness of his forms and in 
the visible layering of images that tends to preclude any single fixed reading.  
We … see that in his presentation of both character and narrative, Kentridge 
also tends to refuse a final, authoritative account of events (1992: 
unpaginated).   
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Lastly, this study embraces the postmodern ideas of ―otherness‘‘; ―diversity‖; 
―decentring‖; ―displacement‖; ―strangeness‖; the marginalised; and the subaltern, in 
order to elucidate Kentridge‘s films.  Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev has observed:  
Kentridge addresses uncertainty and process because they allow the Self to 
approach the world with humility and openness to change, rather than with 
preconceptions and authority.  He is able to avoid the authoritarian modern 
gaze — the panoptikon — by splitting the Self into many different voices and 
identities: Soho, Felix, Nandi, Harry, etc.  Like his undefined drawing style, 
these selves are never fixed, but constantly shifting, splitting, condensing and 
dividing‖ (1998:34). 
 
 
Kentridge has also stated that Soho Eckstein and Felix Teitlebaum are a ―displaced 
self-portrait‖ (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:1315).  His characters are also 
decentred and ―schizophrenic‖ as portrayed most evidently in his film Stereoscope16. 
In terms of giving voice to the subaltern and the marginalised, Kentridge thematically 
does just that, focusing on the dislocated, the disenfranchised, and the exploited.  
These themes are fundamental to the films Monument and Mine. Kentridge has 
claimed of his films and their representation of apartheid and the Holocaust as, 
―elucidating its contradictions and complexities‖ (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:16). 
 
There is one other characteristic of postmodernism that is central to this study.  
Philosopher Richard Rorty, in his book, Essays on Heidegger and Others, argues 
that postmodernists oppose injustice; they are often severe critics of violence, war, 
oppression, and human rights violations (1991:66; and re-iterated by Pontuso 2008). 
                                                          
15
 cf. Alemani 2006:13, 47 and 81; Benezra 2001:15; Cameron 1999:45; Coetzee 1999:86.   
 
16
 Please also see Chapter Nine: Memory, Landscapes, Cities and Monuments for a discussion of 
―cultural schizophrenia‖ and his characters as displaced and decentred selves.   
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Kentridge‘s filmic series, by virtue of its thematic content; anti-violence stance; 
depictions of horror; denunciation of the atrocities of apartheid and the Holocaust, is 
indeed in part, ―postmodern‖.  This is not to say that this study is arguing that the 
artist William Kentridge is a postmodernist.  Or that his works are entirely and only 
―postmodern‖ — to do so would be anathema to the ethos of postmodernism.  In 
Kentridge‘s own words: ―I am interested in a political art, that is to say an art of 
ambiguity, contradiction, uncompleted gestures and uncertain endings‖ (cited in 
Godby 1992: unpaginated).  Postmodernism and its ideas of history is explained 
here, with an emphasis on historian Hayden White‘s works. 
 
3.4 Postmodernism, history and Hayden White 
History has traditionally been written with a capital ‗H‘ — History.  The historian‘s 
History has always been considered to be the evidentiary, factual, official or 
objectively, externally verifiable, documented truth. Historians have also 
conventionally written in a transparent, non-jargonistic, or non-discourse-laden style, 
enabling easy reading and clear understanding (Carrard 1985; Conkin and 
Stromberg 1989; Jenkins 1999; Kearns 1997).  Keith Jenkins has long distinguished 
between different types of history.  The first is ‗History‘ with an ―upper-case H‖, and 
the second is ‗history‘ with the ‗lower-case h‘.  The former refers specifically to a 
grand ―totalising‖ metanarrative, such as Judeo-Christian narratives, Marxist grand 
narrative, or Hegelian philosophy.  The latter ‗history‘ is a history that is taught by 
academics to their student (Jenkins 1999). It is therefore considered to be more 
interrogative of the discipline as a whole. Historians of History have avoided 
hermeneutics; philosophy; metaphor; analogy; rhetoric; and poetic or adjective-laden 
descriptions (Kearns 1997; Jenkins 1999; White 1966, 1973, 1974, 1996, and 2005).  
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They write in an objective, detached, depersonalised manner (Kearns 1997; Iggers 
2010; Jenkins 1999; White 1966, 1973, 1974, 1996, and 2005).  The reasoning 
behind this is easy to understand.  History should, according to most historians, be 
written in an objective style that is accessible to anyone who cares to read it, 
including laymen, and it should not be open to interpretation or textual or inter-textual 
readings.  This type of ―History‖ is largely a hegemonic view of what counts as worth 
remembering (Kearns 1997).  It should also, according to Georg G. Iggers, be written 
with the expert authority of the historian and completely devoid of the historian‘s own 
personality (2010:35).   
 
The postmodernist critique of history is that it is almost always ideological, presentist, 
politically motivated and subjective (Jenkins 1999; Munslow 1997 and 2003; White 
1966, 1973, 1974, 1996, and 2005).  Postmodernists also argue that history, as a 
text, therefore contains no one fixed meaning and is therefore open to many multiple 
and inter-textual meanings.  History is not definitive and is open to many readings.  It 
does not contain only one total, singular ―Truth‖ and is open to interpretation.  There 
is no one overriding master narrative, but many mini-narratives; it is constructed 
according to questions asked and choices made as to what is decidedly important to 
remember and what is not; it is therefore subjective (Jenkins 1999; Munslow 1997 
and 2003; White 1966, 1973, 1974, 1996, and 2005). 
 
Conservative and traditional historians have dismissed history as defined and 
conceptualised by Hayden White, Alun Munslow, and Keith Jenkins (amongst 
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others)17 as nothing more than ―localised contaminations, temporary but nonetheless 
lamentable and pernicious‖; their argument is simple: if theory (such as literary, 
semiotic or philosophical), then not history (Kearns 1997:13).  However, despite this 
reasoning, this ―history‖ as advocated by Hayden White, Keith Jenkins, Alon Confino, 
and Alun Munslow, does not simply disavow objectivity, positivism or realism.  While 
it does not make claims to a total truth or grand historical narrative, it still adheres to 
the basic necessary tenets or methodology of gathering and recording history: the 
verification of facts; the accuracy of communication; and evidentiary support.  
Despite this, traditional historians appear vitriolic in their attacks on postmodern 
historians. For example, Geoffrey R. Elton, in a lecture series, proclaimed that this 
―history‖ is ―the cancerous radiation that comes from the forehead of Derrida and 
Foucault‖ (1991:41).  Alexander Lyon Macfie describes postmodernism as a 
devastating ―assault on history‖ (2010:209).  And Richard Evans vilifies 
postmodernist historians as ―the intellectual barbarians at the disciplinary gates‖ 
(1997:218).  This does need much explaining; the ―intellectual barbarians‖ are the 
postmodernist academics who are challenging the discipline of History. 
 
While this thesis only references Hayden White‘s concept of ―anti-narrative non-
stories‖, most specifically in Chapter Eight of this thesis, a very general overview and 
critique of his perspective is offered here.  This is in part to further contextualise his 
ideas and also to highlight some of his views as they further make up a postmodern 
perspective of history.  He defines traditional History as an emphasis on facts, and a 
commitment to one universal method of empirical research, which demands 
                                                          
17
 Theodor Adorno; Roland Barthes; Jean Baudrillard; Jacques Derrida; Michel Foucault; Luce 
Irigaray; Julia Kristeva; and Jean-François Lyotard are amongst those academics and historians that 
refuse a ―grand‖ or ―master‖ narrative of history. 
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detachment, disinterest and impartiality (1966:9). His book Metahistory, published in 
1973, realigns history with art, and by extension, imagination18.  In 1974 he argued 
further that historical narratives are complex, difficult structures that contain not only 
found elements, but invented ones as well ([1974] 1998:16 and 31).  While stressing 
the commonalities between the historical narrative and a novel he has led some 
critics to argue that the arbitrariness of the process of an historian ―inventing‖ history 
has given credibility to genocide disavowalists, historical revisionists and holocaust 
denialists, or even giving authority for purposeful distortion or ―selective‖ memory 
accounts (Hacking 1999:2; Iggers 2010:42).  Furthermore, White‘s critics are 
incensed by his characterisation of historiography as ―a form of fiction-making‖ 
(1978:122; cf.  Anchor 2001:107).  White is only too well aware of these criticisms, 
but he is arguing for historiography to responsibly communicate history not only as 
true factual statements but also, and most importantly, to write about what these 
events mean19 (2005:333).  Vasso Kindi elaborates on White‘s argument by adding 
that recounting ―simple, factual truth seems so superficial, so crude, so insensitive to 
the complexities of the case‖ (2010:261).  Hayden White and other postmodern 
historians want history to be more than statistics, and detached, ―scientific‖ reports 
(Kindi 2010; Friedländer, 1979; 1993, 1997; Young 1988, 1993). William Kentridge 
himself has emphatically stated: ―it is about the impossibility of factuality.  Facts are 
not enough‖ (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:17). However, this does not mean that 
White is arguing for inaccuracy, inconsistency, and completely fabricated historical 
                                                          
18
 So too does Johan Huizenga.  Please see The Aesthetic Element in Historical Thought (1968). 
  
19
 In his article, The Public Relevance of Historical Studies: A Reply to Dirk Moses, White writes: 
 
The past is the realm of the dead … It is a place of fantasy that we confront with anxiety … 
The past is an absent presence, the equivalent for a community of what one‘s ancestors or, 
indeed, one‘s own childhood, is for the individual person.  The dead can be studied 
scientifically, but science cannot tell us what we desire to know about the past.  Or rather, 
those aspects of the past that can be studied scientifically do not yield the kinds of information 
or knowledge that drives us to study the past in the first place (2005:333). 
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accounts. Robert Anchor points out that one of the distinctive tropes in White (and 
Keith Jenkins‘) discourse is that the ―past is chaotic, radically contingent, a burden, a 
nightmare from which we seek to awaken‖ (2001:110).  Understandably then, the 
postmodernists accuse the outmoded historians of attempting to ―domesticate the 
fantastic and to normalize the unspeakable‖ (Fussell 1975:74). 
 
Hayden White has also argued that historians have rigidly adhered to positivism, and 
accused them of allowing the intellectual movements of the 20th century to pass 
them by (1983).  Furthermore White has reasoned that historians have failed to 
endeavour any ―surrealistic, expressionistic, or existentialist historiography‖ 
(1983:43).  He has therefore argued that history / ies should take the form of ―anti-
narrative non-stories‖ produced in either a literary or cinematic form (1996:32).  
Narrative itself has traditionally taken a very static form: beginning, middle, and end.  
This narrative structure was conceptualised by Aristotle in his work Poetics (335 
BCE), and has been the foundation of all narrative structures as understood in a 
literary or cinematic / televisual form ever since. It has as its quintessence: a linear 
structure; chronology; an immutable and immovable beginning, middle and end.   
The definition of ―story‖ similarly denotes a fixed beginning, middle and end.  White 
has argued that this narrative structure has, as a historical tradition, attempted to 
impose a mastery over historical events, stories, and memories, which implies a 
sanitised version of events, specifically constructed, and disinterested (1996).  
Furthermore, he argues that claiming mastery over one‘s memories is impossible 
due to the fragmentary and ephemeral nature of memories (1996).  He therefore 
proposes ―anti-narrative non-stories‖ as a method of recording history (1996:32).  It 
can include anything from narratives beginning with the end of a story, relating the 
William Kentridge: Chapter Three: Theoretical Literature Review (Part II) 
 
82 | P a g e  
 
beginning and then lastly providing the middle.  Non-stories could comprise anything 
from a poetry account of a historical event, to including fantastical elements or magic 
realism. This idea is central to the film History of the Main Complaint and is 
discussed in Chapter Eight of this dissertation.  Many historical accounts have been 
recorded thus.  For example, Salmon Rushdie, in his novel Midnight‟s Children 
(1991), Rushdie archives Indian history through the narrator Saleem‘s 
―chutneyfication‖ of history: he bottles history and memories and likens it to chutney.  
The pickling is mixed and remade differently every time, albeit subtly.   This is a 
metaphor for how one remakes reality every time one experiences it or remembers 
it.  Rushdie has telepathic children who disappear and reappear, time travel and 
even the changing of genders, but all this exists alongside the horrors of war.  In 
Time‟s Arrow (1991), Martin Amis focuses directly on the Holocaust. It is the story of 
a Nazi doctor, which is revealed in a form of reverse chronology — this serves to 
question narrative structure and its cause and effect.  When the narrative is 
reversed, effect becomes cause.  Using this very contrivance / narrative device, 
Amis produces a post-Holocaust style of writing fiction that ideally encapsulates just 
how difficult it is to explain and depict the Holocaust rationally and logically (Amis 
1991; cf. Hungerford 2004:187).  Another fascinating representation of the Holocaust 
is The White Hotel (1981) by D. M. Thomas20, who uses a specific Jewish (albeit 
                                                          
20
 There are many such examples, for instance: 
 
The two novels by author Thomas Pynchon: The Crying of Lot 49 (1966) which deals with the 
conspiracy of the bones of WW II American soldiers being sold and used as charcoal cigarette 
lighters.  His later novel, Gravity‟s Rainbow (1973) deals with war veterans in the period of months 
after D-day was announced.  He uses non-linear narratives and intermingles facts with fantasy. 
 
Another example is Kurt Vonnigut‘s Slaughterhouse-Five (1969; also known as The Children‟s 
Crusade: A Duty-Dance with Death) about the fire-bombing of the German town of Dresden during 
WW II.  American soldier Billy Pilgrim gets caught by German soldiers and kept as a prisoner of war.  
He then becomes ―unstuck in time‖ and is captured by aliens from Tralfamadore and exhibited in a 
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secular) method of viewing the world, namely psychoanalysis.  He uses this method 
to convey the awful loss of the Holocaust.  He creates a patient of Freud‘s, Frau 
Anna.  Her biography, containing her ailments, dreams and desires, gives a specific 
particularity to an individual, one who was murdered by the Nazis.  Her world, bizarre 
and unique, creates a specific psychology / psychopathology, one that Freud 
attempts to decipher through psychoanalysis.  So vivid are her imaginings and 
desires that the reader is moved by her loss.  Her recounting highlights that these 
numerous victims of the Holocaust are in fact unique individuals, with their own 
desires and needs and idiosyncrasies.  They should not be relegated to mere 
statistics21 (Thomas 1981; cf. Hungerford 2004:187).  Kentridge does a similar thing, 
in that he makes Soho / Felix resemble himself personally.  He therefore 
personalises the experiences of apartheid, surrealistically fashioned in his films, his 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
zoo. However, it is the fire-bombing of Dresden that affects Billy‘s mind.  It is a non-linear narrative 
that incorporates fantasy, science fiction and factual evidence.  
 
There is also Günter Grass‘ The Tin Drum (1959) which deals with the horrors of the Second World 
War in both Germany and Poland as seen through the eyes of the manic ―dwarf‖ Oskar Matzerath. 
 
A play that is also an example of White‘s ―non-narrative non-stories‖ is I am my own Wife by Doug 
Wright (2004).  The play is about the life of Charlotte van Mahlsdorf, born a man and become a 
woman and her experiences surviving both Nazism and Communist East Germany, changing her 
identity constantly to avoid persecution and even death. 
 
One last example is W. G. Sebald‘s historical novel entitled Austerlitz, about a young man Jacques 
Austerlitz who discovers that he is Jewish and that his biological parents died in Theriensenstadt 
concentration camp.  His journey is related in a narrative that lacks paragraphing and includes 
unusually long sentences (9 pages long in one instance).  Sebald mixes reality or fact and fantasy 
and includes evocative black and white photographs throughout the novel. 
 
21
 It is almost impossible to conceptualise 11 million individuals being systematically murdered.  The 
Paper Clip Project was started by 8
th
 Grader‘s in 1998 in the American town of Whitwell in order to try 
and ―show‖ how many 11 million is.  They collected paper clips from all over the world, in part 
because the people of Norway wore them on their lapels as a form of resistance during the 
occupation in Norway by the Nazis during World War II.  The 11 million paper clips are kept in a 
German cattle car (which was actually used during the war to transport Jews and other ―undesirables‖ 
to the death and concentration camps and was flown to America) (Joe Fab [Miramax] 2004).  It is 
called The Children‘s Holocaust Memorial. 
 
William Kentridge: Chapter Three: Theoretical Literature Review (Part II) 
 
84 | P a g e  
 
character / s existentially raising the questions of freedom and responsibility.  In 
doing this the audience can relate to one individual among many.  He has exacted 
an experiment of archivisation, he has exteriorised memories from the private to the 
public domain.  He is acutely aware that there is no one originary moment, for either 
himself or his country — his works are therefore non-narrative in form, with no fixed 
beginning, middle, or end.  His writing of history is subjective, a construct. 
 
While White‘s conceptual idea of history as surrealism, or ―anti-narrative non-stories‖ 
is specifically dealt with in Chapter Eight of this thesis as a means to provide 
academic support for the constructs of Kentridge‘s documenting of South Africa‘s 
past and present, including all its horrors, the postmodern idea of history pervades 
this study throughout. In other words, it posits South African history as many 
histories, both public and personal; it also refuses a grand narrative of South African 
history.  With regard to the latter, one need only to look to the TRC as support that 
history is not a master narrative.  The TRC bore witness to the fact that many 
histories, many historical events were not known and after many years were only 
being revealed then (that is, 1996).  South Africa‘s history not only had to be re-
written in light of the exhuming of this ―new‖ history / histories but it highlighted the 
fact that the previous, supposedly official, documented history of South Africa was 
ideological and politically motivated in nature22.  And incomplete.  
 
No matter how creative, or how much creative licence is taken, different narratives 
and unique imagery can represent / express historical events (even with 
                                                          
22
 Similarly, historians William Dunning and James G. Randall in the 1930s wrote the historiography of 
slavery and its reconstruction in the United States of America.  They wrote objectively, 
dispassionately, and provided a historically factual account that including the obvious ―inherent racial 
inferiority of blacks‖ (cited in Iggers 2010:40).   
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grotesqueries) authentically and with relevance.  Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev writing 
about ―art autre‖ or ―art informel‖ claims similarly: 
[A]dvanced artists felt that direct representation of concentration camp scenes 
— barbed wire, striped camp uniforms, brutal guards, watchtowers, etc. — ran 
the risk of banalising the horror into stereotypical images and spectacle, into 
predictable and over-explicit representations. By abstracting the 
representation, art, it seemed, became more universal, and therefore more 
true (1998:33). 
 
Christov-Bakargiev also writes that, ―Kentridge always focuses on the personal 
narrative, the private story of the individual, not on grand, abstract accounts of South 
Africa or apartheid‖ (1998:142).  In doing so, he personalises the effects that 
apartheid has had on South Africa.  This is significant because as a viewer it is less 
easy to dismiss, as one tends to relate more directly and intimately with one 
individual rather than a thousand statistics.  He gives the victim / perpetrator (Soho / 
Felix) a face, an identity, and he in turn embodies the shame, guilt, remorse, 
responsibility and mourning for a whole country. Also in keeping with a postmodern 
historiography, this study posits that Kentridge‘s films are important because they 
portray the same / identical images that emerged out of apartheid, but because he 
does so in such a unique way they continue to shock and disgust, resulting in fresh 
empathy for the victims of this violent regime.  His films do not leave the viewer 
desensitised but rather astonished and repulsed, causing the audience to re-identify 
with those violated by apartheid.  He shocks the spectator out of their complacency.  
This is also in keeping with authors Catherine Kearns (1997) and Carl Becker (1973) 
who argue that history has several performative responsibilities: firstly, to bring the 
past into the present, with all its horrors, in order not only for it to be remembered but 
also to avoid complacency.  Secondly, it has a responsibility to aid people to 
―remember‖ what they did not experience first-hand or witness directly.  The central 
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concerns of history cannot in any way avoid the issue of memory: remembrance, 
memoirs, memorials, forgetting.   
 
Before focusing on the discourse on memory, this section concludes by quoting 
White from a conversation that he had with Erland Rogne in 2009: 
Well, I‘m really concerned about the discipline.  I‘m much more interested in 
the way creative writers, literary writers, are dealing with history.  You see, 
you need imagination to close the gap between the present and the past.  And 
I think one of the things you have to do, then, is to show how elusive, how 
difficult it is (2009:75). 
 
This quote is important to keep in mind before denigrating White for ostensibly 
condoning holocaust / genocide denialism as his critics are prone to doing.  His 
emphasis on ―non-narrative non-stories‖ should be taken in the milieu for which it is 
meant, the context of creative filmmakers, artists and novelists (White 1996 and 
2009).   
 
To conclude this section on psychoanalysis, post-structuralism and postmodernism, 
it can be argued that many of the principle tenets from these discourses are 
therefore apposite to this thesis. Therefore psychoanalysis, postmodernism, and to a 
lesser extent, post-structuralism, despite their critics, have contributed a significant 
explanatory value to deconstructing Kentridge‘s filmic Drawings for Projection series.  
This chapter now turns its attention to memory. 
 
3.5 Discourse on memory 
Graham Richards writes of memory: ―it might, perhaps justifiably, be suggested that 
the category of ‗memory‘ is simply too sweeping, a folk-psychological term of scant 
scientific utility‖ (2002:129).  Richards‘ remark is easy to understand in light of the 
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proliferation of books, articles and lectures emerging from disparate academic 
disciplines, from history to cultural studies to psychology, that have multiplied in the 
last decade that deal with ―memory‖.  Anna Green calls it a ―memory boom‖ 
(2004:36).  As a result of this proliferation, ―memory‖ is used almost as a catch word, 
or at the very least, a fashionable one.  However, memory discourse or memory 
studies are contending with the following lexicons: ―popular memory‖; ―collective 
memory‖ (Halbwachs 1950 / 1992); ―sites of memory (“lieux de mémoire” (Nora 
1989); ―public memory‖; and ―social memory‖.  These differ from an individual‘s 
memory, which refers to the person‘s ability to conserve information and to recount 
that which has happened in the past.  Generally though, there is a commonality 
between individual memory and collective memory:  that is, the ways in which 
individuals construct a sense of the past.  Alon Confino argues that memory studies 
have, significantly, been used to explore the memory of those who experienced an 
event first-hand; as well as the representation of the past and the making of it into 
shared cultural knowledge by successive generations with artefacts (1997)23.  
 
As to how individual memories differ from collective memories and to what extent, 
and how to define both types of memories, is briefly deliberated here.  This section 
concludes with a critical exposition of the discourse of memory. 
 
3.5.1 Individual memory 
Samuel Hynes defines individual memory as, ―memory is the mental faculty by which 
we preserve or recover our pasts, and also the events recovered‖ (1999:206). Very 
simply, individual memory is considered to be individually-based and exists in the 
                                                          
23
 For instance: museums; literary works; commemorations; films; and art. 
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mind of an individual. Memory is fundamental to the formation of individual and 
collective identity (Eyerman 2004). Memory has long been associated with the 
concepts of the self / mind; consciousness / unconscious; identity as recorded  / 
identity as constructed; and perception / imagination (Favorini 2007:31).  Even if a 
person‘s identity is not specifically part of a collective identity or collective memories, 
say for instance, a collective trauma such as the Holocaust, identity is still shaped by 
the social, the cultural and the political.  
 
3.5.2 Collective memory 
Collective memory is comprised of recollections / remembrances of a past that is 
determined and shaped by a group of people.  Barbie Zelizer suggests that collective 
memory raises issues of contestation, negotiation, and sharing (2003:214).  
Remembering as a group therefore is not only about memory identification and 
recall, but about social, cultural and political norms.  Ron Eyerman defines collective 
memory as ―recollections of a shared past‖ which coalesces the social group over 
time and space by affording them a ―narrative‖ structure (2004:161).  This narrative 
structure situates the individual within that structure and allows for a representation 
of those collective memories in the form of a text: written; filmed; painted; told; 
celebrated; and / or commemorated.  The past also then becomes present through 
symbolic interactions, with memory central both to those interactions and texts 
(Antze and Lambek 1996; Crane 1997; Confino 1997; Eyerman 2004; Green 2004). 
Barry Schwartz‘s definition of collective memory defines it thus, ―a representation of 
the past embodied in both historical evidence and commemorative symbolism‖ 
(2000:9).  His definition allows for a distinctive individual and collective memory in 
that the latter is exemplified in texts and practices which have a supra-individual 
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characteristic.  Alon Confino likewise defines the concept: ―the representation of the 
past and the making of it into shared cultural knowledge by successive generations 
in ‗vehicles of memory‘24, such as books, films, museums, commemorations and 
others‖ (1997:1186).  One cannot however, attempt a definition of the concept 
without mentioning sociologist Maurice Halbwachs25, who originated the term.  He 
wrote in On Collective Memory:  
we can understand each memory as it occurs in individual thought only if we 
locate each within the thought of the corresponding group.  We cannot 
properly understand their relative strength and the ways in which they 
combine within individual thought unless we connect the individual to the 
various groups of which he is simultaneously a member (1980:53). 
 
His work on collective memory implies a multiplicity of pasts and memory.  Collective 
memory should allow for individual development as well as intervals and delays of 
memory and the transience of generations. 
 
Before focussing on the critical exposition of memory studies, there are two more 
points to be made by Halbwachs that are significant: firstly, collective memory and 
lived experience interpenetrate each other; and secondly, collectives and individuals 
interact in their representation and production of collective memory (1980:55; cf. 
Kansteiner 2002; Terdiman 1993; Zelizer 199826).  Schwart, Confino and Halbwach‘s 
definitions of collective memory are intrinsic to this doctoral enquiry.  This chapter 
now focuses on an analysis of memory studies. 
 
                                                          
24
 This term was coined by Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi in his book entitled Zakhor: Jewish history and 
Jewish Memory (1989). 
 
25
 He was born 1877 and died in Buchenwald in 1945.  His book, The Collective Memory was 
published posthumously in 1950 and only translated in 1980, his second book, On Collective Memory 
was published in 1952 and translated in 1992. 
 
26
 Appropriately described by Zelizer to mean: ―collective memories have texture, existing in the world 
rather than in a person‘s head‖ (1998:4). 
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3.5.3 Exposition on memory studies 
One of the critiques of this memory lexicon is that  terms such as ―public memory‖, 
―cultural memory‖, ―historical memory‖, ―social memory‖, and ―collective memory‖ are 
not distinct enough nor have they been given the individual attention they deserve 
(Zelizer 2003). Another problem that Barbie Zelizer highlights is that social, or 
collective memory has been substituted for individual memory (2003:215).  Ann 
Green, in her article Individual Remembering and „Collective Memory‟ argues 
similarly that scholarly work ―conflates collective and individual memory or places the 
latter beyond reach‖; or deems the latter ―insignificant‖ (2004:38; 35; cf. Crane 1997; 
Kansteiner 2002). 
 
Their comment as a criticism of the modern discourse of memory is interesting and 
at complete odds with this study.  This thesis argues for both a clearly demarcated 
individual memory and a collective, or social, memory: the individual as Soho 
Eckstein or Felix Teitlebaum (or a displaced Kentridge); and the collective comprised 
of South Africa‘s subaltern memories.  This also relates to how this thesis has 
positioned Kentridge‘s work as an example of postmemory and clearly differentiates 
between his portrayals of personal memories: Felix in Exile, History of the Main 
Complaint, and WEIGHING and … WANTING which all contain personal, traumatic 
memories.  His films also contain collective or social memories of experiences he did 
not experience first-hand or witness first-hand, the traumatic collective memories of 
the victims and perpetrators living in an apartheid regime.  This argument then uses 
the concept of postmemory to explain how Kentridge has appropriated these 
collective memories through empathy and identification.  These observations are 
postulated in Chapter Five of this study. 
William Kentridge: Chapter Three: Theoretical Literature Review (Part II) 
 
91 | P a g e  
 
 
Although Zelizer has theorised that collective memory has been substituted for 
individual memory, she has written an article detailing the distinct characteristics of 
collective memory (2003).  One of the differences worth mentioning is that 
remembering is no longer finite, with a specific beginning, middle and end; and is no 
longer constituted in time and space, but is constantly transforming and evolving. 
(2003:218).  As a result of this, there is now attention being paid to ―memory undone‖ 
or forgetting, or amnesia: ―How memories are erased, forgotten, or willed absent has 
come to be seen as equally important to the ways in which memories are set in 
place‖ (2003:220; cf. Halbwachs 1992:172).   
 
Barbie Zelizer cautions scholars of the dangers of assuming that ―collective memory‖ 
is a ―catch-all‖ for ―social memory‖, ―public memory‖ and ―cultural memory‖ and that 
academics should examine these concepts more rigorously (2003:235; cf. Confino 
1997).  This is a particularly valid criticism. However, this study does use the 
concepts of ―collective‖, ―cultural‖ and ―social‖ memories interchangeably, although it 
does not fall into the trap of subsuming the individual into the ―collective‖.   Granted, 
while such an intricate and rigorous analysis is called for, it falls outside of the 
purlieus of this study.  In defence of this research though, it has attempted to keep 
the definitions used within consistent throughout and avoided what Zelizer refers to 
as ―conceptual murkiness‖ and a scholarly ―leakiness‖ (2003:235).   
 
One of the critiques of Maurice Halbwachs is that he argued that collective memories 
would be made up of individuals in a group who were in complete harmony with one 
another.  Unfortunately this would mean that an individual‘s memory could be 
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amalgamated with the group‘s collective memory (Green 2004:38).  As a functional 
mechanism, collective memory would serve to unite and solidify identity memories.  
However, if conflicting or dissenting memories arose they would automatically be 
excluded and would then fade over time (Burke 1997; Thomson 1994).  Alistair 
Thomson elaborates on that by explaining that the result of choosing to support / 
cohere to a collective memory and collective identity will cause ―psychic anxieties‖ if 
by doing so the memories of a painful and traumatic past result in feeling unsafe.  
The result: an incoherent personal identity.  Thomson states that this inability to feel 
safe or cohere into a wholly formed identity will cause ―unresolved tension and 
fragmented, contradictory identities‖ (1994:10). 
 
The central problems relating to memory discourse are therefore: a lack of critical 
reflection on its methodology and theorisation; fragmentation; an absence of a clear 
focus; and the subsuming of individual memory by collective memory (Crane 1997; 
Confino 1997; Green 2004; Kansteiner 2002; Thomson 1994; Zelizer 2003). Despite 
these problems, this discourse has been pivotal to the study on memory and even 
the scholars who have critiqued this discourse of memory have acknowledged that.  
For instance Alon Confino argues that its ―open-endedness‖ is actually a positive 
thing (1997:1387). 
 
However, there are many scholars, scientists and psychologists that vehemently 
dispute memory studies as they exist in the humanities and arts.  Amongst those are 
cognitive psychologists, neuroscientists and neuropsychologists. David F. Sherry 
and Daniel L. Schacter, for example, argue that memories only belong to the 
individual and characterise his/her personal life and identity.  In this case, memory is 
William Kentridge: Chapter Three: Theoretical Literature Review (Part II) 
 
93 | P a g e  
 
a completely subjective experience and cannot be collectively shared.  According to 
their research in neuroscience memory does not retain, (excepting for fragments and 
bits and pieces), nor reconstruct the original impression27.  This emphasis on 
individual subjectivity to the extent that it cannot be communal, in any way, is a 
complete denunciation of collective memory and its representations and therefore is 
in direct conflict with the entire premise of this dissertation, that is, that William 
Kentridge‘s filmic series, Drawings for Projection is an aesthetic representation of 
individual and collective memories. 
 
The study of collective, public or cultural memory has also led scholars back to the 
work of Sigmund Freud, such as Peter Burke, Cathy Caruth, Jenny Edkins and 
Dominick LaCapra; and thence to the study of forgetting, and the psychology and 
sociology and history of amnesia (Burke 2007:12; Caruth 1996; Edkins 2003; 
LaCapra 1983).  Within these studies are references to the concept of ―trauma‖, 
which is fundamental to the thesis of this dissertation.   
 
3.5.4 Trauma 
Traumata have several defining or significant traits: they are defined by Cathy Caruth 
as ―overwhelming‖ and ―catastrophic‖ (1996:11; cf. Žižek 199128).  Their nature 
precludes immediate comprehension or rational assimilation; they are elicited by 
associations or connotations (causing disruption in the present); traumatic memories 
                                                          
27
 Anyone wanting to pursue this line of argument is directed to: Sherry, DF & Schacter, DL.  1987.  
The evolution of multiple memory systems.  Psychological Review 94:439-454. 
 
28
 Slavoj Žižek writes in his book, For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor: 
 
The essence of the trauma is precisely that it is too horrible to be remembered, to be 
integrated into our symbolic universe.  All we have to do is to mark repeatedly the trauma as 
such (1991:272-273). 
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recur, repetitively and return with the same initial shock with each repeat reiteration 
(Caruth 1996; Crownshaw 1998; Edkins 2003; Freud1915 / 1991a; Žižek 1991). 
Vincent Engel adds that traumata can seem: ―unimaginable, incommunicable, and 
unspeakable‖ (cited in Lavenne, Renard and Tollet 2005:8). This section now 
centres on a collection of essays on trauma studies edited by Michael Lambek and 
Paul Antze (1996) which is referenced in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  It has been lauded 
by some scholars and criticised by others and as it makes such a substantial 
contribution to this study it bears a closer look.  
 
The book Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory, deals with the 
cultural significance of contemporary traumatic memories of the Vietnam War, the 
Holocaust and with sexually abused children in North America (1996).  Although their 
book, a collection of essays, has contributed significantly to the field of trauma 
studies, there are, however, several concerns with their work.  Lambek and Antze 
begin by premising their essays on the following premise: ―memory is never simply 
recalled, but reconstructed‖ (1996:6).  Furthermore, by referencing Michel Foucault 
they argue that memories are always culturally mediated – dictated to by what is 
desirable to remember in this present.  In this way then, memory is always linked to 
discourse. Robin Crownshaw argues that the main problem with this collection is that 
the contributing authors, including Antze and Lambek, do not offer a theorisation of 
trauma or the way traumas are structured; how the past is narrated and 
remembered; and how trauma often manifests itself subliminally in other historical 
narratives.  Crownshaw also argues that Michael Lambek does not successfully 
theorise how memory is culturally mediated and gives the impression that trauma is 
more genetic than cultural (1998).  However, Robin Crownshaw does concede that 
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their essays provide a noteworthy and complementary reading of the cultural 
significance of trauma, despite the absence of a comprehensive theorisation of 
trauma (1998).  Tina Papoulis sees this absence of a theorisation of trauma in Tense 
Past somewhat differently, describing it as ―an exciting interdisciplinary approach to 
the study of memory as a cultural object‖ and as possessing ―an impressive range of 
material and originality‖ (1998:241; 1998:243).  She rightly points out that these 
authors purposefully move away from a macro-historical approach and Paul Antze 
and Michael Lambek clearly demarcate these parameters in their introduction 
(1998:241). They indeed emphasise a plurality of discourses, locating memory within 
an intersection of individual and collective narratives that are intertwined with 
institutional, political, cultural and social formations (Antze and Lambek 1996).  
However, Papoulis agrees with Crownshaw on a very salient criticism: the uncritical 
comparative analysis between ‗western‘ and ‗non-western‘ with the Eastern cultures 
presented by Lambek as being homogenised with a ―pre-existent collective memory‖ 
which he fails to adequately explain (1998:243 and 1998:410).  Despite these 
criticisms, this thesis uses their definition and explication of culturally mediated 
trauma and applies it to Kentridge‘s films (see Chapter Five). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In concluding then, the historical veracity of memory of the narratives and real, or 
lived experience, is not to be explored here.  It is, however, acknowledged that there 
are problematics between history and memory, as the section on postmodern 
historian Hayden White attests to.  It is also not the aim of this dissertation to 
interrogate the problematics of psychoanalysis, post-structuralism and 
postmodernism.  For instance, this is not a re-assessment of these perspectives in 
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relation to contemporary debates, but rather employs theories about memory and 
trauma as favoured by a particular group of theorists.  For purposes of this thesis it is 
enough simply to take cognisance of them and to reflect upon them.  These theories 
present understandings and explanations of the social and cultural material to be 
explored by the thesis. 
 
The next chapter looks at the methodology used in this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A METHODOLOGY OF MEMORY  
 
As indicated in Chapter One of this dissertation, this study uses a qualitative 
method as its research methodology. The objectives of the research are: 
hermeneutic; exploratory; explanatory; and descriptive.  In this chapter, the 
qualitative research methodology used in this research is briefly discussed and 
then explained in terms of its application within this investigation of the animated 
films of William Kentridge. There is an emphasis on a descriptive analysis of the 
textual-visual material being studied, in this case William Kentridge’s animated 
Drawings for Projection film series; as well as peripheral material such as his still 
lifes, plays and sculptures1. 
 
4.1 The qualitative paradigm 
Qualitative research methodology is defined by Cressell as an investigation 
process of understanding founded on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry 
that explores a cultural, social or human problem (1994). There are several 
reasons that make qualitative research an ideal methodological tool for this study: 
it includes context as an indispensable component of the research; it address the 
researcher’s process of self-reflection and self-awareness; and it provides 
methodological possibilities to address questions that cannot be answered using 
quantitative research.  With regard to this study, the problem in question is a 
human one, that of the representation of traumatic memories as experienced by 
William Kentridge, and South Africans during the brutal apartheid regime.  
                                                 
1
 Please see Chapter One and Chapter Two for a list of William Kentridge’s artistic works. 
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Therefore, the context, in this case, South Africa and its history, is paramount to 
understanding Kentridge’s works. 
 
The manner in which a research study is conducted within a qualitative research 
design is dependent on two central tenets.  Firstly, the needs of the study and 
secondly, the questions that it seeks to answer.  Hence “(t)he problem under 
investigation properly dictates the methods of investigation as well as the research 
design” (Bryman 1984:106; cf.  Becker in Jessor 1996; Jensen 1982).   
 
With regard to the first tenet, the needs of the study, the literature review (Chapter 
Two) on William Kentridge has clearly indicated an absence with regard to an 
understanding of his works within the relatively new discourse on memory and 
trauma.  Chapter Two, which reviews the works that have analysed Kentridge’s 
films, has highlighted that there is indeed a gap.  Most of the literature has 
revealed that: his work has been analysed within an art history discourse; several 
post graduate studies, including several doctoral studies, have not focussed on his 
films as an entire and complete series; and, lastly, none of the analyses have 
focussed on memory and trauma studies.  For instance, the literature review 
revealed that many studies have focused on Kentridge’s works by drawing 
extensively on much of the same literature to interpret his work, such as that of 
Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault and Theodor Adorno.  Kentridge himself refers 
to these sources himself very frequently to add commentary to his own works.  No 
one thus far has interpreted Kentridge’s works using Marianne Hirsch’s concept of 
postmemory; Pierre Nora’s concept of “sites of memory”; James E. Young’s 
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concept of “counter-memory”; Henri Raczymow’s “memory shot through with 
holes”; Sigmund Freud’s concept of “screen memories”; or Maurice Halbwachs 
concept of “collective memory”.  There have been no comparative analyses 
between art spiegelman (sic), Pascal Croci or Joe Kubert.  Thus it can be inferred 
that this study is founded on the fact that there is undoubtedly a lack of a 
theoretical framework from which to analyse and critique the themes found within 
Kentridge’s films. 
 
With regard to the second central tenet upon which a qualitative research design is 
dependent, that is, the questions that it seeks to answer, this thesis addresses the 
following research problem: Does William Kentridge’s animated Drawings for 
Projection filmic series represent memory / memories?  This central research 
question can be divided into the sub-problems: How does William Kentridge’s 
animated series represent memories (his own and others)?  Whose memories 
does he represent?  Why, if at all, does he portray memories in this particular filmic 
series?  Do his animated films represent a specific South African political socio-
historical period of time?  Can Kentridge’s films be considered an “authentic” form 
of documenting South African history?  These questions have therefore informed 
this study’s choice of a hermeneutic approach. 
 
4.2 Qualitative methods 
One of the methods of inquiry that has been used is that of deconstruction:  it is an 
approach that is not logocentric but rather decentring, in other words, the readings 
that occur and the meanings that arise, are neither a reproduction of the work 
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under analysis nor are they a mere repetition.  Deconstruction is the reading of the 
text, in this case the “text” is Kentridge’s animated films.  These readings, of the 
text, occur between the space of the difference, or the in-between-ness of object 
and subject; interpreter and interpreted.  This post-structural technique is an 
interpretation or reading that is constantly in process. These interpretations are 
neither fixed nor authoritative.  Post-structuralism acknowledges the multiplicity of 
meanings within a socio-political world; is self-reflexive; and offers a critique of the 
theories used to analyse the text, as well as the text itself (see Chapter Three for 
an explanation of this). 
 
4.3 The researcher’s role 
Qualitative research studies have been criticised for two main reasons.  Firstly, 
because of the subjective role of the researcher in the data gathering process.  
Secondly, for the reliance on intuitive knowledge, rather than on authoritative 
knowledge.  With regard to the former criticism, the researcher’s subjective role, 
this study acknowledges the subjective nature in the choice of data and in the data 
gathering process.  In its defence though, the topic was selected for investigation 
because of the socio-political milieu in which it was situated, one which this 
researcher inhabited and therefore it has made a “participant observer” of the 
researcher in this study (Gray 2003:17).  Therefore, any distortion that this 
researcher has introduced into this study is minimal and did not have a detrimental 
effect.  The researcher has also been reflective of the study. 
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However, with regard to the reliance on intuitive knowledge, this researcher has 
attempted to overcome this through the referencing and sourcing of a wide and 
extensive range of contemporary publications and authors. 
 
This researcher also acknowledges that the personal perspectives as adopted 
within this study, that is, a refusal of:  “grand” / “master narratives” concerning 
“truth”, “values” and “objectivity”; and totalising theories, is based on the 
researcher’s own personal values and worldviews.  This has meant a very 
subjective selection of source material that lends itself to supporting this worldview, 
although it has been lent credibility by the fact that this is the artist’s worldview too.  
Chapter Three, the theoretical literature review, includes commentary by the artist 
to support this perspective.   
 
4.4 Data collection 
The research hypothesis and research issue for this dissertation is the exploration 
and explanation of the how and the why of the portrayal  / representation of 
memory in the charcoal, hand-drawn, animated film series of William Kentridge: 
Drawings for Projection.  The collection of data in this study is therefore selective / 
purposive. It included a multitude of both primary and secondary sources.  While 
qualitative researchers focus on primary sources, such as the texts / case studies / 
situations themselves they must also refer to, and study, secondary sources 
(Fortner and Christians 1981). It is the responsibility of the researcher to both 
engage with and evaluate them, as well as to weigh their importance or 
contribution / s to the field, and then, either reconstruct or reject them (Christians 
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and Carey; Fortner and Christians 1981; Ragin 1994).   In this study the primary 
sources selected as the texts to be analysed are the filmic series in their entirety2.  
The secondary sources have been provided as literature reviews: one dealing with 
the sources analysing Kentridge’s films such as art reviews and critics, as well as 
post-graduate studies.  The second literature review has provided an overview of 
the relevant literature as it was used as an interpretative tool, such as 
psychoanalysis, post-structuralism, postmodernism and studies on memory. 
 
4.5 Sampling methods 
Theoretical sampling was used as a research technique. Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) describe this research process as: the selecting of new research areas and 
comparing them with existing research areas. For this study different theories (for 
example theories that dealt with historical trauma, memory trauma, memory, and 
identity) were used to explicate the latent meanings of Kentridge’s visual texts.  
Artistic sources of a comparable and similar nature were also selected (artists 
whose works dealt with the representation of the Holocaust, for example art 
spiegelman (sic)). These different comparative analyses investigated topics like the 
definition and discussion of concepts such as traumatic memory and their depiction 
in artistic works. Different meanings and interpretations were elicited through the 
application of complex conceptual and theoretical sources, with specific reference 
to seminal works, such as those mentioned as primary sources (for instance, 
                                                 
2
 Please see Chapter One for a list of all the primary sources that were initially interrogated before 
the series was selected as the primary focus of analysis for this research. 
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Sigmund Freud and Roland Barthes) and supporting sources such as art reviews 
and newspaper reports.  
 
4.6 Data analysis 
After watching the films at the Durban film festival in 1994, the researcher bought 
the films whenever a new film was produced. The stylistic and thematic readings 
included viewing the films in their entirety, several times.  Particular attention was 
paid to the depictions of violence and trauma and domestic scenes involving either 
Soho Eckstein or Felix Teitlebaum.  In some cases both appeared in scenes 
simultaneously, before they morphed into one persona, named Soho / Felix in 
order to indicate their morphing.  This was done for this particular study to separate 
in time and space the three different characters, Soho Eckstein, Felix Teitlebaum 
and Soho / Felix.  “Soho” was placed before “Felix” in their combined name for this 
study (in the sixth film) because while Felix Teitlebaum was always featured naked, 
the newly morphed character retained the outward appearance of Soho Eckstein, 
that is, his pinstriped suit, and his cigars.   Soho / Felix however retained the 
artist’s own very distinct physical features.  Soho was also placed first because the 
united character was very much still the exploitative capitalist and wealthy 
landowner, who over time began to question his capitalistic enterprises and 
accumulation of expensive obet d’arts.  Felix was added second to Soho, because 
of the ethical and moral concerns that the character Felix Teitlebaum was imbued 
with, which he seemed to have imparted to the morphed, singular persona Soho / 
Felix. 
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The animated films were described in detail, as a written form.  A textual reading in 
terms of identifying their thematic content, including recurring motifs, was the first 
reading.  This reading or deconstruction including reading of not only the art 
reviews at the time of their release, and attending the installations, it also included 
attending other art exhibitions that Kentridge was exhibiting at the time, that were 
not related directly to the filmic series (such as Black Box / Chambre Noir; 7 
Fragments for George Méliès; Woyzeck on the Highveld and Ubu and the Truth 
Commission).  It also meant paying special attention to the political events 
happening in South Africa and internationally.  All of this has bearing on his films.   
 
Bernard Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss exalt their qualitative slogan “[m]aximise the 
comparisons” (1967:436-445). One of the main goals of qualitative research is 
“meaning-specific insight through continuing comparative analysis” (Christians and 
Carey 1981:357). Constructing correlations; highlighting contrasts; connecting 
histories; and comparing actualities with other similar types are extremely 
significant. With regard to this study, comparative analysis was carried out between 
different artistic mediums and their representations of human suffering and 
tragedy. From photography to literary works, these comparisons were included to 
emphasise the importance of these artistic forms and their role in perpetuating 
memories and lived experiences. They also provided further credibility to this 
researcher’s interpretations of William Kentridge’s filmic works.  In addition to this, 
they sustain the clarification of certain features and concepts used to extricate 
meaning from Kentridge’s animated films.  This is particularly apparent in Chapter 
Seven: Questions of Memory, Representation and Aesthetics. 
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The purpose of data analysis is ultimately to make sense of the accumulated data / 
sources. Images were scanned in of photographs, drawings, and screen shots.  
This data was organised according to the various embedded themes being 
analysed and where they were relevant as supporting evidence of the 
interpretations being made. Detailed descriptions were added where necessary to 
supplement the visual data. Comparisons were made between different data 
sources. For example, a comparative analysis was carried out between data 
sources that supported the themes found in artistic representations of Kentridge’s 
portrayals of the apartheid era and those themes embedded in artistic 
representations of the Holocaust (see Chapter Seven for this comparison).  Similar 
identified patterns and recurring themes and concepts were categorised and 
analysed together, such as the concepts of postmemory or generational guilt and 
artistic depictions of these concepts (also see Chapter Five and Chapter Seven).  
The data was re-presented in terms of relevant summaries, selected quotations 
and relevant images.  With regard to the time frame of this investigation, the 
primary cases being studied (namely the animated films that make up Kentridge’s 
Drawings for Projection series) demarcate the starting point of 1989 with the first 
film of this series. Whilst the primary case ends in 2003, with Tide Table being the 
last film made, this study included references to the artist’s other works from 1989 
until 2011. The selection of the sample to be positioned as the primary case, the 
Drawings for Projection series, was selected as a purposive sample. It is 
considered to be very specific because it has a distinct beginning, middle and end, 
and follows a close-ended narrative structure (1989—2003). The series is also 
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representative of the artist’s overall body of work in that his choice of medium and 
style is distinctive throughout his oeuvre. It is also very specifically contextualised 
within the socio-political, cultural-historical period of South Africa. According to 
Christians and Carey: “[e]very occasion has a historically singular situation that 
gives it uniqueness” (1981:353).  Beginning in 1989 at the very height of apartheid, 
the series follows the protagonists (Soho Eckstein / Felix Teitlebaum / Soho / Felix) 
through their personal history / journey, a journey that clearly coincides with and 
chronicles the history of South Africa. For instance, William Kentridge’s works are 
representative of historical traumas.  There are no limitations along spacio-
temporal lines — it could be Rwanda, Bosnia, or Darfur:  
In his 1999 film Stereoscope he uses images of police beating students in 
Jakarta, riots outside banks in Moscow, rebels being thrown over a bridge 
and then shot in the river below in Kinshasa, someone throwing rubble at 
the US embassy in Nairobi: all drawn from television broadcasts and 
newspapers appearing while he was working on the film (Stewart 2006:14).   
 
Kentridge himself has commented on this film stating “of course the images are all 
of Johannesburg” (cited in Stewart 2006:14).  Another example would be the 
correlation between his film History of the Main Complaint and the establishment of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in 1996 (please see Chapter Eight for 
more details on this).   
 
Finally, select concepts were described in detail and then applied directly to 
Kentridge’s films in order to explicate the latent meanings within. For instance, see 
Chapter Five for the elucidation of Sigmund Freud’s “screen memories” and then 
their application to Kentridge’s films; Chapter Eight for the discussion of Hayden 
White’s “anti-narrative non-stories” and their application; or the explanation of 
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James E. Young’s concept of “counter-memory” and its application to the film 
Monument found in Chapter Nine.  The data analysis in this study is therefore both 
comparative and interpretative.   
 
4.7 The narrative or pilot study results 
Prior to this doctoral study two “pilot studies” were undertaken, that is, two 
seminars on William Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection series were presented by 
this researcher. One was presented at a departmental (Communication Science) 
seminar in 20043, at the University of South Africa; and one was presented at the 
international SACOMM4 (South African Communication Association) conference in 
Stellenbosch in 2006.  While both were well received, in retrospect there was a 
fundamental flaw in the analysis, that is, there was no theoretical framework 
established or adhered to.  The presentations were mostly descriptive in nature 
and simply highlighted the themes or motifs found within Kentridge’s cinematic 
oeuvre, although considerable attention was given to the socio-political context in 
which they were made. However, they were a relevant research project, if seen as 
the embryonic foundation for the development of a theoretical framework with 
which to analyse and interpret his films. Most importantly they emphasised the 
importance of a deconstructive method of inquiry and they emphasised the need 
for a theoretical framework with which to critique Kentridge’s films. 
 
                                                 
3
 Celebrating William Kentridge’s “Drawings for Projection Series”. Unisa.  
 
4
 A postmodern analysis of William Kentridge’s animated films. SACOMM Conference, Stellenbosch 
(September, 2006). 
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4.8 Limitations 
The field of qualitative research is often described as being limited by studies that 
yield only impressionable data or circumstantial evidence, studies that breach 
statistical procedures and rules in order to assure representativeness (Christians 
and Carey 1981:357; cf. Fortner and Christians 1981; Ragin 1994). The challenge 
of this research design methodology as applied in this dissertation is mostly one of 
over-generalisation. The other limitation is that the sampling method was 
purposive. William Kentridge is a prolific artist working in artistic mediums of 
sculpture (bronze, paper, iron), plays, operas, still lifes, etchings, prints, and 
tapestries, to mention a few.  However, it is the animated film series Drawings for 
Projection that was selected as the primary sample to be studied because, as 
previously stated, it is highly representative of his oeuvre. It is also the only series 
that directly correlates to specific events unfolding in South Africa at the time of 
creation.  Whilst his other artistic works are “political” in nature, such his opera The 
Magic Flute, which deals with post-colonialism, they do not deal specifically with 
eventsin South Africa.  The Magic Flute, for example is an indictment of and 
commentary on the concept of post-colonialism in general.  Even though 
Kentridge’s other works have been referred to, the series is clearly demarcated 
and only allows for brief comparisons and references to his other artistic works.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the qualitative research approach that was employed for 
this doctoral study.  It has justified why a qualitative and not a quantitative research 
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methodology was most suitable.  It also discussed the researcher’s role; data 
collection and analysis; and limitations of the study. 
 
This study now focuses on the scholarly work on memory studies. 
110 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER FIVE: MEMORY 
  
As indicated in Chapter Three of this thesis there are many different ways of 
defining memory, ―individual‖ and ―collective‖, being just two such ways.  This 
chapter looks in detail at many of the concepts already mentioned in Chapter 
Three but discusses them in greater depth and then applies them to Kentridge‘s 
films.  These include: postmemory; rememberings; identity; and screen memories. 
 
Elie Wiesel‘s seminal memoir Night (1960) recounts the horrors that he was 
subjected to during the Holocaust: from his internment at Auschwitz III Monowitz, 
to his liberation. Wiesel‘s long-time friend, François Mauriac, a Frenchman, 
Catholic and resistance fighter, encouraged him to write his autobiography. Wiesel 
did so, but many years later, because like so many other survivors he was caught 
up in a conspiracy of silence. Some survivors thought that no-one was really 
interested in their stories; some thought that no-one would believe them, some 
were ashamed of what they endured, and most found it difficult to find the correct 
language and medium to relate their experiences (Antze 1996).  Elie Wiesel 
himself has written much on this topic, and in an article for the New York Times, 
entitled Art and the Holocaust: Trivialising Memory he includes the story of a young 
Jewish survivor who was told by a Schutzstaffel1 officer:  
[O]ne day you will speak of all this, but your story will fall on deaf ears.  
Some will mock you, others will try to redeem themselves through you.  You 
will cry out to the heavens and they will refuse to listen or to believe. ... You 
                                                          
1
 This is often abbreviated as ―SS‖: this was the name of Adolf Hitler‘s personal bodyguards which 
was represented by the signature silver deaths‘ head badge. 
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will possess the truth, but it will be the truth of a madman (cited in Wiesel 
1989:1).   
 
It is ironic then that the memoir‘s popularity and importance have only recently 
taken off (Oprah 2006; 2008).  Night is a haunting read, and a necessary one, as it 
is an eye-witness account and therefore a testimony of the acts of horror 
perpetrated during the Nazi regime:  ―[R]emembering is bearing testimony, 
breaking the conspiracy of silence‖ (Antze 1996:10).  Lest the world forget, of 
course.   
 
What is quite exceptional though, and highly relevant to this study, are the 
comments made by François Mauriac in the forward to the first edition of the book 
(1960).  In this foreword, he recounts the following: a young Israeli journalist came 
to interview him.  The journalist asked him about his experiences during the war.  
Mauriac confided to the journalist  
that nothing I had seen during those sombre years had left so deep a mark 
upon me as those trainloads of Jewish children standing at Austerlitz station 
(1960:7).   
 
These children were a special convoy of innocent victims to be taken to the death 
camps during the Holocaust to be gassed.  Mauriac then remarkably states: ―[Y]et I 
did not see them myself.  My wife described them to me, her voice filled with 
horror‖ (1960:7).  Mauriac added: ―[I]t is not always the events we have been 
directly involved in that affect us the most‖ (1960:7).  This empathy, this 
remembering of another‘s memory so acutely, this transferring from a first-hand 
account to a second-hand account — this memory is as traumatic an account as if 
it had been an eye-witness account.  It is this very type of remembering that 
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epitomises and explains William Kentridge‘s works.  These ―memories‖ are 
depicted most evidently in his hand-drawn, charcoal-medium, animated film series 
Drawings for Projection.  His ―memories‖ of: the atrocities of the apartheid era; the 
Herero genocide perpetrated by German colonisers in Namibia (the first genocidal 
act in modern history); the annihilation of the Lithuanian Jews by the Nazis in 
World War II; black South African miners working in unforgivably harsh 
circumstances; slaves and their living conditions in the slave ships leaving for the 
Americas; individuals who suffered from apartheid directly (through poverty and 
death) and indirectly (through marginalisation); colonisers raping the African 
landscapes and peoples. These ―memories‖ permeate his body of works: he tells 
and re-tells these ―memories‖ of his in a unique and exceptional way. Not only do 
his works portray these remembrances but the way in which he does so depicts the 
concept of memory itself.  Through his technique of incomplete erasure he reveals 
the continuing effect that the past has on the present.  His work physically 
uncovers layers of reality — the supposedly dominant and ―official‖ present and the 
unsuccessfully erased past.  In other words he draws memory itself.  He depicts 
both the physical landscapes of South Africa — which are the most visible 
reminders of history as well as constituting the actualities of place — and the fluid 
and ever changing landscapes of the human mind (being, the unconscious, and 
memory).  He does this through the flowing / ephemeral nature / process of his 
work, which in turn is a representation of memory and being.  Staci Boris has 
written that the source and ―pivotal motif‖ of Kentridge‘s film, Felix in Exile, ―was a 
friend‘s description of police forensic photographs of murder victims‖ (Boris 
2001:35).  As a result, his ―vizualisations of these bodies‖ scattered in the veld 
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―stayed with him‖, becoming the very images of murdered individuals covered in 
newspapers lying in the landscape (Boris 2001:35; Figure 3.1).  This is a direct 
example of Kentridge‘s rememberings being that of another, made concrete in his 
works.  (An extra layer or sediment added to this is that his friend did not see the 
actual bodies himself — he only viewed the photographs.) Kentridge‘s films and 
other artistic endeavours are memories of others‘ memories, as well as his own 
memories.  These rememberings, and the concept of ―memory‖, and their 
importance in Kentridge‘s artistic creations, need to be expanded upon, and it is to 
this that this chapter now turns its attention. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 
2001: 98). 
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5.1 Memories and rememberings 
In Kentridge‘s animated works one sees evidence of his rubbings out — the traces 
(smudges of charcoal) that are left behind after the still is altered — which gives a 
‗jerkiness to his films as well as a realism and an unpolished feeling — a 
roughness (Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3).  Roland Barthes defines viewing a single 
frame of film as observing ―the trace of the absence of time‖ (Wyver 1989:110).  
This particularly applies to Kentridge‘s work because traces of charcoal are left 
once erased.  These faint traces tell of a different image and therefore a different 
meaning and of course a different memory. Kentridge‘s works are his ―fascination 
with life‘s haphazard and poignant impermanence‖ (Stone 2003:52). 
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Figure 5.2 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 
2001:100). 
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Figure 5.3 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 
2001:28). 
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Marshall Deutelbaum (1989) also emphasises the humanising power of visual 
memory — which, to reiterate, is inherent in Kentridge‘s work — as he highlights 
the importance of remembering our apartheid history and other histories. 
Kentridge‘s theme of memory raises the question: are those who do not remember 
history condemned to repeat it? ―Kentridge‘s drawings betray the traces of his 
making erasures with a history of purpose, the purpose of not forgetting‖ (Stone 
2003:67).  Kentridge‘s technique of incomplete erasure (his physical and artistic 
technique) physically illustrates the fragility of human memory, not simply for the 
sake of its own beauty, but for the purpose of depicting socio-political issues as 
precisely and effectively as possible. As Laurence Kirmeyer aptly puts it, there is 
always: ―[T]he frailty and impersistence of memory‖ to take into account 
(1996:174).   
 
With regard to tenuous memories, there is the example of when Kentridge as a 
child of six went to look at photographs in his father‘s study.  The photographs 
were of individuals killed in Sharpeville (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:28; Oppelt 
1999:6).  That this memory and shock at seeing those photographs is evident now 
in his work is obvious.  However far removed he was from Sharpeville, these 
images still had a personal effect.  It also highlighted for Kentridge that there was a 
life outside of his safe family domain, a life that was very different to his own.  
Psychoanalysis has specifically emphasised that ―we cannot separate a person‘s 
psychology from his or her personal history‖ (Sarup 1988:8).  This is true of 
Kentridge — his experiences of growing up in an anti-apartheid activist home have 
had an effect on his psyche.  He was obviously very aware of the difference 
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between his life and the lives of those living directly under apartheid.   Kentridge 
himself puts it thus: ―I went through life knowing that outrageous things were 
happening in an abnormal society‖ (Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:13).  This is an example of the balance / interaction between the personal 
and the national in his films, highly relevant especially given the embryonic and 
fragmentary nature of South African national identity.  This is particularly evident in 
his film Stereoscope, where Soho/Felix has morphed into one character — with 
Felix Teitlebaum representing the collective and Soho Eckstein representing the 
individual (henceforth referred to as Soho/Felix).   Even so, the screen is split into 
two ―identical‖ images of a brooding Soho/Felix (see Figure 5.4 and 5.5).  He is 
obviously thinking of his past and considering his future. His work engages a 
question (among many): if a coherent national perspective is impossible at present, 
are the only valid South African visions deeply personal ones?  Is Kentridge‘s 
vision therefore paradoxically both personal and generally South African?  
  
 
Figure 5.4 Drawing from Stereoscope (Alemani 2006:59). 
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Figure 5.5 Drawing for Stereoscope (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 
2001:129). 
 
Artist Lucian Freud writes: ―What do I ask of a painting?  I ask it to astonish. 
Disturb, seduce, and convince,‖ furthermore, ―[E]verything is autobiographical, and 
everything is a portrait.  My work is purely autobiographical‖ (Freud cited in Stone 
2003:64).  Is this an appropriate description to borrow and extend to Kentridge‘s 
animated works?  Consider that the main character Felix Teitlebaum, and later on 
in the series, his protagonist Soho Eckstein are drawn in the artist‘s image?  
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However, does Lucien Freud not allude to more than a realistically drawn portrait, 
and rather to the essence of what his work is about — his choice of subject matter, 
his themes, his topics, his ―memories‖?  As the film maker Stephen Dwoskin (cited 
in Wyver 1999:110) has suggested, avant garde films can be defined as ―personal 
works‖ which are ―individually motivated‖. Lucien Freud also posits that  
[T]he painter makes real to others his innermost feelings about all that he 
cares for.  … A painter‘s tastes must grow out of what so obsesses him in 
life that he never has to ask himself what it is suitable for him to do in art 
(Freud 1954:1).  
 
Both Dwoskin and Freud‘s statements very much apply to Kentridge‘s works. While 
the artist William Kentridge in person does not come across as a man obsessed or 
obsessive in his speech, manner or behaviour (even when watching him at work —  
he is incredibly self-contained and graceful; seen in the videotape Drawing the 
Passing, 1999), it nevertheless seems quite clear that his ―memories‖ haunt / 
obsess him. Hence, the recurring themes of guilt, responsibility, injustice; his 
depictions of slaughter, rape (of the land), death — challenging the audience to 
―see‖, to remember, to react.  Lucien Freud also once stated that: ―[M]y object in 
painting pictures is to try and move the senses by giving an intensification of 
reality‖ and ―where the swiping of a brush leaves a mark on the canvas akin to a 
deposit of raw tissue‖ (Freud 1954:1; cf. cited in Stone 2003:33). These are such 
apt statements in regard to Kentridge‘s art, it is almost as if Lucien Freud was 
writing directly about Kentridge‘s works‘ and not his own works.  Kentridge‘s art 
most certainly does ―move the senses‖ simply by choice of subject matter and his 
extraordinary aesthetics, and his art is the ―intensification of reality‖ — even ―more-
real-than-real‖ (Baudrillard cited in Smart 1993).  Quite a feat considering that 
William Kentridge: Chapter Five: Memory 
 
121 | P a g e  
 
Kentridge‘s art is predominantly in charcoal, almost entirely devoid of colour save 
for the occasional use of blue or red pastel. As for the description ―deposit of raw 
tissue‖: this brings to mind the idea of an open wound, and is this not the idea 
behind remembering — keeping the wound open so that one does not forget? Are 
Kentridge‘s themes open wounds, that some would rather forget, preferring to 
banish them to the ―past‖?  Okwui Enwezor is of a similar opinion:  
[R]ather than seeking merely to illustrate or describe that world, Kentridge 
searches for ways to analyse it: to probe it, jab it and scratch at it as if it 
were a sebaceous node, tumescent flesh bubbling with an abscess about to 
burst (1998:67).   
 
Kentridge‘s own technique of making the films is a literal example of 
―remembering‖ because the drawings, the changes / erasures will not be forgotten 
since they are permanently ―preserved on celluloid‖ (Boris 2001:31). Arlene Stone 
also describes Kentridge‘s work as ―dark memories come alive‖.  This is exactly the 
case in his animated films — his memories (his own or those of others), because of 
the medium in which they are expressed, that is, film, do indeed come alive. That 
they are ―dark‖ is not in dispute, and even though they are hand-drawn in charcoal, 
they take on a realism that very much makes them ―alive‖ (Stone 2003:84).  They 
are ―alive‖ also in the sense that they remain relevant to contemporary society. 
 
5.2 ―Postmemory‖ 
Returning directly to the idea of Kentridge‘s work portraying his ―memories‖ of 
others‘ past injustices and past histories, Marianne Hirsch has identified the 
concept of ―postmemory‖ which is relevant to the understanding of this idea.  
Hirsch, in her book entitled Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and 
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Postmemory (1997), analyses the photographs of those who died during the 
Holocaust. She studies ―their existence as spaces of lost memory‖ (1997:22-23; cf. 
Hirsch 2003). From this she deduces and introduces the concept of ―postmemory‖ 
which is different from ―memory‖ by ―generational distance‖ and from history by 
―deep personal connection‖:   
[Post]memory is a powerful and very particular form of memory precisely 
because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through 
recollection but through imagination…Postmemory characterizes (sic) the 
experience of those who grow up dominated by narratives that preceded 
their birth, whose own belated stories are evacuated by the stories of the 
previous generation shaped by traumatic events that can be neither 
understood nor recreated (Hirsch 1997:22; cf. Hirsch 2003; Hirsch and 
Kacandes 2004; Sicher 2004).   
 
This ―postmemory‖ is ―a spatiotemporal exile from a destroyed past that both 
distances and affirms the existence of the past‖ (Hirsch 1997:22-23; 244-245; cf. 
Hirsch 2003). ―Postmemory‖ therefore basically means an  
intersubjective transgenerational space of remembrance, linked to a cultural 
or collective trauma that is not strictly based on identity or familial 
connection.  It is defined through an identification with the victim or witness, 
modulated and carefully delimited by the unbridgeable distance that 
separates the participant from the one born after (Hirsch and Kacandes 
2004:14).   
 
This ―identification‖ with a victim or victims, and ―imagination / remembrance‖ of 
others‘ past traumas helps explain why Kentridge has focused on certain themes in 
his works.  He is very empathetic, for example, carefully drawing the subalterns‘ 
faces with their pained lines — to highlight / show the suffering they are going 
through / have experienced. In Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris intense 
erotic scenes between Felix Teitlebaum and Mrs. Eckstein are juxtaposed with the 
pained and horrifying images of the mine workers‘ faces and seemingly non-ending 
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lines of them stretched windingly across the highveld.  Their faces are highly 
reminiscent of Edvard Munch‘s Scream — evoking the same pain and horror.  
Obviously, at some level, Kentridge identifies with the voiceless, the poverty-
stricken, with ―Harry‖ the hobo, for instance, because he is able to capture and 
portray their misery so realistically.  Consider his film Monument, with Harry 
pinioned to a rock, and the close-ups of Harry‘s face.  That he chooses such a 
theme (the exploitation of workers) is in itself revealing of his empathy, and this 
empathy is amplified by how he draws the themes / topics / individuals, and is able 
to convey their unbearable lives of misery to an audience. 
 
There is a fundamental ―connection between memory and imagination, re-telling 
and re-creating the self‖ (Kirmayer 1996:174).  Kentridge literally does this in his 
films.  His ―memories‖ of others memories, and his own memories are indeed 
linked to the imagination which he has succeeded in drawing, he tells and re-tells 
stories of apartheid and he ―re-creates‖ the self through the merging of Soho 
Eckstein and Felix Teitlebaum.  Another second generational Holocaust writer, 
Henri Raczymow, coined the phrase ―mémoire trouée‖ or ―memory shot through 
with holes‖ — a memory that is a void, a ―memory of not remembering and not 
being there‖ (Raczymow 1994:101-102; cf. Raczymow 2003; Sicher 2004).  
Similarly, the German author, W. G. Sebald wrote that when he watched 
documentary films of War World II, or looked at photographs of the war, he felt as if 
―those horrors I did not experience cast a shadow over me, and one from which I 
shall never entirely emerge‖ — this too is a form of ―postmemory‖ (Sebald 
2003:71).  Atrocities not experienced first hand, as François Mauriac astutely 
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observes (above), are ―those that affect us the most‖ (1960:2).  Froma I. Zeitlin also 
believes that writers and artists ―represent the past through modes of enactment — 
even reanimation — through which the self, the ‗ego‘, the ‗one who was not there‘, 
now takes on a leading role as an active presence‖ (Zeitlin 1998:6; cf. Sicher 2004; 
Zeitlin 2001 and 2004). This is interesting in the light of Kentridge choosing to 
animate his Felix Teitlebaum and Soho/Felix characters in his own image, thereby 
taking on an active presence in his films.  He puts himself directly into his films and 
into the themes he portrays, of which he surely does not have direct / immediate 
experience. 
 
Efraim Sicher suggests another term, that of ―absent memory‖.  Like ―postmemory‖, 
it is still made of angst and other post-traumatic stress-related symptoms, 
memories transferred and experienced as ―first-hand‖ (Sicher 2004).  Geoffrey 
Hartman also adds to these ideas when he coins the phrase ―witnesses by 
adoption‖ — it enlarges the familial connection of memory – to incorporate others‘ 
empathy and identification (Hartmann 2004; Hirsch and Kacandes 2004:14; cf. 
Hartmann 2003).  It is obvious that Kentridge‘s films, by their very themes, identify 
with the dispossessed and the victims of apartheid. Kentridge‘s works ―trace 
unconscious messages from the past‖ (Stone 2003:99). ―Disconsolate and 
irremediable nostalgia and loss are embedded‖ in his works (Stone 2003:99).  And 
so, as if tormented by his memories of others‘ memories Kentridge takes it upon 
himself to document these ―memories‖ — with exquisite aesthetics, and haunting 
and even grotesque subject matter (see Chapter Seven for issues concerning 
aesthetics and representation) in a series of animated films that challenge the 
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viewer him/herself to acknowledge the past and to remember.  Understanding the 
concept of memory and how it works, with a focus on collective memory, and 
memory‘s relationship to trauma, now follows. 
 
5.3 Memory  
In WEIGHING … and WANTING it is apparent that Soho Eckstein is ―obsessed 
with memory‖ (Benezra 2001:25).  Soho Eckstein lays his head against different 
objects, such as a rock, a bakelite telephone and a teacup See Figure 5.6, Figure 
5.7, and Figure 5.8).  The rock morphs into the land — a reference to Soho 
Eckstein and his mines — he is troubled by the fortunes he made exploiting the 
land and the workers.  There seems to be an element of remorse captured in his 
face.  This remorse continues as a theme onto the next installation of the 
chronology of the films, Stereoscope. The rock also traces his past, like actual 
sediments found in the earth.  In Stereoscope, Soho Eckstein‘s wealthy empire is 
demolished, and Soho Eckstein becomes a divided self ―as stereoscopic alter 
egos‖ (Benezra 2001:25).  He appears brooding and melancholic — does he 
mourn the loss of his empire?  Is he questioning his past? Or simply reliving it?  He 
is most certainly preoccupied with his past. 
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Figure 5.6 Drawing from WEIGHING … and WANTING (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas 
and Cameron 2001:123). 
 
 
                                           
Figure 5.7 Drawing from WEIGHING … and WANTING (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas 
and Cameron 2001:125). 
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Figure 5.8 Drawings from WEIGHING … and WANTING as part of installation exhibit 
(Christov-Bakargiev 1999:73). 
 
With regard to the ―past‖, Tasmin Spargo very perceptively attempts to define the 
past:  
the past is what happened before the present: it is time that has passed.  
Thinking in terms of past, present, and future seems natural, inevitable both 
on a personal level and in broader social, cultural terms.  The past is, in a 
sense, over but in another sense it is only available to us, knowable, as part 
of the present.  The past may be real but it is, by definition, irrecoverable in 
its pastness (2000:1).   
 
Her definition captures the ephemeral essence of the concept the ―past‖.   W. G. 
Sebald poetically states: ―[S]uch is the dark backward of abysm of time.  
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Everything lies all jumbled up in it, and when you look down you feel dizzy and 
afraid‖ (2003:74). Directly related to the concept of time, is of course, ―memory‖. 
 
Memory is the edifice of identity, with reference to the individual as well as to the 
collective, but more recently it has become a ―site of struggle‖ — memory has 
become politicised (Antze and Lambek 1996:vii).  It pervades our current 
discourses on culture — this ―politics of memory‖ is a site of trauma and 
victimisation (Antze and Lambek 1996:vii).  Memories do more than simply 
document the past, they ―are interpretive reconstructions that bear the imprint of 
local narrative conventions, cultural assumptions, discursive formations and 
practices, and social contexts of recall and commemoration‖ (Antze and Lambek 
1996:vii).   
 
When violence is perpetuated against individuals and singled-out groups of people, 
memories serve to implicate and indict; they also symbolise victimisation and 
cohesion, and thus are performative in meaning.   
 
The elections in South Africa in 1994 heralded a new era — post-apartheid and 
democracy — that came with the ideas of reparation and reconciliation.  To help 
heal the wounds of a tragic devastating political past a Commission was set up in 
1996 called The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  One of the 
Commission‘s aims was to listen to the testimony of those who had suffered 
enormously during apartheid, but it also served as a confessional.  Those that 
carried out the atrocities of apartheid were asked to come forward to give evidence 
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of their involvement.  These were the memories of both victims and perpetrators of 
injustice.  The idea was to listen and bear witness and then forgive.  South Africa 
was to heal through this process.   
 
The evidence was horrific and traumatic to hear. The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was covered by every form of the media — broadcast constantly on 
television and radio.  It became what Alemani called a ―theatre of cruelty and 
suffering‖ (2006:51); or, ―Theatre of Violence‖ (Foster, Haupt and de Beer 2005, 
this is also the title of their book).  The irony of course was that the criminals were 
to be pardoned while the victims would receive reparation.  The problem was that 
although everyone ―knew‖ about the atrocities committed, no one actually expected 
the content that came out — hideously grotesque, phantasmagoric — therein lies 
the irony. As the TRC continued it became very apparent that these criminals 
should never have been pardoned — their crimes against humanity and their 
compatriots were heinous. It might have been more healing if prosecutions had 
taken place, similar to those of the Nuremburg trials / Bosnia trials (this is the 
researcher‘s own opinion).   
 
Kentridge deals with this topic in the play Ubu and the Truth Commission (Taylor 
1997), directed by Kentridge (and drawings and film by Kentridge).  Obviously 
Taylor‘s title is a direct reference to the Commission.  The content also deals 
directly with the TRC. Ubu and the Truth Commission is inspired by a play called 
Ubu Roi, written by French playwright Alfred Jarry and performed in 1896.  In Ubu 
Roi, Jarry created a character called Ubu.  Ubu is a belligerent despot.  He is 
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vulgar.  His physical features are hideous and he is fat.  He is also stupid.  Jarry 
represents him in all his grotesquery – the play is political satire.  Theatrically 
speaking, Ubu has become the ―symbol for the absurdity of power, its thousand 
different faces and the contradictions inherent in governing‖ (Alemani 2006:49; see 
Figures 5.12 — 5.18: Kentridge‘s drawings of Ubu).  In Ubu and the Truth 
Commission, his adventures are taken and mixed with the real-life drama of the 
TRC.  
 
Jarry‘s original play includes paradoxical elements among the irony and satire, and 
Kentridge shadows this with the way that the ―actors‖ are represented on stage. 
Real actors are used to portray a fictitious Ubu, while the real witnesses, the 
victims, are presented as puppets — large wooden puppets produced by the 
Handspring Puppet Company (see Figure 5.10).  Of course, adding to the 
confusion that reflects the socio-political situation of the time is the background 
animation of the play — creating / adding a further layer of complexity to the 
dramatic process.  The animation consists of documentary footage and drawings of 
torture.    
 
Both collective and personal memories are represented in the play — Ubu 
represents the individual, the iconic criminal; while the puppets represent the 
collective.  They both put forward their memories — there is a meeting of the ―I‖ 
with the collective.  Both sets of memories are traumatic to hear — with the 
perpetrators giving evidence of torture, and the victims describing their loss of 
loved ones and the hideous suffering inflicted upon them.  Ubu (actor Dawid 
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Minnar) is stupid, supercilious, arrogant and slovenly.  The actor wears 
undergarments and boots — he is repulsive and disgusting (see Figures 5.9 — 
5.11).  The loathsomeness of his actions during the apartheid era is perfectly 
encapsulated in his physical appearance — it doubles the disgust at hearing the 
atrocities being recounted.  The play challenges the notion of the TRC being about 
transition and forgiveness. The Commission‘s unveiling darkness, as represented 
in the play, presents one with the conundrum — is forgiveness the way to go?  Or 
does the witnessing of memories result in ―cohesion‖ as Antze and Lambek (1996; 
see above) suggests?  
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Figure 5.9 Photograph from Ubu Tells the Truth (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and 
Cameron 2001:38). 
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Figure 5.10 Photograph from Ubu Tells the Truth (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and 
Cameron 2001:45). 
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Figure 5.11 A colour photograph from the play Ubu and the Truth Commission 
(Christov-Bakargiev 1998:117). 
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Figure 5.12 William Kentridge’s Dancing Man 1998 – similar to his drawings of Ubu 
Roi (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:121). 
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Figure 5.13 Ubu Tells the Truth: etchings 1996—1997 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Ubu Tells the Truth: etchings 1996—1997 
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Figure 5.15 Ubu Tells the Truth: etchings 1996—1997 
 
 
Figure 5.16 Ubu Tells the Truth: etchings 1996—1997 
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Figure 5.17 Ubu Tells the Truth: etchings 1996—1997 
 
 
 
Figure 5.18 Ubu Tells the Truth: etchings 1996—1997 
Figure 5.12 — 5.18 Ubu Tells the Truth: etchings 1996—1997 (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, 
Sitas and Cameron 2001:117-118). 
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5.4 Memory and identity 
It is ―access to memory‖ (Antze and Lambek 1996:xii) that is problematic.  Sigmund 
Freud put forward the ―archaeological metaphor‖ in trying to understand memory: 
as sediments or layers buried beneath the present, or secreted behind a screen 
(1899a and 1899b). This is an ideal definition of Kentridge‘s works — sediments / 
layers that contain memories and reveal different realities and meanings.   In 
psychoanalysis the emphasis is on the play between fantasy and reality — memory 
is embossed upon supple screens that serve at once to conceal as well as to 
reveal (Freud 1899b / 1962).  What one actually remembers are memories — there 
is no undeviating line to the past — these screens are embossed with both 
fantasies and distortions of many consecutive remembering — memories of 
memories. Freud likens memories to dreams in that they are full of concealed 
symbols (see below). 
 
Memories are made out of different experiences — thus memory is inherently 
linked to identity (Antze and Lambek 1996:xii).  Culture influences and shapes 
memory.  Antze and Lambek cite Terdiman‘s 1993 study where he analyses the 
works of poets Marcel Proust and Charles Baudelaire, concluding that their works 
are essentially about retrieval and loss: ―memory begins when experience itself is 
definitively past‖ (1996:xiii).  Memory becomes distanced and detached, or as Paul 
Ricour states: ―a dialectic between appropriation and distanciation‖ (1976:43). 
 
Memory, according to Pierre Nora (1989:7-25; cf. Antze and Lambek 1996:xvii), is 
a ―continuous, dialectical movement in and out of consciousness‖.  Memory 
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functions as a narrative — creating continuity associations between the past and 
the present.  An authoritative version of this creative narrative rests with the 
communal and collective memory, supported by the experts.  Memories are formed 
by the existing conventions of one‘s time, place and position (Nora 1989:7-25; cf. 
Antze and Lambek 1996:xvii).  Memory is centred on an inherent, essential 
subject, whether this subject is an individuated ―I‖ or a collective ―we‖.   
 
Antze and Lambek (1996:xxi, xxii) believe that nations — coherent, continuous and 
whole — can be likened to that of the individual.  They state that nations need to 
construct / create a past, that is, a collective memory.  They claim that trauma is 
always a part of that past — whether it is repression or remembrance.  The 
memory of selves is always coupled with social memory and social memory is 
connected to the personal.  The self and the social always interconnect: 
autobiographical narratives of the self are sustained by social constructs, such as 
judicial testimonies, patient case histories, journalistic accounts, and so forth.  They 
legitimise the autobiographical self.  William Kentridge‘s films are a search for a 
way to mourn South Africa‘s devastating historical past — he looks for ways in 
which he can mourn the suffering of the entire nation, without being reductionist or 
simplistic (cf.  Alemani 2006:15).  Kentridge‘s animation does often include actual 
documentary footage — giving authenticity to his drawings / animations / plays, 
found for example in Black Box / Chambre Noir; Ubu and the Truth Commission; 
and Ubu Tells the Truth. 
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―Memory acts in the present to represent the past‖ (Antze and Lambek 1996:xxiv).  
Terdiman (1993 cited in Antze and Lambek 1996:xxiv) explains that this 
representation does not imply a straightforward ―retelling‖ but rather a complex 
process of ―interpretation‖. Interestingly, Kentridge‘s works by definition are a 
―retelling‖ and an ―interpretation‖ — he draws his interpretations of memories of 
those living in a brutalised country, and he tells certain themes over and over 
again, in different ―interpretations‖ / drawings.   
 
Forgetting is intrinsic to memory or remembering — identity is choreography 
between remembering and forgetting. Kentridge referred to the transitionary period 
of politics, between apartheid and democracy in South Africa, as a ―contest 
between amnesia and memory — between paper shredders and photocopying 
machines‖ (Benezra 2001:25).  This is a direct reference to those who want to 
shred evidence of the evil deeds of apartheid and those who want to photocopy 
them for future use, for proof / evidence.  Kentridge has his own word for forgetting: 
―disremembering‖ (Boris 2001:34).  This implies that it is a conscious act to 
―disremember‖ that which one does not want in one‘s consciousness, and does not 
want to deal with.  Identity is not made up of a cemented set of memories, rather it 
is a ―dialectical, ceaseless activity of remembering and forgetting, assimilating and 
discarding‖ (Antze and Lambek 1996:xxix).  Memories of past incidences are 
constantly reinterpreted and reassimilated with the introduction of new knowledge.  
 
Paul Ricouer (1992; cf. Antze 1996) also claims that our experience of identity has 
a narrative structure.  In his book, Oneself as Another, he claims that one can 
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separate us from others and from the state of being consistent over time through a 
process he calls ―emplotment‖ (Ricouer 1992).  This concept views individuals as 
constantly ―weaving and reweaving of past and present into characters, motives, 
situations, actions‖ (Ricouer cited in Antze 1996:6).  In other words individuals are 
the actors in a play that is being continuously retold, and revised, as our lives are 
lived out.  Kentridge does this with both his characters, Soho Eckstein and Felix 
Teitlebaum.  For example, in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, there is 
the love affair between Felix Teitlebaum and Mrs. Eckstein, and in many episodes, 
Soho Eckstein is depicted at work.  Janice Haaken also advocates that  
the emotional truth of the past is never reducible to the concrete facticity of 
events but is always bound up in interpretation, both in the initial experience 
of events and in their later elaborations and working through in memory ...  
(1994:115).   
 
It is not enough to produce a document or report that something has happened — 
whom it has happened to and how, when and where become important too.  Once 
again, this has been dealt with in Ubu and then Truth Commission, which deals 
with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was specifically formed to hear 
of events endured / perpetrated during the apartheid regime / era.  While this 
theatre production is not part of the Drawings for Projection animated series — it 
offers insight into Kentridge‘s themes: the collective and the individual co-existing 
in a politicised and brutalised society. 
 
Memories arise unexpectedly, not as accounts of the past, but in response to one‘s 
continuous events.  Memories inform our everyday present.  This is most evident in 
History of the Main Complaint — Soho/Felix is simply out for a drive when he looks 
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into his rear-view mirror and sees memories / images of past injustices, unnerving 
him.  He is driving his car in the present, he has an accident, and that instant 
implodes, which gets linked to the past through the images that rise up from the 
past, infiltrating the present.  This also implies an individual and a collective 
responsibility, in that Soho/Felix represents the individual and the terrifying images 
of brutality happening ―out there‖, in society; such as the man being beaten by two 
other men also depicted in History of the Main Complaint.  Should he have tried 
harder to put an end to apartheid?  His middle-class guilt is laid bare. Is it possible 
to separate the two, that is, the individual and the collective?  Is this not the basis 
of Kentridge‘s melancholy?  Many psychoanalytic theorists do not believe that the 
past is really past, but rather present in the here and now as the ―timeless 
unconscious‖ (Antze 1996:10).  Jennifer Arlene Stone makes the same point: ―the 
unconscious knows no time‖ (Stone 2003:111). The author of this dissertation is of 
the opinion that this is an apt description of Kentridge‘s animated films.   
 
The articulation of identity / self is bound by socio-cultural relations of ―power‖ that 
give precedence to the ―reproduction‖ of specific memories above all others 
(George 1996:59). In this instance, in the series, Soho Eckstein and Felix 
Teitlebaum are as well as the symbiotic Soho/Felix‘s identities have been bound by 
the socio-cultural relations of apartheid.  In South Africa during the apartheid era 
the ideology was supported by not only the government, but other state 
apparatuses as well, such as the education system, the police and the army. 
Everything worked to inculcate apartheid.  It is impossible to think that people were 
unaffected by this reign of fascism.  His works give precedence to these 
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―memories‖.  His films also depict socio-cultural relations of power that represent 
time.  
 
Having studied the beginnings of the science / study of memory, Ian Hacking 
introduces a new term to this realm of discourse: ―memoro politics‖.  This term 
replaces the concept of the ―soul‖ with a concept that memory is now constituted 
by moral and political claims (1996:65).  According to his studies, Hacking claims 
that the concept of the memory has permeated Western thought as being 
comprised of both the ―soul‖ and ―identity‖ (1996).  Introduced into these studies 
are the revelations of Sigmund Freud‘s belief that individuals are significantly 
molded and formed by what they have forgotten. This ever-present notion is crucial 
to the idea of ―memoro-politics‖. Indeed, Soho/Felix‘s identity is politically formed.  
One cannot disassociate them from the politics around them — capitalism, 
ideology and apartheid.   
 
Just as Freud and Hacking believe that the individual is created by what they have 
forgotten, John Locke in his book Essay (1700 / 1975), writes that an individual is 
not constituted by a biography, but by ―a remembered biography‖ (Douglas 1992; 
Hacking 1996:81). In the development of the study of memory, it is insightful to 
read Locke‘s vivid description of recovered memory: 
 
The Mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden Idea and 
turns, as it were, the Eye of the Soul upon it; though sometimes too they 
start up in our Minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the 
Understanding; and very often are roused and tumbled out of their dark 
Cells into open Day-light, by turbulent and tempestuous Passion; our 
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affections bringing Ideas to our Memory, which had otherwise lain quiet and 
unregarded (Locke 1700 (1975):152-153). 
 
Once again there is mention of the link between memory and identity (see Chapter 
Eight for more details).   
 
In contrast to long-term memory being directly linked to culture, short term memory 
can be analysed without reference to culture and history. With ―long-term semantic 
memory of a historical past, a memorizing which extends memory well beyond the 
life of the individual, the problem of the nature of the subject must come to the fore‖ 
(Bloch 1996:229).   
 
Such remembrance situates the individual in time by ―invoking, or not invoking, 
notions of a past interaction with an external world which contains truth and 
falsehoods, permanent and impermanent elements, which is, or is not, in a state of 
continual creative dialectic flux‖ (Bloch 1996:229-230).  In this way, according to 
Bloch (1996) not only are individuals ―created‖, but they also create an imagined 
real world in which a predecessor exists, with his/her imagined created self that 
refers to the present.  
St. Augustine, in his famous book Confessions, poetically wrote of the intrigues of 
memory and claimed it is: ―the abyss of human consciousness‖ (1991:179 (397-
398AD); cf. Warner 1963).  Referring to this consciousness, Bloch writes that  
[H]igher order consciousness, consciousness of being conscious, requires 
the representation of the self.  The self-representation of this self, its 
consciousness of temporal and spatial existence, is memory (1996:241).   
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Memory, however, should be understood as ―essentially incomplete‖.  It is 
―perspectival‖, constantly moving (Lambek 1996:242), or ―shot through with holes / 
mémoire trouée‖ as defined by Henri Raczymow, mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter (1994; cf. Raczymow 2003).  
 
Memory is neither completely subjective nor completely objective — it is rather 
intermediary — before it can be authorised in collective texts, such as history 
books, memorialisations or legal testimony.  Benedict Anderson‘s (1991) belief is 
that one cannot recapture memory and therefore one has to replace it through the 
use of narrative.  This belief is similar to Sigmund Freud‘s understanding of how 
dreams work.  The act of dreaming is not based on a solid narrative or picture / 
symbol / image.  One does not know if the dream images originated in the dream 
world, or the waking world — of that there is no certainty — but the retelling of the 
dream takes on a creative process of its very own.  The words that describe the 
dream become the dream, and it is the retold version that one remembers, the 
―representation, not the original experience‖ (Lambek 1996:242).  Kentridge‘s films 
are dreamlike, yet they are also the telling and re-telling of other people‘s ―factual‖ 
experiences / memories.  They are dreamlike in the sense that they are 
hallucinatory and surrealistic.  For example in Mine, Soho Eckstein plays with a 
miniature rhinoceros on his luxurious bed. 
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5.5 Screen memories Part I 
Memory is understood as acts of narrative, or retellings, a claim Sigmund Freud 
made when he postulated the concept of ―screen memories‖ — memories of 
memories, or remembered fantasies as real (see below).  Richard Terdiman adds 
that memory ―cannot distinguish between the register of facts and that of 
interpretation‖ (1993:346; cf. Lambek 1996:252).  Reachable memory is mediated 
―either as subjective experience or as objective fact, but is always in the act of 
being made‖ (Lambek 1996:242).  As Richard Terdiman puts it ―representation can 
never be identical reproduction‖ (1993:59; cf. Lambek 1996:242). This idea is 
central to Stereoscope and the accompanying series of etchings, called Sleeping 
on Glass. For example, Stereoscope shows the screen split in two.  On either side 
Soho/Felix is shown standing and brooding.  At first glance the two sides look 
identical, but they are not.  There are actually many differences between them.  In 
Sleeping on Glass, one etching shows two ―identical‖ tea cups drawn in pencil on a 
double-paged text taken from an old book.  They look ―identical‖ too, but they are 
not.  They are both representations only.  Literally too, because they are drawings 
of teacups and not the actual tea cups themselves.  This description of his 
drawings are to emphasise that Kentridge in drawing ―identical‖ images, a practice 
he makes use of often in his works, appears to be aware that no two images of any 
representation can in reality be identical. He seems to be emphasising the fact that 
representations as he portrays them are like memories, mediated, subjective and 
interpretative. Figure 5.19 below shows two ―identical‖ bakelite telephones — this 
is a still taken from Stereoscope. 
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Figure 5.19 Still from Stereoscope 1998—1999 (Christov-Bakargiev 1999:9). 
Memory by definition implies an individual / self / subject (as already stated) who is 
the one who remembers.  Contemporary views perceive the character of this 
subject to be reliant on references to memory.  In other words, the ―I‖ is a creation 
of who ―I‖ was and what ―I‖ experienced — memory and identity are intrinsically 
bound.  (Details on memory and identity are further explored in Chapter Eight.)  
Remembering functions similarly for both individual and collective subjects.  Both 
narrate and represent their identities, then reproduce their representations through 
individual and public tools or mediums.  There is no ―pre-given primordial or 
essential identity existing apart from the ongoing construction of the self‖ (Lambek 
1996:244).  Benedict Anderson (1991) claims that ―it is out of oblivion that 
narratives spring‖ (cited in Lambek 1996:244). This is an indirect reference to the 
unconscious.  Direct, unmediated remembering of past experiences is impossible, 
hence one relies on the narrative construction to support and create continuity.  To 
repeat, individual and collective memory is never exact reproduction, but ―an 
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artifice to render the continuity in change realistic‖ (Lambek 1996:244). This 
―artifice‖ is significant.  Not only is it a necessary response to ―oblivion‖, but it 
functions in no small part ―by means of selective oblivion, or censorship‖ (Lambek 
1996:244).  Objectified narrative can be understood as a purification of direct 
experience, ―a transformation of pain into art‖ (Lambek 1996:244).  This can of 
course be a literal reference to Kentridge‘s films where pain (his own and others) is 
transformed into art.  In these films he portrays the pain and trauma experienced 
by those suffering during apartheid and South Africa‘s civil war (during the 
apartheid era, pre-dominantly in the Kwa-Zulu Natal regions between the Inkatha 
supporters and the (then banned) African National Congress supporters).  See 
Figure 5.20 below — a drawing of decapitated heads that evoke sympathy for the 
pain etched on their (aesthetically beautiful) faces, and for the torture and fear they 
must have endured before death. 
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Figure 5.20 Detail from drawing of Casspirs (sic) Full of Love (Benezra, Boris, 
Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:61). 
To reiterate, narrated memory is ―a poeisis‖ — a creation and a transformation / 
conversion of remembered experiences (cf. Terdiman 1993).  Hans-Georg 
Gadamer suggests that ―[O]nly by forgetting does the mind have … the capacity to 
see everything with fresh eyes, so that what is long familiar combines with the new 
into many leveled unity (or symbolic consistency)‖ (1985:16).   
As previously mentioned, Kentridge refers to forgetting as ―disremembering‖ — 
which is a deliberate and conscious act (cited in Boris 2001:34).  Conscious 
memory is perceived as unresolved or residual, or as a trace.  In this regard, 
conscious memory is important ―less as the trace of the past than as the kernel of 
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the future‖ (Lambek 1996:244; cf. Kugelmass 1996).  Felix in Exile specifically 
warns against ―collective‖ amnesia.  In 1994 Kentridge clearly stated he was 
―erecting a beacon against the process of forgetting the routes of our recent past‖ 
(cited in Boris 2001:33).  He blatantly stated how important remembering is ―in 
order to navigate the future‖ (cited in Boris 2001:33).  Kentridge suggests the 
concept of ―anamnesis‖ which he defines as a healing through remembering (Boris 
2001:33). This idea is similar to Freud‘s ―talking cure‖ (psychoanalysis), whereby 
patients recall memories and discuss them with the analysand.  Once again there 
is a reference to traces of time — just as with Kentridge‘s works and the smudges 
of charcoal and erasures that refuse to be eradicated without leaving a trace 
behind.  In the History of the Main Complaint — he deals with this concept 
(―anamnesis‖) extensively. He ―remembers‖ his own (those that he experienced as 
a child, opening a box in his father‘s study to find photographs of the Sharpeville 
Massacre; and witnessing the beating of a man.  Both of these memories are 
referenced in Felix in Exile and History of the Main Complaint) and others‘ 
memories (memories of rioters, activists, the subaltern, the dislocated) — this is 
very clear.  Soho/Felix is forced to remember not only his own responsibility in 
supporting apartheid, but he is confronted with the heinous crimes that occurred 
during this period.  He grapples with both personal and collective guilt, but does he 
resolve his guilt?  Does this ―remembering‖, however coerced it might seem, result 
in the ―healing‖ suggested by Kentridge?  He is physically ―healed‖ in the film — 
lying ill for a long time and then getting better. His physiological make-up is 
restored, yet can the same be said of his psychical make-up / conscious?  Where 
does Soho/Felix go to now?  Is it not a case of ―business as usual‖?  This is of 
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course another reference to the TRC — it was based on the same assumption as 
Kentridge‘s. Through remembering and therefore bearing witness — a healing 
would be bestowed on all — victims and perpetrators alike.  However, as author 
and researcher of this dissertation, there is no evidence to support with any 
certainty that this was the actual outcome of the TRC (although technically of 
course, trauma and healing cannot be measured in any empirical / evidential way). 
The formation of the collective self is analogous to the formation of the individual 
self.  However, specific individual experiences present idioms for narrating 
collective identity and experience.  This is apparent in the concept of ―collective 
memory‖.  This concept relies on specific discourses relevant to the collective self, 
which bind individual selves together, such as post-colonialist subjects or gender 
orientation.  Individual identities make up a collective whole.   
In both the individual and collective case we have today in the west the 
conceptualization of highly bounded entities distinguished from one another 
by their property (Handler 1988), property that includes enviable, sacred 
memories belonging to their rightful owners (Lambek 1996:245).  
Again, the TRC was created to give acknowledgement and authenticity to those 
collective / individual memories. 
Considering memory as symbolically mediated does not give one the licence to 
create imaginative stories — memories are often supported by evidence.  
Kentridge provides his own evidence to support his ―memories‖: maps; ledgers; 
documentary footage; photographs; etcetera. Furthermore, memories are 
―organized by means of certain cultural conventions‖ (Lambek 1996: 246; cf. 
Kirmayer 1996).  Mikhail Bakhtin identifies the ―chronotope‖ as one of these 
William Kentridge: Chapter Five: Memory 
 
153 | P a g e  
 
cultural conventions (1981).  The chronotope refers to the spatio-temporal 
continuum in which the action of narratives is constructed.  It is essentially a 
concept that allows for the comparison of worlds in which individuals exist — it 
links the ―events of the memories to the events of their recounting‖ (Lambek 
1996:247). Frederick Nietzsche wrote, in the Genealogy of Morality:  
Perhaps there is nothing more terrible and mysterious in the whole 
prehistory of mankind than our mnemonic technique.  We burn something 
into the mind so that it will remain in the memory; only what still hurts will be 
retained (cited in Sebald 2003:184).   
 
Is this a reference again to a ―sebaceous wound‖? Perhaps memory only logically 
consists of the recall of past traumas? Or is all memory traumatic because all 
memory is ―loss‖? 
 
Victor Burgin reiterates that what one calls ―‗the present‘ is not a perpetually 
fleeting point on a line ‗through time‘ but a collage of disparate times, an 
imbrication of shifting and contested spaces‖ (1996:182).   
 
This too is an apposite description of Kentridge‘s films in the Drawings for 
Projection series.  His animated works recall films such as Fritz Lang‘s Metropolis 
(1927), Sergei Eisenstein‘s Battleship Potemkim (1925), and Vsevolod Pudovkin‘s 
Mother (1926) — where montage (Russian / Soviet Formalism) and German 
Expressionism originated. 
 
Self-identity is ―woven in time and space, history and geography, memory and 
place‖ (Burgin 1996:190).  Obviously, any identity, whether it is individual, national 
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or cultural, implies both a place and a time.  Once again it is a reference to 
Kentridge‘s films being autobiographical.  This quote is also fascinating in light of 
Kentridge‘s love for the city of Johannesburg (prevalent in the film Johannesburg, 
2nd Greatest City after Paris).  This line of thought is pursued in detail later on in 
this study. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
To sum up, this chapter has focused on postmemory, memory, collective memory, 
trauma, and how they relate to Kentridge‘s works.  In the introduction of this 
chapter there were a few paragraphs written on Elie Wiesel‘s memoir Night (1960).  
One of the main points posited is that bearing witness is important because it gives 
testimony and that in turn enables individuals to remember.  It is ironic that the 
testimony focuses on the Holocaust — the idea was to make sure that such an 
occurrence never happens again — through remembering.  Unfortunately, 
following generations (since 1945) have seen genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass 
extermination of individuals — in Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, South Africa and 
Palestine, despite these testimonies and memories.  
 
Having discussed collective and individual memory, and identity, this study now 
focuses on the concept of trauma, and its relationship to memory.   
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CHAPTER SIX:  MEMORY, “THE UNCONSCIOUS” AND TRAUMA 
 
According to Adrienne Kertzer ―[W]hatever form Holocaust testimonies may 
assume … they all inhabit a haunted terrain of traumatized memory‖ (cited in 
Zeitlin 2001:128; cf.  Kertzer 2004; Zeitlin 2004). Traumatic memory is often 
experienced as a collective memory(ies), after a nation and its peoples have 
experienced trauma together.  As such it is difficult to refer to a collective trauma 
without referring to the Holocaust, for very obvious reasons, which provides 
innumerable examples of both physical and psychological trauma endured by 
millions of individuals.  South Africa is another country whose peoples have 
experienced trauma: the trauma of apartheid.  Kentridge‘s portrayals of South 
Africa‘s collective traumas and the resultant memories can be extrapolated to 
other, similarly experienced traumas.  For some viewers, Kentridge‘s references to 
apartheid and its atrocities even transcend the era and time. His images of dead 
bodies becoming one with the ground can be an image taken from any war, or any 
war-torn country where historical atrocities have taken place. How these traumatic 
memories are remembered; how they are processed; and how the collective and 
the individual within such collectives / nations are mourned; and healed; are 
themes that are apparent in William Kentridge‘s works (for example the reference 
to The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa).  While South Africa‘s 
traumatic past is an obvious concern to Kentridge, so too is the traumatic past of 
the Jews, because of his ancestry / heritage. Comparing and extrapolating these 
collective and individual traumas are also theoretically important.  These 
comparisons serve to clarify certain concepts but the correlations also highlight 
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contrasts; connect different cultures and histories; and through doing so, ultimately 
provide insight into the themes that concern Kentridge. 
 
Taking a brief excurses, this introduction now provides the reader with some 
background on William Kentridge and his ancestral heritage.  Kentridge‘s Jewish 
ancestral name is Kantorowicz, whose origins lie in the town Zhager (Zagare in 
English) in Lithuania.  His grandfather, Morris Kantorowicz, who emigrated to 
South Africa in 1903, pre-emptively saved the entire family from annihilation by 
emigrating.  The Nazis obliterated all three thousand Jewish inhabitants of Zhager.  
He would now be resting with those Jews in Naryshkin, a mass grave that the 
victims themselves had to dig up before being murdered. Zhager had been home 
to the Jews since the fourteenth century — making up a substantial sixty percent of 
the population.  They were renowned for having the largest library in the whole of 
Lithuania and for having learned men.   Several thousand more Jews were 
slaughtered in the market square — Jews sent there from Krok, Popilan, 
Yaneshok, and Zaimol among others (Stone 2003).  In her Last Walk to Naryshkin 
Park, Rose Zwi described how the murders began on Yom Kippur (Day of 
Atonement: Holy of Holy days) in October 1941: ―so that blood ran in rivulets over 
the cobblestones into the Shveta River which turned red‖ (Zwi cited in Stone 
2003:95).  A names memorial is to be found in the four volumes of The Holocaust 
in Lithuania 1941—1945: A Book of Remembrance (2002), edited by Saul Missroff 
and Rose Lerer Cohen.  It contains the names of over a hundred and forty 
thousand Jews murdered by the Nazis; abetted by Lithuania militiamen and 
Zhager‘s own citizens.  There were many atrocities carried out:  
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[T]he denizens conducted a public humiliation of Rabbi Israel Riff who was 
in-spanned like a beast and made to drag a cart laden with large stones; 
they precipitated the premature birth of a baby on the edge of the mass 
grave and smashed the newborn‘s head in sight of the Jewish mother who 
was then shot (Stone 2003:94-95). 
 
At Naryshkin, the mass grave is at first immortalised by a Soviet plaque, without 
acknowledging the Jews, the plaque reads: ―[G]rave of the victims of fascism‖.  
Seeking to put the record straight, concrete steel plaques in three languages 
(Lithuanian, Hebrew and Yiddish) were added.  It reads: ―Old Jewish Cemetery.  
May their blessed memory be for eternity.‖  However, in a final terrible act of 
hostility, the headstones were desecrated, being removed from their resting place 
to make pavements and even the foundation of a cowshed:  ―[I]ntolerance of 
tyranny is ingrained in those who experience its offence to the soul‖ (Stone 
2003:96). 
 
In William Kentridge‘s still-life picture, titled Zeno Landscape (2002), from his film 
Zeno Writing, the charcoal resembles ash and smoke rising from the very 
landscape itself, bringing to mind the indescribable horror of the Shoah and the 
crematories: millions of lives going up in smoke; others buried in mass graves 
covered and hidden by the landscape.  In expectancy of annihilating all Austro-
Hungarian and Italian Jews with ease and efficiency, crematories were actually 
organised and constructed in Trieste.  It is ―no wonder Kentridge wishes to 
reanimate memory‖ (Stone 2003:96-97).  With this destruction and horror clearly 
on his mind, Kentridge has drawn two versions of the Jewish graveyard found in 
Trieste, complete with their unknowable Hebrew / Yiddish names and engraved 
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blessings (which thereby make them as unidentifiable as those Jews buried in the 
many mass graves found in Europe (Stone 2003:97; cf. Christov-Bagarkiev 1998). 
The same can be said of Nuit et Brouillard, a film made by Alain Resnais in 1955 
about the Nazi concentration camps.  It is a documentary where there is not a 
single reference to the Jews.  When asked about the political intent of his 
documentary, three decades after its release, Resnais responded: ―[T]he whole 
point was Algeria,‖ where French forces had already committed, and were 
continuing to commit their own racially determined atrocities (Williams 1992:369).  
This answer is obscure - perhaps he wanted the focus of his film to be on all 
Holocaust / genocide victims, yet to leave out completely all mention of the Jews, 
leaves an incorrect idea / effect of what the Holocaust and the camps were all 
about.  It sanitises the camps, making light of the systematic annihilation of the 
Jews.  So too does the statement at the cemetery of Lithuania.  This actually 
distorts history.  Kentridge, quoted in Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev‘s book on his art, 
refers to a documentary that he watched on Poland.  He describes the beautiful 
lush countryside: ―[D]eep grey-green trees and rolling hills in the soft European 
light‖ (1998:48).  The shocking irony is that over a ―hundred thousand people were 
gassed in the back of trucks during the 1940s‖ (1998:48). Yet there is no overt 
evidence of that ever having occurred. He highlights a quandary — how does one 
enjoy the countryside now, knowing what has happened there?  (See Chapter Nine 
of this thesis for a discussion on Kentridge‘s focus on memory and landscapes.) It 
is important to keep Kentridge‘s ancestral heritage in mind when analysing his 
films. 
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William Kentridge‘s works are representative of historical traumas.  There are no 
limitations along spacio-temporal lines — it could be Rwanda, Bosnia, or Darfur:  
In his 1999 film Stereoscope he uses images of police beating students in 
Jakarta, riots outside banks in Moscow, rebels being thrown over a bridge 
and then shot in the river below in Kinshasa, someone throwing rubble at 
the US embassy in Nairobi: all drawn from television broadcasts and 
newspapers appearing while he was working on the film.  He concludes, ―of 
course the images are all of Johannesburg‖ (Stewart 2006:14). 
 
Kentridge was once approached by a Romanian woman who was totally in awe 
that his works were about Romania.  She was astonished that he knew so much 
about her country and that he could ―portray it so accurately and sensitively‖ (Boris 
2001:33). This is testament to the fact that his films are relevant internationally and 
are not bound by time or geography.  This chapter is concerned with memory, 
trauma, dreams and screen memories and how they relate to the animated films of 
William Kentridge. 
 
6.1 Trauma 
Allan Young (1996) highlights two meanings of traumatic memory.  The one is 
firmly rooted in the psyche (which describes Kentridge‘s films exactly), and 
involves images of torments, a vocabulary of agonising words, and disturbing 
psychical sensations.  The second meaning, according to Young, is that of an 
evolving physical, neurological trauma (1996).  This is a bodily trauma which 
continues to ―remember‖ pain.  Ian Hacking is of the view that what has been 
forgotten by one is actually what moulds / creates one‘s personality — a belief 
based on Freudian psychology (1996). Consider the following question (raised 
earlier, too): what has Kentridge forgotten of his past — considering he grew up in 
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an anti-apartheid home, where his father was the legal counsel in the Steve Biko 
inquest and treason trials (Christov-Bakargiev 1999)?  Kentridge refers to bodily 
trauma and mental trauma, he draws pictures of the insides of brains which also 
refers to physical pain — death by being shot or tortured to death, or pain as in 
memories of when one was tortured.  Understanding the concepts of trauma 
(physical and psychical), and its relationship to memories and memorialisation; as 
well as their relationships with the interconnected concepts of guilt, responsibility, 
mourning and healing are important when referring and interpreting Kentridge‘s 
films.  Not only are these themes a constant present in his animated films, 
understanding them intellectually and theoretically helps to comprehend why and 
how Kentridge infuses his works with these themes.  It sheds light on how, through 
these art works, Kentridge tries to come to terms with his recent past as a child of 
apartheid, but also how he deals with his ancestral past. 
 
Figure 6.1 Drawing from Faustus in Africa! (Christov-Bakargiev 1999:21). 
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Hacking points out that it was actually Sigmund Freud who created and inculcated 
the idea of ―psychic trauma‖ (1996:76; cf. Freud 1917 / 1957; Freud 2005; 
―trauerarbeit‖ on the cover of William Kentridge: Black Box / Chambre Noir (2006); 
see Figure 6.2).  He is the one who introduced the concept of the repressed 
memory — a concept that has become entrenched in Western thought.  
Essentially, it was Freud who first recognised that forgotten / repressed trauma has 
a direct effect on an individual. 
 
Figure 6.2 William Kentridge Black Box / Chambre Noir (edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007a: front cover). 
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Ian Hacking highlighted the fact that ―trauma‖ until recently referred specifically to 
violence inflicted on the body (1996).  It is now believed that violence is also 
inflicted on the mind / self, creating invisible wounds.   
 
Every phylogenetic memory has its roots in a particular experience.  This memory 
of experience leaves a neurological trace in the brain.  Such neurological traces, if 
not occasionally recalled or re-enacted simply grow fainter over time.  In the cases 
where the opposite is true, the traces become entrenched in the individuals‘ neural 
pathways (Stone 2003:16).  (Return to Figure 5.19 through to Figure 5.23 in 
Chapter Five and look at the red and blue strata running through the brains drawn 
by Kentridge.  Those strata look as if they represent neural pathways that have 
become entrenched in the brain — physical traces of memories.)  Critics of this 
view argue that phylogenetic memory is not actually a memory because it does not 
reach the level of consciousness.  Allan Young argues that it does enter one‘s 
consciousness at every re-enactment and remembrance (1996).  Chapter Six 
focuses on trauma and the repression of trauma, as well as the concepts of the 
―unconscious‖ and screen memories as they relate to William Kentridge‘s Drawings 
for Projection series. 
 
The concept of traumatic memory has its roots in early 19th century Europe, its 
most famous proponent being Sigmund Freud, who said: ―psychic residue of past 
trauma is held to be at the root of present distress‖ (1899a:152).  Underlying the 
concept of ―traumatic memory‖ is the belief that the mind is filled with past 
memories / recollections too difficult or painful to acknowledge consciously.  They 
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remain buried in the unconscious, but seep out and manifest themselves as 
psychological problems such as depression and mood swings.  These symptoms, 
whatever they may be, are believed to represent or symbolise that past traumatic 
event.  The symptom then needs to be ―decoded‖ — often through the 
interpretation of dreams — just as Kentridge‘s works need to be interpreted.  It is 
important to decode these symbols in order to abreact the associated guilt or 
anger.   
 
Michael G. Kenny refers to the pathologies of the Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
(Post-Vietnam Syndrome): alcoholism, depression, crime, drug use, alienation 
(most apparent in Tide Table with Soho/Felix sitting alone at the beach) and 
nihilism (1995:159).  Wilbur Scott adds:  
Post-Vietnam Syndrome confronts us with the unconsummated grief of 
soldiers — impacted grief, in which an encapsulated, never-ending past 
deprives the present of meaning (1990:301).   
 
Closure needs to be reached, the past ―exorcised‖, mourning needs to take place, 
and the ―bio-psychological effects of trauma reversed or controlled‖ (Kenny 
1995:159).  This is not a fleeting war experience but a life / psyche changing 
situation that has been ―induced by the residue of acknowledged or covert 
traumatic memories‖ (Kenny 1995:159).  Kentridge has in a sense been able to 
exorcise his trauma and South Africa‘s collective trauma through the process of 
drawing or ―re-telling‖ in a manner similar to Freud‘s ―talking cure‖. 
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Psychoanalysts have acknowledged that traumatic memories are posited in such a 
manner that they ―retain their primordial emotional power long after the 
experiences which generated them‖ (Kenny 1995:160; cf. Freud 1899b).  
Sometimes, if the trauma is repetitive, those memories can become lodged in the 
unconscious.  ―It is as if time stops at the moment of trauma‖ (Herman 1992:37).  
When the trauma has been submerged in the unconscious, then the therapeutic 
ideal is to access these memories, bringing them into consciousness through 
―recreating the narrative flow of history‖, or the ―talking cure‖ of psychoanalysis 
(Kenny 1995:160).  The aim of ―exorcising‖ the past is so that individuals can live in 
the present and can finally distinguish between past experiences and present 
reality.  In the process of this excavation of old memories, linking them to the 
present, a new past / history is created.  It is now post post-apartheid.  Kentridge‘s 
works are a form of psychoanalysis / dream analysis — his work is symbolic and 
needs to be decoded.  For example FELIX is a reference to his mother‘s name, 
FELICIA.  However, he was unaware of the relationship until much later when he 
connected the two (Christov-Bakargiev 1999; Stone 2003). The chapter now 
focuses on ―trauma‖ and ―memories‖, the former being a foundation of Kentridge‘s 
works. 
 
6.2 Trauma and second witnessing 
For Holocaust survivors ―violence renders events ineradicable‖ (Kirmayer 
1996:174).  These victims are submerged in memories too terrifying to recall 
because of the pain of the recollection, with symptoms of alienation and 
desensitisation experienced by Holocaust survivors.  Laurence Kirmayer believes 
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that the hindrance Holocaust survivors face in recalling memories is the fact that 
they are limited by language — there are no appropriate words to describe the 
―incomprehensible catastrophe‖ that is the Holocaust (1996:175).   
 
Memories are often referred to as photographs, but Kirmayer believes that this is 
incorrect; memories are rather ―a road full of potholes, badly in need of repair, 
worked on day and night by revisionist crews‖ (1996:176).  Memories are re-
constructed and details are recreated, individuals ―readily engage in imaginative 
elaboration and confabulation‖ and as soon as this happens the ―memory is lost 
forever within the animated story we have constructed‖ (1996:176).  To reiterate, 
―[M]emories are narrative reconstructions‖ (Kirmayer 1996:182).  The extreme 
violence, degradation, humiliation and abuse that Holocaust victims endured, 
render the idea of social, or individual (of the self) cohesion impossible.  The self 
becomes detached / split from the self and from others.   
 
Even secondary witnesses (―postmemory/ies‖), although physically and 
generationally removed from the scene of the violence, through testimonies and 
stories experience empathetic trauma that affects their social reality and intrudes 
on their daily lives.  This splitting of the self occurs when there is a self at the site of 
trauma — concentration camps and death camps, for example — and a second 
self in the present.  They are two distinct selves and live in different worlds, but 
they are perpetuated and connected through the individual‘s pain and the collective 
memory of the public. In the film Stereoscope the splitting of Soho/Felix in two 
could be a direct reference to Kentridge himself.  In a sense he is split into two — 
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he has his artist‘s life (an opulent life, with premieres in countries around the world, 
and the high accolades that he continuously gets) and work, but he is also a 
husband, and father to three children, who does car pool in the mornings.  In 
WEIGHING .... and WANTING this is alluded to with the incorporation of 
Kentridge‘s wife, Anne. That he has an ordinary life outside of this self- flagellating 
never-ending narrative of guilt, responsibility and utter bleakness that is his South 
African heritage as a middle class citizen, is remarkable.  Will Kentridge ever 
forgive himself for his ―role‖ in apartheid?  His tortured unconscious mind is laid 
bare for the entire world to see, heart-wrenching in its inability to gain closure.  
Kentridge seems to be struggling with the issue of white upper middle class guilt.  It 
is after all not a guilt that could come forward and be presented at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.  It is not a guilt borne of torture and heinous crimes, 
but a guilt of being born and bred within a sector of society that most profited from 
apartheid — the white upper middle class.  Kentridge appears to be struggling with 
this guilt — who to confess to?  What to confess for?  How does one exorcise this 
guilt?  If one did not partake directly in the violence of apartheid, why does one feel 
responsible?  How could most white people have been unaware of the atrocities 
carried out during apartheid in their name and in order to protect and preserve their 
lifestyle?  Where does guilt begin and where does it end?  The contradiction that 
Kentridge lives in his ancestral Houghton home and that he was born and brought 
up privileged is not lost on him.  His parents actively took part in anti-apartheid 
activities — but now that transition and transformation have taken place how do 
you atone for your ―guilt‖?  Where does a ―liberal‖ white play his/her part in the new 
South Africa?  The horrors of apartheid were just that — indescribably horrific — 
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and things were therefore clearly delineated back then.  The issues were as clear 
as black and white, or good versus evil.  Retrospectively, it was easy to take sides, 
and there were many instances where one could have made a difference, however 
small, and been part of something big — the eradication of apartheid.  Kentridge 
was involved in student anti-apartheid activities (Christov-Bakargiev 1998; 1999). 
But now, it is as if South Africa and South Africans have moved on, rebuilding their 
lives, taking on new issues and new, differently defined evils.  But for Kentridge it is 
as if he can never forgive himself for what has happened in the past — it is as if he 
is still that six year old boy who finds black and white photographs of the dead in 
his father‘s office.  He is still trying to come to terms with what he sees; he is trying 
to make sense of what he sees, and yet he is only six.  What can he do about it, 
and how can he make it right?   
The revulsion of the mines and the continuous recurrence of decapitated heads 
(see Figures 6.3 — 6.5) appear to allude to Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness 
(1975) — whose main character, Kurtz, has looked into darkness — and to 
Frederic Nietzsche's comment:  
[W]hoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not 
become a monster.  And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also 
looks into you (1979a:99).   
That Kentridge has ―looked‖ into the abyss, is obvious; that it has ―looked‖ back is 
as obvious.  One can question the darkness that resides in Kentridge‘s 
unconscious / psyche. Sometimes the odious images that he portrays seem to 
erupt from the psyche of a sociopath.  He seems ―obsessed‖ with death, dying and 
the final throes of those who have died violently.  There are no calm, easy deaths, 
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slipping quietly into oblivion.  That these disturbing images are acceptable or 
tolerable is only testament to the beauty with which he draws them.  That Kentridge 
is a soft spoken, middle-aged man living with his wife and children in suburbia is a 
huge contrast (contradiction even) to the images he unveils from his unconscious / 
conscious.  It is the author of this study‘s belief that drawing such disturbing, 
repugnant images Kentridge‘s is a form of psychoanalysis, his catharsis.  Viewing 
them is just as cathartic. 
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Figure 6.3 Drawing from Mine (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:120). 
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Figure 6.4 Screenshot from History of the Main Complaint (Cameron, Christov-
Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:92). 
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Figure 6.5 Drawing from Mine (Godby 1992:unpaginated). 
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Although Laurence Kirmayer claims that memories are narrative reconstructions, 
he admits that narratives cannot enclose traumatic experiences (1996:186; cf. 
Greenspan 1992:148).  There is a direct link between Holocaust references and 
South Africa.  Firstly, William Kentridge is South African, and South Africa‘s 
traumatic past is that of apartheid.  Secondly, he is of Jewish descent (as 
mentioned earlier on in this chapter), his ancestral past links directly to that of the 
Holocaust.  Thirdly, apartheid victims / survivors and Holocaust victims / survivors 
have to deal with similar concerns: responsibility; guilt; trauma; traumatic 
memories; memorialisation; forgiveness; et cetera. Holocaust survivors often claim 
that they died during this catastrophe, yet inexplicably remain alive — this sense of 
perpetual death and life coexist as their reality.  Henry Greenspan (1992) believes 
that all survivors should tell their stories — as the listeners bear witness, the 
conspiracy of silence is broken, and the story is given a social context, and in turn 
becomes shared or communal (public) history.  Revealing their personal atrocities, 
which others shared, together with whole communities that recognise the 
grotesqueries of the Holocaust, serves to maintain memory.  When the trauma 
experienced is that of a whole community, a public space can be created by the 
retelling — such was the aim of the TRC.  If these traumas are acknowledged by 
the whole community and become part of their identity then collective memory 
continues.  Individual stories of the atrocities are validated by this collective 
memory.  This is opposed to a private singular trauma that receives validation only 
through a retelling — but this act of retelling becomes an experience of reliving, 
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which is in itself traumatic, the past repeated.  Experiences of survivors of the 
Holocaust provide ―ineradicable memories‖ and endure an ―excess‖ of memories, 
whose stories serve to create and sustain collective memory / history (Kirmayer 
1996:190).  Forgetting and remembering are social acts.  With regard to the 
Holocaust ―recollection is based on the past context in which the story is historically 
rooted and the current context in which the story is retold‖ (Kirmayer 1996:191).  
Very often society refuses to bear witness, mainly for socio-political reasons.  
Victims‘ testimonies are viewed as threatening and confrontational — to the status 
quo, to a way of life.  W. G. Sebald attempts to shed ―some light on the way in 
which memory (individual, collective and cultural) deals with experiences 
exceeding what is tolerable‖ (2003:79).  However, the question of ―what is 
tolerable‖ is impossible to answer really, as it is relative.  Is Kentridge attempting to 
answer this question — does he push the boundaries?  It is the opinion of this 
study that Kentridge is indeed pushing the boundaries.   
 
W. G. Sebald, a German national, states that the nation‘s (Germany‘s) feelings of 
shared guilt prevented anyone (such as writers) from keeping the nation‘s 
collective memory alive.  After all who wants to be reminded of humiliating 
incidents such as at the Almarkt in Dresden. Here 6,865 corpses were burnt on 
pyres in February 1945 by a Schutzstaffel troop (Sebald 2003). For some 
individuals living in South Africa it is the same: who wants to remember one‘s 
passive acceptance of the apartheid regime and the benefits thereof?  Who wants 
to admit to heinous crimes against humanity?  When this denial of collective 
memories is prevalent, reparation is refused.  Once again, this is also dealt with in 
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WEIGHING ... and WANTING and History of the Main Complaint, as well as in 
Stereoscope.  In Felix in Exile, made in the period of drastic change in South Africa 
— from apartheid to democracy (1994 — 1996) — Kentridge highlights the 
importance of keeping collective memory alive.  He states that he was ―erecting a 
beacon against the process of forgetting the routes of our recent past‖ (cited in 
Boris 2001:33).  Laurence Kirmayer (1996:193) points out that memories are more 
powerful and striking when retold to a receptive audience.  Memories become 
easily accessible, wholly developed.  Once this is achieved, societies and 
communities must create cultural events to sustain and support these memories 
throughout time. Culture and history are not simply created by individuals but they 
themselves create individuals.  Robben Island, now a museum, is a famous 
cultural icon because it housed prisoner 46664: Nelson Mandela, former president 
of South Africa, former political activist, and former political prisoner.   
 
Phenomenological preservation of past states is mainly determined by history 
and/or an individual‘s perception of themselves within history, through individuals, 
places / sites and differing views of ethics and intentions (Bloch 1989a; Bloch 
1996: 217).  With regard to being in history, there is no one, singular way of looking 
to the past or the future. (See Chapter Eight which deals with memory, history, 
identity, time and space.) 
 
According to William Niederlander, a psychoanalyst, the worst kind of 
psychological burden rests on those who managed to escape death — survival 
guilt, for … ―[E]xistence prolonged beyond the experience of death has its affective 
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center in a sense of guilt, the guilt of the survivor  ...‖ (cited in Sebald 2003:163). 
(See Chapter Seven for more details on this.)  How ironic is it that it is not the 
Nazis that bear such guilt but the survivors, victims that carry an indelible ―deep 
scar left by the encounter with death in its most terrible forms‖ (cited in Sebald 
2003:163).  Once again there is a reference to the ineradicable — the leaving 
behind of a trace — of trauma — as Kentridge‘s works leave a trace of trauma in 
the form of a direct ―scar‖ — inerasable charcoal.  In the survivor‘s mind the stain / 
scar was a ―chronologically conditioned emgram of death‖ (cited in Sebald 
2003:164).  Niederlander found there to be many physical symptoms, along with 
the mental afflictions of the survivors: brain damage, sleep disorders, heart 
problems, and etcetera.  Jean Améry, a Holocaust survivor, believed that ―the 
discourse of suicide begins where psychology ends‖ and that it related specifically 
to ―pure negation‖ and ―the damnably unimaginable‖ (cited in Sebald 2003:164).  
Jean Améry committed suicide many decades later.   
 
6.3 Memory and dreams 
Sigmund Freud‘s psychoanalytic theory is based on the idea / concept of the  
unconscious and infantile sexuality.  Freud‘s interest in this theory began with the 
diagnosis and treatment of hysteria.  Freud claimed that the hysterical symptom is 
caused directly by the ―repressed‖ memory of something too disturbing to be 
allowed into the conscious realm (memories that are too: shameful; exciting; 
frightening).  His aim was to recover this lost memory / event, either through 
hypnosis or free association, once the memory / event is recovered it gets restored 
to conscious memory; thereby liquidating the symptom that had usurped  its place. 
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This would afford the individual ―closure‖ (Freud 1899b / 1962; 1900 / 1991a; 1915 
/ 1991b; cf.  Rycroft 1972).  Kentridge has created a name for the artistic process 
that he enacts — a process between rationality and chance.  Kentridge dubs this 
process ―fortuna‖, and it involves the coherence or coming together of differing 
ideas, emotions, images — not all that make sense immediately — either to 
himself or to others (cited in Boris 2001:35).   
 
According to Jennifer Arlene Stone (2003:16), Freud  
would have objected to the materialization of a cure through inappropriate 
traumatic means, instead of the deliberate and careful procedures of the 
transference and ‗talking cure‘‖ for very obvious reasons: traumatising an 
individual is not the aim here.1   
 
 
Another way of gaining access to the unconscious is through the interpretation of 
dreams.   Jennifer Arlene Stone sums it up thus: ―... the unconscious in dreams 
portrays a three dimensional image of the mind‘s eye‖ (2003:17).  Interpretation in 
psychoanalysis gained prominence when the memory or the real event came to be 
replaced by the fantasy of the forbidden wish.  Psychoanalytic dreams are 
perceived as being an hallucinatory fulfillment of a wish, but a wish that is 
deplorable to the conscious mind of the subject who wishes / dreams.  Where this 
wish gains entry into a subject‘s consciousness it does so in a ―compromise 
                                                          
1
 Remarkably, the field of neuroscience has studied the neural pathways and their results support 
the fact that the ―talking cure‖ therapy, over time and with perseverance, does eventually change 
the physical structure of the brain circuitry / synapses by establishing new neural systems that 
override the neural pathways that usually make the ―wrong‖ connections. This results in therapeutic 
change (Stone 2003:16). There is therefore scientific proof that psychoanalysis does have an effect 
on some individuals.  
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formation‖ that is the outcome of conflict / variance (Freud 1899b; cf. Freud 1991a 
and 1991b).  ―The manifest dream, therefore, is a transformation of the latent 
content in the service of the defense‖ (Burgin 1996:205).  This theory applies to the 
analysis of an array of symptoms, parapraxes and other manifestations of speech 
and behaviour which suggest defensive conflict — defensive mechanisms such as: 
repression, negation, projection, disavowal, foreclosure.  With regards to all 
defense / conflict mechanisms, interpretation is the means / method by which latent 
/ covert meanings are derived from manifest content. Kentridge‘s works can be 
viewed as dreamlike.  It is almost as if his unconscious is trying to deal with the 
horrors of apartheid and in so doing his work is a window into his unconscious or 
dreams — his dreams are nightmares of torture and death (see Figure 6.6 and 
Figure 6.7). 
 
 Figure 6.6 Drawing from Faustus in Africa! (Christov-Bakargiev 1999:21). 
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Figure 6.7 Drawing from Faustus in Africa! (Christov-Bakargiev 1999:21). 
 
In Freud‘s book, The Interpretation of Dreams (1991a / 1900), he postulates two 
methods of interpretation.  The first is the analysis or interpretation of dream 
elements — a method which he tested on his own dreams at first — this 
interpretative method consists in following the chains of association of the dreamer.  
In this method, the dreamer himself/herself interprets his/her dreams — the latent 
meanings of a manifest element are uncovered indirectly, through webs of 
associations governed by the ―primary processes‖ of unconscious formation: 
condensation; displacement; and ―conditions of representability‖ (Burgin 1996:205).  
Kentridge has purged his unconscious / conscious of horrendous ―memories / 
postmemories‖ — and placed them into an acceptable form — one that is 
―representable‖ / tolerable to draw / view.  However, some individuals might 
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disagree that it is in an acceptable form, because some of the images themselves 
are disturbing.    
 
The second method of interpretation of dreams is carried out not by the dreamer 
him/herself, but by the analyst, where certain symbols are translated on the basis 
of knowledge of typical symbols.  Freud noted that these invariant symbols are 
found in dreams, as well as folktales, myths, religion, and cultural spheres (1991a / 
1900).  Freud only focused on what the symbol meant to the individual in analysis.  
This meaning was only uncovered over a period of some time, contextualised 
within the other materials produced in analysis. 
 
There is a distinction between processes and contents.  Freud named the 
combinatory logics, such as displacement and condensation, ―primary processes‖ 
(1991a).  These processes completely rule / govern the construction of 
unconscious practices / productions.  Freud also distinguishes between descriptive 
unconscious and the topological unconscious.  The former is a generalised use of 
all instances of representations not present to consciousness, this therefore means 
that it includes ―preconscious‖ representations (―conscious-preconscious system‖) 
(Burgin 1996:209).  The topological unconscious refers to representations that are 
barred to the realm of consciousness through the mechanisms of defence.  There 
are obviously memories and different experiences that William Kentridge is not 
allowing us to see. 
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Interpretation of the unconscious is the posing of questions and the creation of 
knowledge in the very process of reading itself: a knowledge of the reader and the 
text.  Kentridge proposes questions and challenges the viewer.  He has clearly 
stated that Felix in Exile specifically questions ―the way in which people who had 
died on the journey to this new dispensation would be remembered‖ (cited in Boris 
2001:32).  Shoshana Felman writes that the psychoanalytic meaning is ―essentially 
the reading of a difference that inhabits language, a kind of mapping in the 
subject‘s discourse of its points of disagreement with, or difference from, itself‖ 
(1987:21-22; cf. Felman 2003).  Furthermore:   
[T]he unconscious … is not simply that which must be read but also, and 
perhaps primarily, that which reads.  The unconscious is a reader.  What 
this implies most radically is that whoever reads, interprets out of his 
unconscious, is an analysand, even when the interpretation is done from the 
position of the analyst (Felman 1987:21-22).   
 
In recognising the ―individual‖ dimension of reading, a hypothesis of general, 
unconsciously generated meaning may be arrived at — simply ―because the 
subject of individual biography is not socially unique‖ (Burgin 1996: 211). 
 
In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud distinctly states that memory and fantasy 
can no longer be definitively disassociated (1991a / 1900).  Moreover he states: 
―the way in which memory behaves in dreams is undoubtedly of the greatest 
importance for any theory of memory in general‖ (1991a:4, 20; cf. Freud 1900). In 
his essay A Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad, Freud returned to the idea that 
―even the most insignificant sensory impression leaves an unalterable trace, ever 
available for resurrection‖ (cited in Burgin 1996:217).  His aim in the essay was to 
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find a place for memory in the representation of the ―first topology‖ — the 
conscious, the preconscious and the unconscious.  The ―mystic writing pad‖ 
analogy aims to institute differences of topological location within memory (Burgin 
1996:217).  Not only do Kentridge‘s works from his films contain faint traces of 
charcoal, but they are also forever preserved on celluloid.   
 
Memory is not based in the conscious realm — because if it were, the system of 
perception-consciousness would be overcome by the sheer multitude of fresh 
impressions.  All memory is unconscious — descriptively speaking.   In the 
topological sense, memory is based in the preconscious.  With regards to 
Kentridge‘s work, there is the ―installation‖ series, called Sleeping on Glass (1991), 
which was made in accompaniment to the film Stereoscope. The exhibit 
highlighted Kentridge‘s ―obsession‖ with memory, mirroring and dreams. His aim 
with regard to this series was to create a three-dimensional depth of theatre, life 
and cinema.  He created a series of small installations — animated films that 
change rather dramatically into ―objects‖ and ―interiors‖ — such as bits of furniture.  
They are cohesive, yet very different, combined / morphing sculptures and 
animated films. In the Sleeping on Glass series a separate set of ink etchings 
appears alongside the exhibit (see Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9).  These drawings 
give direct examples of free association as Freud intended. The etchings are 
drawn onto torn out pages from old books, yellowing with age.  The images are in 
pencil and aquatint, but the words are in red pastel.   
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Figure 6.8 An exhibit from the Sleeping on Glass installation (Christov-Bakargiev 
1999:81). 
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Figure 6.9 An exhibit from the Sleeping on Glass installation (Christov-Bakargiev 
1999:81).  
 
It is an absolutely absurd, but fascinating notion: what would it really be like to 
sleep on glass? What if the glass cracks, breaks; sleeping on glass would render it 
unreliable. It also refers to the fragility of memory.  Glass is fragile — cracks and 
breakage are almost unavoidable.  Yet, even without direct breaking, glass over 
time gets fine cracks — and is unsustainable in the long run — so too is memory.  
Glass is also reflective and reflexive, transparent and translucent / opaque as are 
some memories. This implies a contradiction of sorts, and memory too can be 
contradictory, as can dreams.  Reflexivity is a reflection, an image produced by 
reflection, or a mirroring. Mirrors are made of glass and so are lenses / eye-
glasses, which implies looking / seeing into the mind of the unconscious.  It is also 
a reference to self-reflexivity, looking into a mirror, looking into one‘s own 
unconscious, interpreting one‘s own dreams (being an analysand). The self-
reflexive / recursive aspect of mirroring / glass is evident in Kentridge‘s works. The 
audience is allowed to view an aspect of themselves — that is, in an act of turning 
back upon itself by which a subject grasps, in a moment of intellectual clarity, that 
which it is normally blind to perceiving — in this instance,  his/her humanity 
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(Ricouer 1974). Kentridge does this by asking one to question one‘s societal 
values and by emphatically foregrounding the awfulness that humanity can commit 
and the atrocities that they / one ―allow‖ humanity to commit — apartheid, ethnic 
cleansing and genocide.  Kentridge questions societal values quite clearly in 
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, where he presents Soho Eckstein as 
valuing his businesses and properties and acquisitions more than he values his 
wife. While he busily buys up half of Johannesburg, he neglects his wife who then 
has an affair with Felix Teitlebaum.  He realises his loss in Sobriety, Obesity & 
Growing Old, where he then places value on his personal life.  Soho Eckstein‘s 
alienation and loneliness is made apparent during a scene where he lies in his bed, 
his arm stretched over to the side where one assumes Mrs. Eckstein used to sleep, 
with only his cat for company.  Kentridge also places value on marital harmony in 
WEIGHING ... and WANTING where he emphasises the importance of having a 
partner over material possessions.  He also questions a society that places value 
on all acquisitions — taking pleasure in the buying or owning of artefacts, rather 
than taking pleasure in the artefact itself.  For example in Mine, Soho Eckstein 
excavates or acquires a piece of art, a Nigerian bust, but it is just one of his 
possessions among many — on a scene on his bed-turned-office, he has that 
specific art piece strewn across his bed, along with accounting printouts, 
dismembered heads and of course, the rhinoceros.  The rhinoceros on its own 
questions societal values — a belief that nature can be bought and controlled 
rather than simply enjoyed at a distance and not as a product or possession.  With 
regards to forcing the viewer to ―see‖ human rights violations — apartheid behind 
the veneer — the exposing of police and state brutality (Ubu and the Truth 
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Commission, Stereoscope and History of the Main Complaint), Kentridge depicts 
ethnic cleansing and genocide in Africa.  In Felix in Exile, the numerous dead 
bodies show the terrible results of genocide (also apparent in the play Faustus in 
Africa!).  Once again, the images of the dead could be from any country in Africa 
where war or civil unrest has taken place, such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Rwanda or Somalia.  Kentridge implies that society, as a whole, has turned 
/ turns a blind eye to what has gone on / is going on in cases of civil war / strife / 
ethnic cleansing. He further implies that through this passivity, that is, not saying 
anything about what is occurring / what has occurred, society condones such 
actions.  Through this complacency / passivity society condones those abhorrent 
occurrences.  While there are many human rights organisations and there were 
anti-apartheid movements, the majority of white people during the apartheid era 
and the world in general, were / are in denial about human rights abuses.  He 
makes the viewer aware of his/her own shortcomings, by providing the audience, 
to borrow Jean Baudrillard‘s terminology, with reference to the ―more-real-than 
real‖, or more ―visible-than-visible‖ images (cited in Kellner 1989b).  He shows us 
the consequences of apartheid — mutilated and broken bodies — in Felix in Exile 
and History of the Main Complaint. 
 
With regards to glass and mirrors: Kentridge‘s films contain many instances of 
mirrors / ―mirroring‖, most especially in Felix in Exile, History of the Main 
Complaint, and Stereoscope. In the first film, he repeatedly looks into a mirror, 
initially seeing himself peering back at himself, but after a few shots he sees an 
unnamed black woman reflecting back at him (referred to by Kentridge as ―Nandi‖, 
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cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:12).  In History of the Main Complaint, Soho/Felix 
looks at his rear-view mirror again and again — sometimes it is a close-up of his 
eyes only, and other times images of apartheid South Africa go by — the images / 
memories that came to be known and validated through the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.  With regard to the concept of narcissistic doubling / 
mirroring is the fact that Kentridge uses his own image as the image for Soho/Felix.  
Kentridge has expressly stated that he uses himself as a model simply because he 
needs a model whenever he works and the easiest solution was to make himself 
the model, rather than have someone on call, therefore Soho/Felix only resembles 
Kentridge.  One can question this pragmatic ―alibi‖ and in doing so further question 
the status of his claims about his own work.  Is one getting too close to the ‗real‘ 
Kentridge — is his alibi a defence mechanism?  Which leads one to presume that 
he is hiding something / someone (himself?)? If so, why? If it can be argued that 
his work lays bare his unconscious for the world to see, why is he now putting a 
barrier / boundary in place? 
 
Returning to the Sleeping on Glass artwork, this was an art exhibition on memory 
which was held at the Villa Medici, in Rome, where Kentridge exhibited these 
―installations‖ (Alemani 2006). The object / furniture-transformed sculptures 
featured as a rear-projection screen onto which the animated images of Sleeping 
on Glass were projected.  Sleeping on Glass is revealing of Kentridge‘s interest / 
state of mind — these transitory images represent the constant transitory nature of 
memory and dreams.  His work suggests the dreamlike quality of our thoughts and 
of the devices that make memory and dreams achievable / attainable and 
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imaginable.  The etchings are of: two women (Figure 6.10); tea cups (another 
reference to glass / porcelain) (Figure 6.11); landscaped gardens (Figure 6.12); 
mines (Figure 6.13); and trees (one whole (Figure 6.14); one broken in two (Figure 
6.15)).   
 
Collective memories are represented by the glass, while the individual is 
represented by the inferred sleeper / dreamer.  By association — he implies he 
dreams of the memories of the collective — these are the South African peoples.  
There is the same notion as found in Stereoscope, that is, the individual and the 
collective coming together as one (Soho Eckstein and Felix Teitlebaum), yet 
remaining in an unnatural state of cohesion. 
 
Dissecting the title ―Sleeping on Glass” provides further insight into Kentridge‘s 
obsession with memory. Glass not only breaks but it cuts and slices too.  It can 
break / crack easily and in this sense it is fragile.  It is also hard / resistant and if 
not handled with care, dangerous, and can even be used as a weapon.  All of this 
alludes to memory. Memories can resurface previous trauma. Memories can seem 
to be hard in that they are impenetrable / immovable, yet when confronted, cracks 
often appear.  Of course it is the word ―sleeping‖ in the title that refers to dreams — 
everyone dreams when they sleep.  It can also refer to poetic death (another 
reference to death) — a sleep-like quality, a ―somnambulance‖. Ironically, Nandi 
and other apartheid victims in Felix in Exile are given certain serenity in their faces; 
it is almost as though they are sleeping. With sleep, there is an immediate reversal 
of the state of natural unconsciousness once awakened.  Sleep can be restorative / 
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reparative both physically and mentally — it really is an astonishing thing — all that 
goes on while you are dreaming. 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Sleeping on Glass (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:134-
135).  
 
The images of Sleeping on Glass require deeper analysis.  With regard to Figure 
6.10:  there are images of two (―identical‖) women sitting in a chair, naked and with 
slumped shoulders, leaning slightly forward.  The writing set in these double-paged 
pictures is different to the rest — it appears handwritten, certainly in a script.  The 
words in red pastel are: ―ADAPTABILITY‖, ―COMPLIANCE‖ and then in a much 
larger size, ―SILENCE‖ (perhaps a reference to the personal).  Red pastel is 
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usually associated with danger and anger — both appropriate and commonly felt in 
South Africa.  South Africa is a very dangerous country to be in and there is an 
ongoing and ever growing anger that democracy (it is post-1994) has not delivered 
what it was supposed to deliver.  There is also anger at having constantly to fear 
for your life, because of the high level of violent crime.  The nakedness of the 
figures represents vulnerability, of being at the mercy of South Africa and its 
politics and its constant violence.  The images represent degrees of surrender, 
from least to greatest. 
 
Figure 6.11 Sleeping on Glass (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:134-
135). 
 
Figure 6.11 has drawings of ―identical‖ tea cups on yellow / faded typical typeset 
text.  The words:  ―PANIC‖ and ―PICNIC‖, are written above the teacups.  ―Panic‖ is 
William Kentridge: Chapter Six: Memory, “the Unconscious” and trauma 
 
190 | P a g e  
 
a direct reference to danger, while ―picnic‖ is a direct reference to domesticity, 
which conjures up the idea of gorgeous, lazy ―somnambulant‖ Sunday afternoons, 
spent out in the Botanical gardens, surrounded by loved ones. This of course is 
almost impossible to do today — one is too scared of becoming another crime 
statistic — it is simply too dangerous (the words are easily an example of free 
association). There is the negative reversal of picnic — as in ―living in South Africa 
is no picnic‖.  The words, panic and picnic, in meaning are in direct opposition to 
one another. This is a ―doublethink‖ of white South Africa — a privileged life 
underscored by fear because of the violent crimes being committed on a daily 
basis.  There is a reference to china, a substance similar to glass, which in turn is a 
reference to memories.  Perhaps this too is a longing for the past, as with Figure 
6.12.  The cups are not identical — this too refers to memories — because our 
memories are ―memories of memories‖, and can never be recalled exactly / 
identically, and they are only representations or reflections (which is another 
reference to glass).  They also represent domesticity (as in Stereoscope), the 
safety and warmth that your home represents to you; yet the teacups are empty, 
which is a symbol of negativity. Teacups feature often in his films, from WEIGHING 
… and WANTING, to Mine and as already mentioned, Stereoscope. 
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Figure 6.12 Sleeping on Glass (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:134-
135).  
 
In Figure 6.12 the background text is in ordinary typeset text.  The drawing is of a 
beautiful landscaped garden.  There is some indecipherable handwriting on it, 
which appears in turn to be half-erased.  The drawing differs from the other 
etchings in that this indecipherable hand-writing is separate from the drawing of 
trees and hedges. Once again there is very obvious erasure, with indelible 
smudges, and marks in pencil.  These of course, are his trademark / iconic 
reference to memory.  The words in red pastel are: ―STAYING HOME‖.  It possibly 
refers to the avoiding of the political reality existing in South Africa, and fear of 
violence outside the home. ―Home‖ represents warmth, safety, order (the trees and 
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hedges are very precisely pruned / cut).  The fact that there are rubbings out is 
perhaps a memory of times before democracy, when things were safer for middle-
class whites.  These are high-maintenance suburban gardens, which indicate that 
they are expensive to maintain and are only affordable to those whose earnings 
are high. This is possibly another reference to it being a memory of a previous era, 
because during apartheid only whites were allowed to live in suburbia.  The 
suburbs were completely closed off to black South Africans unless they worked as 
labourers, or domestic workers. They not only were not allowed to own property 
during the apartheid era, but, given their poverty; they certainly were not able to 
buy property that was expensive.  Of course ―staying home‖ could also refer to the 
issue of emigration.  This is a fascinating question to pose to Kentridge considering 
that he is enamoured with Johannesburg, a captive captivated by the city 
(Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris) — could he emigrate? These 
portrayals seem to represent Kentridge‘s internal conflict as to whether or not he 
could, or would ever consider emigrating. 
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Figure 6.13 Sleeping on Glass (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:134-
135). 
 
Figure 6.13 consists of design drawings / architect‘s drawings of proposed 
buildings or mines to be built on untouched/virgin landscapes / mounds of ground.  
The water below is in blue pastel. The water in the one drawing reflects another 
image that is different to the one that it should be reflecting.  Once again this 
implies a split, and is a reference to the reflexivity of glass.  But it is also a 
reference again to ―doublethink‖, because one has to look quite carefully to see 
that the images are different to each other.  You may not expect the reflection to be 
―identical‖, but at least to ―mirror‖ the image above it.  The second mound has no 
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reflection at all, it is only water — this refers to unobtainable / repressed memories.  
There is a pun of ―safer tropics‖ — avoiding the political reality of South Africa — a 
reference to South Africa being near the tropics, a free-association would be 
―topics‖.  Safer topics would refer to the fact that violence, crime and political 
uncertainty are the hot topics of all South African conversations — which in turn 
would be a re-reference to ―tropics‖ as they are known to be climactically hot. 
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Figure 6.14 and Figure 6.15 Sleeping on Glass (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and 
Cameron 2001:134-135).  
 
With regard to Figure 6.14:  there is a beautiful lush big tree drawn over typeset 
text.   The words written in red pastel are: ―THIS IS HOW THE TREE BREAKS‖.  
This implies a promise, a premonition, a prophecy; a bad dream experienced; a 
promise of peace / democracy broken, because Figure 6.15 shows the tree split in 
two (broken).  This is a fulfillment of that prophecy: and again implies a reflection / 
mirroring, a splitting in two, the individual versus the collective, a looking forward in 
time.  The words in Figure 6.15 are: ―TERMINAL HURT‖ and ―TERMINAL 
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LONGING‖: a longing for the past, memories of yesteryear where everything was 
whole, complete; a longing for peace and tranquility.  ―Terminal‖ also refers to 
―fatalistic‖ — is Kentridge fatalistic about South Africa, its people and its politics?  Is 
he prophesising the ―death‖ of an ever-elusive democracy?  Is he resigned to a 
post post-apartheid that is riddled with fear, angst, never-ending existential 
questions about being South African, corruption and emotionally bankrupt 
politicians?  The word ―hurt‖ refers of course to both physiological as well as 
psychical hurt / trauma, which are major themes in the Drawings for Projection 
series of films, both in terms of experiencing trauma and exorcising the trauma, 
both of the individual and of the collective. 
 
All of these etchings deal with mirroring and ―identical‖ reproductions / ―realistic‖ 
interpretations.  These works are palimpsests, literally drawn on text, and are 
polysemic.  Until now the concept of ―screen memories‖ has only been mentioned 
in passing.  This section allows for a more in-depth look at the concept. 
 
6.4 Screen memories Part II 
Sigmund Freud introduced the concept of ―screen memories‖ in 1899 (1899b).  A 
screen memory is ―one that comes to mind in the place of, and in order to conceal, 
an associated but repressed memory‖ (Burgin 1996:221; cf. Freud 1899b).  The 
screen memory, discussed by Freud early on in his career, is specifically an earlier 
memory that screens a later event.  Freud writes that there is a ―retroactive‖ 
chronological relation between the screen memory and the repressed memory / 
content (cited in Burgin 1996:221-222).  In later publications Freud suggests that it 
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is more often an opposite relation: ―an indifferent impression of recent dates 
establishes itself in the memory as a screen memory‖ (1899b:44), and it is the 
earlier memory that disappears behind it.  Freud also identifies a third type of 
screen memory ―in which the screen memory is connected with the impression that 
it screens not only by its content but also by contiguity in time:  these are 
contemporary or contiguous screen memories‖ (1899b:44).   
 
Freud claims that it is characteristic of one‘s memory that the reproduction of one‘s 
life as a connected chain of events begins only from one‘s sixth or seventh birthday 
onwards — often even only at age ten and upwards2.  Memories of incidents prior 
to these years are fragmentary and unrelated — disjointed, and they very seldom 
yield any important / significant events.  However, one‘s earliest memories are the 
most vivid in sensory intensity, which one‘s most recent memories tend to lack.  
Freud emphasises three important points:  
the agency of sexuality in the formation of screen memories, the role of 
language – ―verbal bridges‖ – in the construction of mental images and the 
role of fantasy in the (re)construction of our memories (cited in Burgin 
1996:223; cf. Freud 1899b).  
 
In 1899 Freud wrote in his essay Screen Memories, wherein he suggests:   
[I]t may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all from 
our childhood: memories relating to our childhood may be all that we 
possess.  Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they 
were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories were 
aroused.  In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as 
people are accustomed to say, emerge; they were formed at that time.  And 
a number of motives, with no concern for historical accuracy, had a part in 
                                                          
2
 Keep in mind Kentridge‘s excursion into his fathers‘ study at age six — and the shock and horror 
cemented to his psyche upon seeing photographs of Sharpeville victims.   
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forming them, as well as in the selection of the memories themselves 
(1899b:322).   
 
In addition, Freud suggests that the ―dream work‖ ignores waking logic, ―replacing 
disjunction with conjunction, ―or‖ with ―and‖‖ (cited in Burgin 1996:265).  This too 
adds a hallucinatory / illusionary feel to dreams / dreaming. 
 
Kentridge‘s works in a sense relate directly to Freud‘s ideas of ―screen memories‖.  
As is distinctive of Kentridge‘s works, everything is layered, each previous layer 
―forgotten‖ by the inclusion of a new layer.  This layering, or "accumulated 
progress", as defined by Marshall Deutelbaum (1989), is according to the author of 
this dissertation, evident in Kentridge‘s drawing technique: where one drawing is 
layered upon another and meanings are layered upon one another. Each layer 
changes the meaning of the last layer, and prevents it from being seen.  In 
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, for example, in one scene, Mrs. 
Eckstein is holding a towel, the drawings are slowly changed and the towel 
becomes a fish.  The first image is completely different to the second image — 
meanings are layered like sediments of sand, or are ―archaeological‖ as Freud 
suggests3.  The first image, of Mrs. Eckstein swathed in a towel, could mean 
anything from  her intending to take a bath, or going swimming, the second 
meaning, derived from the towel turning into a fish, a more obscure meaning, could 
be her affiliation with nature.  In Mine, Kentridge introduces a coffee plunger that 
literally plunges below the image of Soho Eckstein in his bed, through the bed and 
linen, to below the earth, turning into a lift shaft as it continues to plunge into the 
                                                          
3
 See section three of Chapter Five. 
William Kentridge: Chapter Six: Memory, “the Unconscious” and trauma 
 
199 | P a g e  
 
depths of a mine.  In the first instance, the coffee plunger is just that, a coffee 
maker used by the middle or upper-middle classes to brew fine, expensive coffee, 
but then the coffee maker turns into a mine shaft, taking working class, and poor 
miners into their dank, dark work place.  The drawings evolve to have different 
meanings, the most obvious of which is the upper level.  This comprises Soho‘s 
luxurious bed, which is equated with wealth and comfort, and is literally the upper-
class or upper stratum of society.  While the lower level, that consisting of mines 
and mine workers, is the lower class or stratum of society.  Yet the two strata are 
distinctly connected by the drawing of the coffer-plunger becoming the shaft.  Or it 
could have quite a different meaning, with the plunger plunging deep into the 
recesses of Kentridge‘s unconscious.  Kentridge himself has referred to this 
―layering‖.  He refers to his drawings as  
an Archimboldo thing, you take a whole range of different items and put 
them together and you see what creature is there. ... I think that within 
drawing there is the potential of complete radical change of meaning 
halfway through ... for hints of meaning to start emerging, at the side, that 
are vaguely there, then to suddenly push them into the foreground, which 
corresponds much more to the way one understands the world...  Well one 
makes sense of any situation, picking up clues at the sides and bits of 
information and forcing that into a realization or understanding or some 
meaning (Kentridge cited in Kapitza-Meyer 1994:97).   
 
Kentridge‘s drawings then are a means of his trying ―to come to terms with reality‖ 
(Kentridge cited in Kapitza-Meyer 1994:97). 
 
Sigmund Freud also came to the realisation that a repressed memory of something 
that did not actually occur is as damaging as the repressed fantasy of something 
that did happen (1899a and 1899b).  Ruth Leys agrees, viewing memory in terms 
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of ―psychological space,‖ which emphasises Freud‘s point of view that ―‗emotional 
memories‘ may not be memories at all‖ (1994:623; cf. Leys 1996 and 2000).  ―The 
ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself 
the projection of a surface‖ (Freud 1923:1-66).  Memories might indeed be 
fabrications, however psychosomatic symptoms are still experienced as real:  
[T]he ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly those 
springing from the surface of the body.  It may thus be regarded as a mental 
projection of the surface of the body, besides as we have seen above, 
representing the superficies of the body … (Freud 1927:147-158). 
 
Jennifer Arlene Stone extrapolates:  ―The ego, for Freudians, is an accumulation of 
losses, of abandoned object choices whose failure in our lives overrides the 
psyche‖ (2003:7).  This ―loss‖ is experienced at the very beginning of life, when the 
newborn baby starts to nurse; s/he licks his/her lips when satiated, repetitiously, 
through separation and satisfaction.  However, after time, desire or eroticism takes 
its place (Stone 2003).  As psychologist K. R. Eissler observed in his earliest 
writings: ―unassuagable yearnings shape our demand beyond satisfaction‖ (cited in 
Stone 2003:7). 
 
―Body ego‖ is Sigmund Freud‘s curious term for a speculation — how best to 
conceive the interface between body and mind?  Ontological dilemmas of psyche 
and soma beset René Descartes‘ dreams (1984 / 1912 (original 1637)): ―I think 
therefore I am‖ (―cogito ergo sum‖) becomes the psychoanalytic trope of above and 
below, conscious and unconscious of ―I dream therefore I am‖. Just as Freud later 
responds with ―dismay‖ in his 1929 letter to Maxime Leroy in which he explains that 
Descartes‘ ―dreams from above‖ are close to the dreamer‘s conscious thoughts 
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and that ―there then remain certain parts of the dream about which the dreamer 
does not know what to say: and these are precisely the parts which belong to the 
unconscious and which are in many respects the most interesting‖ (Stone 2003:26-
27).  Freud regrets that he can achieve only ―meagre results‖ without being able to 
obtain from the historical dreamer any indications for ―in the most favourable cases 
we explain the unconscious [part] with the help of the ideas below,‖ such as the 
―bizarre‖ and ―absurd‖ element of ―a melon from a foreign land,‖ which might stand 
for a sexual picture but remains inexplicable without the individual‘s / dreamer‘s 
associations (Stone 2003:26-27).  
 
Kentridge‘s works are absurd, fantastical, intertexual — he mixes the ordinary with 
the unlikely / strange. For example in Mine there is a scene with Soho Eckstein 
sleeping peacefully in his bed and on the covers there is a wheel-barrow containing 
an image of a decapitated head; or him playing with a rhinoceros on his bed. Other 
works of his are also absurd in their content: Kentridge "puts forward the 
unpresentable in presentation" (Lyotard 1990:29; cf. Lyotard 2003).  Kentridge‘s 
films mix the ―unpresentable‖ — brutality and the macabre / grotesque — with the 
―presentable‖, that is, the commonplace, such as cars and beds and coffee 
plungers.  The violence exhibited in Kentridge‘s work is not gratuitous or 
exploitative, not ―pornographic‖.  It is however, graphically gory and very disturbing.  
It is visually both aesthetically pleasing and brutal.  The images of people and 
animals brutalised and hung up in Faustus in Africa! and Ubu and the Truth 
Commission, and more recently in the Black Box / Chambre Noir are obscene in 
their transparency, detail and visibility — they are the "more-visible-than-visible" 
William Kentridge: Chapter Six: Memory, “the Unconscious” and trauma 
 
202 | P a g e  
 
(Baudrillard cited in Kellner 1989:72).  For example, in History of the Main 
Complaint Soho/Felix‘s physiological body is presented as ―more-visible-than-
visible‖ because the X-rays reveal not body parts, but telephones, and other 
machinery.  Also, in Ubu and the Truth Commission the background images of 
police torture are simultaneously both beautiful and heinous; while the death throes 
of the female protagonist in Felix in Exile are gracefully balletic, shocking and 
exquisite.  The other bodies in Felix in Exile are Christ-like — with open wounds 
weeping blood from their sides, wrists and heads.  The seeping blood into soil 
becomes an emblem of embeddedness, forever staining the land.  These 
juxtaposing images add to the hallucinatory feel of his works.  The juxtaposition of 
these images adds to the hallucinatory feel of his works as they are both surreal 
and dreamlike in their contradictions (see Figure 6.16 and Figure 6.17). 
  
Figure 6.16 Drawing from Mine (Godby 1992:unpaginated). 
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Figure 6.17 Drawing from Mine (Christov-Bakargiev 1999:65). 
 
For the author of this study, it is apparent that Kentridge‘s very process of making 
his films is a form of psychoanalysis in that it allows him to express his 
unconscious and to free associate. 
 
David Grossman, an Israeli author and lecturer, confronts one with the question of 
how the ―representation of a traumatic past forms personal and collective identity‖ 
(2002:42-50).  He asks how individuals / society can imagine or recollect a 
traumatic past that as individuals they have no first hand knowledge of, but that 
affects one daily, momentarily even (Grossman 2002:42-50)?   These questions in 
turn lead one to the idea of representation.  How are mass trauma and personal 
memory portrayed; and what is the relationship of imagination to history, if any 
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(Grossman 2002:42-50)?  All this in turn raises issues of authenticity, responsibility 
and authority.  
 
As Chapter Five was closed, attention was drawn to David Grossman‘s comment, 
―[I]f one forgets the past, then one is denying its existence and thereby desecrating 
the existence of the memory of others‘ — but being unable to forget the past runs 
the risk of being completely maimed by it‖ (Grossman 2002:157; Sicher 2004:268).  
David Grossman believes that the main character in See Under: Love, Momik, who 
is a second-generation child living under the shadow of the Holocaust, feels it is his 
duty to write ―his family‘s suppressed screams into a universal discourse of 
disaster‖ (Grossman 2002:45-46; Sicher 2004:269).  Can the same be said of 
Kentridge?  For the author of this thesis, based on his themes and portrayals in his 
films, it is clear that Kentridge does feel the heavy weight of bearing witness to the 
atrocities of apartheid / colonialisation / histories. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
William Kentridge‘s Drawings for Projection; art spiegelman‘s (sic) Maus Volume I 
and Volume II (1986 / 1991); Joe Kubert‘s Yossel — April 19, 1943 (2003); and, 
Pascal Croci‘s Auschwitz (2001); are narratives that challenge one to ―imagine the 
unimaginable through the artifice of art‖ (Sicher 2004:271).  According to Ephraim 
Sicher, one could claim that these artists present distinctive discourses that 
dismiss literary and artistic conventions, and that they also present ―an artistic 
vision in which history can be known through fiction and memory can be recovered 
through fantasy‖ (Sicher 2004:271; cf. Grossman 1989; Grossman 2002).   
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While spiegelman (sic), Kubert, and Croci focus on the Holocaust, this observation 
by Ephraim Sicher is appropriate to describe William Kentridge‘s artistic 
endeavors.  However, the questions of representation, aesthetics, ethics and 
memory remain, and Chapter Seven focuses on these questions by drawing on the 
works mentioned above, as well as others.  
 
To end this chapter, a rather poetic, but apt, description of ―memory‖ is quoted from 
novelist Salman Rushdie:  
‗I told you the Truth,‘ I say yet again, ‗memory‘s truth, because memory has 
its own special kind.  It selects, eliminates, alters, exaggerates, minimizes, 
glorifies, and vilifies also; but in the end it creates its own reality, its 
heterogeneous but usually coherent version of events; and no sane person 
ever trusts anyone else‘s version more than his own‘  (1982:211). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: QUESTIONS OF MEMORY, REPRESENTATION AND 
AESTHETICS 
 
This chapter focuses on different artistic mediums and their importance in 
representing human suffering and tragedy.  It concentrates on how artists and 
filmmakers represent what is thought to be ―the un-representable‖. From literary 
works to films and then photography, the chapter attempts to show the significance 
of these mediums in their role in perpetuating memories and lived experiences.  
Artistic portrayals of violence unleashed upon the collective and the individual 
serve to guard against the repetition and condoning of such atrocities. The 
inclusion of examples of representations, or re-representations, of memory / 
memories; traumas; and memorialisation might seem an unnecessary excursion.  
However, as with all qualitative research comparative analyses are of the utmost 
importance (Christians and Carey 1981).  There are several reasons for this.  
Firstly the comparisons between artistic representations provide further credibility 
to the researcher‘s interpretations and analysis of Kentridge‘s films.  Secondly, the 
reference to these comparative examples assists with the clarification of certain 
features.  Thirdly, by making conceptual comparisons, it supports definitions and 
exacts concepts used throughout this study to interpret Kentridge‘s films. In 
addition to that, this chapter serves to strengthen and contextualise the link 
between Kentridge‘s art and the Holocaust (artistic representations). Therefore, at 
the centre of this chapter is memory and its often unique and challenging 
depictions. With regard to memory, Susan Sontag writes rather poignantly in her 
book Regarding the Pain of Others: ―[R]emembering is an ethical act, has ethical 
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value in and of itself.  Memory is, achingly, the only relation we can have with the 
dead‖ (2003:174). 
 
7.1 Representation 
Theodor W. Adorno famously wrote:  ―[T]o write a poem after Auschwitz is 
barbaric‖ (cited in Howe 2003:288; cf.  Adorno 1951 / 1991).  It is often misquoted 
but continues to be debated amongst academics and the like (Hirsch and 
Kacandes 2004; Howe 2003; LaCapra 2003; cf. Adorno 1981:17-34; Adorno 
1991:37-54).  Adorno later answered this question himself explaining that 
―consolation necessarily finds its only outlet in art‖ (cited in Gubar 2004:167; cf. 
Adorno 1981:17-34; Adorno 1991:37-54).  Yet, the question of whether or not art 
can represent hideous atrocities perpetrated against humankind is a contested 
question; as is how artists choose to portray these atrocities (Dean 2004; Gubar 
2004; Hirsch and Kacandes 2004; LaCapra 2003).   
 
Jennifer Arlene Stone is a psychoanalyst with a private practice in New York who 
has written extensively on William Kentridge‘s work.  She extrapolates on Adorno‘s 
last statement:  ―art‘s symbolic strivings against the vacuum, the collapse of 
symbolization after Auschwitz, are the sole guarantee against culture‘s dementia‖ 
(2003:63).  In this manner, Kentridge believes that art is a cry, ――Alas!‖  He answers 
Adorno‘s quandary ―Alas, there is the lyric!‖‖  (Stone 2003:67; cf. Christov-
Bakargiev 1998).  Furthermore, Kentridge is quoted in Stone: ―[T]here is still poetry 
after Apartheid‖ (2003:67). From his statement the author of this thesis has come 
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to the conclusion that Kentridge is of the opinion that art has its place in 
perpetuating memory and that carrying on with life after such a tragedy is 
important.   His previous statement is poignant because he has obviously debated 
and provocatively thought about whether or not one should, or can carry on as 
before.  It is indeed a ―quandary‖ — Kentridge seems to imply that that in itself has 
poetry about it. The ambiguity is of course that even after the Holocaust, and other 
atrocities such as the Palestinian or apartheid atrocities, the living do indeed carry 
on living and creating art.  The ability to continue life as before is also something 
that Kentridge explores in History of the Main Complaint.  It is mentioned and 
commented on in Chapter Five, but to reiterate briefly: Soho/Felix encounters 
atrocities and memories of atrocities as he drives along a lonely, empty road1. 
Soho/Felix then becomes very ill, lapsing into a ―coma‖ of sorts, where his 
unconscious attempts to deal with his own hand in such atrocities / actions / 
complicity.  Is it remorse he shows afterwards?  Perhaps so, but still, it is him back 
at his desk, and it is ―business as usual‖.  So whether or not Kentridge identifies 
with the protagonist or the victim, he seems to admit reluctantly that the living 
continues to do just that: carry on living. Kentridge has added to Theodor W. 
Adorno‘s quote by stating that he is concerned with ―time‘s dulling of memory and 
intense passion‖ (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1999:13).  Jennifer Arlene Stone also 
writes, rather relevantly, that William Kentridge‘s work is imbued ―with ―saudade,‖ a 
Portuguese ―yearning‖ indicative of achieved mourning.  … ―Fado‖ intones an 
                                                 
1
 One of the images that Kentridge includes is of a man being beaten by two other men. This is 
something that he actually witnessed as a child while riding in a car with his grandfather, he clearly 
remembers this: ―shocking image of violence‖; incorporating the image into his film (Kentridge cited 
in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:29); cf.  Chapter Two.   
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acceptance of one‘s ―fate‖ against the lugubrious verdict of German pessimism 
after Adorno …‖ (2003:87).  Author Okwui Enwezor has described Kentridge‘s 
works as ―post-Holocaust‖ because, he argues, Kentridge‘s oeuvre deals with the 
―aftermath of a horrific period of history‖ (cited in Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and 
Cameron 2001:33).   
 
Also referring to Theodor W. Adorno‘s famous statement, Susan Gubar adds that 
―the idea of writing poetry of such barbarism is repulsive at worst and inane at best‖ 
(2004:170).  She suggests that poetry, (and read here, by extension all art) has a 
place in Holocaust remembrance because it is able to articulate a contradiction. It 
highlights the difficulty that the representation of such horrors is unattainable, yet it 
also highlights the importance of trying to do so.  Perhaps in a mediated form of 
poetry / art the horrific might be more believable or transmittable than more realistic 
portrayals?  This can be said of Kentridge‘s works: his traumatic past growing up in 
a brutal regime of apartheid and his postmemories are represented as fantastical 
and surreal in his films, yet his work is also authentic, convincing and, yes, even 
very realistic.   
 
―The past can be seized only as an image,‖ writes Walter Benjamin ―and every 
image of the past that is not recognized by the present as of its own concerns 
threatens to disappear irretrievably‖ (1963:255).  By dismissing narrative order, by 
pouncing on specific images of the past, poets (read here artists as well) not only 
highlight discontinuities, but they engage in the psychological, the intellectual, the 
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social, the political, ethical and aesthetic elements without attempting to recreate 
the horrors in their totalities.  They basically do not attempt to answer or provide a 
solution for past iniquities but offer insight where there might be none.  They 
(artists / authors) attempt to show the impossibility of a coherent understandable 
story / drawing, they instead offer ―spurts of vision, baffling but nevertheless 
powerful pictures of fragmentary scenes unassimilated into an explanatory plot‖ 
(Gubar 2004:166).  Trauma itself is not experienced as a narrative — but like 
flashbacks artists provide images that at once testify to its existence and to the fact 
that an event can defy comprehensibility and understanding.  Artist‘s images are 
like those in the unconscious — fragmentary and elusive, yet they exist.  Artists‘ 
depiction of trauma is often ―an involuntary return to intense feelings about an 
incomprehensible, incommunicable moment‖ but in this format the images of the 
trauma can be revisited in relative safety, trying to deal with it and its 
consequences without being ―silenced by it‖ (Gubar 2004:166).  As Geoffrey 
Hartman suggests, there is a form of ―memory envy‖, ―whereby those who have not 
gone through traumatic experiences adopt these experiences, or identify with 
them‖ (2004:230; cf. Hartman 1996).  This of course is similar to Hirsch‘s concept 
of ―postmemory‖ (1997) cited and discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, the Adorno conundrum was strongly stated, this 
section returns to that enquiry. Bella Brodzki claims that the trauma of the 
Holocaust has become an existential and dominant question / concept of modern 
existence.  How does one describe the indescribable; how does one portray the 
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unportrayable? (2004:133). By extension, Darfur and apartheid are just two recent 
(2008) examples where the existential question applies. Imre Kertész, a Holocaust 
survivor, suggests that were the Holocaust to find a reliable language to describe 
the indescribable, ―wouldn‘t this language have to be so terrifying, so lugubrious, 
that it would destroy those who speak it?‖  (2002:39; cf. Stark 2004:199).  This also 
refers back to the Frederic Nietzsche quote in Chapter Five that comments on 
―looking into the abyss‖ (1979a:99).  Is Kentridge being destroyed by his portrayals 
of wicked deeds, or is it a form of catharsis for him?  Kentridge‘s works are also 
what Paul Virilio expressly termed ―the teletopological puzzle‖, that is, ―all of these 
together (photography, cinema, film, television) — ‗together‘ not as a totality but as 
a constantly shifting constellation of fragments‖ (cited in Burgin 1996:22).  The term 
is useful to apply to Kentridge‘s use of a wide array of disparate artistic mediums 
that he uses in his works.  Poet and art critic Rainer Maria Rilke put it thus in his 
observation on Honoré Balzac‘s works: ―this kind of drawing is not of contours, but 
of oscillating transitions‖ (cited in Stone 2003:73): this is a pertinent description to 
apply to Kentridge‘s films.  
 
However, although this study has argued that Kentridge‘s works portray the 
indescribable authentically and realistically, (using surreal imagery at times)2 it can 
                                                 
2
 This is possibly more apt when discussing Kentridge‘s films as his works are both ―dreadful‖ 
(hideous images) and ―consoling‖ (references to remorse and social responsibility).  His works are 
especially ―hallucinatory‖, considering the surreal aspects / images in them.  To quote Alfred Jarry, 
who was writing about his play Ubu Roi: ―[R]ecounting understandable things merely burdens the 
spirit and falsifies memory, whereas the absurd invigorates the spirit and engages memory‖ (cited in 
Cooke 2001:56).  Kentridge‘s films, according to Ari Sitas, are ―playfully using all the post-dadaist 
and surrealist techniques to disturb and animate his imagery‖ (2001:63).  
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still be argued that his various mediums of doing so are in fact too fantastical to be 
credible.  Pre-empting this argument, this chapter looks at the different mediums 
that Kentridge makes use of to portray the ―lugubrious‖ (Kertész 2002:39; see 
Figure 7.1).  The chapter cites previous studies and examples that have been 
artistically created in a similar vein, thereby giving further credibility (through 
comparability) to the authenticity of Kentridge‘s oeuvre and the themes that it 
portrays.  Firstly, the chapter looks at writing / drawing artists; secondly, the 
medium of film, and thirdly, photography. After all, Kentridge‘s works are truly a 
―teletopological puzzle‖, as Paul Virilio would put it (cited in Burgin 1996:2).   
 
Figure 7.1 Drawing from Mine (Godby 1992:unpaginated). 
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7.2 Re-representations 
7.2.1 Artists / authors 
The storytelling or novelistic approach to the historical past, which acknowledges 
our continuing distance from it, becomes less about representation and more about 
―memory, mourning, and reconstruction in different interpretive communities‖ 
(DeKoven Ezrahi 2004:61).  Furthermore,  
[I]n different interpretive communities, the search for a unique language 
adequate to unprecedented experience has yielded to a search for recovery 
of artistic conventions as a way to restore social order in the wake of 
cataclysm and to reclaim a purchase on the future that is continuous with 
the pre-traumatic past (DeKoven Ezrahi 2004:61).   
 
Most importantly, in Israel the idea of authenticity in representing the Holocaust 
has been replaced by what DeKoven Ezrahi defines as ―empathetic projection‖ 
(2004:62).  Kentridge‘s films do just that: through his empathy and identification, 
Kentridge portrays the dreadfulness of apartheid in a unique cinematic and artistic 
way. 
 
Some academics / authors / theorists are critical of the Holocaust purists. Purists 
look back to the crematoria, and insist that authenticity, authority and 
representation are to be protected.  For them Auschwitz becomes ―the sole 
determinant and ultimate extinguisher of meaning‖ (DeKoven Ezrahi 2004:64).    
They see the past — suspended / fixed temporarily and spatially — which has 
resulted in ―a culture of the unsayable, the elusive, the inscrutable, and the 
immutable‖ (DeKoven Ezrahi 2004:64).  Is this not defeatist in a sense, since who 
is to decide what is an authentic portrayal? 
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This section focuses on the following three authors / artists: art spiegelman (sic)3, 
Pascal Croci and Joe Kubert.  Like Kentridge they too have made use of animation 
to portray tragedies.   
 
7.2.1.1 art spiegelman (sic) 
There are varied ways of witnessing trauma, with one such perspective being 
‗generational‘.  Since the early 1970s, much research has dwelt on the effects of 
―what may be unbound, unintegrated, unshared massive traumatization‖ (Brodzki 
2004:132).  How relevant is language to communicate such a legacy? And by 
extension, how relevant is art to communicate such a heritage?  Efraim Sicher 
(2004), in his essay Postmemory, Backshadowing, Separation: Teaching Second-
generation Holocaust Fiction, asks the question of whether or not the children of 
survivors of the Holocaust have the right to their and their parents‘ stories: as 
―second-generation witnesses‖ (Bauman 1998; Berger 1998; Sicher 2004). Are 
they claiming a martyrdom not their own?  Froma I. Zeitlin believes that such 
writers (read ―artists‖ here) ―represent the past through modes of enactment — 
even reanimation — through which the self, the ‗ego‘, the ‗one who was not there‘, 
now takes on a leading role as a active presence‖ (Zeitlin 1998:6; cf. Sicher 2004; 
Zeitlin 2001).  Efraim Sicher believes that ―absent memory‖ is still made of angst 
and other post-traumatic stress-related symptoms (see Chapter Six).  As of now, 
there are no known statistics on whether or not second generation individuals 
                                                 
3 art spiegelman (sic) specifically spells his name with lower case letters, although it is not known 
why, out of respect for his choice, this study does so too. 
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share a common pathology, and it is almost impossible to gauge just how much 
post-traumatic stress they have inherited from their parents / siblings.  
―Generational transference‖ of traumatic memory is more than likely to be affected 
by both national memory and the local environs (Bar-On 1995; Fox 1999; Hass 
1996; Sicher 2004).  Second generation children, as well as their social / age 
groups (not of biological relations to victims / survivors), are expected, and even 
forced, ―to imagine their way from a common post-Holocaust existence into a past 
of which they have no personal memory‖ (Sicher 2004:263; cf. Grossman 1989 / 
2002).   
 
These generations have ―inherited ghosts in the family cupboard‖ (Rosembaum 
1999a:59-60; cf. Sicher 2004), and history has ―maimed them before birth‖ 
(Rosembaum1999b; Sicher 2004:263).  Melvin J. Bukiet, a writer and a child of 
survivors, has commented that ―[F]or anyone who wasn‘t there, on either side of 
the barbed wire, Jew or German, thinking about the Holocaust is really an act of 
the imagination.  All we know is how little we know‖ (2002:16). 
 
art spiegelman (sic) wrote and drew a two-volume book: Maus: My Father Bleeds 
History Volume I (1986), and A Survivor’s Tale Volume II (1991), which details the 
legacy of the survivors‘ son: himself, as ―Artie‖ (the protagonist and cartoon / 
graphic son; see Figures 7.2 — 7.7).  This is a radical form of communication — an 
attempt to share his father‘s oral testimony about his survival of the Holocaust with 
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the rest of the world — a graphic novel of trauma as an uncomprehendable 
devastation.  Maus contains episodes and dialogue that  
expose, examine, and problematize from every conceivable perspective, 
through every technical and intellectual resource available to spiegelman, 
especially the instrument of mordant irony, the complex phenomenon of 
familial transmission and inheritance (Brodzki 2004:132; cf. spiegelman 
1986 / 1991).    
 
art spiegelman‘s Maus is about how the second generation reworks the images of 
a wrecked past.  It is less about his parents‘ original trauma and more about the 
son‘s reworking of that trauma.  James E. Young suggests that spiegelman‘s Maus 
is a work of ―received history — a narrative hybrid that interweaves both events of 
the Holocaust and the ways that they are passed down to us‖ (Young 2000:15; cf. 
Young 2004).  spiegelman‘s reworking is an ―historicizing process‖ — the focus is 
not on the events themselves but rather on how one recovers these events, which 
results in one being aware of what s/he does / does not understand (Bathrick 
2004:297).  Maus is a hybrid, a montage of double narration, sub-plots and 
contradictions (spiegelman 1986 / 1991).  Andreas Huyssen posits that Maus is ―an 
estrangement effect in the service of ‗mimetic approximation‘‖. For example, the 
animal drawings / depictions suggest a possible political allegorisation: Germans 
as cats, Jews as mice, and Poles as pigs (Huyssen 2000:28-44; cf. Huyssen 
2003).  Through this inversion of reality and a reworking / re-imagining of such 
events / types, the imagery becomes expatriated from its origins; ―it is not an 
authentic replication of the real‖ (Bathrick 2004:298).  By this one assumes 
Bathrick is stating that they are not identical reproductions, but representations.  
Artists like spiegelman and Claude Lanzmann (who made the film Shoah) are 
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committed to finding new and innovative ways of visualising the Holocaust; this is 
based on the belief that in order to remember one needs to see and work through 
the past.  They serve as examples that there is no one ―true and all-encompassing 
visualization‖ of the past (Bathrick 2004:298).  The same can be said of Kentridge‘s 
films.  His Drawings for Projection series provide his audience with a new and 
unique way of viewing apartheid. 
 
Memorial books, or yizkor, are a form of survivor testimony — small volumes of 
multi-authored accounts in the form of notes, poems, maps, drawings, 
photographs. They are all an attempt not only to encapsulate the life of a 
community before the Holocaust, but also an attempt at preserving first-hand 
accounts of the horrors of the war.  These memorial books have given rise to post-
memorial (read here ―postmemory‖; cf.  Hirsch 1997) books — texts that are 
endeavours between the survivor and others — often second generation family 
members.  Examples are spiegelman‘s Maus (1986 / 1991) and Alina Bacall-Zwirn 
and Jared Stark‘s No Common Place (1999).  Both capture the memory of others, 
and the relationships that evolve between the teller and the hearer of these 
experiences.  Jared Stark believes that these post-memorial books are an 
insistence ―that witnessing can and should be a collective endeavour, an 
endeavour that does not simply enshrine the past but that recognizes its abiding 
presence‖ (2004:202).   
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Yet Stephen Tabachnick identifies Maus not as a memoir, but as an 
―autobiographical graphic novel‖ (1993:154-162).  He arrives at this conclusion by 
asserting that spiegelman recounts the documentary-biography of his father, 
Vladek Spiegelman, as a journey of discovery from his biological roots to his 
psychological and ethnic foundations.  This journey begins with historical 
knowledge / facts but ends up with a knowledge that is no longer unconscious or 
covert, but ―active and personal‖ (Tabachnick 1993:154).   
 
Maus is the voicing of a survivor‘s muteness which stresses the importance of the 
―communicability of repressed memory and the efficacy of artistic ventriloquism‖ 
(Morahg 1999:457-479; Sicher 2004:267).  In Maus, spiegelman transposes the 
categories of victim and survivor.  Such a ―transposition enacts past trauma as if it 
were present, bringing order to the chaos of history as well as internalizing the 
identities of both perpetrators and victims‖ (Kestenberg 1982:148-149; Sicher 
2004:267).   
 
This internalisation of course, runs the risk of being relegated to moral relativism, 
but it could also be seen as the unlocking and introduction of Primo Levi‘s ―gray 
zone‖ (sic) of the Holocaust ―where there are no clear-cut ethical choices‖ (Levi 
1998:36; cf. Levi 1996 and 1998; Sicher 2004:268). 
  
This study suggests the following observations: in his comic books spiegelman 
portrays his own insecurities — at once guilty and suffering from angst.  How does 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
219 | P a g e  
 
he compete with an immortalised and ever-enduring brother he never knew? 
Would ―I‖ have endured; what if ―I‖ had not survived; and how might ―I‖ have defied 
death; how do ―I‖ contend with such martyrdom (cf. Brodzki 2004)? Discussing his 
guilt with his wife, spiegelman makes a statement, which the author of this study 
believes, reveals his real obsession with his inheritance, despite his denial: ―Don‘t 
get me wrong.  I wasn‘t obsessed with this stuff … It‘s just that sometimes I‘d 
fantasize Zyklon B coming out of our shower instead of water‖ (spiegelman 
1991:16; see Figure 7.6).  
 
It is intriguing to note just how similar and dissimilar spiegelman and Kentridge‘s 
works are.  That they are both animated is obvious; whether you want to term the 
one cartoon-like and the other animated, whether the one is in hand-drawn pencil 
and the other hand-drawn charcoal, the one a graphic novel(s) the other animated 
film(s), are all really technical details of a dis / similar kind.  They are however 
expressions of guilt and (post)memories — their own and others.  That they have 
chosen to draw ―their experiences‖ shows an intimacy and a desire to exorcise or 
own their own guilt and compliance in these tales.  Whether you want to 
academicitise and psychologise and name their guilt as survivor guilt, guilt by 
association, generational guilt, upper middle-class guilt or even relative guilt, their 
guilt is apparent.  That spiegelman says that he was not obsessed with his parents‘ 
stories is in the opinion of the author of this dissertation, a form of denial, a way of 
processing his guilt.  Extrapolating from this, the same can be said of Kentridge‘s 
films, they too are a form of processing his guilt. 
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Figure 7.2 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. My Father Bleeds History. Volume I (spiegelman 1986: 
the front cover). 
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Figure 7.3 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. And Here my Troubles Began. Volume II. (spiegelman 
1991: the front cover).  
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Figure 7.4 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. And Here my Troubles Began. Volume II. (spiegelman 
1991:contents page: unpaginated). 
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Figure 7.5 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. And Here my Troubles Began. Volume II. 
(spiegelman 1991:15). 
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Figure 7.6 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. And Here my Troubles Began. Volume II. 
(spiegelman 1991:16). 
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Figure 7.7 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. And Here my Troubles Began. Volume II. 
(spiegelman 1991: prologue page: unpaginated). 
 
7.2.1.2 Pascal Croci 
Dori Laub, in his essay Bearing Witness; or, The Vicissitudes of Listening 
(2003:221-229) warns of self-defence mechanisms, like denial, that often come 
into play when exposed to death narratives.  However, there are other 
psychological and physical feelings that also present themselves, such as 
sympathy, empathy, extreme anger, and most importantly, ―identification‖ (Laub 
2003:221-229).  Pascal Croci, born in 1961, researched his topic for five years 
before producing the graphic novel / book of pencil sketches, titled simply 
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Auschwitz (2005).  He writes / draws of the experiences of a married couple, 
survivors of the death camp, where their only daughter was murdered.  The story 
finds them in the middle of a civil war in the former Yugoslavia in 1993.  They are 
waiting their execution as traitors, and while they wait they remember their past in 
Auschwitz.  Once again, through the emotion of empathy and identification, author 
and artist Croci has created a brilliant portrayal of experiences not his own.  
Through the unconventional medium of pencil sketches he documents history 
realistically and devastatingly, and also authentically (see Figures 7.8 — 7.11). 
 
Figure 7.8 Auschwitz (Croci 2004: the front cover). 
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Figure 7.9 Auschwitz (Croci 2004:18). 
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Figure 7.10 Auschwitz (Croci 2004:56). 
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Figure 7.11 Auschwitz (Croci 2004:74). 
 
7.2.1.3 Joe Kubert 
In the introduction to his comic / graphic novel Yossel — April 19, 1943 (2003), Joe 
Kubert writes: ―[I]t was something I believed I just had to do.  […]  This book is the 
result of ―What if?‖  It is a work of fiction based on a nightmare of facts‖ (A graphic 
novel … 2003).   
 
Joe Kubert‘s family emigrated to the United States of America in 1926, from 
Yzeran, Poland, thereby escaping the horror of the Holocaust.  A famous 
cartoonist, Kubert can add Tarzan, Batman, The Flash and Sgt. Rock to his 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
230 | P a g e  
 
repertoire of art. Haunted by the annihilation of the Jews and based on the 
descriptions of his neighbours and family friends, Kubert finally decided to pen and 
draw (in pencil) an alternate version of history, one where his family does not 
emigrate and he experiences the degradation and dehumanisation of the war 
firsthand.  He situates himself in the middle of the Warsaw ghetto as a thirteen year 
old with a gift for drawing.  His gift saves him from being deported to Auschwitz, but 
not his family.  The fate of his family and news of the death camps filter back to 
him.  He decides to fight back and takes part in the famous Warsaw uprising, 
beginning on April 19 1943, hence the title of the book.  His sketchbook art has a 
similar ―feel‖ to it as Kentridge‘s work does.  Rough, jagged, unprocessed, and 
sometimes incomplete, the sketches are realistic and portray and express those 
experiences of ghettoised Jews — hunger, bewilderment, shock and trauma (see 
Figures 7.12 — 7.14).  Placing himself at the centre of the story, he personalises 
the narrative, making it easy to identify and sympathise with him.   
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Figure 7.12 Yossel — April 19, 1943 (Kubert 2003: the front cover). 
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Figure 7.13 Yossel — April 19, 1943  
(Kubert 2003:2). 
Figure 7.14 Yossel — April 19, 1943 (Kubert 2003:54). 
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Once again here is a hand-drawn graphic novel filled with postmemories, beautiful 
and horrifying all at once. Saul Friedländer believes that it is essential to represent 
the unrepresentable, even if doing so ―transgresses the boundaries of the 
permissible and tests unconventional representational and conceptual categories‖ 
(1992a:2-3; cf. Sicher 2004). 
 
He argues that in doing so, self-identification becomes possible and the conspiracy 
of generational silence ends (Friedländer 1992:2-3; cf. Friedländer 1992a, 1992b 
and 1993; Sicher 2004:265).  Kubert‘s Yossel — April 19, 1943; spiegelman‘s 
Maus; Croci‘s Auschwitz; and Kentridge‘s Drawings for Projection series do just 
that.  Their portrayals of horror and all that is associated with that repulsion 
transcend the ordinary and the prosaic, and in doing so not only do they bear 
witness to experiences not their own, they reach audiences that might not normally 
be exposed to such experiences.  Their unconventionality makes these works 
unique and therefore memorable, provoking discussion and the raising of 
questions that are outside the norm.  They catch one off guard. 
 
These artists, including Kentridge, are all remarkable.  Not only are their art works 
exquisite, the tales told are heinous, fascinating and poignant (and even 
sometimes humorous).  The fact that these artists / writers allow us a glimpse into 
their postmemories, their unconscious minds, is astonishing.  How they convey / 
represent these stories / (post)memories / experiences is also extraordinary.  But 
most significant of all is their ability to empathise, extrapolate and identify with 
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experiences too hideous to bear / contemplate. In a materialistic, alienating 
contemporary society, that is the most exceptional / noteworthy / significant of all.  
Having discussed the (post)memory representations of three authors, this chapter 
now turns its focus to the medium of film and (post)memory. 
 
7.2.2 Film and postmemory 
In 1992 documentary film maker David MacDougall wrote an essay entitled Films 
of Memory.  He claims that the value of films of memory lies in the ability of film ―to 
leave representation behind and to confront the viewer once again with the primary 
stimuli of physical experience‖ (1992:267-269; cf. Burgin 1996).  Furthermore,  
 
[A] residue of a clearly physical nature remains in film images which are not 
available in verbal narratives, and its importance should not be 
underestimated.  Film images may be reinterpreted in a variety of new 
contexts, but the unalterable record of appearance and place contained in 
them may ultimately prove to have a more profound effect upon our 
―memory‖ of history than the interpretations we attach to them (1992:267-
269).   
 
This is so apposite for Kentridge‘s works: his physical remnants or traces of 
charcoal are interpreted one way and then when he makes changes to that very 
drawing, it is interpreted another way, yet it is still the ―same‖ drawing. 
 
Claude Morhange-Bégué in her book Chambert: Reflections from an Ordinary 
Childhood (2000) is an autobiography that focuses on her separation from her 
mother at an early age: the arrest of her mother by the Gestapo.  She reconstructs 
the scene, going over it again and again, throughout the autobiography.   
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According to Bella Brodzki this is the same as a ―traumatic flashback‖ (2004:131).  
The autobiography, written many years after the incident, indicates the 
incommensurability of language to describe the indescribable — the mental image 
is so vivid but she cannot remember or conjure up the right  words to describe the 
incident — there is, as Brodzki points out, a ―disjunctive relation of image and 
language to memory‖ (2004:131; cf. Morhange-Bégué 2000).  A play by the name 
of The Story I am about to Tell was written about the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Christov-Bakargiev 1998).  It was fairly unique because it included 
three witnesses that had presented evidence to the TRC.  The play consisted of 
them re-telling their testimonies every night before an audience.  These survivors 
retold their hideous experiences.  However, one night during a performance, one 
witness forgot his lines, despite the fact that this was his own testimony.  William 
Kentridge wrote: ―[T]he most moving moment for me was when the survivor of 
three years on death row had a lapse of memory.  How could he forget his own 
story?‖ (Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:129).  This incident supports 
what Brodzki has claimed; and highlights how memory can fail one.  The witnesses 
are describing memories of memories of memories, every night, yet there is bound 
to be a lapse in memory at some stage. 
 
In the individual‘s memory actual events mix with fantasies as well as with 
fragments of memories from photographs, films and television broadcasts.  
Sociologist Marie-Claude Taranger wrote an essay in 1991 which documents an 
oral history project (over four hundred recorded interviews).  Her essay records 
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that there is a universal tendency for one‘s personal history to be intermingled with 
memories of films and other productions of the media (cited in Burgin 1996).  She 
writes that: the function of the film is clear: it completes life; it fills the holes in life.  
It allowed the narrators to see — ―it allows them today to recount — events which 
they did not personally encounter, fragments of History (sic) which are not part of 
their own history‖ (cited in Burgin 1996:226).  Taranger‘s results are similar to the 
psychoanalytical stance on screen memories.  For example, one might say that a 
particular scene from a film ―in which the parents of the young heroine are killed 
when they place their bodies between her and the German guns — has come to 
serve the narrator as a screen memory, representing the repressed fantasy of the 
death of her own parents‖ (cited in Burgin 1996:228; cf.  Chapter Six of this thesis 
for details on Sigmund Freud‘s concept of ―screen memories‖). 
 
There is another case where the personal witness has appropriated the contents of 
another individual‘s life: a narrator provides detailed descriptions of conditions in 
the concentration camps.  Conversely, in this case, the narrator had never been to 
a concentration camp herself.  However, her brother had been incarcerated in a 
concentration camp in Poland during the WWII.  Upon his return, he never once 
spoke of the conditions he experienced there to his sister.  Upon his fathers death 
he cut all ties off with his sister.  Taranger‘s insight is as follows: ―[T]he borrowed 
speech and images have clearly come to fill the absence of brotherly speech, and 
of the brother himself‖ (cited in Burgin 1996:228).  Furthermore, she made 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
237 | P a g e  
 
observations about: ―[M]emories of facts [mixed] with memories of images, or of 
words, and even with memories of memories‖ (cited in Burgin 1996:228).  Also,  
[F]rom such heterogeneous psychical materials, the individual narrator 
would reconstruct her or his hybrid personal history — imposing a coherent 
narrative order on the discontinuous fragments (cited in Burgin 1996:228). 
 
Victor Burgin (1996:229) draws attention to the similarity to Sigmund Freud‘s 
―secondary revision‖.  Freud suggested that ―the delusion owes its convincing 
power to the elements of historical truth which it inserts in the place of rejected 
reality‖ (cited in Burgin 1996:229).  
 
It seems that the fictional passages of recorded history are given credibility by the 
passages of actually experienced events, creating a coherent narrative.  One of 
her results posits that film serves not only as a source of memory but is also a 
source of authority.  ―Authority‖ here is taken from the wide societal / communal 
character of an experience, as if the belief ―we all saw it‖ makes it ―the truth‖ 
(Burgin 1996:229; cf. Chapter Eight of this thesis for the section on history and 
memory). 
 
Marie-Claude Taranger, on the basis of her empirical evidence, concludes that 
authenticity should be viewed in other than binary terms of ―true‖ and ―false‖:  
[I]t is no longer conceivable to consider only the exactitude of facts or the 
sincerity of witnesses.  It is also necessary to take into account in all their 
complexity the procedures which preside at the construction of the story … 
Against the illusion of a simple past, which would only have to be recovered, 
there is thus imposed the necessity of bringing to light the multiple and 
changing relations which ceaselessly produce interference, in an infinite 
play of repetitions and variations, between the voices and the images of the 
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individual and the group, of a past and of its futures (cited in Burgin 
1996:229).   
 
Psychoanalyst Judith Butler writes similarly:  
[W]hat are called ―moments‖ are not distinct and equivalent units of time, for 
the ―past‘‖ will be the accumulation and congealing of such ―moments‖ to the 
point of their indistinguishability (1993:245).    
 
However, it will also consist of that which is refused from construction, the ―domain 
of the repressed, forgotten, and the irrecoverably foreclosed‖ (1993:245).    
 
Concurring with Taranger, Victor Burgin states that the ―shape-shifting hybrid 
objects that coalesce in psychical space from the mnemic debris of films, 
photographs, television shows, and other sources of images‖ (1996:239), are of 
interest.    
 
These ―hybrid objects‖ are situated in part in an imaginary world and in part in a 
real world.   Marie-Claude Taranger‘s study attests to our constant ability to 
confuse ourselves with others, fictive and real.  ―Identification is the privileged 
mechanism by which other histories and memories become our own‖ (Burgin 
1996:239).  William Kentridge‘s films are ―hybrids‖: concoctions created out of his 
memories and others‘, with the use of photographs, films and other visual aids / 
images. 
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Film is an important medium to expose tragedies and to raise questions.  It also 
has a far-reaching effect — engaging an audience who might not normally have 
access to, or interest in, international atrocities.   
 
With regard to aesthetic representation and considering whether or not the 
Holocaust  / genocidal atrocities  / images of apartheid  / Palestine should be 
portrayed by the visual / artistic / fine arts is invariably linked to the question of how 
one would attempt to do so. 
 
David Bathrick, in an attempt to address this question / ethical crisis, gives the 
example of the nine-and-a-half hour film entitled Shoah, which was made by 
Claude Lanzmann.  He believes that this film works through the past images by 
both ―repudiating‖ and ―reclaiming‖ the Holocaust image (2004:294).  Lanzmann 
himself expressly states that this ―cinematic treatise is not a documentary and is 
not representational‖ (1991:96).  Rather, all the interviews of the survivors that he 
films, both perpetrator and victim alike (he also includes interviews of secondary 
witnesses) are not intended to recover memory but ―to explore the process of 
reconstructing and reliving the past in the present‖ (Bathrick 2004:295).  Claude 
Lanzmann refers to his film as ―imageless images,‖ ―because what we see on the 
screen is more absence of an image than an attempted replica of the unspeakable 
deed‖ (cited in Bathrick 2004:295; cf. Lanzmann 1991; 2004).  Furthermore, this 
―absence‖ is referred to by Gertrud Koch as an ―elision which marks the boundary 
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between what is aesthetically and humanly imaginable and the unimaginable 
dimension of the annihilation‖ (1989:96).   
 
The belief that an artist has undeviating and complete access to the visual 
portrayal of an incident(s) is challenged by Lanzmann.  He and his cinematic 
masterpiece serve to ―remind us that there can be no full presence but only the 
marking of the past as object of reconstruction based on traces and traces of 
traces‖ (Bathrick 2004:295).   
 
In addition, Bathrick states that ―[T]he traces in Shoah are sites of memory in the 
present — the pans of the rich, green fields of Treblinka and Auschwitz today‖; 
these sites of memory defy / dispute imagination — the challenge is to imagine 
creatively, to transcend, the very ―normalcy of these traces in order to produce or 
even hallucinate the horror of what was‖ (2004:295-296; cf. the introduction of this 
chapter).  Artist C. K. Williams visited Auschwitz, where he was stunned by the 
empty barracks, the empty crematoria — this was not what he had imagined — yet 
it is through memoirists that he can imagine what it was like because the actual site 
does not deliver any real idea / imagery of what it had been like there.  It is through 
the different characters / individuals who wrote (and assumingly artists who 
artistically represented their experiences / memories) about their experiences that 
one is able to glean a realistic image of what it was like (1999:10).  This 
dissertation puts forward the author‘s opinion that Auschwitz has been sanitised in 
a way — and in a sense cleansed.  These are just ordinary buildings that belie 
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what really happened there.  Gertrud Koch believes that the film Shoah, which 
defies chronology and a pre-given path, is less a documentary or historical epic, 
and is more a piece of modern art, ―drawing its force from the affirmation that art is 
not representation but presentation, not reproduction but expression‖ (1989:20).  In 
other words, one can go beyond representation, and engagement with the evil of 
apartheid should be one of expression over representation.  Theodor W. Adorno 
himself wrote similarly: ―[P]erennial suffering has as much right to expression as 
the tortured have to scream … hence it may have been wrong to say that no poem 
could be written after Auschwitz‖ (1951 / 1991 / 2003:283).  Linked to the concept 
of film is the concept of voyeurism and spectator identification, which will now be 
investigated.    
 
7.2.2.1 Voyeurism and spectator identification 
Jean-Paul Sartre‘s theory of consciousness is that consciousness cannot grasp 
itself (1957).  Sartre‘s book Being and Nothingness (1957) grapples with this very 
concept.  Reflection or categorisation turns the subject into an object.  Because 
subjects do not have fixed characteristics, the moment they try to categorise 
themselves, they become nothing more than a definition, pigeonholed and limited. 
Sartre warns of individuals going to the extreme of defining themselves as a fixed 
set of categories, so that they are then perceived as pure nothingness.  However, 
no representation can capture one entirely. It is the poser that Sartre has tried to 
deal with: one can neither be totally defined; neither can one escape all definition 
(Sartre 1957).  One is the quest for oneself.  Are Kentridge‘s films — based on his 
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image / representation — a quest for his consciousness?  Does he see himself as 
others see him?   Does he draw / represent himself as Soho/Felix as he thinks 
others see him, or as he sees himself, a mirror of one‘s self?  Are his films a mirror 
for his own subjectivity?  Kentridge‘s subjectivity is riddled with guilt, remorse, 
responsibility and mourning / loss / death.  It is significant to note then that in the 
last film of the Drawings for Projection series, Tide Table, Soho/Felix is 
represented as all alone, alienated and cut off from the rest of his family and the 
rest of the world (see Figure 7.15).   
 
Figure 7.15 Drawing from Tide Table (Alemani 2006:92). 
 
 
According to Victor Burgin (1996:29), individuals inhabit two separate worlds: the 
―internal‖ — the mental and private world — and the ―external‖, that is, the public 
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and physical world.  Of course, psychoanalysis has provided one with the theory of 
the unconscious (Freud1915 / 1991b).  Kentridge presents us with both his 
―internal‖ and ―external‖ — references to the unconscious (―internal‖), such as the 
drawings of the insides of his brain; and images of everyday items realistically 
portrayed (the ―external‖), such as the bakelite telephones, the typewriters and 
even tea cups and coffee-plungers (see Figures 7.16 — 7.22).  This is, for the 
writer of this thesis, another element of ―fortuna‖, as defined by Kentridge (see 
Chapter Five for more details).  Ari Sitas describes Kentridge‘s ―fortuna‖ as 
―spontaneous inventiveness, even anarchy, and a relishing of the accidental, the 
transformative (in its literal sense), but there is also [a] discriminating mind that 
channels the energy into meaningful statement‖ (2001:63). 
 
Figure 7.16 Photograph of installation that exhibited drawings from the film 
WEIGHING ... and WANTING (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:135). 
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Figure 7.17 Photograph of the installation that exhibited drawings from the film 
WEIGHING ... and WANTING (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:77). 
 
 
Figure 7.18 A close-up of the drawing from the installation exhibiting drawings from 
the film WEIGHING ... and WANTING (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 
1999:77). 
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Figure 7.19 Drawing from the film History of the Main Complaint (Cameron, 
Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:90). 
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Figure 7.20 Mrs. Beaton’s Household Management (Jug) William Kentridge, 2000 (Stewart 
2006:86).  Lithograph in black with hand-drawn red lines, on page spreads from Mrs. 
Beaton’s Book of Household Management (1906) on Vélin d’Arches Blanc 250 gsm paper. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.21 Drawing, from installation exhibit Stereoscope (Alemani 2006:65). 
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Laura Mulvey, a well-known feminist author, who introduced the concept of the 
―male gaze‖ into film studies, wrote in her book, Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema: ―[T]he voyeuristic-scopophilic look is a crucial part of traditional filmic 
pleasure‖ (1975:45; cf. Burgin 1996).  Roland Barthes writes about the ―[A]uthor, 
reader, spectator or voyeur‖ of representation; all of these subjects ―desire‖, but of 
course it is the voyeur who does so obviously or ―visibly‖ (Barthes 1977b:69).   
 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1957), in his chapter The Look, from his famous work Being and 
Nothingness, describes the position of the voyeur as ―being-as-object for the 
Other‖:  
[H]ere I am, bent over the key hole; suddenly I hear a footstep.  I shudder as 
a wave of shame sweeps over me.  Somebody has seen me.  I straighten 
up.  My eyes run over the deserted corridor.  It was a false alarm.  I breathe 
a sigh of relief.   
 
Sartre however, states that even though he is petrified, he continues with his 
voyeurism,  
I shall feel my heart beat fast, and I shall detect the slightest noise, the 
slightest creaking of the stairs.  Far from disappearing with my first alarm, 
the Other is present everywhere, below me, above me, in neighbouring 
rooms, and I continue to feel profoundly my being-for-others (1957:369-
370).   
 
In chapter four (―The Intertwining — The Chiasm‖) of his unfinished work, The 
Visible and the Invisible, Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes:   
[S]ince the seer is caught up in what he sees; it is still himself he sees: there 
is a fundamental narcissism of all vision.  And thus, for the same reason, the 
vision he exercises, he also undergoes from the things, such that, as many 
painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, my activity is 
equally passivity — which is the second and more profound sense of 
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narcissism: not to see in the outside, as others see it, the contour of a body 
one inhabits, but especially to be seen by the outside, to exist within it, to 
emigrate into it, to be seduced, captivated, alienated by the phantom, so 
that the seeing and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer 
know which sees and which is seen (1968:139; cf. Burgin 1996). 
 
The author of this study believes that this applies directly to William Kentridge and 
his ―portraits‖ as Soho/Felix. 
 
In The Scoptophilic Instinct and Identification, a paper written in 1935, Otto 
Fenichel states: ―the eye plays a double part.  It is not only actively sadistic but also 
passively receptive‖ (1953:375; cf. Burgin 1996).  Included in this book is a citation 
by Géza Róheim on ―looking-glass-magic‖, in which the mirror presents an 
individual with his/her own ego in the form of an external body, which erases ―the 
dividing–line between ego and non-ego‖ (Fenichel 1953:377; cf. Burgin 1996).   
 
According to Michel Serres (Kroker and Cook 1988) and Michel Foucault (1970) 
the disembodied eye is a central metaphor for contemporary experiences:  the eye 
is reversible, expressing in its symbolic effects the interiority of the retina of the 
viewer; it is the apparatus of surveillance and an eternal mirroring-effect of the 
possessive ―I‖ of the self.  It represents the modern experience which circles back 
upon itself in an endless mirroring-effect. In the symbology of the ―eye‖, a 
mirroring-effect is in progress in which the terms of the relation (signifier and 
signified) retract back and forth as image and counter-image in the endless 
curvature of a tautology (Kroker and Cook 1988). It is the eye / I in a society which 
privileges the position of voyeur.  The eye motif emphasises the violence of 
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intrusion, the horror of the loss of privacy.  This is apparent in Mine, where the 
viewer is exposed to the loss of privacy endured by the miners who sleep together 
in crowded bunks, and shower together as if in prison. Thus, self-reflexively, 
Kentridge burdens the viewer with the responsibility to see the awful conditions 
under which the miners work. 
 
The ―eye‖ and vision are central themes throughout Kentridge‘s work — from 
images of a close–up of an eye filling the screen at the end of Monument, to the 
images in History of the Main Complaint where he, or the character of Soho/Felix, 
looks repeatedly at himself in his car‘s rear-view mirror.  There are also many 
scenes where Kentridge draws his character, Felix Teitlebaum, looking at himself 
in a mirror. In Felix in Exile and History of the Main Complaint, there are extreme 
close-ups of Kentridge‘s eye — circled and highlighted.  A more disturbing image 
of the eye is the close-up of Harry the hobo‘s eye, at the end of Monument.  Harry 
is pinioned onto a pedestal — a monument ironically donated by Soho Eckstein the 
―great benefactor‖ (whose philanthropy is bought and paid for by the labour of 
individuals — miners and workers).  Harry‘s eye seems to hold all the pain and 
suffering in the world along with a resignation to his position. Harry, Christ-like, is 
tied to stone, holding up a monumental rock, unable to move, with only the sound 
of his disturbing breathing as the credits roll.  
 
Film theorist and academic, J. P. Telotte (cited in Kolb 1990) suggests that when 
fascination with doubling becomes the dominant force in someone's life, as it has 
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with Kentridge, s/he clearly runs the risk of becoming little more than a copy 
him/herself, potentially less human than the very images that have been fashioned 
in his/her likeness. This is fascinating because, for Kentridge, one must consider 
where reality begins and reality ends. It becomes difficult to disengage the 
characters from Kentridge and his life.  The world is a place in which distinctions 
and differences between realities and images have been effaced.  The real 
becomes not so much what can be produced as "that which is already reproduced" 
(Baudrillard 1983:122). In other words, it is an identification between an artificial 
construct (Kentridge‘s characters) and the real (Kentridge himself).  There is also 
the appearance of being real — in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, 
Felix Teitlebaum‘s dreams about his affair with Mrs. Eckstein do have a dream-like 
quality, and he does daydream about her while he is in the bath. Yet Kentridge also 
deals with the very real themes of social guilt and responsibility, the problems with 
capitalism and the evils of apartheid.  He also includes a portrayal of his wife Anne 
in WEIGHING … and WANTING4. The viewer questions what is real and what is 
not.  
 
There is also the concept of voyeurism for the spectator as the audience watch 
Felix Teitlebaum having sex with Mrs. Eckstein (in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City 
after Paris and Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old).  Another voyeuristic aspect to his 
work is the view into the very depths of the mines and the horror that one sees 
there: decapitations, close ups of pained faces which also reflect the grotesquery 
                                                 
4
 This researcher has had the opportunity to meet William Kentridge‘s wife, Anne Stanwix. 
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within, an overwhelming site / sight of blackness. The horror of the mines and the 
continuous recurrence of decapitated heads again appear to allude to Joseph 
Conrad's Heart of Darkness (1975) — whose main character, Kurtz, has looked 
into darkness — and to Frederic Nietzsche's comment:  
[W]hoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not 
become a monster.  And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also 
looks into you (Nietzsche 1979a:99; also quoted in Chapter Five).   
 
One sees this in the images shown in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, 
Monument, Mine and Felix in Exile.  Mine combines a cross-section:  in the mine, 
underground workers are working in a very dark and depressing setting.  This is 
juxtaposed with Soho Eckstein in his luxurious and very comfortable bed above — 
sometimes sleeping and sometimes using his bed as an office desk.  The images 
of the mine include images of the dormitories — dismal sleeping quarters and rows 
of men showering.  These images include close-ups of severed heads lying on 
hard shelf-like beds — reminiscent of the beds in concentration camps and death 
camps in World War II.   The hostels are divided into minuscule segments, or what 
William Gibson calls ―coffins‖ (1993:124), and which contrast strongly with the large 
opulent homes of the upper classes.  The miners‘ existences — sleeping and living 
in huge concrete slabs and working in monoliths of stone — are alienated, with 
little or no personal contact. The heads look like skulls, not human, similar to the 
decapitated heads on the shelf in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, and 
a recurring theme throughout his work.  These are extremely depressing images, 
which also serve to dehumanise the individuals.  As Kentridge himself has stated 
―everything has been ... de-humanised‖ (Oppelt 1999:6).  The heads are 
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themselves a thing of beauty, and refer to an aesthetic tradition as well.  This is a 
stark contradiction: one generally sees their beauty before realising their brutality, 
which tends to unnerve one.  Like the death throes of ―Nandi‖ in Felix in Exile, they 
are exquisite to look at, but one cannot separate the macabre qualities from the 
beauty.  This makes them somehow more shocking than something that is simply 
ugly and grotesque and which prompts a straightforward response.  Viewing these 
images is uneasy, challenging and confusing. 
 
In Mine, individuals are merely tools to excavate gold or coal.  They are a form of 
resource — dispensable and replaceable.  One sees the dream-like imagery of a 
coffee plunger that makes its way down from and through Soho Eckstein‘s bed, 
becoming a lift shaft and then becoming the drawing of a transatlantic slave ship —  
which was constructed in that way in order to fit as many slaves as possible.  The 
images of slaves and the relevance to the miners are obvious.  Mine workers are 
nothing but slave labour.  Soho Eckstein‘s bed / office desk becomes littered with 
ticker tape papers from an accounting machine — and includes mine workers as 
part of the waste and a part of the scene of a mine dump — industrial and 
environmental waste juxtaposed with a rhinoceros, which represents nature in 
direct opposition to environmental decay and devastation.  Soho Eckstein clears 
his bed / office desk with one sweep of his arm, knocking everything off to allow 
him to play with his new pet project — a rhinoceros (see Figure 7.22 and Figure 
7.23).   
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Figure 7.22 Drawing from Mine (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 
1999:115). 
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Figure 7.23 Drawing from Mine (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee  
1999:115). 
 
 
Kentridge has also made a very short, and quite bizarre film titled ECHO: scan 
slide bottle (1998).  In this film he uses a hand-held camera to trace his near-naked 
physical body very closely.  At times, the images, disembodied fragments of 
sections of his arms, legs and stomach, are disturbing (see Figure 7.24 and Figure 
7.25).   This is because if one is not aware of the overall theme of the film (the 
tracing of his physiological being), one is simply presented with images of portions 
of skin.  These unattached images of patches of skin, which are very hirsute, 
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together with enlarged pores, beam out of the screen.  At first the film ECHO: scan 
slide bottle seems completely contrasted with the films in his Drawings for 
Projection series.  Firstly, with regard to the content of the films, the former is real 
while the latter is imagined.  Secondly, the one is in documentary black and white 
style, in direct opposition to the charcoal hand-drawn animations of his series.  
Thirdly, and most importantly, the one deals with Kentridge‘s corporeality while the 
others deal with his unconscious psyche (or a part thereof).  However, there are 
also blatant similarities.  A closer look reveals that they are all traces of his being in 
terms of cinematic style.  All are astonishingly intimate — a nakedness laid bare for 
the world to see (literally and metaphorically — his body and his mind). All are 
translucent in their intimate portrayals.  They all evoke a sense of guilty voyeurism 
in the viewers.  They also all shed some light on his identity: a slightly overweight, 
somewhat hirsute middle-aged man caught in a perpetual present constantly pre-
occupied and tormented with psychological grapplings of individual and collective 
memories of guilt and responsibility.  
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Figure 7.24 A photograph still 
from ECHO: scan slide bottle (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:126). 
 
Figure 7.25 A photograph still 
from ECHO: scan slide bottle (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:126). 
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7.2.2.2 Voyeurism and aesthetics 
The concept of voyeurism is of course linked directly to that of aesthetics because 
the spectator wants to view images that are visually, or aesthetically pleasing.  Orly 
Lubin (2004) asks the question with regard to the aesthetisation of the Holocaust: 
does the aesthetic form of film portraying these atrocities in any way compromise 
the horror of the Holocaust?  Are there any other forms of aesthetics that are better 
suited to portraying the Holocaust, forms that induce more personal empathy, more 
insight into the atrocities? Film per se uses many different techniques, and many 
different fields come together to make up a film.  All contribute to the production of 
a film: cinematographers, hairstylists, make-up artists, wardrobe artists, actors and 
directors.  This process produces a very mediated form of art — many decisions 
come into play. Therefore the result is a more accessible form of representation.  
Film is a useful art form / medium to sustain memory.  Fictional films specifically 
are distributed widely and are very successful at confronting an audience with such 
horrors in an identifiable and non-threatening form.  With regard to Kentridge‘s 
beautiful cinematic drawings, even while acknowledging the power of the moving 
image — they do present an inherent danger.  One can manipulate the story, and 
with it history; one can delete the political and social contexts; one can ignore the 
horrific scenes, erasing them from the story and history; and most importantly, the 
audience can become enthralled with the exquisite beauty of the pure aesthetics 
even while watching atrocities being perpetrated.  For Orly Lubin (2004) there is 
the foremost danger of ignoring the ethical aspects of the real events as they are 
portrayed, aestheticised and dramatised.  The audience judges the film by its 
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aesthetic appearance — beautiful camera shots, brilliant acting, stunning choices 
of locations, colours and scenery — rather than by judging the film‘s ethical 
meanings, consequences and repercussions.  In his essay The Work of Art in the 
Age of its Technological Reproducibility (2002), Walter Benjamin focuses 
specifically on these questions.  One pertinent question stands out: is film a 
worthwhile form of learning about the Holocaust?  Does it trivialise or bastardise 
the memories of the survivors and victims?  Is film merely about exploitation, or 
financial gain — ―blood money‖?  Does the medium debase the lives of those 
survivors?  How does a visual medium transcend the limitations of language, and 
thus communicate beyond language?  In this age, where the screen or the visual 
replaces the importance of the verbal, do the very individuals onscreen make the 
survivors‘ testimony more real, more believable?  Is the medium more effective at 
communicating descriptive scenes?  Are survivors‘ testimonies — transmuted 
through different cinematic devices, such as the cinematographer‘s camera lens — 
―more-real-than-real‖ (Baudrillard cited in Smart 1993:122)?  Or are they less 
effective or less believable because of the very use of these devices?  How much 
more accessible are testimonies when given in a cinematic form?   
  
With regard to voyeurism and the ―spectacularization of death‖ (Lubin 2004:227), 
feature films attempt to avoid elements of fantasy5. There is a very real danger of 
promoting an ethical indifference that is a by-product of aestheticisation.  Orly 
                                                 
5
 This question links with that of ―pornography of violence‖ and again one is referred to Dean 
(2004).   
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Lubin brings our attention to the dangers of what is referred to as ―Holocaust 
pornography‖ (2004:231). He explains that  
[W]hile some films genuinely investigate the sexualization of power, others 
eroticize death and exploit, for purposes of arousal and profit, the 
sadomasochistic dynamics inherent in the relations between victim and 
perpetrator (Lubin 2004:231).   
 
Orly Lubin also draws attention to the distraction that beauty creates — a beautiful 
actor, a stunning location, an exquisite dress — thereby once again highlighting the 
conflict between ethics and aesthetics (2004).  While Lubin is specifically referring 
to Holocaust feature films, one can easily apply his analysis to Kentridge‘s hand-
drawn animated films and the aesthetics thereof.  Kentridge‘s films contain many 
images that are simultaneously horrifying and beautiful, such as decapitated heads 
with lovely faces.  David Trend believes that beautiful artistic images of violence 
―imbue transcendental meaning, even beauty‖ (2007:118).  Roland Barthes was of 
the opinion that violent portrayals of human suffering serve to calm and placate 
one, because one views the images as having already occurred and therefore very 
much entrenched in the past.  In addition the events portrayed happened to ―them, 
not us‖ in a distant country (cited in Trend 2007:118).  These images serve as 
evidence that such pain will not be repeated.  David Levi Strauss, in his book titled 
Between the Eyes: Essays on Photography and Politics, writes: ―[S]uch images do 
not compel us to action, but to acceptance.  The action has already been taken, 
and we are not implicated‖ (2003:81)6.   
                                                 
6
 For a detailed reading and exploration of ―Holocaust pornography‖; ―pornography of violence‖; 
―empathy fatigue‖; and the desensitisation / numbness when viewing violent images, see Carolyn 
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David Bathrick also refers to Theodor W. Adorno‘s statement that to write poetry 
after Auschwitz is barbaric (2004).  He believes that Adorno was concerned with 
the perils inherent in the organised framework of active aesthetic experience.  He 
believes ―barbaric‖ refers to the ―inevitable feelings of pleasure evoked by certain 
historically contingent aesthetic expressions — the notion, more specifically, that a 
transfiguration can occur and that some of the horror of the event might thereby be 
ameliorated‖ (Bathrick 2004:294).  There is a danger in this (one is referred back to 
the mention of Kentridge‘s beautiful drawings of hideous topics).  In his 
rearticulating of Adorno‘s statement, Bathrick thinks that it is more important to hold 
close the road to an ―aesthetics of postmemory‖ (Hirsch 1997),  
as a reconstructing, even a working through, of the image as fetish and as 
iconic staple of the collective pictorial archive so necessary for the retrieval 
of Holocaust memory in the first place (Bathrick 2004:294).   
 
However, in the opinion of this study‘s author, viewing these images or creating 
these artistic visions can also be seen or experienced as cathartic.  At the 
beginning of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud introduced the term ―abreaction‖ 
(Rycroft 1972; cf. Freud 1899a and 1899b; 1991).  This refers to the expressing / 
identifying / discharging of emotion that is attached to repressed emotion relating to 
a specific experience.  Charles Rycroft wrote that in the early days of 
psychoanalysis, abreaction or catharsis as it is sometimes referred to, was 
believed to be highly therapeutic irrespective of whether or not the individual 
understood or could trace the importance of the repressed emotion / experience 
                                                                                                                                                    
Dean (2004).  William Kentridge has the following comment on the subject: ―desensitisation 
becomes another form of disremembering‖ (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:49). 
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(1972).  Basically if one watched a film in which the character‘s parents died, and 
one had many repressed emotions relating to the death of one‘s own parents, then 
one would emote during this episode.  This would be because it would unleash 
those very repressed emotions that one had repressed. 
 
With regard to the dream-like quality of life, Victor Burgin writes the following: 
Eddie Constantine, an actor portraying a character who acts in B-grade movies, in 
the short film La Paresse, directed by Jean-Luc Godard, refuses an offer of sex 
from a go-getting starlet.  He turns down her offer because he is loath to get 
dressed all over again (1996).  Alain Bergala, a film theorist, writes the following in 
response to this scene:   
Eddie Constantine marvellously embodies that very special state given by 
an immense lassitude, an apparent inertia which is in fact a state of great 
porosity to the strangeness of the world, a mixture of torpor, of loss of reality 
and a somewhat hallucinatory vivacity of sensations … Godard speaks to us 
of this very special way of being in the world (cited Burgin 1996:171).   
 
So too are Kentridge‘s portrayals of ―hallucinatory reality‖ in his films.   
 
Dan Cameron, on writing about Kentridge, also asks whether or not ―any visual 
artist working today has the necessary tools to produce representations of vast 
complex cultural and/or political issues‖ (1999:43).  He answers his own question, 
by stating that Kentridge, in his Drawings for Projection series,  
provides unexpected insight into how a single person [Soho/Felix] can 
become the repository of an entire culture‘s ideas and history, and how this 
can be transmitted in turn through the audience‘s instinctual responses to a 
character‘s behaviour, bypassing temporarily the ideological basis for the 
beliefs underlying that behaviour (1999:46). 
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This chapter now focuses on photography, memory and the concepts of absence 
and presence and the representation of traumata. 
 
7.2.2.3 Photography and representation 
 
In Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (1981), Roland Barthes‘ last work, 
he focuses on the legend of Orpheus.  According to Greek mythology, Orpheus 
was a musician with the ability to enchant plants and animals with his music.  He 
married a nymph, Eurydice.  Unfortunately she soon died after having been bitten 
by a poisonous snake.  Devastated by her death, Orpheus followed Eurydice to the 
underworld.  Using his music he enchanted the underworld deities (Persephone) 
into releasing her.  There was one condition.  Orpheus had to escort Eurydice to 
the upper world without casting his gaze upon her. He did look upon her though, 
with dire consequences — she disappeared completely:   
... yearning to see her with his own eyes,  
through love he turned,  
and with his gaze she slipped away and down.   
He stretched out his arms,  
struggling to embrace and be embraced,  
but unlucky and unhappy he grasped nothing ...  
 
(Ov. Meta. Bk:11 Ln. 61-66; tr. Morford & Lenardon 1977).  
   
For Barthes, a photograph becomes the gaze of Orpheus guaranteeing the 
"absence — as presence‖ in what he calls the ―noeme‖, that is, the certainty that 
―that-has-been‖ (1981:96).  The photograph is pure representation, and contains 
reality and the past.  In other words, if Orpheus had done what he was told to do — 
that is, not look at his wife (which represents absence) — Eurydice would have 
continued to exist (presence).  Yet the photograph captures the subject (or body; or 
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borrowing from Jean-Paul Sartre, the fact of ―being-in-itself‖ (Sartre 1957; cf. Flew 
1979:313) as an object (Wiseman 1989; cf. Moriarty 1991).  The photograph is a 
testament of lost time and lost memories. You know that the person existed 
because s/he is in the photograph. For Barthes, in photography, the presence of 
the thing (at a certain past moment) is never metaphoric.  Furthermore, in a 
"photograph ... the past is as certain as the present, what we see on paper is as 
certain as what we touch" (Kroker and Cook 1988:157).   In his film Sobriety, 
Obesity & Growing Old, Kentridge challenges this idea.  There is a scene where 
Soho Eckstein is at his desk at work.  He looks mournfully at the framed 
photograph of his wife.  Instead of seeing what he expected to see, that is, a fixed 
image of his wife, he is instead shown a mini-film of his wife cavorting with Felix 
Teitlebaum.   
 
In his book, Roland Barthes (1981) also links photography, history and the mother 
figure. He focuses on the mother figure in relation to the question of history, for his 
Mother (sic) represents his origins.  A photograph represents the trace of an origin 
and thus, a personal identity, the proof of having existed and therefore the right to 
exist.  History is that time when his mother was living, before him (Bruno 1987).  
And history implies the possibility of the dream of unity (Wiseman 1989).  
Photographs document existence in history, which are then transformed into 
memories of lives lived and lost. According to Michel Foucault, this documentation 
is imperative for perceiving temporality in terms of past and future (cited in Poster 
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1984).  The photograph bears witness to the reality of its object, where ―reality‖ is 
construed as presence (Wiseman 1989:143-147).   
 
Photography superimposes reality and the past, the signifier and the referent 
(signified) (Moriarty 1991).  Photography, according to Giuliana Bruno (1987), is 
designated the immense task of reasserting the referent, of re-appropriating the 
real and historical continuity.  Can one not say that in Kentridge‘s realistic drawings 
the historical referent is replaced by the drawing referent?  Are Kentridge‘s 
drawings not the same as photographs? The presence of Kentridge in a drawing 
―makes‖ him real.  The presence of the thing certainly is not metaphoric, but real — 
the miners, the slave ships, the capitalists, are they not real?  Kentridge‘s series 
have captured a world of memories — his and others.  Kentridge‘s drawings are a 
world of simulations, a world in which distinctions and differences between realities 
and referents have been effaced.  The real becomes not so much as what can be 
produced as "that which is already reproduced" (Jean Baudrillard cited in Smart 
1993:122).  Kentridge has eliminated the comparable distinction between imitation 
and reality.  His drawings are not mere illusions of realities, but what Baudrillard 
calls ―hyper-real‖ (cited in Smart 1993:122).  The unreal has become real. Again, 
his characters are "more-real-than-real" (Baudrillard cited in Kellner 1989:68).  
 
Another issue raised by Barthes‘ concept of the noeme (―that-has-been‖) of the 
photograph is the question of immortality. Immortality is unattainable — except in a 
photograph where the subject continues to ―exist‖ — lost time is reclaimed and lost 
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memories are re-remembered.  They are immortal in that they have been frozen in 
time.  And so too are Kentridge‘s drawings — frozen in time, documenting history.  
 
David Bathrick, with regard to both the absence and presence of an image, 
focuses specifically on ―the epochal non-enunciation of the Muselmann‖ 
(2004:290).  Survivors such as Jean Améry, Bruno Bettleheim, Primo Levi and 
Ruth Kluger (amongst others) refer to this spectre of a person.  The Muselmann 
gets his/her name from the adapted German word for ―Muslim‖ (association / 
reason unknown), and was the result of systematic, intentional torture and abuse 
by the SS through starving and working inmates to their proximal death, and 
through this very process turning them into submissive, compliant, wandering, 
spectral half dead beings (Bathrick 2004:291).  Jean Améry described them thus: 
―[H]e was a staggering corpse, a bundle of physical functions in its last 
convulsions‖ (1980:9; cf. Bathrick 2004).  This Muselmann has stubbornly 
remained on the periphery of descriptions and testimonies of the Holocaust. 
However Giorgio Agamben writes that it is ―a striking fact that although all 
witnesses speak of him as a central experience, the Muselmann is barely named in 
the historical studies on the destruction of European Jews‖ (1999:52; cf. Bathrick 
2004).   
 
Through his own studies, Agamben has reported an ―absence of visual 
representations‖ of this functional corpse.  He refers to cinematic footage taken by 
the Allies when they liberated Bergen-Belson, describing what he sees as ―living 
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people, a group of prisoners … wandering on foot like ghosts‖ and has reported 
that this remains the sole evidence or visual representation of these spectres 
(1999:51).  
 
For the author of this doctoral study, it begs the question why: why this absence of 
imagery of the Muselmann? Furthermore, does this absence suggest that there 
remains the question of how to portray these individuals and ultimately whether or 
not one should attempt to portray them?  A discussion on this non-portrayal of the 
Muselmann follows below in an attempt to address these questions and engage 
with them, albeit briefly. This discussion is then related to Kentridge‘s works. The 
Muselmann phenomenon is one that is looked at almost in disgust, and Primo Levi 
allocates their representation to the ―gray zone‖ (1989:36-69).  Bruno Bettleheim 
and other victims rather shockingly express their ambiguous emotions of shame, 
disappointment, anguish and loathing towards the Muselmann (1960).  Bettleheim 
believes that these mixed emotions towards these ―ghosts‖ are mere projection on 
the part of the survivors — their own torment and fury / rage at their existence, a 
reminder of ―their own imminent systematic transformation into a nonhuman being‖ 
(Bettleheim 1960:156; cf. Bathrick 2004).  Primo Levi extrapolates on this by 
stating that there was even an ―institutionalized complicity with the SS among 
prisoners‖ who focused on their own survival, even going so far as to knock these 
ghosts down — for what was the purpose of yet another Muselmann dragging 
him/herself to work — they were an unnecessary burden (1996:88).  Of the 
Muselmann, Levi further writes that all those ―who finish in the gas chambers have 
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the same story, or more exactly, have no story; they followed the slope down to the 
bottom, like streams that run into the seas‖ (1996:90; cf. Bathrick 2004:293).   
 
This is similar to those streams of unidentified workers found in Kentridge‘s 
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris. They have a ―ghostly‖, ―nonhuman‖ air 
about them (see Figure 7.24 and Figure 7.25). The proletariat represented in his 
film are not subjects of pity, not deserving of empathy, but rather derision and 
disgust / revulsion (from Soho Eckstein‘s point of view). Thus Soho Eckstein 
throws food scraps at them, rather than feeling sorry for them and giving them food 
parcels, or increasing their pay so they can afford to buy more food (see Figure 
7.26: Eckstein and his overflowing table of food from which he hurls the food).  Are 
they an embarrassment perhaps, because the assumption is that they are not 
workers, but rather slaves, in Soho Eckstein‘s employment? Their poverty is a 
direct result of their working conditions and below subsistence earnings — for 
which Soho Eckstein is undoubtedly responsible.  His actions completely 
dehumanise them.  His throwing food leftovers at them is done with real anger and 
scorn, no sympathy whatsoever is evident.  If he truly empathised with them he 
would no longer view them as his slaves to be exploited, but as individuals who 
work for him, deserving of better pay and better working conditions. 
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Figure 7.26 Drawing from Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris (Godby 
1992:unpaginated). 
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Figure 7.27 Drawing from Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris (Godby 
1992:unpaginated). 
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Figure 7.28 Drawing from Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris (Cameron, 
Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:52). 
 
Is Kentridge‘s work a ―tortured scream‖ (to paraphrase Adorno)?  William 
Kentridge‘s films embody / offer what Robert Kolker (2002) calls a dialectical 
mimetic expression; an expression of atrocities that disturbs viewers, forcing one to 
scrutinise one‘s own values and beliefs rather than pandering to, or satisfying them 
(see Figure 7.29 and Figure 7.30).  
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Figure 7.29 Drawing used in the animation for the play Faustus in Africa! (Cameron, 
Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:21). 
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Figure 7.30 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:95). 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
These mediums show the importance of such representations, or re-
representations, in the role of remembering atrocities, and the significance of art in 
reaching audiences normally untouched by such occurrences.  Having discussed 
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memory, representation and aesthetics, this study now turns its attention to 
Chapter Eight: Memory, History, Identity, Time and Space. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: QUESTIONS OF MEMORY, REPRESENTATION AND 
AESTHETICS 
 
This chapter focuses on different artistic mediums and their importance in 
representing human suffering and tragedy.  It concentrates on how artists and 
filmmakers represent what is thought to be “the un-representable”. From literary 
works to films and then photography, the chapter attempts to show the significance 
of these mediums in their role in perpetuating memories and lived experiences.  
Artistic portrayals of violence unleashed upon the collective and the individual 
serve to guard against the repetition and condoning of such atrocities. The 
inclusion of examples of representations, or re-representations, of memory / 
memories; traumas; and memorialisation might seem an unnecessary excursion.  
However, as with all qualitative research comparative analyses are of the utmost 
importance (Christians and Carey 1981).  There are several reasons for this.  
Firstly the comparisons between artistic representations provide further credibility 
to the researcher’s interpretations and analysis of Kentridge’s films.  Secondly, the 
reference to these comparative examples assists with the clarification of certain 
features.  Thirdly, by making conceptual comparisons, it supports definitions and 
exacts concepts used throughout this study to interpret Kentridge’s films. In 
addition to that, this chapter serves to strengthen and contextualise the link 
between Kentridge’s art and the Holocaust (artistic representations). Therefore, at 
the centre of this chapter is memory and its often unique and challenging 
depictions. With regard to memory, Susan Sontag writes rather poignantly in her 
book Regarding the Pain of Others: “[R]emembering is an ethical act, has ethical 
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value in and of itself.  Memory is, achingly, the only relation we can have with the 
dead” (2003:174). 
 
7.1 Representation 
Theodor W. Adorno famously wrote:  “[T]o write a poem after Auschwitz is 
barbaric” (cited in Howe 2003:288; cf.  Adorno 1951 / 1991).  It is often misquoted 
but continues to be debated amongst academics and the like (Hirsch and 
Kacandes 2004; Howe 2003; LaCapra 2003; cf. Adorno 1981:17-34; Adorno 
1991:37-54).  Adorno later answered this question himself explaining that 
“consolation necessarily finds its only outlet in art” (cited in Gubar 2004:167; cf. 
Adorno 1981:17-34; Adorno 1991:37-54).  Yet, the question of whether or not art 
can represent hideous atrocities perpetrated against humankind is a contested 
question; as is how artists choose to portray these atrocities (Dean 2004; Gubar 
2004; Hirsch and Kacandes 2004; LaCapra 2003).   
 
Jennifer Arlene Stone is a psychoanalyst with a private practice in New York who 
has written extensively on William Kentridge’s work.  She extrapolates on Adorno’s 
last statement:  “art’s symbolic strivings against the vacuum, the collapse of 
symbolization after Auschwitz, are the sole guarantee against culture’s dementia” 
(2003:63).  In this manner, Kentridge believes that art is a cry, ““Alas!”  He answers 
Adorno’s quandary “Alas, there is the lyric!””  (Stone 2003:67; cf. Christov-
Bakargiev 1998).  Furthermore, Kentridge is quoted in Stone: “[T]here is still poetry 
after Apartheid” (2003:67). From his statement the author of this thesis has come 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
208 | P a g e  
 
to the conclusion that Kentridge is of the opinion that art has its place in 
perpetuating memory and that carrying on with life after such a tragedy is 
important.   His previous statement is poignant because he has obviously debated 
and provocatively thought about whether or not one should, or can carry on as 
before.  It is indeed a “quandary” — Kentridge seems to imply that that in itself has 
poetry about it. The ambiguity is of course that even after the Holocaust, and other 
atrocities such as the Palestinian or apartheid atrocities, the living do indeed carry 
on living and creating art.  The ability to continue life as before is also something 
that Kentridge explores in History of the Main Complaint.  It is mentioned and 
commented on in Chapter Five, but to reiterate briefly: Soho/Felix encounters 
atrocities and memories of atrocities as he drives along a lonely, empty road1. 
Soho/Felix then becomes very ill, lapsing into a “coma” of sorts, where his 
unconscious attempts to deal with his own hand in such atrocities / actions / 
complicity.  Is it remorse he shows afterwards?  Perhaps so, but still, it is him back 
at his desk, and it is “business as usual”.  So whether or not Kentridge identifies 
with the protagonist or the victim, he seems to admit reluctantly that the living 
continues to do just that: carry on living. Kentridge has added to Theodor W. 
Adorno’s quote by stating that he is concerned with “time’s dulling of memory and 
intense passion” (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1999:13).  Jennifer Arlene Stone also 
writes, rather relevantly, that William Kentridge’s work is imbued “with “saudade,” a 
Portuguese “yearning” indicative of achieved mourning.  … “Fado” intones an 
                                                 
1
 One of the images that Kentridge includes is of a man being beaten by two other men. This is 
something that he actually witnessed as a child while riding in a car with his grandfather, he clearly 
remembers this: “shocking image of violence”; incorporating the image into his film (Kentridge cited 
in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:29); cf.  Chapter Two.   
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acceptance of one’s “fate” against the lugubrious verdict of German pessimism 
after Adorno …” (2003:87).  Author Okwui Enwezor has described Kentridge’s 
works as “post-Holocaust” because, he argues, Kentridge’s oeuvre deals with the 
“aftermath of a horrific period of history” (cited in Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and 
Cameron 2001:33).   
 
Also referring to Theodor W. Adorno’s famous statement, Susan Gubar adds that 
“the idea of writing poetry of such barbarism is repulsive at worst and inane at best” 
(2004:170).  She suggests that poetry, (and read here, by extension all art) has a 
place in Holocaust remembrance because it is able to articulate a contradiction. It 
highlights the difficulty that the representation of such horrors is unattainable, yet it 
also highlights the importance of trying to do so.  Perhaps in a mediated form of 
poetry / art the horrific might be more believable or transmittable than more realistic 
portrayals?  This can be said of Kentridge’s works: his traumatic past growing up in 
a brutal regime of apartheid and his postmemories are represented as fantastical 
and surreal in his films, yet his work is also authentic, convincing and, yes, even 
very realistic.   
 
“The past can be seized only as an image,” writes Walter Benjamin “and every 
image of the past that is not recognized by the present as of its own concerns 
threatens to disappear irretrievably” (1963:255).  By dismissing narrative order, by 
pouncing on specific images of the past, poets (read here artists as well) not only 
highlight discontinuities, but they engage in the psychological, the intellectual, the 
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social, the political, ethical and aesthetic elements without attempting to recreate 
the horrors in their totalities.  They basically do not attempt to answer or provide a 
solution for past iniquities but offer insight where there might be none.  They 
(artists / authors) attempt to show the impossibility of a coherent understandable 
story / drawing, they instead offer “spurts of vision, baffling but nevertheless 
powerful pictures of fragmentary scenes unassimilated into an explanatory plot” 
(Gubar 2004:166).  Trauma itself is not experienced as a narrative — but like 
flashbacks artists provide images that at once testify to its existence and to the fact 
that an event can defy comprehensibility and understanding.  Artist’s images are 
like those in the unconscious — fragmentary and elusive, yet they exist.  Artists’ 
depiction of trauma is often “an involuntary return to intense feelings about an 
incomprehensible, incommunicable moment” but in this format the images of the 
trauma can be revisited in relative safety, trying to deal with it and its 
consequences without being “silenced by it” (Gubar 2004:166).  As Geoffrey 
Hartman suggests, there is a form of “memory envy”, “whereby those who have not 
gone through traumatic experiences adopt these experiences, or identify with 
them” (2004:230; cf. Hartman 1996).  This of course is similar to Hirsch’s concept 
of “postmemory” (1997) cited and discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, the Adorno conundrum was strongly stated, this 
section returns to that enquiry. Bella Brodzki claims that the trauma of the 
Holocaust has become an existential and dominant question / concept of modern 
existence.  How does one describe the indescribable; how does one portray the 
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unportrayable? (2004:133). By extension, Darfur and apartheid are just two recent 
(2008) examples where the existential question applies. Imre Kertész, a Holocaust 
survivor, suggests that were the Holocaust to find a reliable language to describe 
the indescribable, “wouldn’t this language have to be so terrifying, so lugubrious, 
that it would destroy those who speak it?”  (2002:39; cf. Stark 2004:199).  This also 
refers back to the Frederic Nietzsche quote in Chapter Five that comments on 
“looking into the abyss” (1979a:99).  Is Kentridge being destroyed by his portrayals 
of wicked deeds, or is it a form of catharsis for him?  Kentridge’s works are also 
what Paul Virilio expressly termed “the teletopological puzzle”, that is, “all of these 
together (photography, cinema, film, television) — ‘together’ not as a totality but as 
a constantly shifting constellation of fragments” (cited in Burgin 1996:22).  The term 
is useful to apply to Kentridge’s use of a wide array of disparate artistic mediums 
that he uses in his works.  Poet and art critic Rainer Maria Rilke put it thus in his 
observation on Honoré Balzac’s works: “this kind of drawing is not of contours, but 
of oscillating transitions” (cited in Stone 2003:73): this is a pertinent description to 
apply to Kentridge’s films.  
 
However, although this study has argued that Kentridge’s works portray the 
indescribable authentically and realistically, (using surreal imagery at times)2 it can 
                                                 
2
 This is possibly more apt when discussing Kentridge’s films as his works are both “dreadful” 
(hideous images) and “consoling” (references to remorse and social responsibility).  His works are 
especially “hallucinatory”, considering the surreal aspects / images in them.  To quote Alfred Jarry, 
who was writing about his play Ubu Roi: “[R]ecounting understandable things merely burdens the 
spirit and falsifies memory, whereas the absurd invigorates the spirit and engages memory” (cited in 
Cooke 2001:56).  Kentridge’s films, according to Ari Sitas, are “playfully using all the post-dadaist 
and surrealist techniques to disturb and animate his imagery” (2001:63).  
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still be argued that his various mediums of doing so are in fact too fantastical to be 
credible.  Pre-empting this argument, this chapter looks at the different mediums 
that Kentridge makes use of to portray the “lugubrious” (Kertész 2002:39; see 
Figure 7.1).  The chapter cites previous studies and examples that have been 
artistically created in a similar vein, thereby giving further credibility (through 
comparability) to the authenticity of Kentridge’s oeuvre and the themes that it 
portrays.  Firstly, the chapter looks at writing / drawing artists; secondly, the 
medium of film, and thirdly, photography. After all, Kentridge’s works are truly a 
“teletopological puzzle”, as Paul Virilio would put it (cited in Burgin 1996:2).   
 
Figure 7.1 Drawing from Mine (Godby 1992:unpaginated). 
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7.2 Re-representations 
7.2.1 Artists / authors 
The storytelling or novelistic approach to the historical past, which acknowledges 
our continuing distance from it, becomes less about representation and more about 
“memory, mourning, and reconstruction in different interpretive communities” 
(DeKoven Ezrahi 2004:61).  Furthermore,  
[I]n different interpretive communities, the search for a unique language 
adequate to unprecedented experience has yielded to a search for recovery 
of artistic conventions as a way to restore social order in the wake of 
cataclysm and to reclaim a purchase on the future that is continuous with 
the pre-traumatic past (DeKoven Ezrahi 2004:61).   
 
Most importantly, in Israel the idea of authenticity in representing the Holocaust 
has been replaced by what DeKoven Ezrahi defines as “empathetic projection” 
(2004:62).  Kentridge’s films do just that: through his empathy and identification, 
Kentridge portrays the dreadfulness of apartheid in a unique cinematic and artistic 
way. 
 
Some academics / authors / theorists are critical of the Holocaust purists. Purists 
look back to the crematoria, and insist that authenticity, authority and 
representation are to be protected.  For them Auschwitz becomes “the sole 
determinant and ultimate extinguisher of meaning” (DeKoven Ezrahi 2004:64).    
They see the past — suspended / fixed temporarily and spatially — which has 
resulted in “a culture of the unsayable, the elusive, the inscrutable, and the 
immutable” (DeKoven Ezrahi 2004:64).  Is this not defeatist in a sense, since who 
is to decide what is an authentic portrayal? 
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This section focuses on the following three authors / artists: art spiegelman (sic)3, 
Pascal Croci and Joe Kubert.  Like Kentridge they too have made use of animation 
to portray tragedies.   
 
7.2.1.1 art spiegelman (sic) 
There are varied ways of witnessing trauma, with one such perspective being 
‘generational’.  Since the early 1970s, much research has dwelt on the effects of 
“what may be unbound, unintegrated, unshared massive traumatization” (Brodzki 
2004:132).  How relevant is language to communicate such a legacy? And by 
extension, how relevant is art to communicate such a heritage?  Efraim Sicher 
(2004), in his essay Postmemory, Backshadowing, Separation: Teaching Second-
generation Holocaust Fiction, asks the question of whether or not the children of 
survivors of the Holocaust have the right to their and their parents’ stories: as 
“second-generation witnesses” (Bauman 1998; Berger 1998; Sicher 2004). Are 
they claiming a martyrdom not their own?  Froma I. Zeitlin believes that such 
writers (read “artists” here) “represent the past through modes of enactment — 
even reanimation — through which the self, the ‘ego’, the ‘one who was not there’, 
now takes on a leading role as a active presence” (Zeitlin 1998:6; cf. Sicher 2004; 
Zeitlin 2001).  Efraim Sicher believes that “absent memory” is still made of angst 
and other post-traumatic stress-related symptoms (see Chapter Six).  As of now, 
there are no known statistics on whether or not second generation individuals 
                                                 
3 art spiegelman (sic) specifically spells his name with lower case letters, although it is not known 
why, out of respect for his choice, this study does so too. 
 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
215 | P a g e  
 
share a common pathology, and it is almost impossible to gauge just how much 
post-traumatic stress they have inherited from their parents / siblings.  
“Generational transference” of traumatic memory is more than likely to be affected 
by both national memory and the local environs (Bar-On 1995; Fox 1999; Hass 
1996; Sicher 2004).  Second generation children, as well as their social / age 
groups (not of biological relations to victims / survivors), are expected, and even 
forced, “to imagine their way from a common post-Holocaust existence into a past 
of which they have no personal memory” (Sicher 2004:263; cf. Grossman 1989 / 
2002).   
 
These generations have “inherited ghosts in the family cupboard” (Rosembaum 
1999a:59-60; cf. Sicher 2004), and history has “maimed them before birth” 
(Rosembaum1999b; Sicher 2004:263).  Melvin J. Bukiet, a writer and a child of 
survivors, has commented that “[F]or anyone who wasn’t there, on either side of 
the barbed wire, Jew or German, thinking about the Holocaust is really an act of 
the imagination.  All we know is how little we know” (2002:16). 
 
art spiegelman (sic) wrote and drew a two-volume book: Maus: My Father Bleeds 
History Volume I (1986), and A Survivor’s Tale Volume II (1991), which details the 
legacy of the survivors’ son: himself, as “Artie” (the protagonist and cartoon / 
graphic son; see Figures 7.2 — 7.7).  This is a radical form of communication — an 
attempt to share his father’s oral testimony about his survival of the Holocaust with 
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the rest of the world — a graphic novel of trauma as an uncomprehendable 
devastation.  Maus contains episodes and dialogue that  
expose, examine, and problematize from every conceivable perspective, 
through every technical and intellectual resource available to spiegelman, 
especially the instrument of mordant irony, the complex phenomenon of 
familial transmission and inheritance (Brodzki 2004:132; cf. spiegelman 
1986 / 1991).    
 
art spiegelman’s Maus is about how the second generation reworks the images of 
a wrecked past.  It is less about his parents’ original trauma and more about the 
son’s reworking of that trauma.  James E. Young suggests that spiegelman’s Maus 
is a work of “received history — a narrative hybrid that interweaves both events of 
the Holocaust and the ways that they are passed down to us” (Young 2000:15; cf. 
Young 2004).  spiegelman’s reworking is an “historicizing process” — the focus is 
not on the events themselves but rather on how one recovers these events, which 
results in one being aware of what s/he does / does not understand (Bathrick 
2004:297).  Maus is a hybrid, a montage of double narration, sub-plots and 
contradictions (spiegelman 1986 / 1991).  Andreas Huyssen posits that Maus is “an 
estrangement effect in the service of ‘mimetic approximation’”. For example, the 
animal drawings / depictions suggest a possible political allegorisation: Germans 
as cats, Jews as mice, and Poles as pigs (Huyssen 2000:28-44; cf. Huyssen 
2003).  Through this inversion of reality and a reworking / re-imagining of such 
events / types, the imagery becomes expatriated from its origins; “it is not an 
authentic replication of the real” (Bathrick 2004:298).  By this one assumes 
Bathrick is stating that they are not identical reproductions, but representations.  
Artists like spiegelman and Claude Lanzmann (who made the film Shoah) are 
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committed to finding new and innovative ways of visualising the Holocaust; this is 
based on the belief that in order to remember one needs to see and work through 
the past.  They serve as examples that there is no one “true and all-encompassing 
visualization” of the past (Bathrick 2004:298).  The same can be said of Kentridge’s 
films.  His Drawings for Projection series provide his audience with a new and 
unique way of viewing apartheid. 
 
Memorial books, or yizkor, are a form of survivor testimony — small volumes of 
multi-authored accounts in the form of notes, poems, maps, drawings, 
photographs. They are all an attempt not only to encapsulate the life of a 
community before the Holocaust, but also an attempt at preserving first-hand 
accounts of the horrors of the war.  These memorial books have given rise to post-
memorial (read here “postmemory”; cf.  Hirsch 1997) books — texts that are 
endeavours between the survivor and others — often second generation family 
members.  Examples are spiegelman’s Maus (1986 / 1991) and Alina Bacall-Zwirn 
and Jared Stark’s No Common Place (1999).  Both capture the memory of others, 
and the relationships that evolve between the teller and the hearer of these 
experiences.  Jared Stark believes that these post-memorial books are an 
insistence “that witnessing can and should be a collective endeavour, an 
endeavour that does not simply enshrine the past but that recognizes its abiding 
presence” (2004:202).   
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Yet Stephen Tabachnick identifies Maus not as a memoir, but as an 
“autobiographical graphic novel” (1993:154-162).  He arrives at this conclusion by 
asserting that spiegelman recounts the documentary-biography of his father, 
Vladek Spiegelman, as a journey of discovery from his biological roots to his 
psychological and ethnic foundations.  This journey begins with historical 
knowledge / facts but ends up with a knowledge that is no longer unconscious or 
covert, but “active and personal” (Tabachnick 1993:154).   
 
Maus is the voicing of a survivor’s muteness which stresses the importance of the 
“communicability of repressed memory and the efficacy of artistic ventriloquism” 
(Morahg 1999:457-479; Sicher 2004:267).  In Maus, spiegelman transposes the 
categories of victim and survivor.  Such a “transposition enacts past trauma as if it 
were present, bringing order to the chaos of history as well as internalizing the 
identities of both perpetrators and victims” (Kestenberg 1982:148-149; Sicher 
2004:267).   
 
This internalisation of course, runs the risk of being relegated to moral relativism, 
but it could also be seen as the unlocking and introduction of Primo Levi’s “gray 
zone” (sic) of the Holocaust “where there are no clear-cut ethical choices” (Levi 
1998:36; cf. Levi 1996 and 1998; Sicher 2004:268). 
  
This study suggests the following observations: in his comic books spiegelman 
portrays his own insecurities — at once guilty and suffering from angst.  How does 
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he compete with an immortalised and ever-enduring brother he never knew? 
Would “I” have endured; what if “I” had not survived; and how might “I” have defied 
death; how do “I” contend with such martyrdom (cf. Brodzki 2004)? Discussing his 
guilt with his wife, spiegelman makes a statement, which the author of this study 
believes, reveals his real obsession with his inheritance, despite his denial: “Don’t 
get me wrong.  I wasn’t obsessed with this stuff … It’s just that sometimes I’d 
fantasize Zyklon B coming out of our shower instead of water” (spiegelman 
1991:16; see Figure 7.6).  
 
It is intriguing to note just how similar and dissimilar spiegelman and Kentridge’s 
works are.  That they are both animated is obvious; whether you want to term the 
one cartoon-like and the other animated, whether the one is in hand-drawn pencil 
and the other hand-drawn charcoal, the one a graphic novel(s) the other animated 
film(s), are all really technical details of a dis / similar kind.  They are however 
expressions of guilt and (post)memories — their own and others.  That they have 
chosen to draw “their experiences” shows an intimacy and a desire to exorcise or 
own their own guilt and compliance in these tales.  Whether you want to 
academicitise and psychologise and name their guilt as survivor guilt, guilt by 
association, generational guilt, upper middle-class guilt or even relative guilt, their 
guilt is apparent.  That spiegelman says that he was not obsessed with his parents’ 
stories is in the opinion of the author of this dissertation, a form of denial, a way of 
processing his guilt.  Extrapolating from this, the same can be said of Kentridge’s 
films, they too are a form of processing his guilt. 
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Figure 7.2 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. My Father Bleeds History. Volume I (spiegelman 1986: 
the front cover). 
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Figure 7.3 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. And Here my Troubles Began. Volume II. (spiegelman 
1991: the front cover).  
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Figure 7.4 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. And Here my Troubles Began. Volume II. (spiegelman 
1991:contents page: unpaginated). 
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Figure 7.5 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. And Here my Troubles Began. Volume II. 
(spiegelman 1991:15). 
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Figure 7.6 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. And Here my Troubles Began. Volume II. 
(spiegelman 1991:16). 
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Figure 7.7 Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. And Here my Troubles Began. Volume II. 
(spiegelman 1991: prologue page: unpaginated). 
 
7.2.1.2 Pascal Croci 
Dori Laub, in his essay Bearing Witness; or, The Vicissitudes of Listening 
(2003:221-229) warns of self-defence mechanisms, like denial, that often come 
into play when exposed to death narratives.  However, there are other 
psychological and physical feelings that also present themselves, such as 
sympathy, empathy, extreme anger, and most importantly, “identification” (Laub 
2003:221-229).  Pascal Croci, born in 1961, researched his topic for five years 
before producing the graphic novel / book of pencil sketches, titled simply 
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Auschwitz (2005).  He writes / draws of the experiences of a married couple, 
survivors of the death camp, where their only daughter was murdered.  The story 
finds them in the middle of a civil war in the former Yugoslavia in 1993.  They are 
waiting their execution as traitors, and while they wait they remember their past in 
Auschwitz.  Once again, through the emotion of empathy and identification, author 
and artist Croci has created a brilliant portrayal of experiences not his own.  
Through the unconventional medium of pencil sketches he documents history 
realistically and devastatingly, and also authentically (see Figures 7.8 — 7.11). 
 
Figure 7.8 Auschwitz (Croci 2004: the front cover). 
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Figure 7.9 Auschwitz (Croci 2004:18). 
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Figure 7.10 Auschwitz (Croci 2004:56). 
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Figure 7.11 Auschwitz (Croci 2004:74). 
 
7.2.1.3 Joe Kubert 
In the introduction to his comic / graphic novel Yossel — April 19, 1943 (2003), Joe 
Kubert writes: “[I]t was something I believed I just had to do.  […]  This book is the 
result of “What if?”  It is a work of fiction based on a nightmare of facts” (A graphic 
novel … 2003).   
 
Joe Kubert’s family emigrated to the United States of America in 1926, from 
Yzeran, Poland, thereby escaping the horror of the Holocaust.  A famous 
cartoonist, Kubert can add Tarzan, Batman, The Flash and Sgt. Rock to his 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
230 | P a g e  
 
repertoire of art. Haunted by the annihilation of the Jews and based on the 
descriptions of his neighbours and family friends, Kubert finally decided to pen and 
draw (in pencil) an alternate version of history, one where his family does not 
emigrate and he experiences the degradation and dehumanisation of the war 
firsthand.  He situates himself in the middle of the Warsaw ghetto as a thirteen year 
old with a gift for drawing.  His gift saves him from being deported to Auschwitz, but 
not his family.  The fate of his family and news of the death camps filter back to 
him.  He decides to fight back and takes part in the famous Warsaw uprising, 
beginning on April 19 1943, hence the title of the book.  His sketchbook art has a 
similar “feel” to it as Kentridge’s work does.  Rough, jagged, unprocessed, and 
sometimes incomplete, the sketches are realistic and portray and express those 
experiences of ghettoised Jews — hunger, bewilderment, shock and trauma (see 
Figures 7.12 — 7.14).  Placing himself at the centre of the story, he personalises 
the narrative, making it easy to identify and sympathise with him.   
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Figure 7.12 Yossel — April 19, 1943 (Kubert 2003: the front cover). 
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Figure 7.13 Yossel — April 19, 1943  
(Kubert 2003:2). 
Figure 7.14 Yossel — April 19, 1943 (Kubert 2003:54). 
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Once again here is a hand-drawn graphic novel filled with postmemories, beautiful 
and horrifying all at once. Saul Friedländer believes that it is essential to represent 
the unrepresentable, even if doing so “transgresses the boundaries of the 
permissible and tests unconventional representational and conceptual categories” 
(1992a:2-3; cf. Sicher 2004). 
 
He argues that in doing so, self-identification becomes possible and the conspiracy 
of generational silence ends (Friedländer 1992:2-3; cf. Friedländer 1992a, 1992b 
and 1993; Sicher 2004:265).  Kubert’s Yossel — April 19, 1943; spiegelman’s 
Maus; Croci’s Auschwitz; and Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection series do just 
that.  Their portrayals of horror and all that is associated with that repulsion 
transcend the ordinary and the prosaic, and in doing so not only do they bear 
witness to experiences not their own, they reach audiences that might not normally 
be exposed to such experiences.  Their unconventionality makes these works 
unique and therefore memorable, provoking discussion and the raising of 
questions that are outside the norm.  They catch one off guard. 
 
These artists, including Kentridge, are all remarkable.  Not only are their art works 
exquisite, the tales told are heinous, fascinating and poignant (and even 
sometimes humorous).  The fact that these artists / writers allow us a glimpse into 
their postmemories, their unconscious minds, is astonishing.  How they convey / 
represent these stories / (post)memories / experiences is also extraordinary.  But 
most significant of all is their ability to empathise, extrapolate and identify with 
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experiences too hideous to bear / contemplate. In a materialistic, alienating 
contemporary society, that is the most exceptional / noteworthy / significant of all.  
Having discussed the (post)memory representations of three authors, this chapter 
now turns its focus to the medium of film and (post)memory. 
 
7.2.2 Film and postmemory 
In 1992 documentary film maker David MacDougall wrote an essay entitled Films 
of Memory.  He claims that the value of films of memory lies in the ability of film “to 
leave representation behind and to confront the viewer once again with the primary 
stimuli of physical experience” (1992:267-269; cf. Burgin 1996).  Furthermore,  
 
[A] residue of a clearly physical nature remains in film images which are not 
available in verbal narratives, and its importance should not be 
underestimated.  Film images may be reinterpreted in a variety of new 
contexts, but the unalterable record of appearance and place contained in 
them may ultimately prove to have a more profound effect upon our 
“memory” of history than the interpretations we attach to them (1992:267-
269).   
 
This is so apposite for Kentridge’s works: his physical remnants or traces of 
charcoal are interpreted one way and then when he makes changes to that very 
drawing, it is interpreted another way, yet it is still the “same” drawing. 
 
Claude Morhange-Bégué in her book Chambert: Reflections from an Ordinary 
Childhood (2000) is an autobiography that focuses on her separation from her 
mother at an early age: the arrest of her mother by the Gestapo.  She reconstructs 
the scene, going over it again and again, throughout the autobiography.   
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
235 | P a g e  
 
According to Bella Brodzki this is the same as a “traumatic flashback” (2004:131).  
The autobiography, written many years after the incident, indicates the 
incommensurability of language to describe the indescribable — the mental image 
is so vivid but she cannot remember or conjure up the right  words to describe the 
incident — there is, as Brodzki points out, a “disjunctive relation of image and 
language to memory” (2004:131; cf. Morhange-Bégué 2000).  A play by the name 
of The Story I am about to Tell was written about the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Christov-Bakargiev 1998).  It was fairly unique because it included 
three witnesses that had presented evidence to the TRC.  The play consisted of 
them re-telling their testimonies every night before an audience.  These survivors 
retold their hideous experiences.  However, one night during a performance, one 
witness forgot his lines, despite the fact that this was his own testimony.  William 
Kentridge wrote: “[T]he most moving moment for me was when the survivor of 
three years on death row had a lapse of memory.  How could he forget his own 
story?” (Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:129).  This incident supports 
what Brodzki has claimed; and highlights how memory can fail one.  The witnesses 
are describing memories of memories of memories, every night, yet there is bound 
to be a lapse in memory at some stage. 
 
In the individual’s memory actual events mix with fantasies as well as with 
fragments of memories from photographs, films and television broadcasts.  
Sociologist Marie-Claude Taranger wrote an essay in 1991 which documents an 
oral history project (over four hundred recorded interviews).  Her essay records 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
236 | P a g e  
 
that there is a universal tendency for one’s personal history to be intermingled with 
memories of films and other productions of the media (cited in Burgin 1996).  She 
writes that: the function of the film is clear: it completes life; it fills the holes in life.  
It allowed the narrators to see — “it allows them today to recount — events which 
they did not personally encounter, fragments of History (sic) which are not part of 
their own history” (cited in Burgin 1996:226).  Taranger’s results are similar to the 
psychoanalytical stance on screen memories.  For example, one might say that a 
particular scene from a film “in which the parents of the young heroine are killed 
when they place their bodies between her and the German guns — has come to 
serve the narrator as a screen memory, representing the repressed fantasy of the 
death of her own parents” (cited in Burgin 1996:228; cf.  Chapter Six of this thesis 
for details on Sigmund Freud’s concept of “screen memories”). 
 
There is another case where the personal witness has appropriated the contents of 
another individual’s life: a narrator provides detailed descriptions of conditions in 
the concentration camps.  Conversely, in this case, the narrator had never been to 
a concentration camp herself.  However, her brother had been incarcerated in a 
concentration camp in Poland during the WWII.  Upon his return, he never once 
spoke of the conditions he experienced there to his sister.  Upon his fathers death 
he cut all ties off with his sister.  Taranger’s insight is as follows: “[T]he borrowed 
speech and images have clearly come to fill the absence of brotherly speech, and 
of the brother himself” (cited in Burgin 1996:228).  Furthermore, she made 
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observations about: “[M]emories of facts [mixed] with memories of images, or of 
words, and even with memories of memories” (cited in Burgin 1996:228).  Also,  
[F]rom such heterogeneous psychical materials, the individual narrator 
would reconstruct her or his hybrid personal history — imposing a coherent 
narrative order on the discontinuous fragments (cited in Burgin 1996:228). 
 
Victor Burgin (1996:229) draws attention to the similarity to Sigmund Freud’s 
“secondary revision”.  Freud suggested that “the delusion owes its convincing 
power to the elements of historical truth which it inserts in the place of rejected 
reality” (cited in Burgin 1996:229).  
 
It seems that the fictional passages of recorded history are given credibility by the 
passages of actually experienced events, creating a coherent narrative.  One of 
her results posits that film serves not only as a source of memory but is also a 
source of authority.  “Authority” here is taken from the wide societal / communal 
character of an experience, as if the belief “we all saw it” makes it “the truth” 
(Burgin 1996:229; cf. Chapter Eight of this thesis for the section on history and 
memory). 
 
Marie-Claude Taranger, on the basis of her empirical evidence, concludes that 
authenticity should be viewed in other than binary terms of “true” and “false”:  
[I]t is no longer conceivable to consider only the exactitude of facts or the 
sincerity of witnesses.  It is also necessary to take into account in all their 
complexity the procedures which preside at the construction of the story … 
Against the illusion of a simple past, which would only have to be recovered, 
there is thus imposed the necessity of bringing to light the multiple and 
changing relations which ceaselessly produce interference, in an infinite 
play of repetitions and variations, between the voices and the images of the 
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individual and the group, of a past and of its futures (cited in Burgin 
1996:229).   
 
Psychoanalyst Judith Butler writes similarly:  
[W]hat are called “moments” are not distinct and equivalent units of time, for 
the “past’” will be the accumulation and congealing of such “moments” to the 
point of their indistinguishability (1993:245).    
 
However, it will also consist of that which is refused from construction, the “domain 
of the repressed, forgotten, and the irrecoverably foreclosed” (1993:245).    
 
Concurring with Taranger, Victor Burgin states that the “shape-shifting hybrid 
objects that coalesce in psychical space from the mnemic debris of films, 
photographs, television shows, and other sources of images” (1996:239), are of 
interest.    
 
These “hybrid objects” are situated in part in an imaginary world and in part in a 
real world.   Marie-Claude Taranger’s study attests to our constant ability to 
confuse ourselves with others, fictive and real.  “Identification is the privileged 
mechanism by which other histories and memories become our own” (Burgin 
1996:239).  William Kentridge’s films are “hybrids”: concoctions created out of his 
memories and others’, with the use of photographs, films and other visual aids / 
images. 
 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
239 | P a g e  
 
Film is an important medium to expose tragedies and to raise questions.  It also 
has a far-reaching effect — engaging an audience who might not normally have 
access to, or interest in, international atrocities.   
 
With regard to aesthetic representation and considering whether or not the 
Holocaust  / genocidal atrocities  / images of apartheid  / Palestine should be 
portrayed by the visual / artistic / fine arts is invariably linked to the question of how 
one would attempt to do so. 
 
David Bathrick, in an attempt to address this question / ethical crisis, gives the 
example of the nine-and-a-half hour film entitled Shoah, which was made by 
Claude Lanzmann.  He believes that this film works through the past images by 
both “repudiating” and “reclaiming” the Holocaust image (2004:294).  Lanzmann 
himself expressly states that this “cinematic treatise is not a documentary and is 
not representational” (1991:96).  Rather, all the interviews of the survivors that he 
films, both perpetrator and victim alike (he also includes interviews of secondary 
witnesses) are not intended to recover memory but “to explore the process of 
reconstructing and reliving the past in the present” (Bathrick 2004:295).  Claude 
Lanzmann refers to his film as “imageless images,” “because what we see on the 
screen is more absence of an image than an attempted replica of the unspeakable 
deed” (cited in Bathrick 2004:295; cf. Lanzmann 1991; 2004).  Furthermore, this 
“absence” is referred to by Gertrud Koch as an “elision which marks the boundary 
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between what is aesthetically and humanly imaginable and the unimaginable 
dimension of the annihilation” (1989:96).   
 
The belief that an artist has undeviating and complete access to the visual 
portrayal of an incident(s) is challenged by Lanzmann.  He and his cinematic 
masterpiece serve to “remind us that there can be no full presence but only the 
marking of the past as object of reconstruction based on traces and traces of 
traces” (Bathrick 2004:295).   
 
In addition, Bathrick states that “[T]he traces in Shoah are sites of memory in the 
present — the pans of the rich, green fields of Treblinka and Auschwitz today”; 
these sites of memory defy / dispute imagination — the challenge is to imagine 
creatively, to transcend, the very “normalcy of these traces in order to produce or 
even hallucinate the horror of what was” (2004:295-296; cf. the introduction of this 
chapter).  Artist C. K. Williams visited Auschwitz, where he was stunned by the 
empty barracks, the empty crematoria — this was not what he had imagined — yet 
it is through memoirists that he can imagine what it was like because the actual site 
does not deliver any real idea / imagery of what it had been like there.  It is through 
the different characters / individuals who wrote (and assumingly artists who 
artistically represented their experiences / memories) about their experiences that 
one is able to glean a realistic image of what it was like (1999:10).  This 
dissertation puts forward the author’s opinion that Auschwitz has been sanitised in 
a way — and in a sense cleansed.  These are just ordinary buildings that belie 
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what really happened there.  Gertrud Koch believes that the film Shoah, which 
defies chronology and a pre-given path, is less a documentary or historical epic, 
and is more a piece of modern art, “drawing its force from the affirmation that art is 
not representation but presentation, not reproduction but expression” (1989:20).  In 
other words, one can go beyond representation, and engagement with the evil of 
apartheid should be one of expression over representation.  Theodor W. Adorno 
himself wrote similarly: “[P]erennial suffering has as much right to expression as 
the tortured have to scream … hence it may have been wrong to say that no poem 
could be written after Auschwitz” (1951 / 1991 / 2003:283).  Linked to the concept 
of film is the concept of voyeurism and spectator identification, which will now be 
investigated.    
 
7.2.2.1 Voyeurism and spectator identification 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of consciousness is that consciousness cannot grasp 
itself (1957).  Sartre’s book Being and Nothingness (1957) grapples with this very 
concept.  Reflection or categorisation turns the subject into an object.  Because 
subjects do not have fixed characteristics, the moment they try to categorise 
themselves, they become nothing more than a definition, pigeonholed and limited. 
Sartre warns of individuals going to the extreme of defining themselves as a fixed 
set of categories, so that they are then perceived as pure nothingness.  However, 
no representation can capture one entirely. It is the poser that Sartre has tried to 
deal with: one can neither be totally defined; neither can one escape all definition 
(Sartre 1957).  One is the quest for oneself.  Are Kentridge’s films — based on his 
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image / representation — a quest for his consciousness?  Does he see himself as 
others see him?   Does he draw / represent himself as Soho/Felix as he thinks 
others see him, or as he sees himself, a mirror of one’s self?  Are his films a mirror 
for his own subjectivity?  Kentridge’s subjectivity is riddled with guilt, remorse, 
responsibility and mourning / loss / death.  It is significant to note then that in the 
last film of the Drawings for Projection series, Tide Table, Soho/Felix is 
represented as all alone, alienated and cut off from the rest of his family and the 
rest of the world (see Figure 7.15).   
 
Figure 7.15 Drawing from Tide Table (Alemani 2006:92). 
 
 
According to Victor Burgin (1996:29), individuals inhabit two separate worlds: the 
“internal” — the mental and private world — and the “external”, that is, the public 
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and physical world.  Of course, psychoanalysis has provided one with the theory of 
the unconscious (Freud1915 / 1991b).  Kentridge presents us with both his 
“internal” and “external” — references to the unconscious (“internal”), such as the 
drawings of the insides of his brain; and images of everyday items realistically 
portrayed (the “external”), such as the bakelite telephones, the typewriters and 
even tea cups and coffee-plungers (see Figures 7.16 — 7.22).  This is, for the 
writer of this thesis, another element of “fortuna”, as defined by Kentridge (see 
Chapter Five for more details).  Ari Sitas describes Kentridge’s “fortuna” as 
“spontaneous inventiveness, even anarchy, and a relishing of the accidental, the 
transformative (in its literal sense), but there is also [a] discriminating mind that 
channels the energy into meaningful statement” (2001:63). 
 
Figure 7.16 Photograph of installation that exhibited drawings from the film 
WEIGHING ... and WANTING (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:135). 
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Figure 7.17 Photograph of the installation that exhibited drawings from the film 
WEIGHING ... and WANTING (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:77). 
 
 
Figure 7.18 A close-up of the drawing from the installation exhibiting drawings from 
the film WEIGHING ... and WANTING (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 
1999:77). 
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Figure 7.19 Drawing from the film History of the Main Complaint (Cameron, 
Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:90). 
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Figure 7.20 Mrs. Beaton’s Household Management (Jug) William Kentridge, 2000 (Stewart 
2006:86).  Lithograph in black with hand-drawn red lines, on page spreads from Mrs. 
Beaton’s Book of Household Management (1906) on Vélin d’Arches Blanc 250 gsm paper. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.21 Drawing, from installation exhibit Stereoscope (Alemani 2006:65). 
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Laura Mulvey, a well-known feminist author, who introduced the concept of the 
“male gaze” into film studies, wrote in her book, Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema: “[T]he voyeuristic-scopophilic look is a crucial part of traditional filmic 
pleasure” (1975:45; cf. Burgin 1996).  Roland Barthes writes about the “[A]uthor, 
reader, spectator or voyeur” of representation; all of these subjects “desire”, but of 
course it is the voyeur who does so obviously or “visibly” (Barthes 1977b:69).   
 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1957), in his chapter The Look, from his famous work Being and 
Nothingness, describes the position of the voyeur as “being-as-object for the 
Other”:  
[H]ere I am, bent over the key hole; suddenly I hear a footstep.  I shudder as 
a wave of shame sweeps over me.  Somebody has seen me.  I straighten 
up.  My eyes run over the deserted corridor.  It was a false alarm.  I breathe 
a sigh of relief.   
 
Sartre however, states that even though he is petrified, he continues with his 
voyeurism,  
I shall feel my heart beat fast, and I shall detect the slightest noise, the 
slightest creaking of the stairs.  Far from disappearing with my first alarm, 
the Other is present everywhere, below me, above me, in neighbouring 
rooms, and I continue to feel profoundly my being-for-others (1957:369-
370).   
 
In chapter four (“The Intertwining — The Chiasm”) of his unfinished work, The 
Visible and the Invisible, Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes:   
[S]ince the seer is caught up in what he sees; it is still himself he sees: there 
is a fundamental narcissism of all vision.  And thus, for the same reason, the 
vision he exercises, he also undergoes from the things, such that, as many 
painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, my activity is 
equally passivity — which is the second and more profound sense of 
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narcissism: not to see in the outside, as others see it, the contour of a body 
one inhabits, but especially to be seen by the outside, to exist within it, to 
emigrate into it, to be seduced, captivated, alienated by the phantom, so 
that the seeing and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer 
know which sees and which is seen (1968:139; cf. Burgin 1996). 
 
The author of this study believes that this applies directly to William Kentridge and 
his “portraits” as Soho/Felix. 
 
In The Scoptophilic Instinct and Identification, a paper written in 1935, Otto 
Fenichel states: “the eye plays a double part.  It is not only actively sadistic but also 
passively receptive” (1953:375; cf. Burgin 1996).  Included in this book is a citation 
by Géza Róheim on “looking-glass-magic”, in which the mirror presents an 
individual with his/her own ego in the form of an external body, which erases “the 
dividing–line between ego and non-ego” (Fenichel 1953:377; cf. Burgin 1996).   
 
According to Michel Serres (Kroker and Cook 1988) and Michel Foucault (1970) 
the disembodied eye is a central metaphor for contemporary experiences:  the eye 
is reversible, expressing in its symbolic effects the interiority of the retina of the 
viewer; it is the apparatus of surveillance and an eternal mirroring-effect of the 
possessive “I” of the self.  It represents the modern experience which circles back 
upon itself in an endless mirroring-effect. In the symbology of the “eye”, a 
mirroring-effect is in progress in which the terms of the relation (signifier and 
signified) retract back and forth as image and counter-image in the endless 
curvature of a tautology (Kroker and Cook 1988). It is the eye / I in a society which 
privileges the position of voyeur.  The eye motif emphasises the violence of 
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intrusion, the horror of the loss of privacy.  This is apparent in Mine, where the 
viewer is exposed to the loss of privacy endured by the miners who sleep together 
in crowded bunks, and shower together as if in prison. Thus, self-reflexively, 
Kentridge burdens the viewer with the responsibility to see the awful conditions 
under which the miners work. 
 
The “eye” and vision are central themes throughout Kentridge’s work — from 
images of a close–up of an eye filling the screen at the end of Monument, to the 
images in History of the Main Complaint where he, or the character of Soho/Felix, 
looks repeatedly at himself in his car’s rear-view mirror.  There are also many 
scenes where Kentridge draws his character, Felix Teitlebaum, looking at himself 
in a mirror. In Felix in Exile and History of the Main Complaint, there are extreme 
close-ups of Kentridge’s eye — circled and highlighted.  A more disturbing image 
of the eye is the close-up of Harry the hobo’s eye, at the end of Monument.  Harry 
is pinioned onto a pedestal — a monument ironically donated by Soho Eckstein the 
“great benefactor” (whose philanthropy is bought and paid for by the labour of 
individuals — miners and workers).  Harry’s eye seems to hold all the pain and 
suffering in the world along with a resignation to his position. Harry, Christ-like, is 
tied to stone, holding up a monumental rock, unable to move, with only the sound 
of his disturbing breathing as the credits roll.  
 
Film theorist and academic, J. P. Telotte (cited in Kolb 1990) suggests that when 
fascination with doubling becomes the dominant force in someone's life, as it has 
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with Kentridge, s/he clearly runs the risk of becoming little more than a copy 
him/herself, potentially less human than the very images that have been fashioned 
in his/her likeness. This is fascinating because, for Kentridge, one must consider 
where reality begins and reality ends. It becomes difficult to disengage the 
characters from Kentridge and his life.  The world is a place in which distinctions 
and differences between realities and images have been effaced.  The real 
becomes not so much what can be produced as "that which is already reproduced" 
(Baudrillard 1983:122). In other words, it is an identification between an artificial 
construct (Kentridge’s characters) and the real (Kentridge himself).  There is also 
the appearance of being real — in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, 
Felix Teitlebaum’s dreams about his affair with Mrs. Eckstein do have a dream-like 
quality, and he does daydream about her while he is in the bath. Yet Kentridge also 
deals with the very real themes of social guilt and responsibility, the problems with 
capitalism and the evils of apartheid.  He also includes a portrayal of his wife Anne 
in WEIGHING … and WANTING4. The viewer questions what is real and what is 
not.  
 
There is also the concept of voyeurism for the spectator as the audience watch 
Felix Teitlebaum having sex with Mrs. Eckstein (in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City 
after Paris and Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old).  Another voyeuristic aspect to his 
work is the view into the very depths of the mines and the horror that one sees 
there: decapitations, close ups of pained faces which also reflect the grotesquery 
                                                 
4
 This researcher has had the opportunity to meet William Kentridge’s wife, Anne Stanwix. 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
251 | P a g e  
 
within, an overwhelming site / sight of blackness. The horror of the mines and the 
continuous recurrence of decapitated heads again appear to allude to Joseph 
Conrad's Heart of Darkness (1975) — whose main character, Kurtz, has looked 
into darkness — and to Frederic Nietzsche's comment:  
[W]hoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not 
become a monster.  And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also 
looks into you (Nietzsche 1979a:99; also quoted in Chapter Five).   
 
One sees this in the images shown in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, 
Monument, Mine and Felix in Exile.  Mine combines a cross-section:  in the mine, 
underground workers are working in a very dark and depressing setting.  This is 
juxtaposed with Soho Eckstein in his luxurious and very comfortable bed above — 
sometimes sleeping and sometimes using his bed as an office desk.  The images 
of the mine include images of the dormitories — dismal sleeping quarters and rows 
of men showering.  These images include close-ups of severed heads lying on 
hard shelf-like beds — reminiscent of the beds in concentration camps and death 
camps in World War II.   The hostels are divided into minuscule segments, or what 
William Gibson calls “coffins” (1993:124), and which contrast strongly with the large 
opulent homes of the upper classes.  The miners’ existences — sleeping and living 
in huge concrete slabs and working in monoliths of stone — are alienated, with 
little or no personal contact. The heads look like skulls, not human, similar to the 
decapitated heads on the shelf in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, and 
a recurring theme throughout his work.  These are extremely depressing images, 
which also serve to dehumanise the individuals.  As Kentridge himself has stated 
“everything has been ... de-humanised” (Oppelt 1999:6).  The heads are 
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themselves a thing of beauty, and refer to an aesthetic tradition as well.  This is a 
stark contradiction: one generally sees their beauty before realising their brutality, 
which tends to unnerve one.  Like the death throes of “Nandi” in Felix in Exile, they 
are exquisite to look at, but one cannot separate the macabre qualities from the 
beauty.  This makes them somehow more shocking than something that is simply 
ugly and grotesque and which prompts a straightforward response.  Viewing these 
images is uneasy, challenging and confusing. 
 
In Mine, individuals are merely tools to excavate gold or coal.  They are a form of 
resource — dispensable and replaceable.  One sees the dream-like imagery of a 
coffee plunger that makes its way down from and through Soho Eckstein’s bed, 
becoming a lift shaft and then becoming the drawing of a transatlantic slave ship —  
which was constructed in that way in order to fit as many slaves as possible.  The 
images of slaves and the relevance to the miners are obvious.  Mine workers are 
nothing but slave labour.  Soho Eckstein’s bed / office desk becomes littered with 
ticker tape papers from an accounting machine — and includes mine workers as 
part of the waste and a part of the scene of a mine dump — industrial and 
environmental waste juxtaposed with a rhinoceros, which represents nature in 
direct opposition to environmental decay and devastation.  Soho Eckstein clears 
his bed / office desk with one sweep of his arm, knocking everything off to allow 
him to play with his new pet project — a rhinoceros (see Figure 7.22 and Figure 
7.23).   
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Figure 7.22 Drawing from Mine (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 
1999:115). 
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Figure 7.23 Drawing from Mine (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee  
1999:115). 
 
 
Kentridge has also made a very short, and quite bizarre film titled ECHO: scan 
slide bottle (1998).  In this film he uses a hand-held camera to trace his near-naked 
physical body very closely.  At times, the images, disembodied fragments of 
sections of his arms, legs and stomach, are disturbing (see Figure 7.24 and Figure 
7.25).   This is because if one is not aware of the overall theme of the film (the 
tracing of his physiological being), one is simply presented with images of portions 
of skin.  These unattached images of patches of skin, which are very hirsute, 
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together with enlarged pores, beam out of the screen.  At first the film ECHO: scan 
slide bottle seems completely contrasted with the films in his Drawings for 
Projection series.  Firstly, with regard to the content of the films, the former is real 
while the latter is imagined.  Secondly, the one is in documentary black and white 
style, in direct opposition to the charcoal hand-drawn animations of his series.  
Thirdly, and most importantly, the one deals with Kentridge’s corporeality while the 
others deal with his unconscious psyche (or a part thereof).  However, there are 
also blatant similarities.  A closer look reveals that they are all traces of his being in 
terms of cinematic style.  All are astonishingly intimate — a nakedness laid bare for 
the world to see (literally and metaphorically — his body and his mind). All are 
translucent in their intimate portrayals.  They all evoke a sense of guilty voyeurism 
in the viewers.  They also all shed some light on his identity: a middle-aged man 
caught in a perpetual present constantly pre-occupied and tormented with 
psychological grappling’s of individual and collective memories of guilt and 
responsibility.  
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Figure 7.24 A photograph still 
from ECHO: scan slide bottle (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:126). 
 
Figure 7.25 A photograph still 
from ECHO: scan slide bottle (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:126). 
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7.2.2.2 Voyeurism and aesthetics 
The concept of voyeurism is of course linked directly to that of aesthetics because 
the spectator wants to view images that are visually, or aesthetically pleasing.  Orly 
Lubin (2004) asks the question with regard to the aesthetisation of the Holocaust: 
does the aesthetic form of film portraying these atrocities in any way compromise 
the horror of the Holocaust?  Are there any other forms of aesthetics that are better 
suited to portraying the Holocaust, forms that induce more personal empathy, more 
insight into the atrocities? Film per se uses many different techniques, and many 
different fields come together to make up a film.  All contribute to the production of 
a film: cinematographers, hairstylists, make-up artists, wardrobe artists, actors and 
directors.  This process produces a very mediated form of art — many decisions 
come into play. Therefore the result is a more accessible form of representation.  
Film is a useful art form / medium to sustain memory.  Fictional films specifically 
are distributed widely and are very successful at confronting an audience with such 
horrors in an identifiable and non-threatening form.  With regard to Kentridge’s 
beautiful cinematic drawings, even while acknowledging the power of the moving 
image — they do present an inherent danger.  One can manipulate the story, and 
with it history; one can delete the political and social contexts; one can ignore the 
horrific scenes, erasing them from the story and history; and most importantly, the 
audience can become enthralled with the exquisite beauty of the pure aesthetics 
even while watching atrocities being perpetrated.  For Orly Lubin (2004) there is 
the foremost danger of ignoring the ethical aspects of the real events as they are 
portrayed, aestheticised and dramatised.  The audience judges the film by its 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
258 | P a g e  
 
aesthetic appearance — beautiful camera shots, brilliant acting, stunning choices 
of locations, colours and scenery — rather than by judging the film’s ethical 
meanings, consequences and repercussions.  In his essay The Work of Art in the 
Age of its Technological Reproducibility (2002), Walter Benjamin focuses 
specifically on these questions.  One pertinent question stands out: is film a 
worthwhile form of learning about the Holocaust?  Does it trivialise or bastardise 
the memories of the survivors and victims?  Is film merely about exploitation, or 
financial gain — “blood money”?  Does the medium debase the lives of those 
survivors?  How does a visual medium transcend the limitations of language, and 
thus communicate beyond language?  In this age, where the screen or the visual 
replaces the importance of the verbal, do the very individuals onscreen make the 
survivors’ testimony more real, more believable?  Is the medium more effective at 
communicating descriptive scenes?  Are survivors’ testimonies — transmuted 
through different cinematic devices, such as the cinematographer’s camera lens — 
“more-real-than-real” (Baudrillard cited in Smart 1993:122)?  Or are they less 
effective or less believable because of the very use of these devices?  How much 
more accessible are testimonies when given in a cinematic form?   
  
With regard to voyeurism and the “spectacularization of death” (Lubin 2004:227), 
feature films attempt to avoid elements of fantasy5. There is a very real danger of 
promoting an ethical indifference that is a by-product of aestheticisation.  Orly 
                                                 
5
 This question links with that of “pornography of violence” and again one is referred to Dean 
(2004).   
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Lubin brings our attention to the dangers of what is referred to as “Holocaust 
pornography” (2004:231). He explains that  
[W]hile some films genuinely investigate the sexualization of power, others 
eroticize death and exploit, for purposes of arousal and profit, the 
sadomasochistic dynamics inherent in the relations between victim and 
perpetrator (Lubin 2004:231).   
 
Orly Lubin also draws attention to the distraction that beauty creates — a beautiful 
actor, a stunning location, an exquisite dress — thereby once again highlighting the 
conflict between ethics and aesthetics (2004).  While Lubin is specifically referring 
to Holocaust feature films, one can easily apply his analysis to Kentridge’s hand-
drawn animated films and the aesthetics thereof.  Kentridge’s films contain many 
images that are simultaneously horrifying and beautiful, such as decapitated heads 
with lovely faces.  David Trend believes that beautiful artistic images of violence 
“imbue transcendental meaning, even beauty” (2007:118).  Roland Barthes was of 
the opinion that violent portrayals of human suffering serve to calm and placate 
one, because one views the images as having already occurred and therefore very 
much entrenched in the past.  In addition the events portrayed happened to “them, 
not us” in a distant country (cited in Trend 2007:118).  These images serve as 
evidence that such pain will not be repeated.  David Levi Strauss, in his book titled 
Between the Eyes: Essays on Photography and Politics, writes: “[S]uch images do 
not compel us to action, but to acceptance.  The action has already been taken, 
and we are not implicated” (2003:81)6.   
                                                 
6
 For a detailed reading and exploration of “Holocaust pornography”; “pornography of violence”; 
“empathy fatigue”; and the desensitisation / numbness when viewing violent images, see Carolyn 
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David Bathrick also refers to Theodor W. Adorno’s statement that to write poetry 
after Auschwitz is barbaric (2004).  He believes that Adorno was concerned with 
the perils inherent in the organised framework of active aesthetic experience.  He 
believes “barbaric” refers to the “inevitable feelings of pleasure evoked by certain 
historically contingent aesthetic expressions — the notion, more specifically, that a 
transfiguration can occur and that some of the horror of the event might thereby be 
ameliorated” (Bathrick 2004:294).  There is a danger in this (one is referred back to 
the mention of Kentridge’s beautiful drawings of hideous topics).  In his 
rearticulating of Adorno’s statement, Bathrick thinks that it is more important to hold 
close the road to an “aesthetics of postmemory” (Hirsch 1997),  
as a reconstructing, even a working through, of the image as fetish and as 
iconic staple of the collective pictorial archive so necessary for the retrieval 
of Holocaust memory in the first place (Bathrick 2004:294).   
 
However, in the opinion of this study’s author, viewing these images or creating 
these artistic visions can also be seen or experienced as cathartic.  At the 
beginning of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud introduced the term “abreaction” 
(Rycroft 1972; cf. Freud 1899a and 1899b; 1991).  This refers to the expressing / 
identifying / discharging of emotion that is attached to repressed emotion relating to 
a specific experience.  Charles Rycroft wrote that in the early days of 
psychoanalysis, abreaction or catharsis as it is sometimes referred to, was 
believed to be highly therapeutic irrespective of whether or not the individual 
understood or could trace the importance of the repressed emotion / experience 
                                                                                                                                                    
Dean (2004).  William Kentridge has the following comment on the subject: “desensitisation 
becomes another form of disremembering” (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:49). 
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(1972).  Basically if one watched a film in which the character’s parents died, and 
one had many repressed emotions relating to the death of one’s own parents, then 
one would emote during this episode.  This would be because it would unleash 
those very repressed emotions that one had repressed. 
 
With regard to the dream-like quality of life, Victor Burgin writes the following: 
Eddie Constantine, an actor portraying a character who acts in B-grade movies, in 
the short film La Paresse, directed by Jean-Luc Godard, refuses an offer of sex 
from a go-getting starlet.  He turns down her offer because he is loath to get 
dressed all over again (1996).  Alain Bergala, a film theorist, writes the following in 
response to this scene:   
Eddie Constantine marvellously embodies that very special state given by 
an immense lassitude, an apparent inertia which is in fact a state of great 
porosity to the strangeness of the world, a mixture of torpor, of loss of reality 
and a somewhat hallucinatory vivacity of sensations … Godard speaks to us 
of this very special way of being in the world (cited Burgin 1996:171).   
 
So too are Kentridge’s portrayals of “hallucinatory reality” in his films.   
 
Dan Cameron, on writing about Kentridge, also asks whether or not “any visual 
artist working today has the necessary tools to produce representations of vast 
complex cultural and/or political issues” (1999:43).  He answers his own question, 
by stating that Kentridge, in his Drawings for Projection series,  
provides unexpected insight into how a single person [Soho/Felix] can 
become the repository of an entire culture’s ideas and history, and how this 
can be transmitted in turn through the audience’s instinctual responses to a 
character’s behaviour, bypassing temporarily the ideological basis for the 
beliefs underlying that behaviour (1999:46). 
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This chapter now focuses on photography, memory and the concepts of absence 
and presence and the representation of traumata. 
 
7.2.2.3 Photography and representation 
 
In Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (1981), Roland Barthes’ last work, 
he focuses on the legend of Orpheus.  According to Greek mythology, Orpheus 
was a musician with the ability to enchant plants and animals with his music.  He 
married a nymph, Eurydice.  Unfortunately she soon died after having been bitten 
by a poisonous snake.  Devastated by her death, Orpheus followed Eurydice to the 
underworld.  Using his music he enchanted the underworld deities (Persephone) 
into releasing her.  There was one condition.  Orpheus had to escort Eurydice to 
the upper world without casting his gaze upon her. He did look upon her though, 
with dire consequences — she disappeared completely:   
... yearning to see her with his own eyes,  
through love he turned,  
and with his gaze she slipped away and down.   
He stretched out his arms,  
struggling to embrace and be embraced,  
but unlucky and unhappy he grasped nothing ...  
 
(Ov. Meta. Bk:11 Ln. 61-66; tr. Morford & Lenardon 1977).  
   
For Barthes, a photograph becomes the gaze of Orpheus guaranteeing the 
"absence — as presence” in what he calls the “noeme”, that is, the certainty that 
“that-has-been” (1981:96).  The photograph is pure representation, and contains 
reality and the past.  In other words, if Orpheus had done what he was told to do — 
that is, not look at his wife (which represents absence) — Eurydice would have 
continued to exist (presence).  Yet the photograph captures the subject (or body; or 
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borrowing from Jean-Paul Sartre, the fact of “being-in-itself” (Sartre 1957; cf. Flew 
1979:313) as an object (Wiseman 1989; cf. Moriarty 1991).  The photograph is a 
testament of lost time and lost memories. You know that the person existed 
because s/he is in the photograph. For Barthes, in photography, the presence of 
the thing (at a certain past moment) is never metaphoric.  Furthermore, in a 
"photograph ... the past is as certain as the present, what we see on paper is as 
certain as what we touch" (Kroker and Cook 1988:157).   In his film Sobriety, 
Obesity & Growing Old, Kentridge challenges this idea.  There is a scene where 
Soho Eckstein is at his desk at work.  He looks mournfully at the framed 
photograph of his wife.  Instead of seeing what he expected to see, that is, a fixed 
image of his wife, he is instead shown a mini-film of his wife cavorting with Felix 
Teitlebaum.   
 
In his book, Roland Barthes (1981) also links photography, history and the mother 
figure. He focuses on the mother figure in relation to the question of history, for his 
Mother (sic) represents his origins.  A photograph represents the trace of an origin 
and thus, a personal identity, the proof of having existed and therefore the right to 
exist.  History is that time when his mother was living, before him (Bruno 1987).  
And history implies the possibility of the dream of unity (Wiseman 1989).  
Photographs document existence in history, which are then transformed into 
memories of lives lived and lost. According to Michel Foucault, this documentation 
is imperative for perceiving temporality in terms of past and future (cited in Poster 
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1984).  The photograph bears witness to the reality of its object, where “reality” is 
construed as presence (Wiseman 1989:143-147).   
 
Photography superimposes reality and the past, the signifier and the referent 
(signified) (Moriarty 1991).  Photography, according to Giuliana Bruno (1987), is 
designated the immense task of reasserting the referent, of re-appropriating the 
real and historical continuity.  Can one not say that in Kentridge’s realistic drawings 
the historical referent is replaced by the drawing referent?  Are Kentridge’s 
drawings not the same as photographs? The presence of Kentridge in a drawing 
“makes” him real.  The presence of the thing certainly is not metaphoric, but real — 
the miners, the slave ships, the capitalists, are they not real?  Kentridge’s series 
have captured a world of memories — his and others.  Kentridge’s drawings are a 
world of simulations, a world in which distinctions and differences between realities 
and referents have been effaced.  The real becomes not so much as what can be 
produced as "that which is already reproduced" (Jean Baudrillard cited in Smart 
1993:122).  Kentridge has eliminated the comparable distinction between imitation 
and reality.  His drawings are not mere illusions of realities, but what Baudrillard 
calls “hyper-real” (cited in Smart 1993:122).  The unreal has become real. Again, 
his characters are "more-real-than-real" (Baudrillard cited in Kellner 1989:68).  
 
Another issue raised by Barthes’ concept of the noeme (“that-has-been”) of the 
photograph is the question of immortality. Immortality is unattainable — except in a 
photograph where the subject continues to “exist” — lost time is reclaimed and lost 
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memories are re-remembered.  They are immortal in that they have been frozen in 
time.  And so too are Kentridge’s drawings — frozen in time, documenting history.  
 
David Bathrick, with regard to both the absence and presence of an image, 
focuses specifically on “the epochal non-enunciation of the Muselmann” 
(2004:290).  Survivors such as Jean Améry, Bruno Bettleheim, Primo Levi and 
Ruth Kluger (amongst others) refer to this spectre of a person.  The Muselmann 
gets his/her name from the adapted German word for “Muslim” (association / 
reason unknown), and was the result of systematic, intentional torture and abuse 
by the SS through starving and working inmates to their proximal death, and 
through this very process turning them into submissive, compliant, wandering, 
spectral half dead beings (Bathrick 2004:291).  Jean Améry described them thus: 
“[H]e was a staggering corpse, a bundle of physical functions in its last 
convulsions” (1980:9; cf. Bathrick 2004).  This Muselmann has stubbornly 
remained on the periphery of descriptions and testimonies of the Holocaust. 
However Giorgio Agamben writes that it is “a striking fact that although all 
witnesses speak of him as a central experience, the Muselmann is barely named in 
the historical studies on the destruction of European Jews” (1999:52; cf. Bathrick 
2004).   
 
Through his own studies, Agamben has reported an “absence of visual 
representations” of this functional corpse.  He refers to cinematic footage taken by 
the Allies when they liberated Bergen-Belson, describing what he sees as “living 
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people, a group of prisoners … wandering on foot like ghosts” and has reported 
that this remains the sole evidence or visual representation of these spectres 
(1999:51).  
 
For the author of this doctoral study, it begs the question why: why this absence of 
imagery of the Muselmann? Furthermore, does this absence suggest that there 
remains the question of how to portray these individuals and ultimately whether or 
not one should attempt to portray them?  A discussion on this non-portrayal of the 
Muselmann follows below in an attempt to address these questions and engage 
with them, albeit briefly. This discussion is then related to Kentridge’s works. The 
Muselmann phenomenon is one that is looked at almost in disgust, and Primo Levi 
allocates their representation to the “gray zone” (1989:36-69).  Bruno Bettleheim 
and other victims rather shockingly express their ambiguous emotions of shame, 
disappointment, anguish and loathing towards the Muselmann (1960).  Bettleheim 
believes that these mixed emotions towards these “ghosts” are mere projection on 
the part of the survivors — their own torment and fury / rage at their existence, a 
reminder of “their own imminent systematic transformation into a nonhuman being” 
(Bettleheim 1960:156; cf. Bathrick 2004).  Primo Levi extrapolates on this by 
stating that there was even an “institutionalized complicity with the SS among 
prisoners” who focused on their own survival, even going so far as to knock these 
ghosts down — for what was the purpose of yet another Muselmann dragging 
him/herself to work — they were an unnecessary burden (1996:88).  Of the 
Muselmann, Levi further writes that all those “who finish in the gas chambers have 
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the same story, or more exactly, have no story; they followed the slope down to the 
bottom, like streams that run into the seas” (1996:90; cf. Bathrick 2004:293).   
 
This is similar to those streams of unidentified workers found in Kentridge’s 
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris. They have a “ghostly”, “nonhuman” air 
about them (see Figure 7.24 and Figure 7.25). The proletariat represented in his 
film are not subjects of pity, not deserving of empathy, but rather derision and 
disgust / revulsion (from Soho Eckstein’s point of view). Thus Soho Eckstein 
throws food scraps at them, rather than feeling sorry for them and giving them food 
parcels, or increasing their pay so they can afford to buy more food (see Figure 
7.26: Eckstein and his overflowing table of food from which he hurls the food).  Are 
they an embarrassment perhaps, because the assumption is that they are not 
workers, but rather slaves, in Soho Eckstein’s employment? Their poverty is a 
direct result of their working conditions and below subsistence earnings — for 
which Soho Eckstein is undoubtedly responsible.  His actions completely 
dehumanise them.  His throwing food leftovers at them is done with real anger and 
scorn, no sympathy whatsoever is evident.  If he truly empathised with them he 
would no longer view them as his slaves to be exploited, but as individuals who 
work for him, deserving of better pay and better working conditions. 
 
 
William Kentridge: Chapter Seven: Questions of memory, representation and aesthetics 
 
 
268 | P a g e  
 
 
 
Figure 7.26 Drawing from Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris (Godby 
1992:unpaginated). 
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Figure 7.27 Drawing from Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris (Godby 
1992:unpaginated). 
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Figure 7.28 Drawing from Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris (Cameron, 
Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:52). 
 
Is Kentridge’s work a “tortured scream” (to paraphrase Adorno)?  William 
Kentridge’s films embody / offer what Robert Kolker (2002) calls a dialectical 
mimetic expression; an expression of atrocities that disturbs viewers, forcing one to 
scrutinise one’s own values and beliefs rather than pandering to, or satisfying them 
(see Figure 7.29 and Figure 7.30).  
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Figure 7.29 Drawing used in the animation for the play Faustus in Africa! (Cameron, 
Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:21). 
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Figure 7.30 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:95). 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
These mediums show the importance of such representations, or re-
representations, in the role of remembering atrocities, and the significance of art in 
reaching audiences normally untouched by such occurrences.  Having discussed 
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memory, representation and aesthetics, this study now turns its attention to 
Chapter Eight: Memory, History, Identity, Time and Space. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: MEMORY, HISTORY, IDENTITY, TIME AND SPACE  
 
History is about the passage of time, albeit a highly particular and biased 
perspective.  History is also the effect that time has on space - that is, the 
landscape.  History changes landscapes, both mental and physical.  It is time 
changing / eroding space.  Therefore, put another way, history erodes / changes / 
reshapes time in terms of memory and identity. The landscape in question in this 
chapter is primarily the mental landscape.  Yet William Kentridge‘s films are history 
recorded physically (his drawings can be seen as paper saturated landscapes — of 
the land and mind — which change with every erasure / stroke).  However, due to 
their contents Kentridge‘s historical images can change one‘s perceptions and 
memories / associations of history and therefore by extension their place in 
spacetime.   His films are a form of cathexis / abreaction (Freud 1991a / 1900). 
They are sedimental, palimpsests of recorded / imagined history(ies) / 
memory(ies).  Images from Kentridge‘s own mind‘s eye as well as others‘ mental 
images — through association, empathy and identification — abound.  Memory, 
history, identity, time and space are inextricably linked.  Kentridge‘s films are 
pellucid psychical and physical topographies — real and phantasmagorical.  Dziga 
Vertov, a documentary Russian / Soviet Formalist film maker called films a form of 
―creative geography‖ (cited in Joyce 1999:423; cf. Vertov 1973). This concept 
encapsulates a definition of Kentridge‘s films. 
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8.1 History as metafiction 
Hayden White begins his chapter on history and the cinema, The Modernist Event, 
by quoting Walter Benjamin: ―[h]istory does not break down into stories but into 
images‖ (cited in White 1996:17).  White posits that cinematic images can 
represent ―historical thinking‖ (1996:17-38; cf. Staiger 1996:39).  He also suggests 
that (post)modernism introduces innovative and creative means to represent and 
examine what he calls ―holocaustal‖ events: events such as the Rwandan and 
other genocides, wars, ethnic cleansing, and so forth (1996:20).  He argues that in 
these innovative / creative representations of real / actual events, the meaning of 
the event and the event itself merge and result in a historical metafiction.  These 
historical metafictions deal with events (such as the Holocaust / Shoah) that not 
only cannot be remembered, but cannot be forgotten, either.  Using the film 
directed by Oliver Stone, JFK, for example, White refers to Stone‘s inclusion of 
documentary footage mixed with that of re-enactments and possible scenarios — a 
blending of fact and fiction.  (Kentridge‘s other works, such as Black Box / 
Chambre Noir and Ubu Tells the Truth are also given a documentary-like emphasis 
with the inclusion of archival footage and the use of maps and found paper, such 
as actual ledger book paper which he has drawn on, and other factual pictorial 
matter: see Figure 8.1 — 8.3).  According to White, JFK is an excellent example of 
a historical metafiction.  Through extrapolation, so too are Kentridge‘s films.  
However, the film JFK was slated by audiences and critics alike.  Referring to an 
American critic who lambasted the film for that very reason (that is, his mixing of 
archival footage with that of recreated scenes), White quotes the critic as stating: 
―… by treating a historical event as if there were no limits on what could 
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legitimately be said about it …‖ (1996:40).  Yet that is exactly what White argues — 
there are no limits when remembering history.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007b:36-37). 
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Figure 8.2 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007b:170). 
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Figure 8.3 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007b:170). 
 
Hayden White relates the recall of ―holocaustal‖ events to psychoanalysis. He 
argues that these events ―function in the consciousness of certain social groups 
exactly as infantile traumas are conceived to function in the psyche of neurotic 
individuals‖ (1996:20).  By this White means, like personal traumas which cannot 
be easily forgotten by an individual, nor adequately remembered, collective 
traumas often have ambiguous meanings and are not easily contextualised.  (This 
can be said of South Africa.  There was no revolution; the TRC tried to reconcile 
the perpetrators and the victims by giving them a platform from which to confess 
and grieve — thereby enabling them to move forward, to enter a present reconciled 
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with their past, and in so doing create closure (cf. Dubow and Rosengarten 2004)).  
As a result of non-closure, communities are prevented from entering a present free 
from the debilitating effects of such collectively experienced traumas.   
 
Events have had their outside phenomenological aspects joined to their inside 
probable meanings.  This fusion results in the meaning of events and their actual 
occurrences becoming indistinguishable from one another.  This is problematic 
because memories of such occurrences are ―unstable, fluid, phantasmagoric‖ 
(White 1996:29).  Hayden White then argues that ―experiential history‖ of an event 
is impossible to conceive (1996:30-31).  White refers to academic Eric Santner 
who states that telling a story of any holocaustal / traumatic event results in 
―narrative fetishism‖ (cited in White 1996:311; This is, according to Santner a 
―strategy of undoing, in fantasy, the need for mourning by stimulating a condition of 
intactness, typically by situating the site and origin of loss elsewhere‖ (cited in 
White 1996:31).   
 
Janet Staiger, in her chapter entitled Cinematic Shots: the Narration of Violence 
(from the book The Persistence of History.  Cinema, Television and the Modern 
Event, edited by Vivien Sobchack (1996)) quotes Jerome Bruner in stating that 
narrative constructs are a historical tradition of recounting stories in order to give 
mastery over the stories, yet ultimately these constructions simply result in 
―verisimilitude[s]‖ (cited in Staiger 1996:41).  It is this so-called mastery that White 
                                                 
1
 Please also see: Dubow and Rosengarten 2004; and Friedländer 1992a / 1992b / 1993 / 2003a / 
2003b / 2003c.   
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questions — because one cannot have mastery over one‘s memories.  However, 
unorthodox / creative official historical representations are contested and 
dismissed outright. 
 
For White then, it is the ―anti-narrative non-stories‖ produced in cinematic and 
literary form that therefore provide a clear distinct break of modern history 
(―holocaustal‖ events) with the histories that have preceded it (1996).  Frederic 
Jameson calls these artistic forms ―psychopathologies‖ — anti-narratives that 
preclude closure, mix narrative forms, split them, reverse them and even exclude 
them (cited in White 1996:32).  This de-fetishisation of events and the accounts of 
them serve to illustrate that to attempt to present history realistically downplays the 
threat of them recurring.  This de-fetishisation also enables individuals and 
communities to mourn, which in turn enables healing.  White therefore strongly 
argues that if individuals attempt to represent the un-representable in linear, 
conservative narratives, with a fixed beginning, middle and end, it results in a 
―fetishisation‖ of that event (1996:32, 40).  In a way it sanitises the event.  Such 
traditional, measured narratives about these ―holocaustal‖ events are impossible of 
course.  Such a narrative results in a surrogate tale, one that attempts to give an 
ordered and structured narrative / account of past events, when it is impossible to 
remember them so. Understanding this from a purely psychoanalytical perspective, 
this narrativisation / fetishisation prevents the mourning of the loss of the object (of 
a loved one, for instance; however Freud extended this to a loss of one‘s country 
or even home (Freud 2005; cf. Freud 1917 / 1957)).  Hayden White concludes that 
it is only through anti-narrative non-stories of the cinematic and literary variety that 
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one can represent traumatic events.  According to White, these anti-narrative non-
stories refuse totalisation and therefore enable the act of mourning to occur (1996). 
White goes on to argue that attempting to represent events in traditional narrative 
constructs through individual agents prevents or delays the mourning process.  He 
even argues that these artificially constructed narratives may result in the events 
being ignored altogether.  He argues for an allegorical representation of traumatic 
events.  He recognises the importance of cinema and other art forms for 
representing subjective versions of the past.  In his analysis of Oliver Stone‘s film 
JFK (1991), White points out that the director, being a Vietnam veteran, 
presumably knows the difference between the events of the Vietnam War and the 
multitude of representations of it (cf. Platoon (1986), Born on the 4th July (1989), 
and Heaven & Earth (1993)).  He believes that Stone acknowledges that certain 
events took place, but that in various representations of the war, there is little 
difference between the factual and fictional versions.  He recounts Stone‘s views 
on ―history‖ from an excerpt published in Esquire magazine:  
What is history?  Some people say it‘s a bunch of gossip made up by 
soldiers who passed it around a campfire.  They say such and such 
happened.  They create, they make it bigger, they make it better.  I knew 
guys in combat who made up shit.  I‘m sure the cowboys did the same.  The 
nature of human beings is that they exaggerate.  So, what is history?  Who 
the fuck knows? (cited in White 1996:37).   
 
Although White‘s critique of JFK is not relevant here in its entirety, and his inclusion 
of Stone‘s quote is by all accounts colloquial, it does raise a significant point to 
illustrate White‘s ideas of ―history‖.  John F. Kennedy‘s assassination has been told 
and re-told, and re-presented so many times, the film is simply one more telling of 
a story of the president‘s murder.  This story is a response to a collective trauma 
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that does not yet have closure and cannot be forgotten, yet at the same time 
cannot be remembered as ―merely an event in the past‖ (White 1996:37).  And as 
White argues, referring to JFK, films show history as it is thought.  Kentridge‘s films 
also show what the subject is ―thinking‖ about: his and others‘ history(ies) / 
memory(ies). 
 
8.2 Identity 
William Kentridge‘s oeuvre explores in part the idea of a South African identity 
through the ontological questions of what it means to have lived through apartheid 
and what it means to live as a South African in the ―new South Africa‖.  It also 
raises the question of an ―artistic identity‖: what does it mean to create aesthetic 
and cultural works of art in the aftermath of a brutal regime?  Kentridge‘s filmic 
works are always situated within the present — a present that is continually shaped 
by his cultural heritage.  Kentridge‘s oeuvre attempts to mediate between a 
traumatic history (apartheid) and a post-history (as of 2009, post post-apartheid) — 
histories some individuals will never know — to which he bears witness and allows 
admittance.  Author Lisa Saltzman describes the artistic work of Anselm Kiefer (a 
second-generation German born in 1945) thus: ―[it] positions itself in that liminal 
space between impossibility and possibility, deferral and realization, repression 
and acknowledgement‖ (2000:2).   
 
This is also an apt description of Kentridge‘s works.  Kentridge‘s art might engage 
in ethical and philosophical questions, but it also positions the subject within a 
historical trauma: apartheid.  History creates psychological trauma, which 
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Kentridge visualises and then draws, which in turn intimates a joining of the 
psychological, the social, cultural, political and historical being represented in his 
works.  His works portray and culminate in what Frederic Jameson described as 
follows: ―history is what hurts‖ (1981:102).  South African identity is very fragile.  
The current national boundaries are a result of the residue of the Anglo-Boer War, 
now usually referred to as the South African War, the origins of which lie in the 
discovery of gold and the creation of Johannesburg.  In a sense, therefore, 
Johannesburg is South Africa, but it is also not South Africa in that it is quite 
different from the rest of the country.  There are many disparate identities in the 
country, constantly formed and re-formed through geography, race, class, 
language and religion.  For white English-speaking South Africans, due to their 
attachment to the West, there is particularly little sense of national identity — only a 
very local sense.  For instance, although a generalisation, it might be easier to 
state ―I am a Johannesburger‖ than to say ―I am a South African‖. In contrast to this 
assumption, there is Kentridge‘s comment: ―London is a suburb of Johannesburg‖ 
(Kentridge cited in Godby 1992: unpaginated).  Johannesburg can be seen as the 
metropole and London as the outpost — in other words, the conflicts around race 
and colonialism one experiences in South Africa are explicit and central here, 
whereas in London the same issues point to the historical forces beyond that city‘s 
narrow confines.  In other words, England in some way takes its definition from 
South Africa. Does it not yet seem then, that the very local identity derived from 
belonging to a particular city does not make one more South African, but less so? 
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In the light of the above, Kentridge‘s two comments: ―Europe weighs heavily on us‖ 
and ―I have been unable to escape Johannesburg‖ (Kentridge cited in Godby 1992: 
unpaginated) are noteworthy.  They convey a sense of profound belonging to 
Johannesburg, but with that added awareness of Western cultural identity.  Felix 
Teitlebaum is first introduced to the audience in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City 
after Paris, next to the caption ―Captive of the City‖, which further reiterates his 
statement, that he has been unable to leave Johannesburg.  Interestingly, Felix is 
also introduced to the viewer naked — a state he adheres to until he becomes one 
with Soho in History of the Main Complaint. His nakedness can mean many things: 
his antithesis to Soho who is always dressed in a corporate pin striped suit; his 
opposition to materialism; a purity; his transparency; his innocence; his birth or re-
birth; his identification with the naked miners found in Mine.  
 
Another recurring theme of Kentridge‘s films is that of desire, which is directly 
linked to that of identity.  Desire is characterised by its negativity: desire represents 
a lack which underlies the dialectical relation of the individual's actions to the world.  
For Georg Hegel, the relationship of consciousness to the self is established by a 
negating desire — not the desire for a thing — but the desire for another's desire 
and recognition (cited in Pefanis 1991). Alexandre Kojeve sums it up as follows:  
"Man is desire directed towards another Desire — that is desire for recognition" 
(cited in Pefanis 1991:12).  Thus, there is a human need for others.  Individuals 
crave acknowledgment and recognition and acceptance from others. Humans, 
however, in Kentridge‘s films are alienated from each other through capitalism and 
imperialism and class and race.  Even Felix Teitlebaum is completely alone in 
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Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old, after Mrs. Eckstein breaks off her affair with him 
and returns to Soho Eckstein.  Something that William Kentridge and others, as 
humans, struggle with on a daily basis — to be whole, and not to be fragmented or 
to live fragmented lives — which in modern society and culture is an extremely 
difficult thing to do.  Consider the fragmented lives of mine workers — leaving their 
wives and children ―at home‖, while they stay in hostels / dormitories and live 
completely different lives than they would if they were still at home — often 
resorting to drinking, prostitution and even homosexuality.  Along with the 
individual‘s need for recognition is the longing for others and their loneliness.  
There are two examples of this from Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old.  The first is 
Soho Eckstein standing in an empty landscape with only his cat for company, with 
the caption ―Her absence filled the world‖.  He is obviously mourning the loss of his 
wife, who is having an affair with Felix Teitlebaum.  Then when Mrs. Eckstein 
returns to her husband, there is an image of Felix Teitlebaum, completely alone 
with only his gramophones for company (see Figure 8.4).  
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Figure 8.4 Drawing from Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old (Godby 
1992:unpaginated). 
 
Another view of desire is that of the narcissistic fascination with doubling.  
Kentridge‘s films contain many images involving reflections and mirrors, most 
especially in Felix in Exile; Stereoscope and History of the Main Complaint.  In 
Felix in Exile Kentridge repeatedly looks into a mirror, initially seeing himself, 
peering back at himself, but after a few shots he sees an unnamed black woman 
reflected back at him (referred to by Kentridge as ―Nandi‖, in Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:12; see Figure 8.5).  In History of the Main Complaint, Soho/Felix looks at his 
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rear-view mirror again and again.  Sometimes it is a close-up of his eyes only, and 
at other times images of apartheid South Africa go by — the images / memories 
that came to be known and validated through the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.  Also concerned with the issue of narcissistic doubling is the fact that 
Kentridge uses his own image as the image for Soho/Felix.   
 
For the author of this dissertation, William Kentridge creates character(s) who are 
critically contemplative, riddled with anxiety and reluctantly reflective: they are 
burdened with the legacy of history / historical trauma.  Nicola King writes in her 
book entitled Memory, Narrative, Identity: Remembering the Self  that: ―the ―I‖ of 
the present is constructed out of, but also continues to rewrite, the ―I‖ of the past‖ 
(2000:40). Using narrative as a means of linking an individual‘s present with her/his 
past allows for a continuous identity, one that is constantly being reconstructed / 
recreated.  Also, according to King, ―the construction of the self is a provisional and 
continuous process‖ (2000:40).  South Africa‘s TRC allows the recounting of 
different versions of ―history‖ in that it gives significance to ―memory‖ as ―history‖ — 
it allows for the participants to recount their experiences under the brutal apartheid 
regime without singling out any one testimony as more significant than another.  
They all have authority.   
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Figure 8.5 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:97). 
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David William Cohen wrote in his book, The Combing of History, ―Remembering 
and forgetting are not opposed and reciprocal programs; they are deeply 
intertwined‖ (1994:xxiv).  Silke Horstkotte cites recent research that positions 
cultural / collective / social memory as dynamic and transformative.  This position is 
premised on Michael Halbwachs‘ view that it is the individual who remembers 
although these memories are presupposed by a ―social framework‖ (1950 / 
1980:193).  Jonathan Crewe writes that Halbwachs ―postulate of collective memory 
made individual memory a function of social memory, not an isolated repository of 
personal experience‖ (1999:75).  Memory and forgetting should be perceived as 
having commonalities with each other and overlapping each other rather than 
being oppositional. 
 
German Expressionists and Russian / Soviet Formalists have placed film as an 
artistic medium that presents history as incredibly dramatic articulation and as vivid 
reflection.  Siegfried Kracauer wrote pre-emptively of the ―return of history as film‖ 
(cited in Kaes 1989: title page).  He also wrote, in his book titled Theory of Film: 
The Redemption of Physical Reality (1960), that the film screen is in fact a 
technological descendant of ―Athena‘s polished shield‖:  herewith the paragraph 
quoted in its entirety: 
We have learned in school the story of the Gorgon Medusa whose face, with 
its huge teeth and protruding tongue, was so horrible that the sheer sight of 
it turned men and beasts into stone.  When Athena instigated to Perseus to 
slay the monster, she therefore warned him never to look at the face itself 
but only at its mirror reflection in the polished shield she had given him.  
Following her advice, Perseus cut off Medusa‘s head with a sickle, which 
Hermes had contributed to his equipment.  The moral of the myth is, of 
course, that we do not, and cannot, see actual horrors because they 
paralyze us with blinding fear; and that we shall know what they look like 
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only by watching images of them which reproduce their true appearance.  
These images have nothing in common with the artist‘s imaginative 
rendering of an unseen dread but are in the nature of mirror reflections.  
Now of all the existing media the cinema alone holds up a mirror to nature.  
Hence our dependence on it for the reflection of happenings which would 
petrify us were we to encounter them in real life.  The film screen is Athena‘s 
polished shield (1960:305).   
 
This shield or cinematic screen reflects the traumatic history of apartheid / 
genocide / atrocities, if only to be viewed indirectly / obliquely, that is, in this case 
through the aesthetics of Kentridge‘s works.  Further to this analogy is the rest of 
Perseus‘ tale, told by Jane Taylor in her article Spherical and Without Exits.  
Thoughts on William Kentridge’s anamorphic film WHAT WILL COME (HAS 
ALREADY COME) (2008).  While this work of art is peripheral to this thesis, Taylor 
does provide further insight into the identity of William Kentridge.  The myth is 
retold here in brief.  Perseus was born to Danaë, daughter of Acrisius, King of 
Argos.  Devastated at having a daughter, the King of Argos consulted the oracle at 
Delphi.  Although Danaë was childless at the time of this consultation, Acrisius was 
forewarned that he would meet his death at the hand of his daughter‘s son.  In 
order to keep Danaë childless he locked her away.  Clever Zeus however 
impregnated her after visiting her in the form of a shower of gold.  Their son was 
called Perseus.  Remembering the oracle‘s prophecy he locked mother and child in 
a wooden chest and threw them into the sea.  They washed ashore and Perseus 
grew to manhood.  Simultaneously Acrisius was banished into exile by his brother 
Proetus.  After beheading Medusa, Perseus attended the games in Larissa, and 
while throwing the discus, it veered off course and killed Acrisius who was sitting in 
the audience (Ov. Meta. 5. 1 – 235; 4. 792 – 802: translated by Morford & 
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Lenardon 1977).  Hence the title of Kentridge‘s work WHAT WILL COME (HAS 
ALREADY COME).  Kentridge has for many years been enthralled by the myth of 
Medusa‘s head (and decapitated heads in general; see Figures 8.7 — 8.14).  He 
has created an anamorphic print of Medusa‘s decapitated head which is visible and 
seen in perspective as reflected in a mirrored cylinder (Taylor 2008:4: see Figure 
8.6).  
Figure 8.6 Medusa (2001) William Kentridge, three-run lithograph printed over chine collé  of 
spreads from Le Nouveau Larousse Illustré Encyclopaedia (1906), on BFK Rives White 
paper, flat image is reflected in a mirror-finish steel cylinder placed at its centre (not shown) 
(Stewart 2006:116). 
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This is a very clever play with the myth obviously in mind.  This cylindrical mirrored 
image is metaphorically important to Kentridge‘s works, including his films.  
Referring to the circular narrative structure of his films, Taylor points out that his 
transmogrified images have an internal / inherent logic in them (2008).  Due to the 
layered nature of his drawing technique, the absurd images of a cat turning into a 
gas mask appear as a natural occurrence, fluid.  As Taylor puts it, the ―relationship 
has become a necessary one‖ (2008:4).  Predictability is impossible.  Also of 
significance to the circular narrative structure of Kentridge‘s films is his statement 
that his films reveal his subjectivity to the audience.  As he states, they are ―a kind 
of self-portraiture‖ (cited in Taylor 2008:4; cf. Breidbach 2006:68)2.   
                                                 
2
 Something very intriguing to note, during his interviews with Angela Breidbach, Kentridge 
―doodles‖ whilst talking — an almost unconscious act.  Of significance then is the first page of her 
book. In Kentridge‘s handwriting amongst drawings that reference his past works is the statement in 
capital letters ―I DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE AN ARTIST‖ (2006:unpaginated).    As author 
of this thesis on Kentridge, considering his talent as an artist, it seems a curious statement for him 
to write; and further suggest that these words are an allusion to his insecurity as an artist. 
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Figure 8.7 Drawing from the History of the Main Complaint (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev 
and Coetzee 1999:92). 
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Figure 8.8 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (Flute edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007b:159). 
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Figure 8.9 Photograph of theatre production Black Box / Chambre Noir (Flute edited 
by Law-Viljoen 2007b:172). 
 
 
Figure 8.10 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (Flute edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007b:173). 
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Figure 8.11 Fragment of drawing from Il Ritorno d’Ulisse (1998) William Kentridge, 
charcoal on paper (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:142). 
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Figure 8.13 Head (1993) William Kentridge, drypoint, from 1 copper plate and two 
hand painted templates on Vélin d’Arches Blanc 300 gsm paper (Stewart 2006:46). 
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Figure 8.14 Blue Head (1993—1998) William Kentridge, drypoint, from 1 copper plate 
and two hand painted templates on Vélin d’Arches Blanc 300 gsm paper (Stewart 
2006:47). 
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Kentridge has also used his films in part as self-definition by confronting his 
historical past.  Kentridge implies that he and by extension his audience, need to 
confront and acknowledge a past that has been repressed and enshrined in a 
conspiracy of silence since childhood.  Kentridge‘s works serve to situate the past 
unavoidably in the present.  He acknowledges that he is an heir to a legacy of 
―historical trauma‖ (Saltzman 2000:16).  Kentridge‘s works confront the past 
aesthetically with a tacit acknowledgment that history, including history after 
apartheid / genocide / Auschwitz, can only be understood through the realisation of 
its ―very inaccessibility of its original occurrence and experience‖ (Saltzman 
2000:16). His works are an ―artistic exploration of the collected histories, 
memories‖ of South Africa‘s past and present (Saltzman 2000:39).  Kentridge‘s 
works bear witness and represent the voiceless.  According to Theodor W. Adorno  
the abundance of real suffering tolerates no forgetting … [it] demands the 
continued existence of art [even as] it prohibits.  It is now virtually in art 
alone that suffering can still find its own voice, consolation, without 
immediately being betrayed by it (1977:188). 
 
Kentridge‘s own embodied subjectivity is unique in that it portrays perpetrator 
(Soho Eckstein) and victim / proletariat (Felix Teitlebaum).  His chronological 
progression of films seems an attempt to negotiate his own legacy and identity in 
relation to history.  Therefore Kentridge combines the characters of Soho Eckstein 
and Felix Teitlebaum in his later films in the Drawings for Projection series. 
 
Kentridge‘s oeuvre, from its earliest incarnations, has premised and aesthetically 
portrayed and actualised the traces of historical wounding.  The term ―trauma‖ or 
―wound‖ originally referred to a direct physical injury inflicted upon an individual(s), 
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but as discussed in Chapter Five of this study, extended to include the wounding of 
the mind / psyche / unconscious; fore mostly posited by Sigmund Freud.  There is 
a duality to this term which is manifested in Kentridge‘s works.  As discussed 
previously, his charcoal drawings leave a trace of charcoal behind on the paper —  
which could be viewed as a scarification, a physical wound of the ―trauma‖ he has 
drawn (traumatic themes / topics).  However, his work is also psychically situated 
within that of apartheid, whose legacy is that of the mentally traumatised (post-
traumatic stress syndrome).  While the physical wounds of those suffering under 
apartheid may well have healed, leaving behind traces of disfigurement; the 
psychic wounds on the other hand may never heal, leaving the past in the 
immediate present.  So too are Kentridge‘s works, they are of the past but as they 
are currently viewed / screened they are also in a perpetual present.  This is yet 
another example of Kentridge‘s works being seen as wounds — both physical and 
psychical. 
 
Kentridge‘s works can be seen as psychoanalytical (a point that has been raised 
previously).  His works dig into the minds of the collective, physically with layer 
upon layer of charcoal drawings — each layer revealing more (psychical and 
physical) meaning / sediments.  They enact what Lisa Saltzman termed ―the 
melancholy impulses of repetition, entombment, burial, and repression‖ (2000:89).  
However, they also work as a psychoanalyst would — not only revealing repressed 
memories but facilitating the recovery of repressed memories.  His oeuvre is one of 
excavation of the collective / individual memories in history.  This excavation / 
recovery ultimately lead to healing.  Of course, Kentridge‘s works are more 
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complicated than that.  It can be argued that his works do not reveal collective 
memories, but bury them — erasing them, drawing over each drawing (physically 
and metaphorically).  His works are therefore dialectical — at once remembering 
and forgetting, recovering and burying.  His repetitions (of themes and drawings) 
imply an unobtainable resolution, a perpetual deferral – they offer no closure.  They 
are works of healing and mourning (cf. Dubow and Rosengarten 2004; White 
1996).  Dziga Vertov, a Russian / Soviet Formalist film maker, defined the term 
―Kino-Eye‖ or cinematic eye (1973:79).  This is what the eye does not see, similar 
to that of an X-Ray eye (discovered after watching films in slow motion and 
realising that in the process of film making, there is much that is on celluloid that 
the eye does not consciously see — evident in slow motion and apparent now with 
DVD where you can play a film shot-by-shot) (1973:79; see Figure 8.15).  Sergei 
Eisenstein said that he did not believe in the ―Kino-Eye‖, but rather in the ―Kino-
Fist‖ — images hurled at the audience (cited in Kolker 2002:50).   Eisenstein also 
wanted to show the discontinuity of time.  He did not want to show linear time, but 
emotional time — a time of suspense and thought.    He wanted images to 
represent the conflict of history itself — a  
form of dialectical materialism, that philosophy of history which sees events 
and ideas churning in conflict with each other, negating one another, 
creating new syntheses, constructing the new out of conflicting elements of 
the old (Kolker 2002:51).   
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Figure 8.15 Still photograph from film Ubu tells the Truth (Alemani 2006:53). 
Kentridge‘s films are examples of what Sergei Eisenstein tried to capture on 
celluloid.  Michael Fried writes of Picasso‘s Guernica in his book Three American 
Painters: Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Frank Stella:   
it is …. a conviction matured out of painful experience, individual and 
collective — that only an art of constant formal self-criticism can bear or 
embody or communicate more than trivial meaning (1965:25).   
 
While obviously avoiding artistic comparisons between Picasso and Kentridge, the 
quote essentially applies to Kentridge‘s films too.  And as Ari Sitas writes of William 
Kentridge:  
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The surreal, after all, is an apt metaphor for the existential situation of a 
white artist in Johannesburg who chooses to venture across the boundaries 
of privilege, class, and race: from the violence of the streets to tea in the 
afternoon with an aging relative, from Soweto to Houghton, from the ironies 
of the communal Junction Avenue Theatre Company to the elite galleries of 
Johannesburg, from the oppressive to the sublime, compressed in a day, a 
week, a lifetime (2001:63). 
 
Fascinatingly, in support of artistic re-creations / representations of atrocities, 
Slavoj Žižek comments in his book For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment 
as a Political Factor:  
[T]he point is not to remember the past trauma as exactly as possible: such 
‗documentation‘ is a priori false, it transforms the trauma into a neutral, 
objective fact, whereas the essence of the trauma is precisely that it is too 
horrible to be remembered, to be integrated into our symbolic universe.  All 
we have to do is to mark repeatedly the trauma as such, in its very 
‗impossibility,‘ in its nonintegrated horror … (1991:273).   
 
8.3 Sigmund Freud’s A Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad (1899a) 
Multiple temporal points are fundamental to the development of the films, just as 
this temporality is entrenched within their materiality — Kentridge‘s images are 
made up of reversals, angularities and layers — these in turn render different 
meanings and readings.  His films, by the very nature of their making, layers upon 
layers of drawings, conjure up the idea of the palimpsest / quite literally are 
palimpsests3. His sedimental drawings are drawn, erased, re-drawn, and re-
interpreted — residues of charcoal adhering to giant sheets of white paper.  Even 
Kentridge‘s studio in Houghton is a space of sedimentation and accumulation of 
memorial fragments — stills from his past films, cameras, photographs, paper cut-
outs, prints, works in progress (see Figure 8.16). 
                                                 
3
 Etymologically derived from the combination of the following two Greek words: palin meaning 
again, and psaein meaning to rub smooth (Chambers Concise Dictionary 2004:859).   
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Figure 
8.16 A photograph of William Kentridge’s art studio, with images of drawings for his 
film Stereoscope on the wall (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:144). 
 
For Rosalind Krauss Kentridge‘s films are ―the emblematic form of the temporal 
and as such it is the abstraction of narrative, of history, of biography‖ (2000:24; cf. 
Christov-Bakargiev 1998; McIlleron 2003).  Sigmund Freud in his writings on 
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psychoanalysis develops a similar concept to that of the palimpsest, that of A Note 
upon the Mystic Writing Pad (introduced in Chapter Six) (1899a).  This is based on 
the original idea of parchment or papyrus and the use of a stylus which allows for 
the writing of messages.  This is usually followed by the rubbing out of the present 
writing to make way for new words to be written.  But just as the palimpsest implies 
residues so too does this ―mystical writing pad‖.  Despite constant erasures, 
impressions of previous words / drawings are eternally imprinted / left behind.  
Freud writes that ―the Pad provides not only a receptive surface that can be used 
over and over again, like a slate, but also permanent traces of what has been 
written, like an ordinary writing pad‖ are left behind (1899a:432).   
 
Freud uses this as a blueprint to describe the machinations of the unconscious 
mind — memories of experiences past are indelibly imprinted in an individual‘s 
mind.  These memories of a subject‘s history(ies) past are buried deep within, 
erased but not completely effaced.  It is the analysand that merges these traces / 
histories past with that of one‘s history‘s present. 
 
Jacques Derrida posits that it is in this metaphor of writing that Freud discovers the 
spatio-temporal foundation of consciousness.  Freud claims that the writing on the 
‗mystic writing pad‘ ―vanishes every time the close contact is broken between the 
paper which receives the stimulus and the wax slab which preserves the 
impression‖ of the stylus (cited in Meisel 1981:179; cf. McIlleron 2003).  These 
pauses between suspension and writing, between erasure and imprint are applied 
by Freud to the understanding of the psyche as containing a dis-continuist notion of 
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time.  This relates directly to Freud‘s concept of the ―perceptual apparatus and 
consciousness‖ (Pcpt.-Cs) – a belief that positions consciousness as ―dependent 
on periodic non-excitability‖ (1899a:433; cf. Freud 1984; McIlleron 2003:9).  There 
is a fast mental image recurring at intervals from within the psyche destined 
outwards to the exterior.  Sigmund Freud claimed that consciousness was inherent 
in these intermittent, erratic thought processes (1984:433).  As such, Freud 
extended the claim of Pcpt.-Cs, arriving at the belief that this cathexic apparatus 
was the origin of one‘s concept of time.  Temporality therefore consists of spacing 
or discontinuities.  Jacques Derrida termed this ‗spacing‘ as the ―time of writing‖ 
which consists of both horizontal fluctuations and recurring vertical profundities (cf. 
Derrida in Meisel 1981:179).   
 
Jacques Derrida appropriates Freud‘s idea of the mystic writing pad as the form for 
consciousness and refers to it as ―Being-in-the-world of the psyche‖ (cited in Meisel 
1981:179; cf. McIlleron 2003).  This implies that the interiority of a subject‘s 
concept of time must collude with the exteriority of the collective‘s concept of time.  
Of course this collusion of time, this collusion of the subjective and collective 
experience(s) / history(ies) is a central and inveterate obsession found in the 
oeuvre of William Kentridge.  Anne McIlleron, curator of Kentridge‘s works, writes 
in her MA Research Report:  
The entwining of what is intimate and private with what is public constitutes 
a remarked and recurrent theme in Kentridge‘s works; historical events are 
understood only as they are refracted through the minutiae of individual 
lives, whilst individual lives become comprehensible as the counterpoint to 
larger events surrounding them (2003:5).   
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For instance, Kentridge includes the image of Anne, his wife, in WEIGHING … and 
WANTING; his idea of home (referenced through the use of comforting images 
such as tea cups, reminiscent of the extravagant colonial high tea taken / enjoyed 
in the late afternoons at the height of apartheid); the comforting presence of cats; 
the luxurious bed that Soho Eckstein so often reclines in; and even Felix 
Teitlebaum‘s affair with Mrs. Eckstein.  This personal narrative of Soho/Felix is 
situated within the larger context of apartheid and South Africa‘s civil war — riots, 
unemployment, dislocations, disenfranchisement, racism, and violence (see Figure 
8.17 and Figure 8.18).   
  
 
 
Figure 8.17 Black and white photograph of white miners’ strike, Johannesburg 1922 
(Christov-Bakargiev 1998:11). 
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Figure 8.18 Drawing from Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:11). 
 
 
Jacques Derrida emphasises that Freud‘s ‗mystic writing pad‘  
joins the two empirical certainties by which we are constituted: infinite depth 
in the implication of meaning, in the unlimited envelopment of the present, 
and, simultaneously, the pellicular essence of being, the absolute absence 
of foundation (cited in McIlleron 2003:10; and Meisel 1981:174). 
 
Once again, if applied to Kentridge‘s films as they are understood to contain the 
unconscious of an individual‘s psyche, thus this quote of Derrida‘s is an excellent 
definition of Kentridge‘s films.  Put aside the oft-repeated description of Kentridge‘s 
layered approach to drawing his films, and one can unpack Derrida‘s quote in 
relation to Kentridge‘s films in another way.  There is immeasurable profundity in 
the interpretation of Kentridge‘s works.  They are also, by way of their medium, 
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forever in the present.  They are literally and metaphorically pellucid pellicles of 
being — by way of proxy — his being (or at least a part of what makes up the 
multiplicity that is William Kentridge).   
 
This is similar to the concept of intertextuality, which was introduced by Julia 
Kristeva (1996).  Intertextuality refers to the way in which texts have multiple 
meanings, how they interrelate with other texts, how texts assimilate other texts, 
cannibalise them, or allude to them.  Through this interrelatedness, a text will 
contain residues and traces of texts having come before it and after it, which then 
reside within the text itself, and therefore have many different connotations. The 
charcoal residues and traces are left behind on the still drawings that make up his 
film footage. In Another Country he takes an actual artefact, a tin of Sunbeam 
polish, and its slogan, “Shine ... Shine” and incorporates it into the film.  As 
mentioned before, he uses other texts such as archival and documentary footage 
in his films.  Kristeva also emphasises that texts are not made in isolation but are 
ideological constructs that bring with them resonances of politics, ideology, culture, 
religion and beliefs and values (1996; cf. Bullock, Stallybrass and Trombley 1988). 
There is obviously a proliferation of interpretations of Kentridge‘s work.  No 
interpretation can claim to be the final one.  Each of Kentridge‘s films enables 
multiple readings and reflects an aesthetic that melds together different levels and 
images, and the erosion of limits and boundaries.  These films are open to new 
meanings and interpretations, dependent on ongoing interaction.  They constitute a 
system where truth is contingent, and where there may be dominant images, but 
where others make their presence felt as well.  These films reflect a matrix with 
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ever-increasing connections and interconnections.  They reveal increasing 
complexity, are opposed to simplification, and ultimately offer no final answers.  
Michael Godby writes that  
Kentridge in fact rejoices both in the suggestive openness of his forms and 
in the visible layering of images that tends to preclude any single fixed 
reading ... Kentridge also tends to refuse a final authoritative account of 
events (1992:unpaginated). 
 
8.4 Time and space 
There is a scene in History of the Main Complaint where Soho/Felix is driving his 
car at night through a thicket of ominous, very claustrophobic trees.  His eyes / 
retina stare back at the audience in his car rear-view mirror.  As he drives forward 
memories of South Africa‘s apartheid atrocities appear (electrodes that at first send 
electrical shocks across the car‘s screen thread their way through to a Sunday 
roast, which in turn attach themselves firstly to a toe and then most horrifyingly to a 
penis and testicles. The reference to the Sunday roast is obvious — while most 
white South Africans enjoyed their Sunday family dinners, black South Africans 
were being tortured through well documented, heinous torture techniques.)  The 
memories give way to the present, where a dead body appears lying inert next to 
the road Soho/Felix traverses.  Other individuals materialise — brutalised, trampled 
and kicked.  As Soho/Felix lies in his coma, these attacks are chronicled on his 
body scan through the use of red pastel marks (see Figures 8.19 — 8.28).  Almost 
subliminally fast, they are wiped out by a dual windscreen wiper / medical scanner 
— this ―device‖ moves backwards and then forwards, and again, backwards and 
forwards, and then again.  The rhythmic, soothing cadence is interrupted by the 
unexpected individual who dashes from the pitch black void directly in front of 
William Kentridge: Chapter Eight: Memory, history, identity, time and space 
 
311 | P a g e  
 
Soho/Felix‘s car.  The projecting front car head lights illuminate his shocked face 
— held momentarily in stasis — before the car hits him.  Then there is a close-up 
of his face colliding with the windscreen — the force of which smashes / crushes 
his face, and the startling image of the imploding windscreen.  At that very second 
Soho/Felix emerges from his coma.  The implosion is not only one of bodies and 
hardware, but of time.  The past, represented by apartheid‘s atrocities, collides with 
the present — the moment the car impacts with the person and the immediate 
present — Soho/Felix awakens from his coma.  This traumatic collision of the past 
with the present(s) results not only in an awakening of his physical being (coma) 
but also of his unconscious being — repressed images of occurrences that took 
place in his (and South Africa‘s) past.  Jessica Dubow and Ruth Rosengarten 
believe that this represents Walter Benjamin‘s ―differentia of time‖ — a moment 
when the chronological time of the past and present collide in a freeze-frame 
(literally in Kentridge‘s case — as it is drawn thus) (2004:198).  Benjamin‘s concept 
refers to the momentary discontinuity of time — time as it is understood to exist as 
fluid, ordered and uninterruptedly continuous.  Dubow and Rosengarten suggest 
that Soho/Felix‘s crash is ―a plunge into the time-image itself‖ (2004:198).  They 
refer directly to Walter Benjamin‘s idea of the time facet compacting together the 
―what-has-been‖ and the ―now‖ — unmoving in their emerged ―consonance and 
dissonance‖ (Dubow and Rosengarten 2004:198).  The car crash and 
simultaneous emerging from his coma are one — a dialectical shock, an 
experience of deficient temporality.  This is the instant of time when something 
becomes conscious — in and during a confrontation with crisis. The confrontation 
is one of his conscious and unconscious and also a physical confrontation, that is, 
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the car impacting with the windscreen and the physical awakening of his being.  
Extrapolating from that, this confrontation is also one of responsibility and guilt.  He 
feels responsible not only for the accident, a directly personal action, but 
responsible for acts of atrocity that were carried out while he was one of the white 
elite living in luxury and benefiting from apartheid.  His guilt is for his own actions 
and also his non-actions (for instance, Soho/Felix‘s capitalistic gains, which would 
have been impossible without the rule and support of apartheid).  Then there is his 
guilt at crashing into the man.  There is also his guilt at not actively trying to stop 
apartheid.  This is further implied when he simply continues to drive by the dead 
body lying in the ditch and does not stop to help when he sees a person being 
beaten to death.  As with apartheid, he was aware of what was being carried out in 
the name of ―democracy‖, but chose to look away.  He continues to drive on and it 
takes the impact of the crash to make him stop.  It is implied that Soho/Felix would 
have continued on his way had the accident not occurred.  This is ironic, because 
even though the crash forces him to acknowledge his responsibility and guilt at the 
end of the film, he does nothing to address these ―awakenings‖. He continues with 
his life as before. 
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Figure 8.19 Drawing from the History of the Main Complaint (Cameron, Christov-
Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:91). 
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Figure 8.20 Drawing from the History of the Main Complaint (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:38). 
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Figure 8.21 Drawing from the History of the Main Complaint (Cameron, Christov-
Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:92). 
 
 
 
Figure 8.22 and Figure 8.23 Drawings from the History of the Main Complaint 
(Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:92). 
 
 
 
 
 
William Kentridge: Chapter Eight: Memory, history, identity, time and space 
 
316 | P a g e  
 
 
 
Figure 8.24 Drawing from History of the Main Complaint (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, 
Sitas and Cameron 2001:108—109). 
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Figure 8.25 Drawing from History of the Main Complaint (Cameron, Christov-
Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:90). 
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Figure 8.26 Drawing from History of the Main Complaint (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, 
Sitas and Cameron 2001:108). 
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Figure 8.27 Drawing from History of the Main Complaint (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, 
Sitas and Cameron 2001:109). 
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Figure 8.28 Drawing from the History of the Main Complaint (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, 
Sitas and Cameron 2001:114). 
 
The film History of the Main Complaint was made in 1996, the year the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was formed, as a direct response to the TRC.  As there 
was no ―revolution‖, or overt break in social relations, the TRC was seen as a 
compromise to appease both sides (victims and tormentors / perpetrators) with the 
hope of healing rifts — making it possible for the oppressed to live harmoniously 
with their oppressors.  Dubow and Rosengarten refer to the retrieval of the past 
injected into the current present as ―psychic historicism: that is to say, the creation 
of temporal delineation as part of the remedial relation of sickness to cure, of 
retrieval to reflection to repair‖ (2004:200).  They imply that this retrieval of past 
trauma(s) through giving voice to them would allow for closure, allowing South 
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Africans to heal and move forward into the new present.  Dubow and Rosengarten 
emphasise that the TRC was to be a means of consigning history to the past. 
 
These ideas are psychoanalytical ones.  Sigmund Freud, in his book Mourning and 
Melancholia writes about ―trauerarbeit‖ (1917 / 1957; cf. Dubow and Rosengarten 
2004; Freud 2005; Rycroft 1972) (mentioned in previous chapters; also used by 
William Kentridge in one of his images from Black Box / Chambre Noir; see Figure 
8.31).  This work of mourning involves working through these feelings by 
expressing them verbally, externalising them.  Of course, this process is an 
example of the use of Freud‘s technique that makes up psychoanalysis — his 
―talking cure‖, which involves exteriorising repressed memories / traumas which 
results in psychical healing and closure.  Freud did not limit the idea of mourning to 
an individual‘s lost loved one but extended it to include other ―objects‖ such as the 
loss of democracy or the loss of one‘s home.  Freudian influenced historians such 
as Hayden White (1996) and Keith Jenkins (1996), who also argues that collective 
/ community traumas need to undergo this ―labour of mourning‖ before a new 
collective / national identity can be created.  These traumas need to be 
acknowledged before a new subjectivity(ies) can be formed.  However Freud does 
stress that the significant part of mourning is not the process itself, but rather the 
end result — closure — which allows memory(ies) to find their place and hence 
healing to begin.  The TRC‘s aims are therefore encapsulated in Freud‘s 
―trauerarbeit‖ (1917 / 1957; cf. Freud 2005).  Soho/Felix‘s experience mirrors that 
of the TRC — although it is debatable whether or not Soho/Felix achieves closure, 
as his life continues as before.  The implication then is that Soho/Felix has not 
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psychically healed; he is locked in a perpetual traumatic present.  The exploding 
watch worn by the person he crashes into points to that — it stops at a specific 
time, forever in the present.  Without closure, Soho/Felix is doomed to obsess 
about the ―lost object‖ — his unresolved feelings of guilt and responsibility 
repetitively resurging — he becomes, in Freudian terms, a melancholic (see Figure 
8.30).   
 
 
 
Figure 8.29 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007a:front cover). 
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Figure 8.30 Drawing from Stereoscope (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 
2001:133). 
 
Victims / survivors of genocides / atrocities / wars often lack the words and images 
to describe or present as witness their experiences.  However, theorist Janine 
Altounian points out that it is precisely ―on the written scene that the memory of an 
event that cannot be remembered may be built — through displacement, through 
‗translation‘‖4 (cited in Rollet 2007:169). Sylvie Rollet believes that it is through the 
reciprocity between the cinematic image and mental images that films resurrect 
remembrances.  She therefore concludes that films are not merely a form of 
                                                 
4
 ―Displacement‖ is a Freudian term that relates to his concept of cathexis (Freud 1900 / 1991a; cf. 
Rycroft 1972; and Chapter Three).   
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representation:  ―Cinema is an active, dynamic reciprocity between two entities‖ 
(2007:169).  She goes on to argue that cinema is a ―site‖ of reconstruction or ―re-
representation‖ where the ghostly memories of the past are neatly resurrected and 
reinstated.  She writes ―[c]inema appears, therefore, to be the tool of recollection 
for a disremembered, collective history‖ (2007:172).  While she is specifically 
referring to mainstream cinema, of course this applies directly to Kentridge‘s works 
too, although the medium of film making differs considerably.  It is an argument for 
cinema as engagement and images working as triggers to release memories 
packed away in one‘s deepest recesses of the unconscious.  She also posits that 
memory is inseparable from an image (Rollet 2007:172).   She continues to argue 
that this is specifically so in film because the filmmaking device is one of projection 
— the same as is found in the psychoanalysis of Freud.  Technology intersects 
with the term‘s psychological meaning.  According to Jacques Derrida, cinema 
encourages: 
‗grafts‘ of spectrality, it inscribes the traces of ghosts in a general 
framework, the projected film, which is itself a ghost. […]  Cinema is the 
absolute simulacrum of absolute survival.  It tells us the story of that from 
which there is no return, it tells us the story of death (cited in Rollet 
2007:173).   
 
Film as a response to unexpressed / repressed collective trauma — even though 
―absence‖ resides in film, it provides a space or place where individual histories 
can join the flow of collective histories.  So for instance, with Kentridge, he tells his 
own story or narrative of Soho/Felix, but his narrative provides a place to explore 
collective stories too, those also relating to apartheid and their experiences of this 
fascist regime.  The spectator-witness plays a role in the reconstruction of 
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memories — the audience ensures a shared experience or a sharing of memories 
that also serves to ―out‖ the individual‘s memory (Rollet 2007:173). 
 
Memory can be seen as rather unsteady and insecure, and one can go so far as to 
perceive it as a form of ―displacement‖ (Baronian, Besser and Jansen 2007:12).  
This is in as far as memory is inherently constantly moving and in flux.  Individual / 
personal memory and collective memory (or cultural memory), or post-memory 
(Hirsch 1997) consist of ―re-articulations and re-enactments‖ (Baronian, Besser 
and Jansen 2007:12).   
 
As already emphasised, memory is formed by the process of bearing testimony / 
witness and through forgetting, and memory is by nature performative, a process 
that associates with the space of identity, and is not secured by it.  Therefore its 
―temporal status is always in the present‖ (Huyssen 1995:3).  Anne-Marie Fortier 
defines a place of re-membering as  
a place of collective memory in which elements of the past are cobbled 
together to mould a communal body of belonging.  It is a place where 
individual lives, present and past, are called upon to inhabit the present 
space, to ‗member‘ it (cited in Baronian, Besser and Jansen 2007:76). 
 
Roland Barthes (1981) introduces one to the concept of the ―punctum‖ — the point 
of memory.  Using this concept, one can take images from the past as ―points of 
memory‖, which implies a criss-crossing of the past and the present, memory and 
post-memory and individual memories with collective memories.  The word ―point‖ 
is spatio-temporal — physical, such as geographical site, and also an instant in 
time — and therefore signifies the interconnectedness of spatio-temporality in the 
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mechanisms of both individual and collective memory.  A point is piercing and so 
sharp that it can puncture.  Etymologically, punctum, is a ―little hole‖ or ―puncture‖, 
relating to pungo, ―to puncture‖ or ―stab‖:  conjuring up images of wounds —  
memories as wounds, to return briefly to previous work in this study (Chambers 
Concise Dictionary 2004:968). Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer posit that like 
Barthes‘ punctum, points of memory perforate / penetrate through different layers, 
including those of ―oblivion, interpellating those who seek to know about the past‖ 
(2007:141).  A point can also be tiny, a miniscule detail which belies a past.  It can 
therefore communicate the past as dissected fragments that have been passed 
down to us and exist in the present.  These ―points of memory‖ can provide 
profound or ―piercing‖ insights that transcend time, space and experience.  Points, 
of course, can also proliferate and in doing so they can communicate dissimilar 
perceptions and frames of reference, preventing one singular meaning.  Hirsch and 
Spitzer suggest that remnants or points from the past ―prick and wound and grab 
and puncture, like the punctum — unsettling assumptions, exposing the 
unexpected, suggesting what Barthes calls ‗a subtle beyond,‘ or the ‗blind field‘ 
outside the frame‖  (2007:141).  This is what Kentridge‘s works are like — 
punctums that make one question the past in the ever present.  He (re)produces 
fragments of the past or ―points of memory‖ to help one remember and generate 
remembrance.  For Roland Barthes the ―point of memory‖ is first identified by some 
personal connection, a memory or partial memory that draws one in to the bigger 
picture.  It suggests a personalisation or subjectivity and an acknowledgement of 
the ordinary / mundane in the extraordinary.  For example, one sees Kentridge‘s 
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use of the coffee plunger, the inclusion of an obsidian sculpted head, cat(s) et 
cetera — everyday objects / things placed in surreal contexts. 
 
While Barthes‘ memorial punctum is predominantly viewed as personal / subjective 
/ individual, this punctum can also be viewed as being dependent on collective 
and/or social factors / effects.  For example, the images of hundreds of workers 
exploding out of a tax calculator might simply be a surrealist image for individuals 
who are not viewing the images from a cultural / historical perspective, a 
perspective that has not been influenced by capitalism and colonialism and which 
immediately puts those images into a different context and hence a different 
meaning.  As personal and cultural interpretations, points of memory are 
dependent on the social factors that influence individuals and how these individuals 
experience factors such as politics, age, class, race, ethnicity, religion and even 
power relations (the ‗haves‘ versus the ‗have-nots‘).  Through various 
interpretations these points of memory reveal historical and cultural meanings, 
even leading to the questioning of certain associations.  For instance, in Mine, 
Kentridge uses the coffee plunger to track a route from the bed of the capitalist, 
Soho Eckstein, through the horrific scene of underground workers in a very dark, 
dank, claustrophobic mine, to an image of a slave ship.  The point of memory 
begins as a personal one, an association with the ordinary, a coffee plunger, as it 
descends into the somewhat surrealistic mine, in the transformation into a mine 
shaft, the points of memory become social / cultural / historical — they represent 
the greed of the colonialists, the rapists of the earth, the exploiters of man and 
land.  Then, as the plunger continues, the point of memory continues too — into a 
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slave ship that then enables the individual to make the association that the miners 
are no more than that — slave workers, living under horrific conditions to supply 
colonials with almost free labour.  Without the first point of association, the first 
point of memory (the coffee plunger), the individual watching the film might never 
have been drawn into the rest of these meanings. They might not make the 
connection between apartheid and colonialism. Colonialism, capitalism, slave ships 
and the ‗haves‘ and ‗have-nots‘ all have a specific meaning for a white South 
African living under apartheid — a South African subject who has been shaped 
politically and culturally by his background.  These images also serve to uncover 
certain intersections between such factors as class, race and gender.  The ordinary 
point of memory also serves to challenge the viewer or interpreter of such images 
— bringing into question associations not thought of before — the cultural and 
historical association between the early colonialists taking ships of slave labour to 
western countries, and the latter-day colonialists using mine labourers as nothing 
more than slave labour.  While those taught of such associations and enlightened 
by education might find these observations obvious, to individuals not aware of 
their own socialisation, not aware of their identity and subjectivity having been 
shaped and formed by apartheid and all its inherent associations, these are 
shocking revelations that enforce memory, bringing memory(ies) to the fore, 
bringing cultural / collective memory to the forefront.  Kentridge‘s works therefore 
serve to keep visible individual memory in relation to cultural memory (for instance, 
they might lead one to question his/her own role in upholding apartheid or using 
labour as slave labour — for example the realisation that one is using a domestic 
worker as an exploited labourer, condoned and in fact encouraged by apartheid 
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and its laws and beliefs).  For Roland Barthes, the punctum is about the overt and 
the covert, the visible and the invisible. With regards to the ―subtle beyond‖, or the 
―blind field‖ outside the frame (cited in Hirsch and Spitzer 2007:141; cf. Barthes 
1981) if a tiny, seemingly insignificant detail / point, however, misaligned, 
interpellates a subject, it literally blocks out other details found within an image, 
even though these other details might be central or significant to the image as a 
whole.  The focus on the coffee-plunger in an surreal environment / larger image 
serves to draw in the subject leading the subject to a variety of memories, 
questions, associations not actually found on the screen — these associations are 
made beyond or outside of the filmic frame itself.  Barthes refers to this ―subtle 
beyond‖ as an ―insistent gaze‖ — an intense gaze that turns outward of a frame 
towards the beyond, that which cannot be contained within a specific frame (in 
Kentridge‘s case literally a filmic frame) (cited in Hirsch and Spitzer 2007:141; cf. 
Barthes 1981:49-51).  This ―beyond‖ is important, for the author of this study on 
Kentridge — as it allows for associations to be made, important questions to be 
asked by the subject — not only of his/her own identity and subjectivity and 
personal memories but of the wider societal / cultural memories as well as his/her 
role within those latter memories.  Furthermore, as the author of this doctoral 
dissertation, the opinion put forward here is that in Kentridge‘s films, this point is 
not only an ―insistent gaze‖ turned outward, but an ―insistent gaze‖ turned inward. 
 
The second part of Barthes‘ book, Camera Lucida (1981), focuses on the punctum, 
not spatially, but in terms of ―Time‖.  In his writings Barthes states  
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I now know that there exists another punctum (another ―stigmatum‖) than 
the ―detail.‖  This new punctum, which is no longer of form but of intensity, is 
Time, the lacerating emphasis of the noeme (―that-has-been‖), it‘s pure 
representation (1981:96; cf. Hirsch and Spitzer 2007).   
 
This punctum of ―Time‖ is directly related to mourning / death, loss, absence and 
change — all of which are inevitable.  This punctum refers to the incongruity 
between the meaning of an object in the past and its meaning in the present.  This 
is what Kentridge‘s works deal with in the manner of their making and in their 
content.  His drawings reveal and conceal, insisting that one attempts to perceive 
the spaces between the drawings or filmic frames, to perceive the hesitations, the 
silence and the empty space or ―absence‖.  They therefore do not simply impress 
upon one to view the presence, but through Barthes‘ ―insistent gaze‖ to view the 
presence and the absence.  His oeuvre impresses upon us the way in which 
different individuals live / experience the same historical moment differently.  This 
is the temporal incongruity that Barthes refers to.  Kentridge‘s works also reveal a 
different reading from when they were shown when they were first made (1999) 
and the readings / interpretations of the work now (2010 / 2011).  Yet both hold 
validity.  Different individuals have the same experiences but with different 
outcomes.  Both have credibility yet have juxtaposing meanings, then and now.   
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on history as metafiction, identity, and time and space. The 
most important event that has been covered in this chapter as it relates to these 
ideas is that of The Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Michel Foucault 
describes the narrative process of history as the decomposing and restructuring of 
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documents through the creation of new relations (cited in Poster 1984), which is 
what has happened with The Truth and Reconciliation Commission — the 
hearings, and the narrative process of the hearings gave South Africans a new, or 
different  perspective of apartheid and its effects  And during this process it is 
memory and the individual‘s memories that produce history — history is re-
arranged through the process of ―bisociation‖ — a term coined by Arthur Koestler 
to refer to the merging of disparate contexts.  It is the combining, reshuffling, and 
the relating of separate ideas, facts, frames of perception and associative contexts 
(cited in Madison 1990). Gary Brent Madison (1990) further states that the image 
or memory of the image produces new and relevant meaning in its 
sequentialisation.  And that is what has happened with South Africa‘s history.  
Apartheid and its practices are now acknowledged as wrong, and now you have 
new images to sustain that history — images and memories, eye-witness accounts 
of torture; detention without trial; interrogation brutality; captivity; individuals lost / 
missing, raped and murdered.  Whether or not one agrees that the TRC was 
successful in terms of reparation and convictions, or whether or not it served to 
heal and repair (Foster, Haupt, and de Beer 2005), it did successfully achieve one 
thing — it laid bare the innards of the atrocity that was apartheid, its intricate 
workings, and the complicated infrastructure that every white South African was a 
part of.  No longer can one ignore or deny the reality and repercussions of 
apartheid.  It laid bare South Africans‘ identities. 
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CHAPTER NINE:  MEMORY, LANDSCAPES, CITIES AND MONUMENTS 
 
Throughout this thesis (albeit pre-dominantly in Chapter Eight) William Kentridge‘s 
oeuvre has been likened to a palimpsest — in other words, it has been 
characterised as sedimentary.  His work consists of layers — in different mediums 
of charcoals, pastels, inks, sugar lifts. Even his miniature theatre production Black 
Box / Chambre Noir is comprised of layers of little theatre production sets 
positioned one in front of the other, from largest to smallest, for perspective 
purposes (Figures 9.1 — 9.3).  This idea of his work as a palimpsest / sediments is 
in turn linked to his charcoal drawing / animation work that leaves traces behind, 
remnants of what has come before (hence the reference to Sigmund Freud‘s A 
Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad (1899a)).  His work conjures up a dissection and 
internal view of land — one layer of earth impacted upon another layer of earth.  
Each layer of earth holds remnants / traces and information of what that particular 
layer has had built upon it.  The archaeological dig gives up information, secrets 
even, to be decoded and interpreted, of what the land has held / possessed, that 
has since been buried and then unearthed.  Kentridge‘s oeuvre, however, is not 
just metaphorically and physically linked to the idea of sediments.  His work 
actually contains many instances of images of land / landscapes themselves.  
Landscapes in Kentridge‘s work abound — landscapes of steel, metal and glass, 
as well as landscapes of earth, even internal views of the physical landscape (such 
as found in Mine).  From some of his earliest works (for example his still-life series 
Colonial Landscapes (1995 — 1996; see Figure 9.74 and Figure 9.75) and co-
created (with artist Doris Bloom) multi-media series Memory and Geography (1995 
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and 1996); see Figure 9.4 and Figure 9.76) he has concerned himself with the 
physical landscape(s) / cityscape(s).  The colonial and post-colonial landscape; the 
land and body as one; the city of Johannesburg as it mirrors his unconscious; the 
inner city (including scenes of riots); and the Highveld around Johannesburg, are a 
few of his themes / subjects / motifs (see Figures 9.5 — 9.9).  One of the videos 
that the artist was kind enough to make accessible for purposes of this study is of 
him walking through vast stretches of the Highveld, with mine dumps in the 
background.  The starkness and barrenness of him walking alone — desolate and 
eerie, yet startling beautiful, conjures up images of his creation Soho/Felix.  William 
Kentridge has said that ―[t]here is a sense of drawing a social or historical 
landscape.  The process of actually making the drawing finds that history because 
the landscape itself hides it‖ (cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998:23).   
 
This chapter deals specifically with these themes / subjects, that is, landscapes, 
cities and monuments.  Walter Benjamin wrote in his work titled Berlin Chronicle: 
Language shows clearly that memory is not an instrument for exploring the 
past but its theatre.  It is the medium of past experience, as the ground is 
the medium in which dead cities lie interred.  He who seeks to approach his 
own buried past must conduct himself like a man digging …  He must not be 
afraid to return again and again to the same matter, to scatter it as one 
scatters earth, to turn it over as one turns over soil.  For the matter itself is 
only a deposit, a stratum, which yields only to the most meticulous 
examination what constitutes the real treasure hidden in the earth: the 
images, severed from all earlier associations, that stand – like precious 
fragments or torsos in a collector‘s gallery – in the prosaic rooms of our later 
understanding (cited in Coombes 2003:116; cf.  Benjamin 1963). 
 
This quote is obviously appropriate to Kentridge‘s work.  The reasons why will be 
explicated in more detail below. 
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Figure 9.1 Photograph of Black Box / Chambre Noir miniature theatre (William 
Kentridge Black Box / Chambre Noir edited by Law-Viljoen 2007a:unpaginated). 
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Figure 9.2 Photograph of Black Box / Chambre Noir miniature theatre (William Kentridge 
Black Box / Chambre Noir edited by Law-Viljoen 2007a:unpaginated). 
 
 Figure 9.3 Photograph of Black 
Box / Chambre Noir miniature theatre (William Kentridge Black Box / Chambre Noir edited by 
Law-Viljoen 2007a:unpaginated).  
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Figure 9.4 Colour aerial photograph of Memory and Geography (1995) William 
Kentridge (and Doris Bloom), multi-media project, Rome (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:20). 
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Figure 9.5 Drawing for Woyzeck on the Highveld (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and 
Cameron 2001:24). 
 
Figure 9.6 Drawing from WEIGHING ... and WANTING (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:137). 
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Figure 9.7 Photograph of disused mine dumps and electrical pylons (Christov-
Bakargiev 1998:26). 
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Figure 9.8 Drawing from Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:11). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.9 Photograph of white miners’ strike 1922 (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:11). 
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9.1 Landscapes 
―Landscapes‖ is originally a term used by geographers to refer to culturally 
embedded geographies (Osborne 2001:5).  As constructions / formations of 
human-created material forms, they represent cultural records lying palimpsest-like 
spatio-temporally, and as such they can be excavated / interrogated as relics and 
symbolically laden signifiers of meaning (Cosgrove 1998; Meinig 1979; Sauer 
1963).  From the Sauerian (Carl O. Sauer) geography / anthropology-impelled 
perspective of landscape as constructions / formations of physical / material 
culture-traits and complexes, the impetus has now moved to a more nuanced 
decoding of the emblematic meaning of landscapes (Osborne 2001; cf. Sauer 
1963).  Denis Cosgrove suggests  
that landscape constitutes a discourse through which identifiable social 
groups historically have framed themselves and their relations with both the 
land and with other human groups, and that this discourse is related 
epistemologically and technically to ways of seeing (Cosgrove 1998:xiv). 
 
This is an idea pertinent to Kentridge‘s works, because he wants one to literally 
―see‖ the landscape as having been marked.  This is why he uses red pastels to 
highlight land sites in his stills and films (see Figure 9.10). 
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Figure 9.10 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 
1999:124). 
 
Through day-by-day living and dying in specific places, the ―abstraction of space is 
transformed into a social and psychic geography‖ (Osborne 2001:5).  This is 
especially true of Kentridge‘s works, where he positions the bodies as they have 
died, which in turn become newspapers and then mounds of earth — the remnants 
of what has taken place there is now only psychical.  Both a cognitively derived 
knowing about a place and an innate sense of place(s) / landscapes are subsumed 
into individuals‘ identity (see Figures 9.11 — 9.13).  Charles Tilley argues that:  
[p]laces, like persons, have biographies in as much as they are formed, 
used, and transformed in relation to practice … stories acquire part of their 
mythic value and historical relevance if they are rooted in the concrete 
details of locales in the landscape, acquiring material reference points that 
can be visited, seen and touched (1994:33).   
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In other words, by living somewhere, abstract space becomes particular place 
through the processes and actions of social and material means. 
  
Figure 9.11 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:91). 
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Figure 9.12 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 
2001:28). 
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Figure 9.13 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 
2001:99). 
 
It is well documented how place is of great significance to pre-modern, non-
western, communities in terms of cultural ecology, subsistence living, communal 
organisation and beliefs (Osborne 2001).  Underlying this idea is the suggestion 
that physical surroundings are infused with complex symbolic relationships.  The 
interweaving of place and self can be very forceful:  
many premodern and preliterate societies are bound to the land in the sense 
that they and place seem to be virtually one.  This is encouraged by the use 
of landscape as part of memory in an oral society that must remember 
everything about itself and its practices.  Hence place, of necessity must be 
more intimately a part of its own culture.  It is enhanced by the tendency in 
these cultures to blur distinctions between the natural and the cultural, the 
living and the dead.  Place is often inhabited by the spirits of the ancestors, 
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or the place may have been given to the people by the gods (Sack 
1997:136).   
 
This idea is central to modern times too.  Places of the dead, such as death, 
concentration and internment camps are often considered to be sacred / 
sacrosanct and infused with the ghosts of the dead.  Kentridge‘s mini-production 
theatre, Black Box / Chambre Noir deals with these concepts in depth.  The 
artwork of this piece focuses on the Herero peoples and their attempt to hold on to 
their land and identities (see Chapter Eight for more details).  Germany attempted 
to colonise the peoples and their lands — using them for cheap labour, and mining 
their land.  When the Herero resisted and were forced to fight for their land, the 
Germans decimated the community.  Those that did not succumb to death through 
murder, starvation, and disease (they were placed in concentration camps) were 
forced to scatter and relocate, in some cases all the way to Botswana.  The same 
can be said of the Native Americans who ended up being placed in dry, arid 
demarcated reservations.  Of course, with Kentridge‘s focus on Johannesburg 
there is the implied reference to townships and so-called independent Bantustans.  
In his film Felix in Exile the dead individuals go through a ―ghostly‖ appearance 
before succumbing to the land and being eradicated by newspapers — infusing the 
land with the ghosts of the dead (again see Figures 9.11 — 9.13). 
 
Landscape is often seen not as a noun, but a verb, and one should ask of it:  
not just what landscape is or means but what it does, how it works as a 
cultural practice.  Landscape … doesn‘t merely signify or symbolize power 
relations; it is an instrument of cultural power, perhaps even an agent of 
power that is … independent of human intentions.  Landscape as a cultural 
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medium thus [sic] has a double role with respect to something like ideology; 
it naturalizes a cultural and social construction, representing an artificial 
world as if it were simply given and inevitable (Mitchell 1994:1-2). 
 
As Barbara Bender puts it: ―[t]he landscape is never inert, people engage with it, 
re-work it, appropriate and contest it.  It is part of the way in which identities are 
created and disputed, whether as individual, [or] group …‖ (1993:3).  There are 
many places in history and the world that are associated with blood and soil, which 
have to signify belonging: Masada (AD 73) for the Jews; Gallipoli (1916) for the 
Australians and New Zealanders; and Culloden (1746) for the Scots, are just a few 
(Ignatieff 1993). 
 
Generally paintings of landscapes are what Andrea Latterwein calls ―artified‖ – by 
this she means that they influence our artistic view of and pre-empt the translating 
of the ―grids that we impose on the countryside‖ (2007:134). However, Andrea 
Latterwein (quoting Anselm Kiefer in support) challenges this perception as he 
believes that no landscape can be depicted ―innocently‖ because ―it has been for 
ever impregnated with history, with war, ‗an impure blood waters our furrows‘…‖ 
(cited in Latterwein 2007:134).  Anselm Kiefer, a second-generation German, born 
in 1945, has drawn many landscapes, which have been likened to Kentridge‘s work 
by Staci Boris (2001).  There is indeed a striking similarity between Kiefer‘s 
landscapes and Kentridge‘s — in terms of both themes and portrayals of 
landscapes.  For example, some of Kiefer‘s landscapes also consist of many layers 
— thickly layered oils with mixed materials, sometimes straw and sometimes ash.   
Obviously by their very definition oil paintings are layered, but it seems as though 
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Kiefer is at pains to layer some of his landscapes in a deliberate manner — the 
paintings are almost overburdened with paint — thickly clotted and very rough.  
They too then conjure up the idea of excavating his paintings — for they too are 
sedimental.  Kiefer‘s use of ash is also similar to Kentridge‘s use of charcoal.  The 
use of grey ash and/or charcoal — Kentridge uses brushes and ―paints‖ with loose 
charcoal, as one would make use of paint — brings to mind the ash that was 
emitted from the crematoria.  Many survivors have commented on how the ash fell 
around them continually, especially when the crematoria were working at their 
maximum.  Andrea Latterwein refers to one of Kiefer‘s landscape paintings in a 
watercolour entitled Sick Art (1975; see Figure 9.14; Figure 9.20; Figure 9.22; 
Figures 9.27 — 9.29).  The Nordic landscape is covered with snow which in turn is 
covered with oozing, pulsating red boils.  These red boils instead of being ugly are 
actually very aesthetically pleasing (if one is ignorant of what they represent, one 
can transcend their real meaning).  That they are depicted as pretty though is not 
accidental — Kiefer seeks to make the point that the Nordic landscape revels in its 
unmasked beauty and is opposed to history.  If one was to portray a landscape that 
depicts history accurately one would have to paint very aesthetically displeasing 
images.  Kiefer speaks of the contamination of landscapes by ideology (2007:134).  
Kiefer has said that the use of red directs one to an historical event — especially 
that which contains a ―wound‖ (cited in Latterwein 2007:144).  The same can be 
said of Kentridge‘s Drawings for Projection series, as well as his Colonial 
Landscapes series and the background film and stills for his play Faustus in Africa! 
(amongst others).  Kentridge marks these ―historical sites / wounds‖ in bright red 
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pastel which is in stark contrast to the grey and black charcoal which he 
predominantly uses, and takes up most of the drawings (see Figures 9.34 and 
9.35).  
 
Referring to the mass murder of the Jews and other supposed ―undesirables‖, it is 
a fact that their bodies were recycled and made into common artefacts such as 
soap, lampshades and fertilizer.  This fertilizer was distributed throughout Germany 
to enhance the growth of landscapes and meadows.  These in turn created food for 
both humans and animals.  Latterwein writes that ―[i]t is the logical conclusion to 
this cannibalistic recycling that the ashes became physically ubiquitous: they are 
absorbed into the countryside, into humans, and into every living thing‖ (2007:144).   
 
Anselm Kiefer is also cited in Andrea Latterwein‘s book, Anselm Kiefer.  Paul 
Celan. Myth, Mourning and Memory: ―I never see a forest that does not bear a 
mark or sign of history‖ (2007:133).  This is an almost identical comment made by 
Kentridge with regard to Poland‘s landscape (and most of Europe) as being tainted 
with blood, yet erased of all evidence, which is quoted in Chapter Three.  Kentridge 
likens the landscapes of Poland to that of the Auschwitz crematoria, of which 
nothing remains (an idea that has been referred to throughout this study) (Christov-
Bakargiev 1998:48). 
 
Anselm Kiefer‘s landscapes are scarified and empty.  He portrays them in a 
―destructive‖ way and nature, instead of representing an individual‘s reality, as has 
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been done previously during art‘s Romantic era, now depicts ―collective history‖ 
and by extension collective memory (2007:133; see Figures 9.15 — 19; Figures 
9.21 — 9.26; and Figures 9.30 — 9.33; also compare to Kentridge, see Figure 
9.34. and Figure 9.35).  This can also be said of Kentridge‘s landscapes — yet his 
are also infused with personal metanarratives and often a combination of both the 
personal and the collective.  For example, in the film Sobriety, Obesity & Growing 
Old there is a scene of Soho Eckstein making love to his wife (with whom he has 
been re-united) in the middle of a vast landscape. This is a very personal and 
intimate act; however, they are surrounded by hundreds of faceless individuals 
(see Figure 9.39).  Another example is a still from the film WEIGHING … and 
WANTING:  Soho/Felix is a tiny figure seemingly overwhelmed by large tracts of 
landscape containing huge pylons of steel for electricity and what appears to be 
discarded mining waste.  In another still from the same film, Soho/Felix lays his 
head on a huge rock, which in turn lies on a vast, striated / scarified landscape 
populated with five tiny, barely identifiable individuals in the distance.  In 
Stereoscope, Soho/Felix is surrounded by a landscape of mainly water; in the 
background is a huge factory with giant chimneys spewing out effluence into the 
sky, polluting it and the landscape around it (once again there is the association 
between ash, charcoal, chimneys and the crematoria). 
 
Heiner Müller wrote the following poem, Hamletmaschine, from which these lines 
are taken:   
I felt MY blood come out of MY veins 
And turn MY body into the landscape 
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of MY death (cited and translated in Birringer 1990:86; cf. Saltzman 2000).   
 
Obviously this is an apt description of the artistic endeavours featuring Kentridge‘s 
landscapes, where the bodies of apartheid victims become one with the land 
(especially seen in Felix in Exile — including the principle female character, Nandi, 
see Figure 9.37; also found in Anselm Kiefer‘s works – see Figures 9.20 — 9.29). 
 
Figure 9.14 Sick Art (1974) Anselm Kiefer, watercolour on paper (Latterwein 
2007:69). 
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Figure 9.15 Operation Hagenbewegung (1975) Anselm Kiefer, oil on burlap 
(Latterwein 2007:74). 
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Figure 9.16 Siegfried Forgets Brünhilde (1975) Anselm Kiefer, oil on canvas (Latterwein 
2007:73). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.17 Operation Barbarossa (1975) Anselm Kiefer, oil on burlap (Latterwein 2007:74). 
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Figure 9.18 The World-Ash (1982) Anselm Kiefer, burnt wood on acrylic, emulsion, 
shellac, straw on original photograph and canvas (Latterwein 2007:80). 
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Figure 9.19 Your Golden Hair, Margarete (1980) Anselm Kiefer, watercolour, gouache and 
acrylic on paper (Latterwein 2007:112). 
 
 
Figure 9.20 Ice and Blood (1971) Anselm Kiefer, watercolour on paper (Latterwein 2007:134). 
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Figure 9.21 Cauterization of the Rural District of Buchen (1974) Anselm Kiefer, 
original photograph, iron oxide, linseed oil on fibrous paper (Latterwein 2007:136). 
 
  
 
Figure 9.22 Cauterization of the Rural District of Buchen (1974) Anselm Kiefer, 
original photograph, iron oxide and linseed oil on fibrous paper (Latterwein 
2007:137). 
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Figure 9.23 Winter Landscape (1970) Anselm Kiefer, watercolour on paper 
(Latterwein 2007:135). 
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Figure 9.24 The Sands of Mark Brandenburg III (1976 — 1977) Anselm Kiefer, book.  
Linseed oil and sand on original photographs and fibrous paper (Latterwein 
2007:140). 
 
 
Figure 9.25 The Sands of Mark Brandenburg (1980) Anselm Kiefer, acrylic, shellac, 
sand and glue on photograph and burlap (Latterwein 2007:141). 
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Figure 9.26 Lot’s Wife (1990) Anselm Kiefer, acrylic, emulsion and ashes on canvas 
with salt and lead (Latterwein 2007:26). 
William Kentridge: Chapter Nine:  Memory, landscapes, cities and monuments 
 
 
359 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 9.27 Sol Invictus (1995) Anselm Kiefer, sunflower seeds and emulsion on 
burlap (Latterwein 2007:168). 
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Figure 9.28 Ash Flower (1995) Anselm Kiefer, pencil, watercolour and ash on paper 
(Latterwein 2007:169). 
 
Figure 9.29 Reclining Man with Branch (1971) Anselm Kiefer, watercolour, gouache 
and pencil on paper (Latterwein 2007:170).  
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Figure 9.30 Your Ashen Hair, Shulamith (1981) Anselm Kiefer, oil, acrylic, emulsion 
and straw on canvas (Latterwein 2007:94). 
 
 
Figure 9.31 Magarete — Shulamith (1981) Anselm Kiefer, watercolour on paper 
(Latterwein 2007:112). 
William Kentridge: Chapter Nine:  Memory, landscapes, cities and monuments 
 
 
362 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 9.32 Bohemia Lies by the Sea (1995) Anselm Kiefer, oil, acrylic, emulsion, 
shellac on burlap (Latterwein 2007:186). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.33 The Song of the Cedar — For Paul Celan (2005) Anselm Kiefer, book. 
Acrylic, charcoal, twigs and photograph on cardboard (Latterwein 2007:211). 
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Figure 9.34 Drawing from WEIGHING ... and WANTING (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:137). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.35 Drawing from WEIGHING ... and WANTING (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:137). 
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Figure 9.36 Black and white photograph (1986) David Goldblatt’s Lifetimes:Under 
Apartheid (Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:49). 
 
Figure 9.37 Drawing from History of the Main Complaint (Cameron, Christov-
Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999: 124). 
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Figure 9.38 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 2001:32). 
 
 
Figure 9.39 Drawing from Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old (Godby 1992:unpaginated). 
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Figure 9.40 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 
2001:97). 
 
Symbolic landscapes, places of geography, monuments etcetera, are often 
specifically besieged with the intent / idea of devastating and annihilating identities.  
There are numerous accounts of mosques in Iraq, Palestine and Kosovo that have 
been attacked in this way; Buddhist statues in Afghanistan were targeted by the 
Taliban; churches in Macedonia were also beleaguered.  Of course the most 
famous recent examples of such identicide / urbicide (the reverse of identity 
construction) are the attacks on the United States of America‘s World Trade Centre 
and the Pentagon.  The decimation of the WTC has left a shallow imprint regarded 
as ―shadow ground‖ of landscapes of calamity and violence (Berman 1996; Foote 
William Kentridge: Chapter Nine:  Memory, landscapes, cities and monuments 
 
 
367 | P a g e  
 
1997; Neal 1998; Maharg 1999; Porteous 1989).  Other examples include the 
remnants of the death and concentration camps in Europe and the Japanese 
internment camps of World War II. 
 
What is the effect of history, particularly the history of industrial capitalism, on the 
physical landscape?  How do these changes in the landscape affect our memories 
of the past?  What of the nature of memory and memorialisation in the films?  The 
ephemeral personal memories of those who suffered from apartheid are often set 
against the bulky physical monuments erected (both deliberately and inadvertently) 
by those who benefited from it.  Individuals are a resource, and an expendable one 
at that.  This idea is central to Felix in Exile. 
 
David Harvey‘s book, Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference (1996) 
introduces one to the concept of ―embeddedness‖ which refers to the dialectic 
between nature and society.  Referring to the use of cats, fish, hyenas and other 
animals in Kentridge‘s Drawings for Projection series, Godby proposes that the 
animals ―appear to revolt against [social] abomination of nature‖ (1990:104), and 
points out that Kentridge‘s use of ―animals as symbols of nature [is] in contrast to 
the perverted state of the prevailing social order‖ (1990:112; see Figure 9.40).  
That is, capitalists such as Soho Eckstein, who represents the dominant social 
order, control nature (and people who are seen as an extension of nature) to their 
own ends.  In Mine, for instance, Soho Eckstein‘s bed / office desk becomes 
littered with ticker tape papers from an accounting machine — and includes mine 
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workers as part of the waste and a part of the scene of a mine dump — industrial 
and environmental waste juxtaposed with a rhinoceros which represents nature in 
direct opposition to environmental decay and devastation. As previously 
mentioned, Soho Eckstein clears his bed / office desk with one sweep of his arm, 
knocking everything off to allow him to play with his new pet project — the 
rhinoceros.  However, as Soho Eckstein plays with his new pet, one gains the 
impression that this rhinoceros is simply a new acquisition, to be discarded at will 
— once Soho Eckstein has tired of playing with it.  Another example of 
embeddedness relates to Kentridge‘s Jewish origins.  In World War II, when the 
Germans knew that the Allies were getting very close to one of their death camps, 
Auschwitz, they tried to get rid of the evidence that the place was specifically a 
death camp.  They dismantled the ―showers‖ and the ovens.  They levelled the 
dormitories, scattered the ashes and forced the remaining Jews and other inmates 
to walk to another camp.  Today, very little exists of the original camp — it is mainly 
flat ground, with a few sign posts.  However, according to an oral legend, no living 
animal will go near that ground.  It is completely deserted and silent. It has been 
reported that birds that fly over that land, do so silently.  Society, or rather 
individuals, through their deaths, have permeated the landscape, inhabited, or 
become embedded in the land — and their permeation has changed the landscape 
so drastically that in one case, that of  Auschwitz, no living animal will be found on 
it (Kentridge cited in Christov-Bakargiev 1998).  The oral legend is also significant 
in that it tells one about a human desire to have nature as witness to culture — to 
have a nature that is outside culture / history as an objective source of meaning. 
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Figure 9.41 Drawing from Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:71). 
 
What is particularly interesting about Felix in Exile is that history here also takes on 
a different meaning. The black female protagonist measures and marks the land, 
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through the use of a land surveyor (theodolite), but her land marks are people — 
dead people.  The associations of the use of a theodolite are fascinating. The 
original use of a theodolite as a Western product of technology is to demarcate and 
cut up the land in straight linear marks — (re)allocating indigenous land or land 
sold to the colonialists (pitiful amounts for most usually the land was simply 
appropriated for colonial use).  Nandi, as the first image of post-colonialism in 
William Kentridge‘s series of films, is using the theodolite in an anti-Western way. 
She marks the human landscapes and brings to the fore the negativity of such 
earlier colonial demarcations and the effect they had on the peoples already living 
here.  It is also a reference to forced removals, a popular tactic of the apartheid 
political and social machinery.  Nandi challenges the use of Western technology, 
giving it an organic, natural reference.  In mapping out the night sky / space she 
seems to imply the arrogance and greed in attempting to claim natural landscapes 
that belong to everyone (see Figure 9.41). At the very least, by association she 
makes a comparison between the ridiculous idea of owning the sky and the 
indigenous peoples who believed that everyone who lived on the land had a right 
to do so — in other words, the land was not ―owned‖ by anyone.  In doing so she 
questions technology as a by-product of the Enlightenment. The victims‘ bodies are 
transformed into landmarks, absorbed into the landscape, staining the landscape 
with their blood — history, memory and the land are being re-claimed / re-written.  
Individuals and the land are important, not material things or products, as 
proclaimed by capitalists. This is ideological.  
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Figure 9.42 Drawing from Felix in Exile (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas and Cameron 
2001: 96). 
 
Many cultures are nomadic, and the transportable goods and animals become 
tokens of migrancy and the well-being associated with movement.  The relationship 
between people and the land is sacrosanct — a sanctity that has been defiled by 
colonialism, imperialism, capitalism and apartheid. Many who have a deep 
attachment to the physical land are not born there, and their identity with regard to 
the land is via an idea and an ideal — which raises the following question: in what 
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way does such a relationship develop?  Consider for example, Jews and their 
belief in Israel, or African Americans and their attachment to Africa — even though 
they might never have been there, they are very attached to what they believe is 
their homeland.   
 
A fascinating example of individuals and their association / relationship to their 
homeland, and the connectedness of land and collective memory, is the 
firebombing of Dresden.  The almost complete destruction of Dresden during WWII 
when it was firebombed by the Allies, has, according to W. G. Sebald, barely left  
a trace of pain behind in the collective consciousness, it has been largely 
obliterated from the retrospective understanding of those affected, and it 
never played any appreciable part in the discussion of the internal 
constitution of our country (2003:4).   
 
The devastation of Dresden required a superhuman strength to reconstruct what 
little was left.  The Germans proceeded though, while entering into a conspiracy of 
silence, not looking back, but looking only to the future.  This conspiracy of silence, 
a form of individual and collective amnesia, was probably a preconscious form of 
self censorship.  There was indeed an agreement that the real material and moral 
ruin of Germany was not to be exposed or even acknowledged, rather hidden away 
— a shameful family secret (Sebald 2003).   The focus of this chapter now turns to 
William Kentridge‘s portrayal of cities in his art works. 
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9.2 Cities 
William Kentridge‘s works have a haunting view of the city as both a catastrophic 
and beautiful site. For instance, within Johannesburg there are areas such as 
Bertrams, Hillbrow and Berea which are decrepit and literally falling apart. Then 
there is the beauty of the Highveld landscape surrounding Johannesburg, 
juxtaposed with industrial waste, environmental waste and the mine dumps.  All 
this is in turn combined with surrealistic images of nature, such as the rhinoceros 
on Soho Eckstein‘s bed in Mine.  In Felix in Exile and Mine one finds images of the 
Johannesburg Highveld, this is beautiful and stark in comparison to the inner decay 
of the mine dumps.  In the latter film, Mine, one finds beautiful open spaces in 
direct comparison with the claustrophobic mines.  The films provide a sense of 
living on the edge between violence and seduction, between ecstasy and decay 
(see Figures 9.43 — 9.45).  The same can be said of Kentridge‘s plays Faustus in 
Africa! and Woyzeck on the Highveld. 
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 Figure 9.43 A black 
and white photograph: South African Landscape (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:26). 
 
  
 
Figure 9.44 Photograph: David Goldblatt: Lifetimes: Under Apartheid (1986) 
(Cameron, Christov-Bakargiev and Coetzee 1999:49). 
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Figure 9.45 Drawing from Sobriety, Obesity & Growing Old (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:11). 
 
 
Included in David Harvey‘s The Condition of Postmodernity (1993) is Jonathan 
Raban‘s Soft City, an intensely personal rendition of London in the early 1970s 
(first published in 1974).  Most writers at that time saw cities as highly automated 
and rationalised systems of mass production and consumerism, while Raban in 
fact saw the city as being about the production of ―signs and images‖ (cited in 
Harvey 1993:5).  Rather than a linear structure, Raban wrote that cities were like 
theatre productions containing individuals capable of many different roles.  Raban‘s 
city theatre presents itself as a stage whereupon individuals act out their lives.  The 
city, according to Raban, is ―irrational, chaotic, ephemeral, and ever-changing‖ —
much too complex a space ever to be disciplined by authoritarians and 
bureaucrats.  ―A labyrinth, an encyclopaedia, an emporium, a theatre‖, the city is a 
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space where fact, imagination and fantasy have amalgamated (cited in Harvey 
1993:5). 
 
Also according to Raban ―[p]ersonal identity had been rendered soft, fluid, 
endlessly open to the exercise of the will and the imagination‖ (cited in Harvey 
1993:5).  He writes that one‘s individualism has an effect on cities, which are 
essentially spaces that attempt to meld themselves to that individualism.  The 
relationship between city and individual is a dynamic one, ever-changing and 
reforming.  Raban thus sees  
that living in a city is an art, and we need the vocabulary of art, of style, to 
describe the peculiar relation between man and material that exists in the 
continual creative play of urban living.  The city as we can imagine it, the 
soft city of illusion, myth, aspiration, nightmare, is as real, and maybe more 
real, than the hard city one can locate in maps and statistics, in monographs 
on urban sociology and demography and architecture (cited in Harvey 
1993:5).   
 
If one looks at Johannesburg as a text, then how much is planned and how much 
is self-creating?  In Kentridge‘s film, Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, 
the city is literally text — the name of the city is typed or drawn in, the writing slowly 
dissolves to make way for the city as city — roads / highways buildings and so on, 
while traces of the name remain.  Consider this: is Johannesburg more planned 
than most cities?  There is the deliberate change of the landscape (physical city) 
and deliberate social engineering (reflected in the physical city - the townships and 
hostels) with unimagined consequences (apartheid and the resistance to 
apartheid).  The Johannesburg landscape has been created by humans, and also, 
accidentally, stands as a record of industrial capitalism in the last one hundred 
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years. As a result, there have been deliberate and inadvertent monuments — the 
machinery and mine dumps. It has been industrial capitalism‘s version of history / 
truth that has marked South Africa‘s land.  Is Kentridge‘s work planned or 
unplanned?  His initial starting point is planned, but his work has unforeseen 
consequences in that it develops without his knowing exactly what will come next. 
 
The city is the ultimate human artefact — it has a life of its own.  Humans set it in 
motion but cannot control its final destiny.  Kentridge‘s work is a private landscape 
on paper and then on film, following this same individual process of development 
as the city.  It reflects the preconscious as the city reflects the collective 
unconscious — his work mirrors the city — his own internal landscape.  In 
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, the city of Johannesburg is spread out 
in front of a naked Felix Teitlebaum, emblazoned with the caption, ―captive of the 
city‖. The highways, roads and buildings collapse and are rebuilt in different 
versions.  The images conjure up concrete slabs, steel beams, and tarred roads.  It 
is almost as if Kentridge is surveying his land objectively — internalising it.  With 
the films Monument and Mine the city takes on a different perspective with the 
darker side of a city made up of dispensable labourers, reflecting a collective 
unconscious.  In Felix in Exile the focus is on the bare, dry abandoned landscape, 
and History of the Main Complaint has Soho/Felix driving along a long winding 
round, assuming it is the countryside — further away from Johannesburg.  In Tide 
Table, the final film in the Drawings for Projection series, Soho/Felix is at the beach 
— far away from the city of Johannesburg.  It raises the question of whether or not 
William Kentridge: Chapter Nine:  Memory, landscapes, cities and monuments 
 
 
378 | P a g e  
 
Kentridge has finally been freed from that city — not in exile, not in conflict with 
himself or the city, but at rest.   His internal landscape reaches even further, 
severing ties with Johannesburg (and by association South Africa) completely with 
his innovative Black Box / Chambre Noir and Magic Flute productions, as well as 
his production of WHAT WILL COME (HAS ALREADY COME) and pre-production 
of the Shostakovich opera The Nose, whose subject matter is the rise of Stalinism 
in the Soviet Union. 
 
The synthesis of representations of both body and city has been documented from 
very early on.  Vitruvius1 a Roman engineer and architect, wrote a set of books (his 
most famous being On Architecture) that focus on the design and building of 
temples.  He observed that in some cases the outstretched limbs of a man serve to 
encompass the circle and the square.  This reference serves to encourage the 
creation of buildings that ―display the same harmonious relation of parts to whole 
as Vitruvius found in the human form.  The body is not simply that which is to be 
contained by a building, the body contains the very generating principle of the 
building‖ (Burgin 1996:141).  The human form is seen not only as the origin of a 
building but of the entire built environment.  Françoise Choay refers to the writings 
of Leon Battista Alberti (1404 — 1472), an architect-theorist of the Italian 
Renaissance, who writes that ―the city is like a large house and the house is like a 
small city,‖ but more significantly, ―every edifice is a body‖ (cited in Burgin 
1996:141).  
                                                 
1
 Marcus Vitruvius Pollio born c. 80—70BC, died c. 15BC. 
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Keith Basso posits that self-awareness / knowledge cannot be (re)constructed 
without place-worlds:  
[i]f place-making is a way of constructing the past, a venerable means of 
doing history, it is also a way of constructing social traditions and, in the 
process, personal and social identities.  We are, in a sense, the place-
worlds we imagine (1996:7).  
 
There is no innate identity to places; rather it is human actions that construct 
identity in reaction to places (Osborne 2001).  Monuments, streets, etcetera are 
material / physical constructs, but they evoke explicit meaning and provide spatial 
coordinates of identity (Lynch 1972).  Things / constructs are often associated with 
society/ies through repetitive ritualised performances and commemorations.  In 
other words, there is often a continuous complimentary relationship between 
individuals and the places / spaces that they inhabit.  Individuals therefore 
construct places and they take their identities from them: ―people are constituted 
through place‖ (Osborne 2001:5).  For instance, the elision of the WTC not only 
represented fear and grief for the enormity of loss of human lives, but also 
represented disorientation and bewilderment at the loss of such a visible and easily 
identifiable landmark.  Interaction between place and experience is not always a 
positive one.  There are also negative impacts on individuals and such places can 
evoke alienation and ambivalence.  This again raises the concept of the 
―shadowed ground‖ of negative remembrances (Cresswell 1996; Foote 1997; Neal 
1998; Osborne 2001; Shields 1991).  Physical constructs are ideologically 
constructed and Richard Schein refers to them as ―discourse materialized‖ 
(1997:662).  Thus, as society/ies evolve/s and change/s so do the places 
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themselves transform into ―dynamic and reflexive sites of innovation‖ (Massey 
1995:182).   
 
The constant connection of individuals with their lived-in spaces strengthens their 
recognition and identification with time, place and one another.  Dislocation, or 
forced removals, from such places elides / severs the physical and spiritual 
connectedness of individuals.  Of course industrialisation, bringing with it 
capitalism, imperialism and colonialism, has impacted on individual‘s lives and their 
lived-in spaces:  
[w]e live in a dynamic and complex culture in which experiences, memories, 
and stories are not necessarily shared by others, so that one person‘s 
associations with place, though intense, may not be culturally reinforced.  
We also encourage a view of ourselves in the world that is more abstract 
and detached.  When this is coupled with a dynamic and mobile social 
system, places become thinned out and merge with space (Sack 1997:138). 
 
An example of forced removals during the apartheid era is to be found in District 
Six.  The District Six Museum has a seven metre by seven metre laminated map of 
the area covering the floor of the museum.  This map is an attempt to reclaim the 
city with all its old names and places.  This is similar to Kentridge‘s incorporation of 
actual found maps in his prints and miniature theatre production Black Box / 
Chambre Noir, and his tapestries; see Figures 9.46 — 9.55.  (Also see Anselm 
Kiefer‘s similar works Figures 9.56 — 9.59.) 
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Figure 9.46 William Kentridge: untitled study for tapestry (Basualdo 2007:28).  Chine 
collé and collage. 
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Figure 9.47 William Kentridge Porter series: Géographie de hebreux ou Tableau de 
la dispersion des Enfants de Noë (2005) (Basualdo 2007:84).  A tapestry weave with 
embroidery. 
 Figure 9.48 Studio 
installation of drawings for Black Box / Chambre Noir (Law-Viljoen 2007c:36-37). 
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Figure 9.49 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law 
Viljoen 2007b:156). 
 
Figure 9.50 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law-
Viljoen 2007b:174). 
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Figure 9.51 
Photograph of Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007b:175). 
  
Figure 9.52 Photograph of Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law-
Viljoen 2007b:185). 
 
William Kentridge: Chapter Nine:  Memory, landscapes, cities and monuments 
 
 
385 | P a g e  
 
  
Figure 9.53 Photograph of Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law-
Viljoen 2007b:185). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.54 Photograph of Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law-
Viljoen 2007b:186). 
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Figure 9.55 Photograph of Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law-
Viljoen 2007b:165). 
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Figure 9.56 Starfall (1998) Anselm Kiefer, emulsion, acrylic, shellac on canvas with 
broken glass (Latterwein 2007:171). 
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Figure 9.57 Starfall (1998) Anselm Kiefer, emulsion, acrylic, shellac on canvas with 
broken glass (Latterwein 2007:172). 
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Figure 9.58 The Sands of Mark Brandenburg (1980) Anselm Kiefer, acrylic, shellac, 
sand and glue on photograph on burlap (Latterwein 2007:141). 
 
Figure 9.59 Siegfried Forgets Brünhilde (1975) Anselm Kiefer, oil on canvas 
(Latterwein 2007:73). 
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―Frozen time‖ is often the description given to architecture.  Victor Burgin suggests 
that national monuments are the accumulation of national history.  Furthermore, he 
posits that where none exist, national identity is delicate.  He refers to an Albanian, 
located in the predominantly Albanian south of Serbia who laments: ―I know we 
have been here the whole time, fine.  I know that.  But you can see the Roman 
baths, the Turkish mosques, and the Serbian monasteries.  Where are our 
buildings?‖  (cited in Burgin 1996:140). From this lament Burgin deduces that 
where there are national monuments, which somehow are destroyed, this is turn 
erases national identity.  Bosnian-Serb ―ethnic cleansing‖ did not only consist of 
annihilating ethnicities found to be undesirable, it also included the destruction of 
the undesirable‘s historic / ancient mosques.  An example of this eradication 
included the obliteration of the Ferhad-Pasha Mosque, dating from 1583 (Ottoman 
period).  This mosque was considered to be the most exquisite of all mosques 
found in the Balkans.  A bridge in Mostar was also eradicated — destroyed after 
existing for four centuries.  According to Burgin (1996) and Kinzer (1993) this 
bridge represented the common and integrated life of Muslims, Croats, and Serbs 
before the violent degeneration of Yugoslavia into ethnic mini states.  A Belgrade 
architect quoted in the New York Times commented:  ―[t]he bridge was a piece of 
metaphysical architecture that linked cultures and people‖, he concludes by stating 
―I ask myself how the people of Mostar will live without that bridge.  They have now 
lost a part of their being.  With a loss like this, people will lose their place in time‖ 
(Sudetic 1993:A7). 
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Individuals‘ identification with certain places is often emotive.  These places 
become iconic and are often even empowered by the specific cultivation / 
development of linked mythologies (Osborne 2001).  Through this, places and 
landscapes within the physical world become filled with symbolically-loaded sites 
and even silences that add to collective memory/ies and provide spatio-temporal 
reference points for society/ies (Fogelson 1989; Harootunian 1988; Osborne 1994, 
1996 and 2001).  Individuals occupy space and live in places and identify with 
them, or alternatively are completely alienated by them.   
 
For Robert Kolker (2005), there is the concept of ―cultural schizophrenia‖, which he 
has phrased.  This is a schizophrenia that one assumes to refer to divides between 
worlds or different cultures.  One can experience this cultural schizophrenia quite 
palpably in South Africa.  One merely has to visit a township like that of Alexandra 
or Soweto and then visit the mostly white suburbs, such as Sandton or 
Stellenbosch, to be thrown into a vortex of difference — different lifestyles, races, 
and values.  Take for instance the difference between Soho Eckstein‘s bed and the 
innards of the mine dumps and hostels / dormitories in Mine.  In this film the screen 
is split horizontally between the underground and the world above, showing divided 
lives, divided cultures and divided existences.  (Compare this to the vertically split 
screen used to similar effect in Stereoscope.) If one was to travel between these 
two places one would experience a sense of surrealism or difference - the worlds 
so different it is difficult to believe that they exist simultaneously, and in some 
cases mere kilometres away from one another.  Kentridge has stated  
William Kentridge: Chapter Nine:  Memory, landscapes, cities and monuments 
 
 
392 | P a g e  
 
[t]hroughout my life there has been a sense of the comfortable internal living 
inside the spaces where one lives and the awareness of chaotic desperate 
lives outside. [The films are a] heightened awareness of that anomaly‖ 
(Oppelt 1999:6).  
 
In Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, there is the image of Soho Eckstein 
feeding the poor — him at a banquet table literally hurling food at the poor masses 
and a poor hobo ―Harry‖ (Godby 1992:unpaginated).  There is a stark contrast 
between the haves and the have-nots.  The miner‘s faces are lined with pain and 
the hardships they have endured — while Soho Eckstein‘s face is gelatinous and 
flabby, representing extreme excess.  The film then moves on to Felix Teitlebaum 
and Soho Eckstein brawling — the images change to a bare landscape with a 
shelf-like apparatus filled with macabre images of severed heads.  Mrs. Soho 
Eckstein walks out from behind this shelf of heads with a towel over her shoulder, 
nonchalantly as if going for a swim, but then her towel morphs into a big fish and 
the macabre images are erased.  In a more banal and domestic / suburban scene 
Felix Teitlebaum and Soho Eckstein fight it out again and Felix Teitlebaum wins.  
The masses of workers are also seen as victorious.  Felix Teitlebaum represents 
the fight of the oppressed against the oppressors of this world — the difference 
between the haves and the have-nots and in Felix Teitlebaum‘s mind, or in 
Kentridge‘s mind, the land and the spoils belong to the voiceless, the un-
empowered, the proletariat.  But this is an unrealistic utopian vision of Kentridge‘s, 
as this is not how things are in the real world. This scene and the one before are 
examples of the cultural schizophrenia to which Robert Kolker refers (2005).   
 
William Kentridge: Chapter Nine:  Memory, landscapes, cities and monuments 
 
 
393 | P a g e  
 
Kentridge‘s films accentuate the presence of industrialisation, in the design of 
drawings and the post-industrial decay.  The future / present shows schizoid signs 
of burnout, waste, excess and discharge.  It represents the development of today's 
society as a catastrophic site.   Highways and buildings — a phantasmagoria of 
glass and stone, layer into one another.  With little light on ground level, the deep 
shadows and the black shapes, colours and contours evoke a mood of decay, 
despair and doom.  The streets are covered with detritus, wreckage, refuse, and 
are slick with wetness and traces of effluence, poisoning the landscape and sky.  
This excrement is a result of the accelerated time process to which industrialisation 
aspires — it is a society in which the dominant tradition is that of rapid 
replacement:  novelty is the very staple of the consumer society and rapidly 
becomes its waste.   With Kentridge‘s work, there are the effects of industrialisation 
— mine workers, mine dumps, greed and exploitation.  Soho Eckstein is the 
ultimate result of an industrial society — a gluttonous, greedy exploitative capitalist.  
There is also the merging of the Third World with the First world, what Umberto 
Eco refers to as the ―medievalisation of the city‖ (cited Smart 1993:30), a process 
that turns the city into a ghettoised and fragmented place.  In South Africa this is 
particularly true — next to the high-priced, exclusive suburb of Sandton (first 
world), you have the ghetto of Alexandra (third world), and further fragmentation 
occurs through  the use of razor wire and electric fences to keep the third world at 
bay (evident in Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris). 
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This rampant industrialisation results in a society characterised by money and 
power, and controlled by a small core of people represented perfectly by Soho 
Eckstein, the fat-cat capitalist.  (Yet, when Felix Teitlebaum and Soho Eckstein 
become one and the same character, in his sixth film, Kentridge seems to be at 
pains to veer away from the stereotype of the greedy capitalist, and rather depicts 
the morphed character of Soho/Felix as a complex, three-dimensional character of 
lived and personal experiences).  Everywhere, there is an overwhelming sense of 
psychosis, pathos and degeneration. This is evident in the Babel-like (consider that 
South Africa has eleven official languages) world of dispossessed people who 
roam the streets — here everything is a matter of cancelled identities which reflects 
indifference.  These cancelled identities contrast distinctively with the nobility of 
Felix Teitlebaum who is represented as pure and unmaterialistic, and Soho 
Eckstein, fat and oleaginous.  Felix Teitlebaum is depicted as one at odds with 
autocracy — a revolutionary — someone who romantically and idealistically 
believes that water could / can cleanse the world of all decay and waste; and a 
romantic idealist who loves Mrs. Soho Eckstein despite their barriers.   Disused 
mines, discarded machinery and mine dumps are cultural and industrial landmarks 
that have marked the land and the people that have been exploited — people who 
have been used, replaced, and eventually disposed of.  Post-industrialisation and 
technology are associated specifically with loss and salvage.  Technology in a 
post-industrial society is seen as unnatural and a violent intervention into nature as 
a resource for capital gains.  The traditional boundaries between the city / suburbs 
or centre, and the countryside or periphery, are ―displaced into a semi-urban 
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landscape depiction penetrated by the technologies of capital, exploitation, 
industrialisation, the media‖ (Kapitza-Meyer 1994:66).  The distinction is no longer 
clear — industrialisation has crossed over into suburbia and vice-versa.  Moreover, 
technology has not only been used to plunder the land, but as Johannesburg, 2nd 
Greatest City after Paris suggests, technology was also the means by which 
apartheid plundered the people of their lives and of their rights.  In one scene in 
Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris, the shelf-like drawing that holds 
decapitated heads is similar to a large still drawing of Kentridge‘s, called Casspirs 
Full of Love (sic; 1989; see Figure 9.60).  The two drawings depict individuals who 
have been subjected to state violence.  The title itself is rather ironic, as it is taken 
from transmitted radio messages of mothers to their sons serving in the army 
during apartheid: “from Mum, with Casspirs full of love” (sic; Cameron, Christov-
Bakargiev & Coetzee 1999:50).  Caspirs represent technology in its most violent 
form — armoured vehicles filled with soldiers to crush opposition by any means 
possible — including the use of extreme violence. Of course they are emblematic 
of apartheid itself, given the conspicuous and constant presence in townships.  
Apartheid technology also included tear gas, guns, and inhuman methods of 
torture such as repeated electric shocks. 
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Figure 9.60 Drawing Casspirs Full of Love (sic; Stewart 2006:37). 
 
Phenomenological preservation of past states is mainly determined by history 
and/or individuals‘ perceptions of themselves within history, through individuals, 
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places/sites and differing views of ethics and intentions (Bloch 1989; Bloch 
1996:217).  This is especially true of Kentridge.  Soho/Felix represents both a 
personal and collective history — his sense of guilt, remorse and responsibility is 
expressed as he sees himself (projected through his character) within the history of 
South Africa. 
 
Writing specifically about Kentridge‘s prints, Kay Wilson encapsulates an ever- 
present theme of his:  
[a]ll around Johannesburg, what initially appear to be ―mountains‖ are in fact 
heaps of debris left by mining companies while the ground underlining the 
periphery is subject to frequent collapse.  A contemporary website for the 
city‘s real estate development explains without irony that in the 1960s the 
gold mines surrounding Johannesburg were depleted and that the mining 
company looked to further value in the land and in 1968 a Properties arm 
was established with Rand Mines (the overall owner) to plan, proclaim, and 
market the now disused mining land (2006:18).   
 
William Kentridge‘s landscape prints directly address this process of stripping, 
depleting, and commercialising the space of nature.  He engraves the landscape 
over the pages of the Rand Mine ledger book from 1910 and inscribes other 
landscapes with superimposed surveyor‘s marks (see Figures 9.61 — 9.68).  
―Euphemism characterizes human suffering as well as the ruined landscape‖ 
(Wilson 2006:18). ―Monuments‖ as they occur in Kentridge‘s works, constitute the 
last theme explored in this chapter. 
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Figure 9.61 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007a:unpaginated). 
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Figure 9.62 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007a:unpaginated). 
 
 
 
  
Figure 9.63 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007a:unpaginated). 
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Figure 9.64 Photograph of Black Box / Chambre Noir (edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007a:unpaginated). 
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Figure 9.65 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (from Flute edited by Law-
Viljoen 2007b:181). 
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Figure 9.66 Drawing from Black Box / Chambre Noir (edited by Law-Viljoen 
2007a:unpaginated). 
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Figure 9.67 Rand Mines (1999) Kentridge, etching, soft ground, aquatint and 
drypoint from 1 copper plate, on spreads from ledger of 1913, on Vélin d’Arches 
Blanc 300 gsm paper (Stewart 2006:76 — 77). 
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Figure 9.68 Rand Mines (1999) Kentridge, etching, soft ground, aquatint and 
drypoint from 1 copper plate, on spreads from ledger of 1913, on Vélin d’Arches 
Blanc 300 gsm paper (Stewart 2006:76 — 77). 
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9.3 Monuments 
Architecture and monuments attempt to generate an ―awareness of belonging‖ and 
even the ―politics of fantasy‖ (Simmel cited in Werlen 1993:169; cf. Ignatieff 1993; 
Osborne 2001).  Monuments are often contested sites in terms of actual land, and 
also in terms of social change and the human psyche.  For some, they last too 
long:  
[p]ublic monuments are the most conservative of commemorative forms 
precisely because they are meant to last, unchanged, forever.  While other 
things come and go, are lost and forgotten, the monument is supposed to 
remain a fixed point, stabilizing both the physical and the cognitive 
landscape.  Monuments attempt to mould a landscape of collective memory, 
to conserve what is worth remembering and discard the rest (Savage 
1997:4).  
 
Sanford Levinson, basing his comments on Frederic Nietzsche‘s statement that 
monumentalism is ―a protest against the change of generations and against 
transitoriness‖ has argued that ―[a]ll monuments are an effort, in their own way, to 
stop time‖ (cited in Levinson 19980:7).  This has led Vito Acconci to posit that time 
is fast and space is slow (1990).   
 
Katherine Verdery has studied ―political burials and reburials‖, or made a study of 
the ―post-mortem life‖ of memorialised individuals and studied how and why the 
skeletons of the dead become political symbols (1999:5).  Verdery further suggests 
that ―dead-body politics‖ needs the deliberation of several ideas: ―political 
symbolism; death rituals and beliefs; national and international contexts; and the 
reworking of memory‖ (1999:5).  For her,  
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[s]tatues are dead people cast in bronze or carved in stone.  They symbolize 
a specific famous person while in a sense also being the body of the person.  
By arresting the process of that person‘s bodily decay, a statue alters the 
temporality associated with the person, bringing him into the realm of the 
timelessness of the sacred, like an icon (Verdery 1999:5). 
 
This is particularly relevant to Kentridge‘s monument in his film of the same name 
— the ―statue‖ is alive though.   
 
There is also the idea of the ―countermonument‖ — an anti-monument (cf. 
Coombes 2003; Young 2003b).  Annie Coombes mentions the Vietnam Veteran‘s 
Memorial Wall in Washington D.C., created by Maya Ying Lin. Seen as an example 
of countermonument, initially the wall was not well received by the public.  After an 
outcry sculptor Frederick Hart was commissioned to erect a less abstract and more 
figurative sculpture.  However, Coombes points out that ironically it is Lin‘s Wall 
that is the more popular with survivors and their families.  Individuals come to the 
Wall and trace the names on the walls onto pieces of paper (2003).  Another 
example of a countermonument mentioned by Coombes is the 1986 Harburg 
Monument against Fascism.   It is described as a twelve-metre high column of 
hollow aluminium covered in soft lead with a plaque at the bottom.  The plaque 
reads:  
[w]e invite the citizens of Harburg, and visitors to the town, to add their 
names to ours.  In doing so, we commit ourselves to remain vigilant.  As 
more and more names cover this 12 metre tall lead column, it will gradually 
be lowered into the ground.  One day it will have disappeared completely, 
and the site of the Harburg monument against fascism will be empty.  In the 
end it is only we ourselves who can rise up against injustice (cited in 
Coombes 2003:93).   
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By November 1993, the only remnant left of the column was a plaque and a glass 
vitrine on the ground.  Through the glass, one can see the lead column sculpture, 
but one cannot read the inscriptions that were written on the sides of the column.  
Both these sculptures represent Pierre Nora‘s statement with regard to the concept 
of the ―trace‖ as being the bearer of significance in modern life: ―impermanent, 
mutating, and fragmentary, referring to but never entirely revealing the whole of 
which it is a part‖ (cited in Coombes 2003:93).  Annie Coombes further suggests 
that the concept of the countermonument is manifestation of the character of 
memory in ―that it risks obliteration and repression and, conversely, that it is only in 
the act of remembering that memory exists at all‖ (Coombes 2003:93). 
 
With regard to representation, memorials, monuments and aesthetics the film 
Monument offers a special case — as the author of this thesis on Kentridge: it is an 
example of a countermonument.  William Kentridge wanted the film to follow after 
Mine because it would have had specific relevance to the miner as labourer.  When 
one learns that it is the so-called philanthropist, Soho Eckstein, who is erecting the 
monument, the initial thought is that it is in his favour — a bust commemorating all 
that he has done for the city of Johannesburg and the work he has provided for the 
miners.  Then one realises that it is in fact a monument to the labourer.  The 
assumption then is that it is going to be unveiled as a proud miner, standing tall in 
his uniform, pick over shoulder, with standard flashlight-cum-hardhat.  Of course, 
miners as labourers have to endure excruciating, difficult conditions: the 
claustrophobia; the incredible heat and humidity; no air; the darkness; the constant 
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physical danger; and not least, the physical hard work.  Then there are the 
peripheral problems: the alcoholism; the homosexuality; the prostitution; leaving 
their families behind, often in rural areas; and, the spread of AIDS.  William 
Kentridge‘s Monument (and his film Mine and his play Woyzeck on the Highveld; 
see Figures 9.69 — 9.71) is a testament to all of those things — the pain of the 
Everyman, the Other. 
 
Figure 9.69 Black and white photograph of scene from play Woyzeck on the 
Highveld (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:81). 
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Figure 9.70 Black and white photograph of scene from play Woyzeck on the 
Highveld (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:79). 
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Figure 9.71 Black and white photograph of scene from play Woyzeck on the 
Highveld (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:81). 
 
It is fascinating how Kentridge sets up the scene of the unveiling of the monument.  
There is the immaculate Soho Eckstein addressing the crowds, uttering 
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philosophising, soothing words, welcoming them. He is the great philanthropist who 
bestows this monument to the city in recognition of the labourer.  In fact is this not 
a reward for those labourers that go to work every day, the have-nots, the 
dispossessed, the slaves.  It makes the statement, ―Look at the great work you are 
doing as labourers‖.  Yet, of course, one can question the real expense.  Who has 
really paid for this monument?  This is intimated in the drawings / images with the 
cross-cut to the auditor‘s calculator on Soho Eckstein‘s office table / bed.  The 
calculator spews out not literal numbers but numbers of people — the real cost of 
this monument.  The film continues; with faceless individuals rapidly enter the 
stadium / auditorium, presumably dressed for the occasion, high in anticipation, the 
sculpture covered in an enormous sheet. The excitement grows as people 
increasingly fill the stadium (see Figure 9.72). All unveilings are by association big 
events — covered by the media, attended by the elite, the mayor, the politicians, 
dignitaries, the art critics, the artist of the sculpture; those with a personal interest; 
those whom it represents.  It has first been commissioned, then advertised, the 
event of the year perhaps.  Finally it is time and the sheet is removed.  A sculpture 
of monumental size, an art work deemed spectacular enough to be worthy of such 
a representation.  The audience digests the unveiling; there is silence, and then a 
sigh.  Beautifully sculptured, a bit realistic perhaps, are the first responses, the face 
of the labourer lined / etched with years of pain and suffering.  However, he is not 
standing proud, he is shown bent over in pain, the enormous rock almost crushing 
him, overburdened, overwhelmed.  Then one notices that he is not there of his own 
volition — he is in fact tied to the monument‘s stand (see Figure 9.73).  A silence 
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ensues when the audience realises that this is not what they had expected or 
envisaged.  The audience is confronted not with a proud, hard-working labourer.  
Instead it is in fact Harry ―the Hobo‖ who represents not only the labourer, but the 
dispossessed, the exploited, the slaves, the have-nots — in all his ragged ―finery‖. 
As the audience — in the film and of the film — simultaneously digests all of this, 
with eyes glued to this monstrosity / screen, something extraordinary happens.  
There is a close-up of Harry‘s face. Harry blinks.  He is alive.  The enormity of this, 
the complete unexpectedness, the shock, the revulsion, changes everything in less 
than a second.  That he is alive, actively suffering as one looks on, is horrifying and 
there is an overwhelming feeling of helplessness.  One does not want to be faced 
with this unimaginable dreadfulness, this dilemma — what does one do, what can 
one do to stop this suffering?  As a monument, it is perpetual, erected in the belief 
that it will be there forever.  Rather than celebrating and acknowledging a 
labourer‘s hard work, the audience is confronted with a situation that is real.  Is 
Kentridge questioning one‘s complicity in this pain and suffering, mesmerised and 
yet completely immobilised?  Memorials of any kind are there to help one 
remember horrors that are too awful to contemplate, in a serene, highly organised, 
structured and controlled way.  Is Kentridge suggesting that the audience are 
somehow responsible for Harry‘s suffering, experienced in the ever-now?  With 
monuments, individuals want something that symbolises the horror — but 
simultaneously do not want to be confronted with the horror itself.  This is a 
monument reversed / inverted — a countermonument (cf. Coombes 2003; Young 
2003b).  It is unusual, extraordinary, unique and appalling all at once. 
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Figure 9.72 Drawing from Monument (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:56). 
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Figure 9.73 Drawing from Monument (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:53). 
 
Does one confront this living countermonument, or stop it —is one responsible, 
complicit, does one look away?  Is it all in the name of memory / remembrance?  
One does not have to remember the hardship experienced by the labourer 
because one is experiencing / seeing it firsthand. This recalls events in Germany 
and Poland during the liberation of the concentration and death camps in 1945.  
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Many of these camps were very close to German / Polish towns, but when 
townspeople were questioned afterwards about their knowledge of these camps 
everyone pleaded ignorance.  Enraged and disbelieving of this response — the 
soldiers of the American liberation army‘s insisted that every individual walk down 
to the camps to see the atrocities committed in the name of Hitler.  Documentaries 
show these individuals, lined up, person by person, looking at the multitudes of 
naked skeletal corpses of men, women and children.  They had to, in single file, 
walk though the camps and see the conditions of the camps, inhale the smell of 
decomposing bodies, and the smoke lingering from the chimneys where millions of 
people were cremated (they held tissues and handkerchiefs to their noses).  One 
wonders at the sense of remorse and guilt or responsibility that these onlookers 
experienced when confronted by the result of their denial and inactivity?  It appears 
as if Kentridge is attempting to achieve the same effect with Harry being pinioned 
alive.  He is making one confront not only the horror of apartheid, but also one‘s 
denial of apartheid and capitalist exploitation.  He is forcing the viewers to confront 
their condoning, justifications and contributions to apartheid and capitalist 
atrocities. Keeping in mind that this film was made during the apartheid era, 
Kentridge is presenting a challenge — see, remember, question, and act. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
In concluding this chapter, the reader is referred to Kentridge‘s film Shadow 
Procession (see Figure 9.74).  It presents the viewer with another fascinating 
example of Kentridge‘s use of the cityscape and how the city and an individual(s) 
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are entwined.  It begins with a fluid procession of cut-out / out-lined individuals 
faceless and displaced.  Melancholy music by Alfred Makgalemele accompanies 
the procession.  Their destination is not known — and this gives the procession a 
desolate, poignant feel.  These are the dislocated, the remnants of individuals 
fleeing from forced removals.  Bitterly sad and even macabre — for example there 
is a miner who is hanging from a noose (suicide at being forced to relocate, or 
murdered?) Others are overburdened with their only belongings, similar to Harry 
the Hobo‘s heavy load in the film Monument.  In the procession one individual is 
burdened with an entire neighbourhood, while another carries a city on his back.  
The associations are obvious; they are the victims of apartheid‘s ―apartheid‖ — 
demarcated land for townships, Bantustans.  Neighbourhoods such as the already 
mentioned Sophiatown and District Six are simply re-claimed at will by the rulers of 
the regime.  Pierre Nora, the French social historian, claims that “lieux de mémoire” 
or ―sites of memory‖ such as monuments, museums, festivals and archives 
amongst many ―are fundamentally remains, the ultimate embodiments of memorial 
consciousness that has barely survived in a historical age that calls out for memory 
because it has abandoned it‖ (1989:12; cf. Kugelmass 1996:199).  Similarly, Saul 
Friedländer, a psycho-historian, claims that there have been two divergent streams 
of thought in contemporary Western societies: the first is for a profusion of 
―deliberate evocations of the past‖ with the creation of museums, monuments and 
media productions.  By contrast, the second stream of thought acknowledges the 
increasing ―irrelevance of historical consciousness‖ in a new era that is 
predominantly ―post-historical‖ (Friedländer 1993:58-59; cf. Kugelmass 1996:199).  
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The commonality of these divergent points of view is contained in the cultural 
sphere of the commercial sector: the past is both ―pervasive and apparently 
irrelevant‖ (Friedländer 1993:58-59; cf. Kugelmass 1996:199).  For Kentridge the 
past is the ever-now, the perpetually present — he attempts to evoke the past 
through his works.  He attempts to capture remnants of the past history/ies of 
South Africa, Namibia, Ethiopia and Soviet Russia.  He focuses on memory and 
how it is layered into landscapes, cities and monuments.  He attempts to capture / 
freeze the very idea of memory/ies, yet his works simultaneously acknowledge the 
ephemerality and transience of the very concept of memory.  His drawings are 
sedimental; so too are the landscapes and the cities that he draws.  In Sobriety, 
Obesity & Growing Old, for example, Soho Eckstein‘s businesses and buildings 
collapse.  They are erased, imploded and then re-erected — residues of charcoal 
and assumed sediments of glass, concrete and steel are left behind.  Kentridge 
has not just portrayed the land in his films, stills and other productions, including 
his charcoal and pastel drawings aptly titled Colonial Landscapes (1995 — 1996; 
see Figure 9.75 and Figure 9.76); and others: Anti-Waste (1990); Spartan / Isando 
(1988); Urbanise (1988); Landscape with Pipe (1988). He has also marked the 
land physically.  In a collaborative art work with Danish artist Doris Bloom, they 
marked the landscape with a giant anatomical heart in white charcoal (an inversion 
of Kentridge‘s usual style of black / grey charcoal on white paper).  In another work 
they drew a gate with a metaphorical heart shape in the middle and set it alight.  
The title of the series stands for itself: Memory and Geography (see Figure 9.4 and 
Figure 9.77).  The second drawing was literally burnt into the landscape forever, 
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but not necessarily observable forever.  Both are monumental designs.  Both 
become actual, excavatable sediments.  Both were drawn, and then erased.  Only 
traces are left.  And, once again his theme of the body and the land as one is 
apparent.  In a video made of these art works there is footage of William Kentridge 
looking down from the helicopter which was flying over the art works.  It is almost 
identical to the image he drew of Felix Teitlebaum looking down at the city of 
Johannesburg in his film Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.74 Colour photograph of William Kentridge’s Johannesburg studio with 
bronze sculptures from the Procession series (2000) (Benezra, Boris, Cooke, Sitas 
and Cameron 2001:58). 
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 Figure 9.75 
Drawing from Colonial Landscapes (1995—1996) William Kentridge, charcoal and 
pastel on paper (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:177). 
 
Figure 9.76 Drawing from Colonial Landscapes (1995—1996) William Kentridge, 
charcoal and pastel on paper (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:179). 
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Figure 9.77 Colour aerial photograph of Memory and Geography (1995) William 
Kentridge (and Doris Bloom), multi-media project, Rome (Christov-Bakargiev 
1998:21). 
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION 
Theoretical and analytical sampling, as well as comparative analysis, have 
provided the means for this researcher to interpret Kentridge’s films in an 
inimitable way, affording new insight into the artist’s works. This thesis has 
explained how Kentridge has depicted various themes such as memory, 
identity, trauma, and guilt, within a specifically situated South African context.  
In addition, this study has highlighted the importance of Kentridge’s works in the 
way that he has represented historical and cultural phenomena, such as that of 
the brutal apartheid regime and its aftermath.  Through this research, the way in 
which Kentridge has provided astonishing and creative insight into and 
understanding of culturally and historically specific contexts has been brought to 
the fore. This study has also contributed to the understanding and meaning of 
Kentridge’s emergent themes and idiographic depictions of trauma, guilt, 
history, memory and identity in his Drawings for Projection animated film series.  
Thus, through connecting memory and trauma this thesis has also articulated 
how and why Kentridge portrays apartheid’s atrocities and its reverberations, 
surrealistically and ingeniously.  The films themselves are acknowledged as an 
important source of reference of South African society.  They are a 
documentation of the trauma and horror experienced during the height of 
apartheid. 
10.1 Contributions and limitations of the study  
As Chapter Two: Literature Review: William Kentridge (Part I) and Chapter 
Three: Literature Review: Theoretical (Part II) emphasise, there has clearly 
been a research gap of heretofore unexamined theoretical and analytical 
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analysis into the how and why of Kentridge’s portrayal of memory.  This doctoral 
study has addressed this gap, and in doing so has contributed to the field in 
three distinct and significant ways:  firstly, to the growing scholarship on William 
Kentridge’s artistic work; to a specifically South African perspective of the 
growing field of trauma studies; and lastly, to the apartheid and post-apartheid 
reflections on re-remembering and forgetting; memorialisation; forgiveness; and 
guilt. 
However, the study has not been without its challenges and limitations.  Most 
pointedly, the research design methodology as applied in this dissertation is 
mostly one of over-generalisation. The other limitation is that the sampling 
method was purposive. William Kentridge is a prolific artist working in artistic 
mediums of sculpture (bronze, paper, iron), plays, operas, still lifes, etchings, 
prints, and tapestries, to mention a few.  However it is the animated film series 
Drawings for Projection that was selected as the primary sample to be studied 
because: firstly, it is highly representative of his oeuvre; and secondly, because 
it directly correlates with events taking place in South Africa at the time of their 
creation, which provide reflective and reflexive elements to them.  For example, 
History of the Main Complaint was made during the year the TRC was 
instituted, while Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris and Mine and 
Monument were made during the height of apartheid, and during a State of 
Emergency. These films included both direct and indirect references to the 
political and socio-cultural events of their time.  However, references have been 
made to Kentridge’s other works, such as 7 Fragments for George Méliès; 
Black Box / Chambre Noir; Ubu Tells the Truth; and  Ubu and the Truth 
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Commission.  Still, the series is clearly demarcated and only allows for brief 
comparisons and references to his other artistic works.  This is predominantly 
because of time constraints, but also because the nine films that make up the 
Drawings for Projection series are a self-contained unit, specifically beginning in 
1989 (Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris) when the first film was 
made, and ending in 2003 when the last film was made (Tide Table). 
10.2 In summation 
William Kentridge’s charcoal, hand-drawn, animated film series Drawings for 
Projection was positioned at the beginning of this study as a dialectic of self and 
memory as embodied in a post-colonial South African setting.  The series 
spanned a period of time that documented the apartheid to post-apartheid to 
post post-apartheid eras. The central theme of Kentridge’s complex, unique 
Drawings for Projection series is that of memory: the representation of his own 
memories and those of others.  Using qualitative methodology, the study has 
substantiated this hypothesis by referencing certain seminal works.  For 
instance there is Marianne Hirsch’s concept of “postmemory” (1997) and 
Sigmund Freud’s theories of “screen memories” (1899b).  At the outset the 
thesis sought to understand the very concept of memory, relying on the 
psychoanalytic explanation of memory and the unconscious mind as explicated 
by Sigmund Freud.  The study progressed with the linking of memory to the 
many themes found within Kentridge’s series, such as: representation (of, for 
example apartheid violence and traumatic memory); time; space; history; 
identity; cities, land / landscapes / geography; violence; and memorials and 
memorialisation.  Further supporting the study’s hypothesis were comparative 
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analyses of Kentridge’s works with those of other artists such as Pascal Croci, 
art spiegelman (sic) and Anselm Kiefer.  These artists have also depicted 
memory — their own and others’ — of, for example, atrocities committed during 
the Holocaust. Throughout the study, and as peripheral support for this 
hypothesis, many references have also been made to Kentridge’s erstwhile 
works.  However, whilst concluding that William Kentridge’s series does indeed 
depict his own personal and artistic memorial to his relationship with South 
Africa, it in no way argues for a definitive critique of his work.  In keeping with 
Kentridge’s own theme of intertextuality, and in keeping with the researcher’s 
own world view, this thesis proffers only one interpretation, one methodological 
investigation among many. 
10.3 New / other Kentridge projects 
William Kentridge has continued to work prolifically since the final film (Tide 
Table 2003) in the Drawings for Projection series.  It would appear that this 
series, with its specifically South African setting, is now at an end, as Kentridge 
explores events and stories beyond South Africa’s borders; such as that of the 
Herero peoples in Black Box / Chambre Noir and The Magic Flute.  However, 
he continues to focus on his key themes of memory, history, time, landscape, 
guilt and responsibility. 
From 2001 to 2007, Kentridge created the designs for a series of seventeen 
tapestries.  These designs were created by fastening black paper cut-outs onto 
pages from books, usually colonial-era European atlases (Guercio 2008), a 
process that depicts the impact of history on the landscape.  There is also an 
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ongoing production of static images such as prints (Krut 2006) in addition to his 
animations and theatrical pieces. 
In 2003 Kentridge presented a new series of seven very short films entitled 7 
Fragments for Georges Méliès, dedicated to the late nineteenth century pioneer 
of cinematic special effects.  Using a mix of animated drawings and live-action 
film, they depict Kentridge himself interacting with the typical objects to be found 
in his studio.  These interactions are of the same surreal nature as the events in 
Méliès’ groundbreaking films.  Kentridge depicts himself not only as a live-
action, but also as an animated figure (sometimes being drawn by the live-
action figure), thereby exploring his identity as an artist in relation to his own 
work, particularly as regards the private creative landscape of his studio.  
Another short film from 2003, Day for Night, was filmed in an experimental 
manner by tracking the movements of ants congregating around sugar water, 
and then printing the negative of the resulting film.  The result is a constantly 
changing set of patterns composed of white dots (Alemani 2006).  In all these 
films one sees the private introspective side of Kentridge’s work — the 
landscapes of the mind that in Drawings for Projection are intertwined with his 
more public self. 
The year 2005 saw the premiere of Kentridge’s production of the Mozart opera, 
The Magic Flute.  Once again, projections of Kentridge’s animated drawings 
served as a backdrop for the production.  He also designed stage machinery to 
move performers and props across the stage (Law-Viljoen 2007b and 2007c).  
The production itself, with its imagery of light triumphing over darkness, is both 
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a presentation and a critique of the Enlightenment ideas of Mozart’s era (Law-
Viljoen 2007b and 2007c). 
In the process of planning this opera, Kentridge produced a number of model 
theatres depicting different stages of the performance.  These models in turn 
led to the creation of the multi-media installation, Black Box / Chambre Noir 
(2005) (Law-Viljoen 2007a).  This work features a mechanised puppet theatre 
production in a room with drawings on found paper hung on the walls.  The 
theatre production also incorporates live-action film and Kentridge’s animated 
drawings.  Its subject matter is the German colonial massacre of the Herero 
people of Namibia from 1904-1907, during which approximately sixty percent of 
all Herero were killed (Hoffman 2007).  Regarded as the first-ever genocide 
(Taylor 2008) it is, as Kentridge himself puts it, “now mostly forgotten, 
overshadowed by other German massacres and genocides later in the century” 
(Kentridge 2005:51).  Not only is this a reference to the Holocaust, but it makes 
it clear that memory and its associated themes are central to Black Box / 
Chambre Noir.  As Kentridge sees it, tragedies such as the Herero genocide are 
the final bitter fruit of the failed ideals of the Enlightenment.  In other words, they 
are the working out of the historical processes set in motion by colonialism 
(Law-Viljoen 2007a). 
Another Western atrocity in a part of Africa outside South Africa is the subject 
matter of the anamorphic film WHAT WILL COME (HAS ALREADY COME) 
(2007).  This film is concerned with the Italian bombing of Ethiopia with mustard 
gas in the mid 1930s, an atrocity that resulted in 30 000 deaths.  It experiments 
with the effects of reflection and distortion through the revolving projection of the 
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film onto a table, with a cylindrical mirror in its centre that then captures the 
image.  The repetitive effects created by this process (as well the title of the 
film) are a commentary on the repetitive nature of history (for example, the 
events depicted in this film could suggest contemporary events in Iraq) (Taylor 
2008).  In addition, the distorted perspectives of the film comment on the way in 
which one’s personal perspectives invariably distort one’s understanding of 
history. 
At the time of writing (2011) William Kentridge has just completed working on 
the Shostakovich opera The Nose, whose subject matter is the rise of Stalinism 
in the Soviet Union (Korenblat 2007).  Once again themes of totalitarianism and 
genocide come to the fore.  Other projects have been engendered by this work 
in progress, just as The Magic Flute gave rise to Black Box / Chambre Noir.  I 
am Not Me, the Horse is Not Mine (2008) is the title of two productions.  Firstly, 
it is the title of a multi-media lecture by Kentridge, accompanied by projections 
of drawings and animations from his work on The Nose (Korenblat 2007; 
McIlleron 2009).  Secondly, it is an installation displaying eight animated films.  
In addition, Kentridge has worked with the composer Francois Sarhan on a 
performance entitled Telegrams from the Nose (McIlleron 2009). 
 
10.4 Possible future projects for research 
There are many possible future projects with regard to Kentridge’s oeuvre, not 
only because he is so prolific, but because his intensely personal and public 
creations are layered with latent meanings, waiting to be explicated.  One such 
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element that this study lacked, for example, was a series of interviews with the 
artist.  Another project might involve an analysis using a post-colonial 
theoretical framework with the works of Edward Said, Franz Fanon and Homi K. 
Bhabha. 
 
10.5 Conclusion 
Of all the multifarious creations in William Kentridge’s body of work, with their 
complex intertwining strands of meaning, their mixture of playful humour and 
deep tragedy, their contrasting of the public / political with the intensely 
personal, it is the Drawings for Projection series that stands out as the 
centrepiece.  Spanning most of the artist’s career, it reflects his ever-changing 
inner world as that world responds to the outward circumstances of political 
change in South Africa.  The last film, Tide Table, depicts Kentridge’s presumed 
alter-ego, Soho / Felix, sitting immobile and asleep in a deckchair as the sea 
changes the world around him, sometimes taking life in the process (Alemani 
2006).  Does this reflect the artist’s own concern with his inability to change, his 
fear of his own aging and eventual death, or a fear of the stultification of his art 
— a lack of inspiration for future projects?  Or is Kentridge simply saying that 
this is the end of the series, and with it, the end of his intense focus on South 
Africa? Soho / Felix is perhaps not so much the artist’s alter-ego as it is that 
aspect of himself troubled by the history of South Africa and by his own 
memories of growing up under apartheid.  Kentridge is perhaps saying that he 
has taken these concerns, and with them the character of Soho / Felix, as far as 
they can go.  Apartheid and its immediate aftermath have receded and there is 
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no longer the same moral imperative to explore this subject matter repeatedly.  
South Africa has supplied Kentridge with his essential theme of memory and all 
that goes with it, and he is now free to examine this cluster of concepts as they 
manifest in other parts of Africa and the world.  It is not just that history repeats 
itself, but it repeats itself in diverse places.  What one has learnt from South 
Africa can be applied to other countries.  In the end, Soho / Felix perhaps 
reflects Drawings for Projection itself, now “fixed” in its final form as the whirling 
flux of history moves onwards.  This study ends with an insightful statement 
made by the award committee when Kentridge was presented with the Kyoto 
Prize in 2010, the first African to ever win this prestigious award.  The 
committee stated that Kentridge has created “a new contemporary vehicle of 
artistic expression within which various media fuse together in multiple ways” 
and praised him for his “deep insight and profound reflection on the nature of 
human existence” (cited in BLOUINARTINFO 2010).    
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